CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029000010020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 11, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Friday June 11, 1976 CI NIDC 76-137C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, June 11, 1976
The NID Cable is for t e purpose-off in-
forming senior US officials.
Syrian forces began an armor and infantry assault
last night against a Palestinian position on the outskirts of
Beirut, according to press reports. This followed a day of quiet
on the major Lebanese battle fronts.
Prior to the assault, fighting had been at a rela-
ive y low level, with clashes between Syrian and leftist forces
reported in Sidon but little military activity noted in Beirut
and Tripoli.
yrian armore units
leftist forces beat back an attempt by
o enter Sidon.
//Syria has strengthened its forces near Sidon with
new troops from Syria. Military authorities in Tel Aviv reported
yesterday that a mechanized brigade of the Syrian 7th Infantry
Division had entered Lebanon and was moving toward Sidon. Sup-
port vehicles of the division were seen entering Lebanon yester-
day by the US defense attache in Syria. This is the first firm
indication that Syria has begun to draw directly upon its forces
confronting Israel on the Golan Heights.//
//The US attache saw empty tank transporters moving
south from the capital. These probably will pick up armor from
one of the Syrian armored units along the Golan front for use
within Lebanon.//
//The introduction of the new unit into Lebanon
brings the total number of regular Syrian troops inside the
country to about 12,000, with another 5,000 or so in support
roles in adjacent border areas.//
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Potential Iraqi Role
Although a Syrian foreign ministry official said yes-
terday that he believed the Iraqis were only "showing off," Da-
mascus predictably is not giving Baghdad the benefit of the
doubt. Foreign Minister Khaddam yesterday informed Arab ambassa-
dors in Damascus that Syria would take "suitable measures" to 25X1
counter any Iraqi troop movements.
The Syrian Baath Party newspaper reported yesterday
that Damascus had replied to the recent Iraqi request that Syria
open its border to Iraqi troops by warning Baghdad against any
"provocation or act of aggression" in the border area.
Baghdad's press, quoting "informed sources," accused
Damascus of having reneged on its approval of the entry of Iraqi
forces into Syria during Libyan Prime'Minister Jallud's tour of
the area in mid-May. Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn, however, re-
iterated his earlier statement to the press that the deployment
,of Iraqi troops to Syria is conditional on Damascus' consent.
Cease-Fire Efforts
Libyan Prime Minister Jallud, meanwhile, continued his
efforts yesterday to work out acceptable terms for a cease-fire
in Beirut, and Arab League Secretary General Riyad visited Da-
mascus to make preliminary arrangements for the introduction of
the six-party Arab security force into Lebanon. After talks with
Syrian President Asad, Riyad announced that an Arab League mili-
tary mission would go to Damascus within the next two days for
detailed talks with Syrian officials.
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The Arab League delegation presumably will be led by
gyp ian chief of staff Fahmi, who is the assistant to the sec-
retary general for military affairs. Riyad yesterday instructed
Fahmi to begin forming the Arab force.
Actions taken by Riyad and Fahmi are likely to reflect
the wishes of Egyptian President Sadat, who will probably push
for the early commitment of a substantial force. This will be
opposed by Damascus; Asad has agreed to accept a symbolic force,
but will attempt to prevent the Arab unit from replacing or in-
terfering with Syrian forces already in Lebanon.
Asad preempted the Arab League before its session on
Tuesday by arranging for a Libyan-Algerian force to proceed im-
mediately to Syria. According to press reports, some Libyan and
Algerian troops may already have moved from Syria into Lebanon.
There are indications that the conservative Arabs are
unhappy that they were outmaneuvered, but they and Palestine Lib-
eration Organization chairman Yasir Arafat apparently decided
that their best strategy would simply be to add other Arab con-
tingents to the Algerian-Libyan team.
Arab, Israeli Reactions
Arab moderates apparently are concerned that Damascus,
despite is acceptance of the Arab League resolution, may try to
preserve a distinction between the Libyan-Algerian force and
what it calls the "symbolic" Arab force.
Syria's Baath Party newspaper, in an effort to mini-
mize the importance of the Arab League action, yesterday was
still referring to the cease-fire in Lebanon as a product of
'Libyan and Syrian mediation in Beirut, rather than as a result
of the Cairo meetings.
Damascus' success in eliciting from the Arab League
foreign ministers a declaration that the joint military force
will be used only "within the framework of Lebanon's sover-
eignty" provides Syria another way to restrict or even prevent
implementation of the League resolution. Syrian spokesmen have
insisted publicly that Lebanese approval is necessary before
any joint Arab force can be used.
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Lebanese President Franjiyah, who recently has been
cooperating closely with Damascus, has denounced the Arab League
resolutions, and leaders of the major Christian militias appar-
ently are following his lead. President-elect Sarkis, who is
more immediately responsive to Damascus, has said nothing.
Israeli defense and foreign ministry officials denied
reports yesterday that the Rabin government was revising its
hands-off policy toward Lebanon. According to one press report,
government sources indicated that Israel could accept a "sym-
bolic" Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon provided, as usual,
that it does not threaten Israel's security.
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A contingent of Cuban troops arrived in Havana from
Angola on Wednesday, according to a Yugoslav press report.
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T e size o e con-
tingent was not given; the press item sal only that the troops 25X1
were seen aboard a "column of buses" in Havana that afternoon.
Havana has not officially announced the arrival of the
troops noted by the Yugoslav press report. Cuba's large-scale
intervention in Angola has been an irritant in its relations
with Belgrade, and it is possible that the Cubans gave the story
to the local Yugoslav press representative to make sure the news
got back to Belgrade quickly.
Havana may have intended to use Belgrade's wire service
for nonaligned countries to disseminate the story rapidly in the
As the Italian election campaign heads into its final
week, debate is centering on three major issues: the Christian
Democrats' record in government, the future role of the Commu-
nist Party, and the sharp increase in politically motivated
violence.
The Christian Democrats are under attack from all sides.
The Communists are coupling their demand for participation in
the government with the charge that Italy's problems stem from
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30 years of "bad government" by the Christian Democrats. Most
of the Christian Democrats' previous coalition partners--the
Socialists in particular--cite Christian Democratic government
as the root cause of Italy's problems. The Christian Democrats
have responded by emphasizing the uncertainties that would ac-
company Communist entry into the government rather than defend-
ing the Christian Democratic record.
The Christian Democrats seem to have submerged their
internal differences in an effort to retain their position as
Italy's largest party.
Despite the Communists' insistence that no effective
government can be formed without them, there are signs that the
party will not press the issue unless it achieves massive gains.
the Communists
wou pre ter to remain out ot the government at least until af-
ter the US and West German elections this fall. Berlinguer is
reportedly open to an agreement under which the Communists would
support the government on specific programs--an idea pushed by
the Socialists and favored by some Christian Democratic leaders.//
The assassination in Genoa this week of the city's po-
litically conservative public prosecutor, presumably by left-
wing extremists, ensures that political violence will remain a
hot issue. All parties condemn the violence that has occurred
during the campaign but disagree over who is best qualified to
deal with it. The Christian Democrats portray themselves as the
only party able to maintain public order but the Communists
charge that the Christian Democrats, by virtue of their long
domination of the government and their stress on anti-communism
in the campaign, are to blame for the climate that encourages
violence.
The director of Italy's principal public opinion or-
ganization has reportedly concluded from his research that the
law-and-order issue now favors the Communists--a finding con-
sistent with other evidence that the Communists are increasingly
seen by the middle class as better guarantors of public order
than the Christian Democrats.
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One of Romanian President Ceausescu's closest
advisers, party secretary Stefan Andrei, will arrive in the US
on Sunday for a visit of about 10 days. //Andrei is the young-
est member of the party's political executive committee, which
is roughly equivalent to the Soviet Politburo.//
//Andrei has told US diplomats that he is car-
rying a message from Ceausescu to President Ford and that
Ceausescu has asked him to seek President Ford's views on "one
or two issues of major interest."//
The Romanian will arrive shortly after attending the
current preparatory session for the proposed European communist
party conference and briefing Ceausescu on the outcome. The tim-
ing of the visit illustrates Ceausescu's tactic of balancing Ro-
mania's contacts with the superpowers.
//Andrei has been party secretary for foreign
and interparty relations since April 1972. He is second only to
Ceausescu in the formulation of Romania's delicately balanced
foreign policy.//
//Since the death last January of party elder
statesman Emil Bodnaras, Andrei's credentials as a kind of "su-
per foreign minister" have been enhanced. He clearly outshines
Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu.//
//Andrei has drive and personality. Unlike others
around Ceausescu, he is willing to voice his opinions on selected
issues. He is impatient with protocol and small talk, and does
not like to waste time. His manner is crisp and no-nonsense,
sometimes even brusque, but he is able to turn on personal charm.//
//In recent years, Andrei has been an articulate
spokesman for Romania's maverick brand of national communism,
particularly at the preparatory talks for the European party
conference. For this reason, he is reportedly not well liked by
his Soviet and East. European counterparts, who find him tough
and even abrasive.//
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During his talks in Washington, Andrei can be expected
to deal directly with whatever topics arise. He will stress the
good state of US-Romanian. relations but probably will also voice
displeasure over the "spheres of influence" that Bucharest be-
lieves the two great powers want.
Andrei is likely to be somewhat defensive about Roma-
nia's record on emigration and the problem of divided families.
He will no doubt express his gratitude to the President for rec-
ommending to Congress that Romania continue to enjoy most-
favored-nation privileges, but will make clear that Bucharest
does not tolerate interference in its internal affairs.
Andrei will almost certainly be willing to discuss in
detail Soviet-Romanian relations. He is apt to discuss recent 25X1
Soviet pressures, including the ideological and historical at-
tacks that Romanians believe call into question the legitimacy
of the Romanian nation.
//For the first time in the MBFR negotiations, the
Soviets have provided some data on the strength of the Warsaw
Pact forces. The information appears to be incomplete, however,
despite a Soviet assertion that the "figures covered all catego-
ries of military servicemen."//
//The Soviet ambassador to the MBFR negotiations,
O leg Khlestov, said yesterday at a formal plenary session that
the Warsaw Pact overall force strength in the NATO Guidelines
Area--which includes East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia--
is 987,300 men, including 805,000 in the ground forces.//
//The Soviet ground force figure is 144,000 lower
,than the NATO estimate. It appears that the Soviets have ex-
cluded certain non-combat forces arid have used definitions of
forces that have not been accepted by the West. There has been
no agreement at the MBFR talks on which categories of forces
should be counted or on how to reconcile differences in the rel-
ative manpower strength of ground and air forces of the Warsaw
Pact and NATO.//
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//The Soviets may have:
--Counted the manning of Soviet units at less than the
strength that NATO claims they maintain.
--Excluded non-combat uniformed support personnel, such as
those assigned to academies and provincial staffs, which
are included in the Western figures.
--Defined ground and air force units by function rather
than by service designation. The Soviets, for example, want
to assign all territorial air defense personnel to the air
force, while NATO currently counts most of them as ground
forces.//
/According to NATO estimates, the Warsaw Pact
ground forces in the NATO Guidelines Area have about 160,000
more troops than NATO. The Soviets have not yet presented their
estimate of NATO strength, but it is likely that their data will
show a smaller disparity between Warsaw Pact and NATO ground
forces than do Western figures.//
//Current MBFR proposals from both sides call for
a reduction of US and Soviet forces during the first phase. All
other NATO and Warsaw Pact participants would be involved in
later reductions.//
//The US has contended that, because Warsaw Pact
torces in the NATO Guidelines Area are larger than NATO's, there
should be an asymmetrical reduction leading to a common ceiling
of about 700,000 for the ground forces of each side.//
//The Soviets have insisted that there is already
an appropriate "correlation of forces" and that reduction should
be approximately equal. This approach has been a basic tenet of
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Libyan President Qadhafi has launched a major new
effort to increase the size of the Libyan armed forces, according
to the US embassy in Tripoli. Processing of eligible draftees
is said to be under way, and the first call-ups are expected in
the next two weeks.
Qadhafi's efforts to build up a large 25X1
volunteer army have been frustrated because of the small popula-
tion base on which to draw--about 2.5 million--and a general lack
of interest on the part of eligible males.//
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Qadhafi has been planning for some time to expand the
armed forces to man his growing stocks of Soviet and West Euro-
pean weaponry. At present, the Libyans do not have enough
trained manpower to operate much of the equipment.
(Even a plan limited to the conscription of government
workers is likely to have a severe impact on Libya's economy,
which already suffers from a serious shortage of skilled man-
power.
According to the US embassy, at least two branch banks
have already been closed because their staffs are to be drafted,
and Qadhafi has been besieged with pleas for exceptions from
cabinet ministers and department heads fearful that their of-
fices will cease to function. The draft would involve almost
20 percent of the Libyan bureaucracy.
Libya's domestic labor force currently encompasses
less t an one quarter of the population, and a large proportion
of this force is illiterate and unskilled. Labor shortages have
been compensated for by a large foreign work force, which is
estimated to be roughly equal in size to Libya's.
Recently the economy has been adversely affected,
however, by the expulsion of about 30,000 Egyptian and Tunisian
workers and by continuing problems with the renewal of foreign
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Workers at two of Bolivia's major tin mining complexes
have begun an indefinite strike to protest the state of siege
declared on Wednesday. There has been no violence thus far, and
the government's earlier precautions--arresting leaders of the
mineworkers' federation and using mainly experienced troops to
occupy the mining districts--will probably keep the lid on.
In other areas the occupied mines are quiet; one re-
port indicates that troops have withdrawn five kilometers (three
miles) from the mine complex at Huanuni following an accord with
the miners.
President Banzer originally declared the state of
siege to deal with a number of unrelated demonstrations through-
out the country. Banzer may be taking advantage of these dispa-
rate disturbances to move against the militant miners who were
threatening a crippling national strike over wage increases.
Banzer has canceled a trip to Panama, but the govern-
ment appears in control of the situation.
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