NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010030-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 22, 2005
Sequence Number: 
30
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 17, 1976
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010030-0.pdf504.14 KB
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Air Air Air AV APP 2 RO Ad- r'wlease 2005,06109 FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. 25X1 25X1 Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE Friday December 17, 1976 CI NIDC 76-294C w NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 25X1 Top Secret 25X1 .'0 (Security n 'Jar 'A Approved For Release 2005/06/09 CCIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 AV Aff AV : CIA-RDP79T00975A02960T6033-ecret 33 (Security Classification) CONTROL NO. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Approved For kelease 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A0 National Intelligence Daily Cable for December 18, 1976. 25X1 25X1 senior o icia OPEC: Price Comp IRAQ-SYRIA: Mili ls. rom tar ise Reached y Moves Page 1 Page 3 CHINA: Personnel Changes USSR-OPEC: Tass Sympathetic Page 4 Page 5 25X1 MBFR: Negotiations FRANCE: Government Challenge POLAND: Domestic Critics P age 8 Page 9 Page 10 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010030-0 Approved For Rel - 010030-0 25X1 OPEC: Price Compromise Reached The oil ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries at their meeting in Doha were unable to agree to a single percentage on which to base an oil price. hike effective January 1. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates reportedly will confine the price rise on their crude oil to 5 percent. The other eleven OPEC members agreed to raise prices by 10 percent for six months, and consider another price hike in mid-1977. I The agreement--an interim arrangement to prevent a split in the oil cartel--evidently was adopted as a last re- sort once it became apparent that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were not prepared to compromise with other OPEC members. The divergence on pricing probably amounts to a test of wills that can be decided only by the market. If the Saudis' are insistent on a 5-percent increase for the cartel as a whole, they can bring on stream more than 2 million barrels per day in underutilized Saudi productive capacity in an ef- fort to depress the market of the other producers; this would make it extremely difficult for some of the others to maintain a 10-percent increase. In any case, we expect some softening of demand in early 7 as companies draw down excess stocks built up in anticipation of this price increase. This could reinforce the Saudi position. We expect the next few weeks to be a period of moderate instability for the cartel. The price position of Saudi Arabia coming into the OPEC ministers meeting and the subsequent walk-out by Saudi Oil Minister Yamani were a culmination of Saudi diplomatic ef- forts during the past two weeks. I I Yamani flew home on Thursday when it became apparent tnat a eadlock had developed on prices. He then returned to Doha, evidently with instructions from his government. These Saudi moves suggested to the other OPEC repre- sentatives that not much room existed for amicably achieving a sizable price increase immediately. A stalemate at Doha would have played into the hands of the Saudis and stretched out the current price freeze. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010030-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Approved Fo IRAQ-SYRIA: Military Moves Iraq is persisting in its efforts to weaken the re- gime of Syrian President Asad. Since the entry of Syrian regular troops in force into Lebanon in June, Iraq has tried to undercut Syria's effort to impose a settlement on the warring factions in Lebanon. Iraq infiltrated some 4,000 troops and Baath Party militiamen into Lebanon to support leftist and Palestinian forces against the Syrian army and tried to deter further Syrian military inter- vention by massing forces near the Syrian border. 25X1 25X1 We doubt Iraq's ability to form a credible anti-Syr- ian opposition front with the dissident exiles. A serious plot to bring down Asad would require the collaboration of the Syr- ian army, but Asad has thus far managed to curb dissident of- ficers and appears to retain the loyalty of key commanders. In view of Baghdad's unrelenting antagonism toward Damascus, how- ever, Iraq will continue to assign high priority to toppling Asad from power, no matter how slim the chances for success. I //Parallel with its effort to create a Syrian op- position front, Iraq is using terror and sabotage to create disturbances in Syria. Syria may already have retaliated in kind to i.scour- h age furt er Iraqi-instigated terrorist operations in Syria. Baghdad Radio charged that the explosion on Tuesday at Baghdad 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Approved For R$ airport, which killed three persons and wounded others, was the work of the Syrian rprr; n,A CHINA: Personnel Changes I I Major personnel changes are in the offing in China's finis ry of Foreign Affairs. Since the purge in early October of four Politburo members and the appointment this month of Huang Hua as minister, at least 19 Chinese ambassadors have left or have been scheduled to leave their overseas posts, many of them permanently. I I While no decisions have yet been announced, specula- ion among Chinese diplomats abroad centers on prospective re- assignment of two senior diplomats to posts in New York, Wash- ington, or Moscow. Ambassador to Japan Chen Chu is apparently slated to become China's permanent representative to the UN. Chen served in the UN as a deputy permanent representative under Huang Hua before going to Tokyo in 1973. Chen seems well suited to the assi nm t g en , which will give him ample opportunity to use his experience in dealing with the USSR. He had been head of the Soviet and East European affairs department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a min- ister to the Chinese embassy in Moscow in the late 1950s. I The other diplomat who reportedly will be transferred to a key post abroad is Ambassador to Canada Chang Wen-chin. Chang's years of intimate involvement in developing Sino-US re- lations as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and aide to Chou En-tai make him a fitting candidate to succeed Huang Chen, who has headed the liaison office in Washington since it opened in 1973 and could be due for reassignment. . 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release - Approved For 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 An alternative but less likely possibility is that Chan Wen-chin will go to the UN 25X1 an Chen Chu will return to MOSCOW. I I In either case, the appointments of Chang and Chen to posts ea ing with Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations would not signal changes in Chinese policy toward either Washington or Moscow. USSR-OPEC: Tass Sympathetic 25X1 Soviet media treatment of the meeting of the Organi- zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in. Qatar has been sympathetic to the call for a price increase for oil. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Tass wire service transmissions on Wednesday noted that crude oil prices have not changed for more than a year and that the real income of OPEC countries has dropped be- cause of the effects of inflation in the capitalist countries. Tass accused the US of putting pressure on the OPEC countries to prevent a decision on a price increase. Soviet radio broadcasts in Arabic have cited the "progressive" policies of such Soviet clients as Algeria, Iraq, and Libya to justify an increase. The Soviets accused Saudi Arabia, which called for a six-month freeze in oil prices, of working with the "imperialist forces," particularly the US. Higher oil prices will be a mixed blessing for the Soviets. On one hand, Soviet hard-currency earnings will rise because of the higher prices Moscow will be able to charge its European oil customers. There were reports that the Soviets were already holding back on new oil delivery contracts with some East European countries until a decision was reached in Qatar. feel the effects of any economic downturn in the West caused I On the other hand, the Soviets will be hurt by higher Arab of prices, although Soviet purchases from the OPEC coun- tries are relatively small. The Soviet trade balance will also by an increase in world oil prices. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010030-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Approved For 25X1 25X1 25X1 MBFR: Negotiations //The Western side at the force reduction talks in Vienna presented updated data on Western forces Wednesday, having reached an agreement with the French on exclusion of their forces from new Western figures.// 25X1 //Eastern representatives declined formal com- on e move until they have had an opportunity to study the data, but noted that the West's figures are at variance with Eastern estimates and do not include all Western forces in the reduction area.// 25X1 //The East, which presented figures on its forces for the first time last June, has been insisting on updated Western figures as a prerequisite for entering into detailed discussions of the existing balance of forces in Europe.// 25X1 //The present negotiating round ended day; talks will resume in late January. 25X1 Approve, or a ea 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A09600010030-0 25X1 FRANCE: Government Challenge French Prime Minister Barre seems determined to re- sist a oris demands for wage increases in 1977. He has said that these increases would seriously undermine the govern- ment's efforts to control inflation. Barre reportedly hopes to set a precedent for pri- vate-sector wage negotiations between labor and management by taking a hard line with public-sector unions in contract ne- gotiations early next year. In the last few years, the govern- ment has set a bad example for private sector employers by granting wage increases of over 15 percent to public employees. The public-sector negotiations will probably be delayed until March or April, when the government hopes the rate of infla- tion will have visibly declined. Barre has said wage restraint in 1977 is essential to improve corporate profitability--which has not fully re- covered from the recession--and thereby boost the still lag- ging rate of private investment. In effect, one goal of Barre's austerity program is a shift from consumption to investment by temporarily halting the usual. rapid increase in real wages. When Barre announced his austerity program in Sep- tember, he said wages should be allowed to increase next year only enough to offset inflation, which he anticipated at around 6.5 percent. Wages have been a key inflationary factor in re- cent years, rising at a rate of 15 to 20 percent annually. If prices should rise more than 6.5 percent in 1977, the govern- ment presumably would authorize additional compensating wage increases during the year. Barre's stance negates a clause added five years ago to some of the collective bargaining agreements in the public sector. That clause, in mining, gas, and electricity workers' contracts, guaranteed an automatic minimum 2 percent increase in real wages each year unless either side abrogated the agree- ments. In his recent book, President Giscard cited those collective bargaining agreements as a model for labor-manage- ment relations in the "advanced liberal society" he hopes to Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T009754 029600010030-0 create in France. Consequently, the government may indicate that it hopes to suspend the agreements only for 1977. Paris might also try to mollify the unions by offering a special bonus to workers, to be paid next year if the wage-price guide- lines are adhered to. I I Barre's intention will provoke many confrontations between he union and employers, both public and private, and between the government and left opposition parties. The result may well be a compromise economic situation that would favor neither side in the upcoming elections. The left would lack a clear target to campaign against, but at the same time the gov- erning parties would be denied the clear economic success that could revive their chances at the polls. Labor leaders have been calling sporadic strikes to protest the wage issue and other elements of the Barre plan for several weeks. Workers, who are concerned about job Security, have not turned out in the numbers anticipated by labor leaders. Strike participation has been greater, however, among the pub- lic-sector employees, of whom Barre now hopes to make an ex- ample. Aside from their economic motivations, the two major a or federations are militantly leftist and believe that the Giscard ov g ernment has shifted the burden of the austerity pro- gram and the nation's economic troubles unfairly onto the work- ers. These unions and the leftist politicians with whom they are in agreement plan to do what they can to emphasize these defects in the government's policies before the municipal elections in March and the legislative elections in 1978. They will not want to appear overly militant in this pre-election period, however. On the other hand, the government hopes to profit 1 e voters by maneuvering leftist unions and politicians into activities that will alienate voters. Its efforts in this regard in the public sector are complicated somewhat because the Force Ouvriere, a moderate labor federation, is sympa- thetic to the leftist protests for the first time in several years. It has staked its reputation on the continuation and effectiveness of the collective bargaining process. Approved For Release - Approved Fo Management, too, is skeptical about the Barre plan-- which in fact is not off to a good start. Despite Barre's price controls, inflation continued unabated in October and November at an 11 percent annual rate, and the trade deficit worsened considerably. Moreover, any OPEC oil price increase promises additional problems on both the inflation and trade fronts. In the face of all this, business optimism has taken an extraordinary plunge since spring. Businessmen now foresee a production downturn in the next few months and a further de- cline in their real investment spending in 1977. I The Polish regime has taken the case against its more outspoken domestic critics a step further. An article in the major party daily on December 13 for the first time names the Workers' Defense League as the chief anti-government group at home and abroad and attempts to undercut the League's claim to speak as a legitimate repre- sentative of the workers. I The party daily belittles the influence of the dis- si en s w o belong to the League, calling them only a dozen or so individuals whom the foreign press calls "intellectuals." The article asserts that such opponents of the regime enjoy the support of only scattered students and the "naive" trust of a few Western literary figures. I IThe article appears to be a thinly veiled effort by party o icials to sow discord and mistrust between the intel- lectual-based League and its adopted working constituency. There is no indication that party leader Gierek plans to move more decisively against the League at this time--a step that would only increase general antagonism against the regime. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010030-0 Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0 Top Secret (Security Classification) 0 0 Top Secret O,jff (Security Classification) -Approved For Release 2005/06/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29600010030-0