NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029700010048-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: January 29, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGERQE DALL CABLE
Saturday January 29, 1977 CG NIDC 77-023C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday
January 29, 1977.
e NIV Ca le is or the purpose o i n arming
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
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SPAIN: Dealing with Terrorism
FRANCE: Nuclear Cooperation
GUYANA-CUBA: Arming the Militia
CANADA-BRAZIL: Broadening Contacts
ROMANIA: Personnel Changes
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SPAIN: Dealing with Terrorism
The Spanish government last night suspended portions
of the constitution for one month after gunmen killed three
policemen in the Madrid suburbs.
The suspension will allow police to search homes
without warrants and to hold suspects indefinitely. It was an-
nounced following an emergency cabinet meeting called by Prime
Minister Suarez last night. The new measures follow tough search
and arrest powers already granted police on Wednesday. Suarez
plans to address the nation today.
Earlier yesterday, all police and civil guards were
mobilize , roadblocks were set up around the capital, and spe-
cial units were sent to airport and railroad terminals to check
all departing passengers in a search for the suspected terror-
ists.
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t e terrorist attacks were aimed at producing a climate of fear
and a lack of confidence in the authorities. The ministry as-
sured listeners that the government and police remain in con-
trol.
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Apparently the government still does not know whether
yesterday's assailants were leftists or rightists. It issued a
blanket warrant for the arrest of all political "extremists"
for questioning. In spite of the government's evenhanded treat-
ment of the political factions, speculation continues concern-
ing the reliability of the police, who in the past have been
accused of having close ties with rightist terrorists.
Government authorities, who have been in close touch
with leaders of the political opposition, yesterday advised
them to close their offices to guard against a recurrence of
the right-wing attack on Monday in which four Communist lawyers
were killed.
I The latest attacks appear calculated to sow fear and
doubt an cripple the government's efforts toward democratiza-
tion. The new attacks have aggravated the already tense situa-
tion and spurred additional demands for the government to end
the killing.
The vast majority of the Spanish people, including
the Communists and other opposition parties, want to maintain
law and order. For the present, at least, they are likely to
continue to respond positively to appeals from both the govern-
ment and their own leaders to remain off the streets in order
to minimize the danger of further violent incidents.
FRANCE: Nuclear Cooperation
The head of the French Atomic Energy Commission,
Andre Giraud, last week renewed his proposal that the US and
France cooperate in the expansion and management of nuclear
fuel cycle facilities. This is the second time in three months
that he has called for such an arrangement.
Giraud may not have been speaking on behalf of his
government, but he almost certainly had the support of top-
level officials for his suggestion to US officials that the two
countries coordinate their civilian nuclear fuel operations.
Although the proposed cooperation was not fully defined, it in-
cluded planning and management of uranium enrichment plants,
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nuclear fuel fabrication plants, and fuel reprocessing plants.
Giraud indicated that France would welcome cooperation either
between the two governments or among the respective nuclear
fuel industries.
//The proposal probably was motivated primarily
by economic concerns. The French are already the leading par-
ticipants in the construction of Europe's first large uranium
enrichment plant, through a consortium called Eurodif, but at
the same time they are planning a second multinational plant
costing several billion dollars and are worried that future
construction of uranium enrichment plants in the US will create
a surplus of enrichment capacity.//
//By jointly planning the expansion of each coun-
ry s enrichment capacity, and perhaps investing in each
other's efforts, the supply of uranium enrichment services
could be made to follow demand more closely, and France might
secure a greater share of future worldwide enrichment con-
tracts.//
//France also hopes to secure a large part of the
worldwide fuel reprocessing market. To do so, current domestic
reprocessing capacity may be increased by the mid-1980s to
2,400 metric tons of fuel per year, twice the capacity France
needs for its own purposes.//
I //France now has the advantage of operating one
of the world's few plants capable of reprocessing common power
reactor fuel. Even so, cooperation with the US could eliminate
potential problems for France in reprocessing any foreign re-
actor fuel containing uranium that was obtained or enriched in
the US. France probably also would be more assured of a fixed
reprocessing market.//
In addition to similar economic benefits for US in-
dustry, the French probably believe that creation of the stable
supply of nuclear fuel services that would result from this co-
operation could greatly benefit international efforts on non-
proliferation. Assurance of these services would reduce the in-
centive for countries to develop an independent capability to
enrich uranium or to extract plutonium from spent fuel.
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//Although France may prefer cooperation with the
US, it could turn to other countries if overtures to the US
are not successful. France already operates its existing re-
processing plant in conjunction with West Germany and the UK,
and future reprocessing plants might also be operated through
this group, particularly if the US maintains the moratorium on
fuel reprocessing. There also is some evidence that France is
exploring cooperation with the West German-British-Dutch ura-
nium enrichment consortium, Urenco.//
GUYANA-CUBA: Arming the Militia
//Cuba is apparently supplying weapons
Guyana presumably for the newly formed Peoples' Militia .1
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//The Guyanese government began organizing the
Peoples' Militia last year under the guise of mobilizing the 25X1
country against foreign threats. The government says it has
recruited some 5,000 men already, but actual strength is prob-
ably about half that number. Even so, the militia would be
roughly equal to the regular armed forces in numbers and equip-
ment, if not in training.//
//Former premier Cheddi Jagan, leader of the East
Indian opposition in this racially divided country, recently
charged that the militia was'=actually a partisan force designed
to intimidate opponents of Prime Minister Burnham and to per-
petuate black rule in Guyana.//
//Burnham, who is now convalescing from the mild
ear a ac he suffered last weekend, has long been preoccupied 25X1
with security measures, both. to protect himself and to preserve
his political position. Cuba. has played on this concern, pro-
viding Burnham with extensive advice and assistance
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CANADA-BRAZIL: Broadening Contacts
Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson's visit to Brazil,
Peru, and Colombia underscores the importance the Latin Ameri-
cans and Canadians place on broadening foreign economic and po-
litical contacts, thus reducing their dependence on the US.
Brazilian President Geisel has pointed to the 16-day
visit as proof of Brazil's growing stature both as an economic
power and as a spokesman for developing state interests. Much
attention was also paid during the visit to the similarities
between Brazil and Canada--their European roots, commitment to
a mixed economy, and federal system of government--and to the
challenges both face in developing their frontiers.
Jamieson reportedly was surprised by the warmth of his
reception in Brazil and by the considerable freedom of the Bra-
zilian press. While the visit focused primarily on economic
matters, a wide range of international issues was also dis-
cussed, including the Law of the Sea negotiations and the situ-
ation in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
I I Although the Brazilians succeeded in deleting any
mention of nuclear proliferation or human rights from the com-
munique issued at the end of the visit, Jamieson did bring up
both issues in private talks with Geisel and Foreign Minister
Silveira. He reportedly argued that Brazil should sign the non-
proliferation treaty or accept full-scale safeguards on all its
nuclear facilities but did not press the Brazilians to change
their position.
Canadian officials have disputed claims that Jamieson
offered to mediate the US-Brazilian dispute over nuclear safe-
guards or that he was relaying any message from the new US ad-
ministration. The Brazilians, in their talks with Jamieson and
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later at a press conference, stood firm on their determination
to develop a full-fuel cycle nuclear industry regardless of
foreign opposition.
citing recent efforts to improve their record and arguing that
the situation was worse in several other Latin American states.
Jamieson later acknowledged at a press conference that human
rights problems in Chile and Argentina "were worse."
I I Canadian officials believe major progress was made to-
ward achieving the primary objective of Jamieson's visit--ex-
panding economic cooperation with Brazil. The Brazilians are
very pleased that the economic talks laid the foundation for in-
creased cooperation in trade and technology amounting to more
than $2 billion over the next ten years.
I I Major contracts were concluded establishing joint ven-
tures in the areas of transportation, petrochemicals, and min-
erals. A half billion dollar barter deal was also approved in-
volving the exchange of Brazilian iron ore for Canadian coal.
The two foreign ministers signed three major techni-
The Brazilians defended their position on human rights,
cal cooperation agreements covering a wide range of projects
including telecommunications, data processing, education, agri-
culture, and science. One of the agreements calls for special
"trilateral" arrangements providing technical assistance to de-
veloping states, mostly in Africa and Latin America.
Jamieson's visits to Peru and Colombia were marked by
similar success, particularly in the economic field. In Lima,
Jamieson announced several new measures to promote bilateral
trade and signed six technical cooperation accords amounting to
$10 million.
ROMANIA: Personnel Changes
President Ceausescu announced on Tuesday the most
sweeping changes in the Romanian party and government in recent
years. The country's economic problems, rather than political
maneuvering, seem to have spawned the shuffles, which follow a
smaller reorganization only seven months ago.
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ambitious economic plans, which call for continued 8 percent
growth through 1980 despite increasing energy and hard currency
constraints. Until recently, Bucharest could support rapid ex-
pansion with foreign borrowing and domestic oil, but these re-
sources have been depleted by the growing demands of industri-
alization. Last year, Romania became a net oil importer, and
its hard currency debt burden reached 46 percent.
I I Ceausescu's apparent prescription for Romania's eco-
nomic i s is to consolidate party control over the government
economic apparatus. He has advanced party activists from the
provinces into the middle levels of those government sectors
that are lagging.
Economic difficulties arise from Ceausescu's overly
On the government side, Cornel Burtica, a party secre-
tary,and Ion Stanescu, a former interior minister who appeared
to be under a cloud since 1973, were named deputy premiers.
Stanescu also became a party secretary, and may assume respon-
sibility for military and security affairs. It is unusual--if
not unprecedented--in Romania that two party secretaries simul-
taneously serve as deputy premiers.
The regime appointed new ministers for labor, elec-
tric power, and the mining and petroleum industries, and new
minister - state secretaries were selected for the troubled
areas of foreign trade, agriculture, machinebuilding, and the
chemical industry. Ceausescu's concern about flagging popular
enthusiasm and discipline may have led him to choose a new jus-
tice minister, general prosecutor, and chairman of the supreme
court. According to available information, most of these minis-
terial appointees have strong party backgrounds. Seven are
former county first secretaries.
Ceausescu expanded the party's five-man Permanent
Bureau by adding Burtica, party secretary Ilie Verdet, Deputy
Premier Gheorghe Radulescu, and his wife Elena. Ceausescu ap-
pears to use this body to decide day-to-day questions. It has
seemed to focus largely on economic matters in the past, but
increasing its membership suggests that Ceausescu may expand
its role. Romanian sources say this expansion was necessary to
include a broader mix of subject areas and to focus responsibil-
ities more clearly.
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party's Political Executive Committee--similar to the Soviet
Politburo--she has now become a powerful force in her own right.
She is extremely unpopular, and her new post may spur more
charges of nepotism.
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The elevation of Elena Ceausescu to the Bureau forma-
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lizes her considerable behind-the-scenes influence in party af-
fairs, especially in personnel matters. A full member of the
I Ceausescu has apparently returned to the frequent
"cadre rotations" that characterized his rule in the early
1970s. Earlier, he replaced old guard leaders with lesser known,
younger men who presumably were loyal to him.
A planned central committee plenum in February is
likely to make further changes at lower levels of the party.
There are also rumors of shifts in the Foreign Ministry. Presi-
dential counselor Vasile Pungan, who advises Ceausescu on for-
eign economic affairs, may replace Foreign Minister Macovescu,
whose departure has been rumored for some time.
As he shapes his team, Ceausescu seems hard pressed
to balance his requirements for loyalty with the need for eco-
nomic and administrative competence at the highest levels. He
seems to be returning to older, senior figures--such as Radul- 25X1
escu and Verdet--whose careers appeared to be stymied, but who
have strong backgrounds in economic affairs.
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//Negotiations for a $200-million Eurodollar loan
for CEMA's International Bank for Economic Cooperation have
been terminated because of a legal impasse.//
I /Lawyers for the lending syndicate, which is
based in the UK, concluded that under British law IBEC is not
a legal entity and thus cannot enter into a contract, sue, or
be sued. IBEC is an international organization owned by the
nine members of CEMA.//
//IBEC and the lenders failed to agree on several
alternative proposals to rewrite the loan agreement to side-
step the issue. IBEC finally withdrew its request for the loan
on January 21.//
//The failure to conclude the loan does not re-
flect unfavorably on the credit rating of IBEC or the CEMA coun-
tries. The loan was well received at the same favorable interest
terms that have been given on recent loans to the USSR and
Czechoslovakia.//
//The termination raises questions about previous
loans to 1HKC and its sister bank, the International Investment
Bank (IIB). IBEC has borrowed some $250 million since 1972 and
IIB some $1.1 billion, mostly over the past two years. If the
latest legal opinion should hold up, creditors involved in past
loans presumably could sue loan managers for failure to obtain
adequate guarantees. There have been a number of suits of this
type recently, but the IIB and IBEC loans will probably not
lead to suits except in the unlikely event of default.//
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//A solution to the impasse over the legal status
probably wi take several months, since it probably will in-
volve changes that require approval by the nine CEMA member
countries. One possible solution would be for the members to
assume a more explicit role in the banks' agreements with. the
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half the country's 600,000 coal miners from 38 to 30 hours. A
similar reduction, in the face of mounting energy and manpower
problems, is planned for the remaining miners, but such cuts
are not likely to spread to other sectors of the economy.
The USSR has unexpectedly cut the workweek for about
The hours reduction, which is coupled with a 10-per-
pay hike, probably is an attempt to attract more workers
into this unpopular line of work.
I This is the first reduction in the Soviet workweek
since 1960, when the standard week dropped from 46 to 41 hours,
with coal miners working 38 hours to compensate for adverse
working conditions. A shift to a general 35-hour workweek, and
30 hours for miners, was scheduled for implementation between
1964 and 1968 but was canceled because of declining rates of
growth of employment and the failure of productivity gains to
meet planned rates.
Soviet coal production has received greater emphasis
in recent years as petroleum extraction problems have become
widespread. After stagnating in the late 1960s, coal production
has increased at an average annual rate of 2.5 percent since
1970, and plans for 1976-1980 call for this rate of growth to
rise to 3.7 percent per year.
I In light of the high priority for coal, the official
explanation that the hours reduction was made possible by tech-
nological advances, which enabled the workweek to be cut with-
out sacrificing production levels, is unconvincing.
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I lAverage wages in coal mining are already the highest
in Soviet industry, and the new increase will bring the average
level in coal to about double the average for all industry.
Other incentives designed to attract and hold workers in this
field include a recent increase in the pensions of coal miners
and a ruling that permits pensioners to receive their full pen-
sion if they continue to work in the mines. In most Soviet in-
dustries, working pensioners can receive only half of their
pensions.
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