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December 16, 2016
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February 22, 2005
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December 2, 1976
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1 0 1 1 plj~gr Release 2005/06/09 NAAAE AB~`D~AD?DR~ ESS __-~ tom! ~~r ACTION APPROVAL COMMENT CONCURRENCE R~fUlA62@tS: DIRECT REPLY DISPATCH FILE INFDRMATfON RECOMMENOATION~ RETURN CIA-RDP79T00975A02960~Oap ~~cret (SecurOity Classification) 1 Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE Thursday December 2, 1976 CI NIDC 76-281C NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 25X1 Top Secret 25x1 (Security Cla sification 1 1 1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 25X1 gpproved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 25X1 Approved For Rel 25X1 25X1 National Intelli ence Dail Cable T e a e is or e purpose o in orming senior US o icials. MEXICO: Presidential Inaugural Speech RHODESIA: Guerrilla Delegation USSR: Yakubovsky Posts Vacant LIBYA-USSR: Qadhafi to Soviet Union Page 1 Page 2 Page 2 Page 5 25X1 25X6 Page 8 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 Approved Four Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T009~5A029600010004-9 MEXICO: Presidential Inaugural Speech Mexican President Lopez Portillo, sworn into office yester ay, devoted most of his inaugural address to economic policy, outlining measures needed to restore confidence in the government. In a moderate and businesslike way he indicated that he plans an orderly shift away from the expansionary fis- cal policies of his predecessor. On Tuesday, outgoing president Echeverria used his last full day in office to polish his populist image. He gave peasants titles to 445,000 hectares of land that had been ex- propriated in past years, and ordered a new expropriation of some 3,500 hectares to be split up into small plots for peas- ants' homes. In his inaugural speech, Lopez Portillo said that the ~ crisis in confidence was a danger to the economic and political future of the country. He warned that continued economic dis- order could cause domestic strife that would have to be dealt with by force. He said a period of austerity will be necessary, including import controls and cuts in government spending. The new President made clear that he viewed land dis- tribution as the wrong way to solve the urgent rural problem because peasants cannot produce efficiently on small parcels of land. These sentiments, in direct conflict with the expro- priations carried out by Echeverria, will be received well by conservatives, but will not assuage those landowners already affected by Echeverria's actions. Lopez Portillo will be under pressure to revoke the ~ expropriations, although any effort to reverse Echeverria's actions would risk a peasant uprising. Lopez Portillo's cabinet is composed of close asso- cia es with strong administrative records rather than well- known political figures, indicating that he will emphasize ad- ministrative efficiency rather than the olitical rhetoric that characterized Echeverria's years. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 Approved For Re RHODESIA: Guerrilla Delegation A black Rhodesian nationalist delegation from the i a we Peoples' Army will join the talks at Geneva today. Despite the organization'~~ initial assertion that its delega- tion would be an independent group at the conference, the dele- gates have now indicated ghat they will "strengthen" Robert Mugabe's group, the militant faction of the Zimbabwe African National Union. he delegation includes senior military commander Josiah Tongogara. and other representatives of the guerrillas who were part of Mugabe's dele ation durin first week of the talks. The Peoples' Army has been harshly critical of t e Geneva conference, and its leaders have taken a hard line on settlement terms. The presence of the military leaders at the conference, therefore, seems likel to cam licate to reach an agreement. 25X1 25X1 25X1 USSR: Yakubovsky Posts Vacant //The Soviet leadership will probably not allow e posts of first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces to remain vacant for very long.// //Marshal Yakubovsky, holder of those posts, whose ea- was announced yesterday, had been ill for some time. The Soviet leadership may have already decided on his successor at the time they appointed General Gribkov as chief of staff and first deputy commander of the Warsaw Pact forces. No announce- ment is likely until after Yakubovsky's funeral; one may be made when the Warsaw Pact defense ministers meet in Bulgaria next week.// Approved For Re ease - - 25X1 Approved For 25X1 //The new Warsaw Pact commander in chief will al- most cer ain y be a Soviet military officer, despite occasional Romania complaints about Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact command structure. Like Yakubovsky, the new commander will also become one of three first deputies under Soviet Minister of De- fense Ustinov. The others are Chief of the Soviet General Staff Kulikov, and General Sokolov, who appearslfo~/ave broad manager- t 25X1 se ial responsibilities at the ministry i //In the event of war, the Warsaw Pact commander would hold t e highest field command position in the Soviet armed forces and would receive his orders from the Supreme High Command through the General Staff.// 25X1 //In peacetime, th.e Warsaw Pact commander, in his role as first deputy, usually fills in for the Soviet minister of defense when the latter is absent. On a day-to-day basis, however, the chief of the General Staff may play a more impor- tant role in deciding policy matters or advising Minister of Defense Ustinov on various issues.// 25X1 //The Warsaw Pact commander is away from Moscow much of t e time, visiting the forces under his command in Eastern Europe or engaging in public relations activities that keep him in the limelight but away from meetings on important defense questions.// 25X1 //Any one of several high-ranking Soviet military leaders cou d be in the runnin for Yakubavsk 's ost but the 25X1 name mentioned most frequently is General Ogarkov. He is a deputy minis er o e ense, an we believe he may be working on systems analysis of Soviet defense needs.// 25X1 //Ogarkov has recently been seen with Minister of Defense Ustinov on several occasions, and we assume he advises Ustinov on day-to-day matters. Ogarkov may in fact be needed too much in his present post to be reassigned just now.// 25X1 //Kulikov is another possibility. His appointment would forma y be a move upward for him, but it would remove him somewhat from the center of decision making on defense mat- ld make less ters. It would put him in a position where he cou trouble for Ustinov, with whom 25X1 ~~ he has been at odds.// 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 Approved For 25X1 //Such a move could be interpreted as re ti p para on or t e defense minister's job in the event that post is re- turned to a professional officer after Ustinov leaves. It might also enable Ustinov to move Ogarkov, a former first deputy chief of the General Staff, into Kulikov's present position, where he would be more closely involved with the defense min- ister and all aspects of military planning.// //Other candidates for the top post in the Wars ac command Forces in Ge aw include generals Ivanovsky, commander of the Soviet rmany; and Petrov, first de ut commander of the Soviet ground forces. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005 6 - - Approved For Rel LIBYA-USSR: Qadhafi to Soviet Union Li ya, t e Soviets would probably be willing to provide Libya with some additional military equipment on a cash basis, de- spite the fact that the Libyans have no real need for more hardware even if their armed forces are expanded as planned. Libya alread has more militar e ui ment than its armed forces can absorb e es ima e e va ue o a t e equipmen e were an ye o come to be about $730 million.// Qadhafi pushed through a recent "people's congress" in repo i a resolution that gave unusually high praise to the Soviets' "historic friendship" with Libya and noted that such ties must be strengthened to serve the cause of development in Libya. Rumors circulating in Tripoli that Libya and the USSR wi sign a friendship treaty during Qadhafi's visit are probably unfounded. Although Qadhafi has recently been moving 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Libyan President Qadhafi will visit the USSR this ~In the hopes of increasing their influence in Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 25X1 Approved For toward warmer ties with the USSR, he remains deeply suspicious of the Soviets and is unlikely to commit himself to the tangi- ble and symbolic ties that a friendship treaty implies. 25X1 Qadhafi has consistently refused to grant the Soviets ase rig is in Libya or even permission far naval visits, and Soviet military advisers have not been allowed to work with Libyan ground units. 25X1 25X1 25X6 The Soviets, for their part, would no doubt be par- icu ar y wary of concluding a treaty with Libya. An alliance with Qadhafi would not improve Soviet stature among the Arab states, although it would cause deep concern in Egypt. and they would be hesitant, after the embarrassment of Egypt's The Soviets know Qadhafi's erratic nature, moreover, abrogation early this year of its friendship treaty with the USSR, to run the high risk of having another treaty annulled. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 25X6 gpproved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 Approved For R~ 25X1 25X6 25X1 25X1 25X1 CHILE-PERU-BOLIVIA: Corridor to the Sea Chile's blunt rejection of a Peruvian formula for prove ing Bolivia with a corridor to the sea seems to set the stage for a deadlock that could get the US involved in the long-festering dispute. Chile had earlier offered to grant Bolivia exclusive sovereignty in a corridor on the Chilean side of the present Chile -Peru border. The Peruvian counterformula called for tri- partite control in part of the corridor. Chile asserts that the Peruvian initiative represents a c ear and manifest modification" of Chilean sovereignty as established by a 1929 treaty. Chile argues that Peru's preroga- tives under the treaty are limited to approving or rejecting Chilean plans involving disposition of the territory, which Chile conquered from Peru about a century ago. 25X1 If the two sides are unable to come to terms, the US may ecome involved under a provision of the 1929 treaty that refers any dispute over interpretation of the treaty to the US president. 25X1 25X1 week, before Chile's rejection, that if Chile and Bolivia re- jected Peru's counterproposal, the situation would return to "point zero." An official response to Chile on November 26, however, implied that Peru is still willing to talk. Peruvian Foreign Minister de la Puente announced last 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A02 - pproved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9 Top ecret (Security Classification) Top Secret (Security Classification) Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9