NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029300010028-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: September 17, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Friday September 17, 1976 CI NIDC 76-219C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, September 17, 1976.
T e NID Cable is for the purpose ot intorming
senior US officials.
LEBANON: Situation Report
RHODESIA - SOUTH AFRICA: Situation Report
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LEBANON: Situation Report
The talks involving Syrian, Palestinian, and Lebanese
represen atives, which were proposed by Arab League mediator
al-Khuli, begin today in Shaturah, a Lebanese town under Syrian
control.
would cover the terms of a new cease-fire, a timetable for the
application of the restrictive Cairo accords, and the with-
drawal of Palestinian forces from the Mount Lebanon area.
Camille Shamun, speaking in his new capacity as act-
ing prime minister, indicated yesterday that the negotiations
J//The negotiating mandate of Lebanese presi-
en -e ect Sar is, who will represent the Christian side, is
likely to be highly circumscribed by Shamun and President Fran-
jiyah. Shamun, insisted yesterday that the Palestinians would
have to withdraw from "all fronts-"-F-
//The talks today probably will be only prelimi-
nary; Sarkis flies to Cairo tomorrow to meet with President
Sadat. Sarkis, like Christian Phalanges leader Jumayyil--who
was in Cairo earlier this week--is likely to urge Sadat to en-
courage the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists to negotiate in
good faith and to make a plea for the Egyptians to patch up
their quarrel with the Syrians in order to facilitate an over-
all settlement to the Lebanese civil war. Sadat can be expected
to urge Sarkis to seek a Syrian withdrawal at the earliest pos-
sible date.//
I IPresident Franjiyah's cabinet shuffle continues to
raw angry denounciations from Lebanese Muslims. The pro-left-
ist radio in Beirut yesterday accused the President of strip-
ping Muslim Prime Minister Karami of most of his power in order
to promote partition and obstruct the transfer of constitu-
tional power to Sarkis.
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temporarily enhanced authority to implement measures that will
strengthen the position of their supporters in the new Sarkis
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government. By giving Shamun the defense portfolio, the two
men clearly hope to ensure the Maronites a dominant voice in
the reconstruction of the Lebanese army. This could place Sha-
mun at odds with the Syrians
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RHODESIA - SOUTH AFRICA: Situation Report
Rhodesian Front party has given Prime
//The rulin
g
Minister Smith a unanimous vote of confidence and "full backing
to negotiate" on behalf of the Rhodesian people, according to
press reports. There is no indication, however, that the party's
action, taken yesterday at its annual congress, reflects any
softening in the Smith government's position toward a settle-
ment with the black nationalists.//
I //Prior to the congress, right-wing members of the
party, who are opposed to any concessions to the blacks, report-
edly were unhappy with some government actions. The unanimous
backing given to Smith at the congress suggests that the right-
wingers are satisfied that the Prime Minister does not plan any
new moves toward a settlement.//
//Smith is expected to return to Pretoria this
weekend or more talks with South African Prime Minister Vor-
ster, and the Rhodesian Front's action may have been designed
to give Rhodesia the appearance of reasonableness in the face
of any pressure for new settlement talks.//
I I In South Africa, the latest round of work stoppages
and sca ered demonstrations has thus far not resulted in major
outbreaks of violence. The three-day work stoppage of black
workers in Soweto was highly successful; some three fourths of
the workers stayed away from their jobs in nearby Johannesburg.
Although there are conflicting reports regarding the
number o black deaths that occurred during the boycott, the
level of violence was far below that of the boycott last month.
Police seem to have helped reduce violence by using mass arrests
rather than relying on weapons to control the situation.
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I In Cape Town, a work boycott by coloreds (mulattos)
is sputtering along and scheduled to end today. The heaviest
absenteeism is reported among dock hands and small commercial
firms that employ only a few workers. There was a flurry of
mob violence last night but most services in the city continued
to operate. A school boycott by, nonwhite students that began on
Wednesday continued yesterday.
//Higher volumes and prices pushed non-communist
of i s in the first half of 1976 to a record $60.6 billion.
We expect the total cost for 1976 to reach $127 billion, 19
percent above the 1975 level.//
/Higher oil import volume accounted for more than
a_ the increase in oil bills. Non-communist imports were 27
million barrels per day, compared with 25 million barrels per
day in the first half of 1975. Because of the price hike im-
posed in September 1975 by the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries, the average price of imported oil in the
first half of 1976 was 9.5 percent above the level a year
earlier.//
I //Import volumes in the seven major industrial
countries--the US, UK, France, Italy, West Germany, Japan, and
Canada--in the first half of this year were roughly 8 percent
above levels a year earlier. US oil import volume jumped nearly
13 percent.//
//Net oil imports of non-OPEC developing countries
as a group grew to an estimated 3 million barrels per day in
the first half of 1976, up 10 percent from the first half of
1975. Import growth in the stronger economies such as South
Korea and Taiwan has been particularly rapid, running close
to 20 percent annually. Increasing oil production, primarily
in Mexico and Egypt, has kept the overall developing countries'
deficit from skyrocketing.//
//Despite the recent slackening in the pace of
economic recovery in several major countries, the volume of
the seven major industrial countries' imports in the second
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half of this year will be 11 percent above the pace for the
first half of 1976 and 17 percent above the average 1975 rate.
Stockpiling in anticipation of the expected December OPEC
price hike will account for some of the increase. We expect
imports by the small developed countries to rise by about 2
percent in the second half of 1976.//
//In 1977, the main determinant of the rise in
oil bills will be the price decision taken by OPEC oil mini-
sters at their December meeting. At the 1976 volume, each 1
percent change in the price of oil has a $1.3 billion effect
on non-communist countries' oil bill. If economic activity
continues to rise as expected in 1977, the oil import bill
could reach $152 billion.//
I
evenly distributed.//
/Even without a price hike, the US bill would
increase y roughly $6 billion in 1977 because of rising con-
sumption and declining production. A 15-percent OPEC price
rise would add $5 billion, bringing the oil import bill to
$44 billion next year, compared with $32 billion in 1976.//
//We expect the volume of Japanese oil imports to
increase 5 percent in 1977. A 15-percent rise would boost Ja-
pan's oil bill to roughly $28 billion next year, compared with
$23 billion in 1976.//
I //Britain's oil bill will fall substantially be-
cause o rapidly rising North Sea production. France and Italy,
which lack alternative energy sources, will import substantially
more oil next year. Import bills will likely rise by about $2.1
billion and $1.7 billion respectively. The West German bill
will rise by $2 billion.//
//Canada's net oil import bill will more than tri-
p e in ecause the expected 5 percent rise in oil demand
will have to be covered entirely by imports.//
//The expected $25 billion increase in oil bills
next year s ould not, of itself, prove an unmanageable burden
for the consuming countries. It will, however, exacerbate
existing economic problems for many.//
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//The increase in oil bills next year will not
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//The higher oil bills will intensify current ac-
count problems in some countries. Italy and France, after a-
chieving near balances in their current accounts last year,
have already seen their balances shift into the red. The ex-
pected oil price hike will also hit hard at the current ac-
counts of some countries such as Greece and Portugal, which
have experienced deficit problems over the last few years-
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