NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010038-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: December 22, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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pprgved For Release 00-5/06/0
Wednesday December 22, 1976 CI NIDC 76-298C
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National Intelli ence Daily Wednesday- D
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NiD a e is tor the purpose o in orming
e
senior U o icials.
CONTENTS
EGYPT-SYRIA-JORDAN: Relations Page 1
USSR-JAPAN: Relations Improving
LEBANON: Situation Report
USSR: Brezhnev's Birthday
SINGAPORE: Pre-election Report.
CHILE: Finance Minister Resigns
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Page 3
Page 5
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EGYPT-SYRIA-JORDAN: Relations
The plans for eventual unity between Egypt and Syria
announce yesterday following President Asad's four-day visit
to Cairo will probably never come to fruition. The announce-
ment, however, underscores--primarily for US and Israeli bene-
fit--the two sides' determination not to be divided again on
Middle East peace negotiating tactics.
Egypt and Syria in fact probably do not intend to
work toward a full merger. Their joint declaration on the sub-
ject and subsequent press conference statements by foreign
ministers Fahmi and Khaddam spoke of "relations of unity"
rather than of "union." Moreover, a separate communique issued
by presidents Sadat and Asad made only brief mention of the
unified political command to be established to lay the basis
for "unity."
I Although the political command is to establish com-
mittees to discuss integration of policies in the areas of de-
fense and national security, foreign affairs, financial and
economic affairs, education, and culture, it is likely that at
most the committees will serve as a framework for coordination
on key policy matters of mutual interest.
Neither Sadat nor Asad has any illusions about the
fate of past Arab unity schemes, and both would resist full
integration of policies. They are particularly interested now
in coordinating strategies for forthcoming peace negotiations
and in presenting a solid Arab front against Israel when talks
begin.
I ITheir various statements yesterday stressed the need
tor united Arab action as the only effective means of bringing
about progress in negotiations. The statements were clearly
intended to convey the message to Israel and the US that, de-
spite the bitter inter-Arab feuding of the past year, the
Arabs do not basically differ on strategy and will not in the
long run fall prey to Israel's openly stated policy of attempt-
ing to divide them on tactics.
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I I Asad and Sadat probably still harbor private suspi-
cions a out each other, and each no doubt views the unified
political command as a useful mechanism for keeping the other
in line.
This is particularly true of Asad, who almost cer-
tainly fears that Sadat, despite his disclaimers, could again
adopt an independent negotiating policy, as he did last year
in pursuit of the second Sinai agreement. Asad probably looks
on the joint command as a means of better ensuring that Sadat
will indeed coordinate policy and of preventing Sadat from
again moving too far ahead of Syria and the other Arabs.
ian negotiating policies as well.
trol over the Palestine Liberation Organization. He probably
sees the joint command as a way of maintaining some Egyptian
influence not only over the Palestinian movement but over Svr-
Sadat, for his part, has become increasingly con-
cerned over the last year about Asad's rising stature in the
Arab world and particularly about Syria's efforts to gain con-
USSR-JAPAN: Relations Improving
25X1 The USSR informed Japan late last week that it was
ready to schedule two economic meetings the Soviets had threat-
ened to postpone because of Japan's handling of the MIG-25 in-
cident.
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the problems for Japan.that result from the USSR's recent imposi-
tion of a 200-mile exclusive fisheries zone.
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The Soviets have also indicated, in an article in a
Tokyo newspaper, that they are willing to receive the new Japan-
ese foreign minister in the USSR.
The USSR sent two formal protest notes to the Japanese
government over the MIG-25 incident and ostentatiously refused
to exchange greetings on the 20th anniversary of the normaliza-
tion of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations in October. The
Soviets also seized an above-average number of Japanese fishing
boats in September and October for alleged violation of Soviet
territorial waters.
The Soviets were reluctant to carry out threats to
retaliate in other economic areas because Soviet-Japanese eco-
nomic cooperation benefits the USSR as much as it does Japan.
The Soviets, moreover, did not want to give China an advantage
with new Japanese leaders by prolonged remonstrances over the
MIG-25 affair.
LEBANON: Situation Report
I Fighting has once again broken out between pro-Syrian
and pro- ragi Palestinian groups in refugee camps near Beirut,
forcing units of the Arab peacekeeping forces to intervene. We
are not sure who started the fighting; Syria may have initiated
the conflict as a pretext for moving against the more extreme
fedayeen groups.
I I Clashes have also taken place between rival wings of
the extremist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -
General Command; one wing is generally pro-Syrian in orienta-
tion.
Members of the Syrian-controlled Saiqa fedayeen group
began re urning to Lebanon after Syria's intervention there was
blessed by the other Arab states at conferences in Riyadh and
Cairo in October. There have been several clashes since with
members of other fedayeen groups, particularly with the
"rejectionists" who, unlike the more moderate Fatah, did not
reconcile with Syria following the settlement.
I Little progress has been made on the major problem
plaguing the cease-fire--the collection of heavy weapons from
the combatants. The quadripartite committee--representatives of
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Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait charged with overseeing
the truce--has so far failed to agree on a course of action.
All the parties have been caching their weapons since the
cease-fire and have shown no disposition to hand them over
voluntarily.
I I Camille Shamun's National Liberal Party has made the
first c en gesture to initiate the handing in of heavy arms.
On Saturday, the party moved two armored cars, two armored per-
sonnel carriers, several artillery pieces, and some ammunition
to an assembly area in the mountains. A spokesman has made it
clear, however, that the party will turn no arms over to the
Lebanese government until the quadripartite committee has
adopted a definitive plan.
JThe Syrians have as yet made no effort to send peace-
eeping orces--either their own troops or those of some of the
other countries minimally involved in the peacekeeping effort--
to southern Lebanon, where the Palestinians have considerable
freedom of activity. The border has nevertheless been generally
quiet in recent days, although some shelling activity has taken
place. On Monday, Israeli gunboats chasing a ship that was
trying to deliver supplies to the leftist-held port of Tyre was
fired on from leftist positions near the coast.
The Syrians, meanwhile, also have begun to silence
some of their more vocal critics among Lebanon's traditionally
freewheeling press. Syrian troops on December 15 occupied the
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offices of three papers subsidized by Iraq. In the next few
days, four more papers--two of them widely respected indepen-
dents--were closed, possibly in reaction to their condemnation
of the initial Syrian move.
The Syrians may have acted to try to force the Lebanese
government to inaugurate press censorship, something the Sarkis
government itself has been considering. Steps recently have
been taken to bring the government-owned radio and television
under the control of the Ministry of Information, and Sarkis
had been pressing the media to come up with a system of self-
censorship. If the government asks for emergency powers, it may
move to regulate the pres as well as establish broad security
measures.
USSR: Brezhnev's Birthday
The celebration of General Secretary Brezhnev's 70th
bit ay last weekend boosted his prestige--if not his author-
ity--as the top Soviet leader and as the major figure in the
world communist movement. The outpouring of personal praise
and honors also took note of his status as a military commander.
Beneath it all, however, there were signs of an effort to keep
Brezhnev's cult of personality under control.
ddition to the medals bestowed by the East Eu-
T
i a
ropean leaders, Brezhnev received from the Soviet party and the
state another Order of Lenin, the title Hero of the Soviet
Union for the second time, and a ceremonial sword embossed with
the state seal. Tass commented that the sword was presented to
"Marshal Brezhnev" in recognition of his services in strength-
ening the nation's defensive might; some observers believe the
award is a revival of a distinction that was conferred upon
old Bolsheviks during the early days of Soviet power.
Brezhnev responded with calculated modesty border-
ing on umility; he said he is not one "whose head can reel
ted to characterize himself as a common
d attem
i
p
se an
from pra
man. He carefully accepted the awards in the name of the Soviet
party and seemed to be trying to link his name directly with
the party as a whole. Brezhnev made no mention of collective
leadership and referred to the Politburo and Central Committee
only once, when he pledged that their members would continue
to work toward communist goals.
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Party Secretary Mikhail Suslov, the keynote s
eake
p
r
at the Kremlin reception, sought to introduce a note of collec-
tivity into the otherwise one-man show. He produced necessary
laudatory rhetoric but underlined Brezhnev's role as servant
of the party and its Central Committee.
Suslov pointed out that the party had entrusted Brezh-
nev wit his job and that the Soviet people saw in him the
embodiment of the party's collective reason and will. He may
have made his most telling point when he praised Brezhnev as
a man able to listen to the opinions of his comrades.
I The proceedings in Moscow were echoed in the prov-
inces, w ere regional party leaders outdid each other in their
accolades.
Congratulatory messages were received from all over
e world, although China ignored the affair. There was one
seeming oddity--North Korean President Kim Il-song announced
that he was awarding Brezhnev the Order of the State Banner,
1st Class. Relations between North Korea and the USSR have been
SINGAPORE: Pre-election Report
Singapore's voters will elect a new parliament to-
morrow. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's ruling party is likely
to win handily, but some local observers are saying that the
opposition may win some representation in parliament for the
first time in many years.
I IThe absence of opposition candidates for 16 of the
seats virtually assures Lee's victory. The parliament was
dissolved on December 6, and the unorganized opposition given
two weeks to get ready for the election.
There are. no serious issues in the election
alth
h
,
oug
ere is some concern that slower economic
rowth ma
t
g
y no
Sus-
tain the prosperity that Singapore's nearly 2.5 million resi-
dents now enjoy. This concern is not sufficiently serious to
threaten Lee or his party, but it will reinforce the Prime Min-
ister's policy of placing more specialists and "technocrats"
in the government whose expertise can guide the nation's growth.
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During the brief campaign, some discussion has emerged
I i
about a successor for Lee. While Lee's leadership is unchal-
lenged, there is some worry that if he should suddenly depart
the scene, Singapore's political stability could be seriously
jeopardized. Lee may provide some clues in the coming months
on his plans for succession in order to allay this concern.
CHILE: Finance Minister Resigns
JThe resignation of Chilean Finance Minister Jorge
Cauas, e architect of the junta's economic recovery program,
is not likely to bring a major shift in policy. His successor,
Sergio de Castro, who is serving as economy minister, is a
capable professional and a strong proponent of foreign invest-
ment to rebuild the Chilean economy.
who has occupied the post since July 1974, was
Cauas
,
given a road mandate in April 1975 by President Pinochet to
push through austerity measures. The program has been criticized
by ranking military officials and others who believe it entailed
too high a social cost, but Pinochet continued to back Cauas.
After his resignation, Cauas was named ambassador to
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