NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 3, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Friday December 3, 1976 CI NIDC 76-282C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, December 3, 1976
The NID Cable is tor e purp
ose
informing
senior officials.
CHINA: New Foreign Minister
Page 1
RHODESIA: Guerrilla Activity
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THAILAND: Relations with Neighbors
Page 3
FRANCE: New Gaullist Leader
Page 4
OPEC:
Re
cent Developments
Page 6
FRANCE:
Communist Socialist Alliance
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I
Page 11
POLAND:
Personnel Changes
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CHINA: New Foreign minister
The standing committee of the National People's Con-
gress, China's legislature, announced only one major personnel
decision when it ended its three-day session yesterday.
Former Chinese ambassador to the UN Huang Hua, who
was recalled to Peking a few days ago, has replaced Chiao
Kuan-hua as foreign minister. Huang is one of China's most
seasoned diplomats and played an important role in the early
stages of China's opening to the US. His appointment suggests
that Peking does not plan any major departures from its current
foreign policy line. In fact, the announcement of the close of
the session included a reference to continuation of Mao's
revolutionary line on foreign affairs, a codeword for the opening
to the US.
The removal of former foreign minister Chiao Kuan-hua
I 1 was apparently based on his domestic political attitude--he
evidently was too strident in his criticism of ousted vice
premier Teng Hsiao-ping--rather than on any unhappiness with
his conduct of foreign policy.
I I The standing committee decided on other appointments
to and removals from important government positions, but none
was announced. These probably included the formal removal of
the ousted leftist leader Chang Chun-chiao from his job as vice
premier and the naming of new ministers of culture, education,
and coal.
I I The meeting did not name a new premier. Party chair-
man Hua uo-feng continues to hold that title, and the leading
candidate for the post, Li Hsien-nien, was identified as a vice
premier. It is possible that strong supporters of former vice
premier Teng Hsiao-ping--perhaps among them Defense Minister
Yeh Chien-ying, the second most powerful man in China--are
advocating that the job be kept in Hua's hands until Teng can
be "rehabilitated" and step into it.
Other than the opening speech by Politburo member Wu
Te, none of the speeches or announcements made at the session
referred to the need to continue to criticize Teng. His re-
habilitation does not seem likely to occur soon but is a
strong possibility over the longer term.
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There was no announcement of a new chairman of the
National People's Congress, a position that is equivalent to
head of state. Filling this post could be a contentious issue.
There are signs that some in the leadership, possibly led by
ambitious military leader Chen Hsi-lien, would like Defense
Minister Yeh Chien-ying to move up to the chairman's job,
leaving the defense portfolio to Chen.
I I Yeh probably does not want to relinquish his control
over the army. He and others in the leadership probably would
prefer that the chairmanship go to Wu Te, a civilian and lead-
ing candidate for the job. Wu, however, continues to be
identified as a vice chairman.
sis en
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treatment of Chairman Hua and Yeh as separate from the others in
attendance. Hua and Yeh were bracketed together several times
in speeches and announcements connected with the session.
An unusual feature of the session was the con ' t
R contained a good deal of this--was however
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The press treatment of the two as almost equals is
an indication of Yeh's importance and suggests that Hua shares
some power with him. Adulation of a top leader--and the reports
on the meet'
HODESIA: RHODESIA: Guerrilla Activity
25X1 The raids have destroyed sizable quantities of muni-
s, demonstrated the vulnerability of both the guerrilla
camps and their Mozambican defenders, and probably forced the
insurgents to move back from the border. The Rhodesian security
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forces have also retaliated in force against Mozambican military
units that initiated border actions; in at least one case, the
Rhodesians used jet fighters.
Inside Rhodesia, the security forces have apparently
tracked down numerous guerrilla bands, including many infiltrat-
ing for the first time. Nearly 250 guerrillas were killed last
month, according to Rhodesian communiques. The weaknesses in
the guerrillas' military training were evident. The insurgents
have also been hampered by factional fighting at camps inside
Rhodesia.
4Although the Rhodesian security forces apparently in-
tend to keep up the pressure on the guerrillas, the insurgents
will probably make a stronger showing in the weeks ahead. The
heavy rains are beginning to provide significantly improved veg-
etation cover. Moreover, the guerrillas' ranks will be swelled
as more black Rhodesians recruited over the past year become
THAILAND: Relations with Neighbors
I Prospects for improved relations between Thailand
an i s Indochinese neighbors suffered a significant setback
with the military takeover in Bangkok on October 6.
I IThe anti-communist, and specifically anti-Vietnamese,
oric of the new Thai leaders, especially Prime Minister
Thanin, sparked a vitriolic response from Hanoi that has con-
tinued unabated. Vietnam continues to express concern that the
return to military control will lead to a return of US military
forces to Thailand, although the thrust of Vietnamese complaints
in recent weeks has been the alleged mistreatment of Vietnam-
ese residents and refugees in Thailand.
I uIn spite of its rhetoric, however, the Thai leader-
ship has moved fairly quickly to try to halt the deterioration
in relations.i
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I Hanoi's reaction has been discouraging for Bangkok.
There sti. l has been no answer to Thailand's diplomatic note
on the August agreements, and the Thai offer to send a delega-
tion to Hanoi to discuss the question of technical overflights--
an issue that has been dragging on for several months--was
turned down. Hanoi's excuse was that the Vietnamese are too
busy preparing for a party congress this month.
I IThis may be true. Once the party congress is over,
the Vietnamese may respond more positively to Thailand's ges-
tures. Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong has reaffirmed
to foreign diplomats Vietnam's desire for normal relations with
Thailand. There may be further delays, however, before the
Vietnamese come around to a more reasonable exchange on out-
standing practical issues.
I Some of the basic issues that have long plagued Viet-
nam- ai relations--such as the repatriation of the Vietnamese
in Thailand--are not likely to be resolved in the next few years
and will be a continuing source of tension. In the meantime,
the Thai government may come under pressure from those who see
such conciliatory gestures as demeaning, especially when the
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25X1 A revived Gaullist party, elated by its success in
the French by-elections last month, will elect Jacques Chirac
as its president at a special convention on Sunday.
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The dynamic and ambitious former prime minister will
then be a rival to President Giscard for leadership of the
center-right, although both deny they are competitors. Giscard's
popularity is at an all-time low, and the Gaullists are finding
they have less and less in common with his policies.
I I The Gaullists have, for example, recently resisted
Giscard s efforts to push for ratification of the EC plan for
direct elections to the European Parliament. They have also
rejected his choice for a single progovernment candidate for
Paris' first election of a mayor next spring.
I The Gaullists view the by-elections as a per-
sonal success for Chirac and a defeat for Giscard's Indepen-
dent Republicans, who lost two out of the three seats they cam-
paigned for and only narrowly captured the third. The Gaullists
see this as proof that Chirac's strategy of direct confronta-
tion with the left has more election potential than Giscard's
unsuccessful attempts to win over certain leftists.
The Gaullists are on the verge of an extensive re-
structuring of their party at Chirac's behest. Although some
of the Gaullist "barons" have reservations about Chirac's plans,
only former prime minister Jacques Chaban-Delmas has set him-
self up in complete opposition. Other "barons" disagree with
some of the details but will probably go along.
Partisans of Chirac's reforms dominate more than
half of the party federations, and the convention is likely
simply to ratify reforms--including a change of name and the
replacement of the old executive bureau--that have already been
agreed upon.
Although Chirac's emergence as the new Gaullist
leader will influence election maneuvering and introduce a new
fluidity into French politics, the majority parties still have
a common desire to defeat the left in the 1978 legislative elec-
tion. There will be a strong trend toward polarization of the
right as Chirac strives to attract new voters and assure the
primacy of his party within the governing majority. An abrupt
break is unlikely before the election.
I
by the weakness of the other two members of his alliance--the
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Giscard's "presidential majority" is also troubled
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centrists and the Radical Socialists. Both have been hard hit
by their poor performance in the elections, by the President's
declining popularity, and by the emergence of Chirac. Although
.they have been talking of "asserting their own identity" within
the majority, they will have trouble regaining enough momentum
OPEC: Recent Developments
//At its meeting in late November, the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries' Economic Commission
Board failed to come up with a concrete oil price recommenda-
tion for the oil ministers' conference in Doha, Qatar, later
//The oil ministers' meeting, still officially set
0 open on ecember 15, probably will be postponed for five days
to avoid conflict with the ministerial session of the Confer-
ence on International Economic Cooperation scheduled to begin
in Paris on December 15. The temporary delay would afford sev-
eral oil ministers the opportunity to attend the CIEC and as-
sess concessions by developed countries before deciding on the
oil price increase. The delay would also avoid making CIEC a
forum for criticism of an OPEC price decision.//
//If the Paris meeting is postponed until early
next year, as nas been advocated by some participants, OPEC
will undoubtedly go ahead with its Doha session. The ministers
are obligated under the terms of the OPEC charter to hold a
meeting at about this time, other business is on the agenda,
and OPEC members would not want to offend Qatar, the host coun-
try.//
25X1 //The oil ministers must vote on a successor to
ecretary General Feyide of Nigeria, whose term expires this
month. The new secretary general, who will serve a two-year
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term, may be given more advisory powers and greater authority
over working-level substantive activities under a reorganiza-
tion plan that is being considered.//
//Under the informal rotational system, Ecuador
would be in line to nominate one of its nationals as secretary
general. It might select Petroleum Minister Vargas. Qatar, which
previously passed its turn, also wants to name a candidate. It
might choose Ali Jaydah, Qatar's delegate to the OPEC Board of
Governors.//
//In a November interview with the West German
magazine Der Spiegel, the Shah of Iran proposed a new variation
of his scheme to link oil prices to the price index of indus-
trial goods that Iran imports. He now is proposing a series of
bilateral indexing deals between Iran and the countries that
purchase its oil, with the expectation that other OPEC countries
would follow his lead.//
//The Shah's plan would distort crude and product
prices throughout the oil consuming countries because the in-
flation rates for their industrial exports to OPEC vary from
state to state.//
//The new scheme is more complex and less rational
than the Shah's previous proposal for a single index applicable
to both producers and consumers; that idea has met substantial
opposition from virtually all oil im ortin , and some oil ex-
porting, states.
I I The French Communist Party's mixed performance in
as month's legislative by-elections--in which the Socialist
Party fared much better--highlights the Communists' difficul-
ties in trying to expand their political base.
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IThe proportion of blue-collar workers--traditionally
the main source of Communist support--is gradually declining
in France, and the party lags far behind the Socialists in sup-
port from voters of other categories. Communist leaders have
decided that they must broaden the party's appeal just to re-
tain the 20 percent of the vote the party has won in the recent
past.
commitment to civil liberties and independence from Moscow.
In order to maintain tactical flexibility and to
so en - e break with past policy, party leader George Marchais
has used unofficial spokesmen to float some of the leadership's
more unorthodox ideas--for example, the proposition that French
participation in NATO could make the left's ultimate accession
to power in France "safer." In addition, the party gave its
candidates in the by-elections more freedom than it had ever
permitted before in the hope that this would convince French
voters that the Communists respect democratic practices.
I The new tactics have had mixed results. In the first
round ot the by-elections, the Communists held their own in
one district, gained four percentage points in another, and
lost almost as many points in each of the remaining five. It
was the Socialists, rather than the Communists, who attracted
most of the new voters and some voters from the center and
right.
I I In the two districts in which the Communists had
secon -round candidates, party discipline among the leftist
parties held and the Communists made a good showing. In fact,
the Communist candidate in the run-off in a Paris suburb at-
tracted more than the combined first-round votes of the left
and was only narrowly defeated. Although there were many local
factors responsible, the close result confirms the growth of
the party in some of the Paris suburbs--in part a result of the
exodus of working-class voters from the high-cost central city
area.
I As part of this effort, the party now emphasizes its
The party's election tactics have created problems
within the party itself. According to a recent US embassy anal-
ysis, party ideologists see in Marchais' tactics the danger
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that the party will lose its identity, draw away from its tra-
ditional working-class base, and become the kind of "catch-all"
party they believe the Socialists to be.
Marchais and his faction are in firm control now, and
his tactics appear to be successful in terms of membership. The
party has been attracting new members of agriculturally de-
pressed areas and in the suburbs of some of the larger cities.
Its claim to have almost a half million members is probably
not far from the truth.
I In most cases, however, the party is still getting
its members from traditional sources--workers or families with
a tradition of supporting the left--and adding strength in
areas where it is already in the majority. The new members tend
to be young, but they are also less disciplined and less re-
ceptive to orthodox Marxist ideology, and probably more fickle
in their voting.
I IThe party's new liberal line has not improved the
image of Marchais, who has never been popular. A recent poll
indicated that one year after frequent exposure to a noncom-
bative Marchais on television and in press conferences, more
than half of the French public still had an unfavorable impres-
sion of him--a slightly higher number than a year earlier.
I I Whether or not the new approach represents a genuine
evolution of French Communist views--40 to 50 percent of the
French public do not believe it does--the party will probably
continue its softer line in the period before the local elec-
tions next year and the legislative election in 1978.
It is unlikely that the party's election tactics will
ring -1 =anything more than a marginal number of new voters.
Just maintaining its strength in the face of both the Socialist
challenge and shifting sociological patterns may turn out to be
a considerable accomplishment. Even if their voting strength
declines, however, the Communists stand to increase their
participation in municipal governments through their alliance
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VENEZUELA: Oil Sales to Cuba
During his recent visit to Moscow, President Carlos
Andres erez concluded an agreement in principle with the USSR
for Venezuela to supply Cuba a small amount of its petroleum
needs.
Venezuela will initially sell Cuba 10,000 barrels per day
of crude oil, about 8 percent of Cuba's crude requirements; this
amount will eventually double.
I uIn return, the USSR will supply a similar amount of
petroleum to some of Venezuela's customers in Europe. The pro-
posed deal would reduce transportation costs for the USSR, which
would be able to shift to other uses a few of the 20 to 25 tank-
ers now in the Cuban trade.
Because of the difficulties in determining the per
I arre equivalence of Venezuelan and Soviet oil, it may be some
time before the agreement actually goes into effect. Inability
to overcome this problem scuttled a previous trilateral arrange-
ment among Mexico, the USSR, and Cuba. For Venezuela, the agree-
ment is largely a political gesture to both the USSR and Cuba.
It will receive no economic advantage in its trade relations
with either country.
I In Venezuela, the political impact of the arrangement
with e soviet Union will be minimal. The limited scope of the
arrangement--in comparison with earlier reports that the swap
would entail as much as 120,000 to 150,000 barrels per day of
Venezuelan crude--may cause some surprise.
Administration leaders will probably emphasize the
positive aspects of the agreement: the potential for increasing
Venezuelan influence in Cuba, diversification of Venezuela's
petroleum export market, and the enhancement of Venezuelan in-
fluence in the Caribbean region, an area that Venezuelan offi-
cials have come increasingly to regard as a natural sphere of
influence.
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POLAND: Personnel Changes
Personnel changes announced yesterday in Warsaw are
clearly intended to strengthen Gierek's hand in the party and
the party's control over the government. The announcement im-
mediately followed a central committee plenum and a session of
parliament.
Two Politburo members, Jan Szydlak and Jozef Kepa,
were name deputy premiers, auguring tighter party control over
the economic bureaucracies. These moves to pack the government
with proven party stalwarts probably reflect Gierek's reported
conclusion that economic technocrats had increasingly escaped
party control. He also blamed the technocrats in part for the
fiasco over price increases last June.
I iSzydlak will have to give up his position on the party
secretariat and Kepa his position as head of the Warsaw party
organization. In practical terms, however, the two men will be
well situated to use their status as Politburo members to improve
economic coordination and performance.
I Two new party secretaries were also announced. Stefan
stows i resigned his position as foreign minister to assume
the party position. This move appears to be a promotion. Alojzy
Karkoszka comes to the secretariat from the Council of Ministers
and will strengthen the party's direct control over investment.
Both men are compatible with Gierek. Emil Wojtasek, a career
diplomat, will be the new foreign minister.
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