NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 3, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Thursday February 3, 1977 CG NIDC 77-027C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelli ence Dail Cable for Thursda February 3, 1977.
e NiD a e is or e purpose or inrorming
senior o icials.
CONTENTS
Page 1
BRAZIL: Nuclear Development
Page 5
Page 6
ITALY: Political Activity
SPAIN: Situation Report
IRAQ: Policy Statement
IRAN: Countering Dissidents Abroad
Page 8
Page 10
Page 10
Page 11
INDIA: Congress Party Defections
Page 14
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//Unfounded rumors are circulating in West
Germany an Berlin that military action is impending that in-
volves East German troops.//
Some of the rumors, which have now appeared in the
West erman press, stem from recent East German efforts to
erode the special status of East Berlin, from the regime's
crackdown on attempts by East German civilians to emigrate, and
from what appears to be a routine call-up of some East German
reservists.
There are some reports, also unconfirmed, that a
country-wide mobilization exercise is scheduled for this May.
The last such exercise took place in 1970, although there was
a large, but not country-wide, exercise in August 1974.
I lIt is possible that the East Germans are in the proc-
ess 37--testing their mobilization alert call-up procedures.
This would allow a more efficient call-up if a larger exercise
were to take place this spring.
Such call-ups are not in themselves unusual. East Ger-
man regulations require that all reservists take part in train-
ing every three or four years for periods of a, long as three or
four months.
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--Rumor One--The "troop mobilization" has been made neces-
sary by the prospect of serious disorder in East Germany.//
I //As the rumors and reports have become more
..1___1 =________d, they have generated a new series of specula-
tive rumors:
I //That such rumors have resonated, and perhaps
originated, in East Germany is testimony that there is consider-
able unease in the country. The question is how serious is it
and how concerned are the East German leaders.//
//The evidence su
//--Rumor Two--The East Germans may move aga
I
Allied in erests in West Berlin and particularly Allied
access to the city.//
I The East Germans this year have taken steps to under-
mine rne Allied contention that East Berlin has a special status.
Some unofficial spokesmen have also made threats about curtailing
West German traffic to East Germany. The East Germans and the
Soviets have continually asserted that the Quadripartite Agree-
.ment does not apply to East Berlin, and they and the Soviets
have asserted that the "four power status" of East Berlin no
longer exists.
I Neither the East Germans nor the Soviets, however,
have a ed about interfering with either West German or Allied
access to West Berlin.
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I IThe East Germans have complained that the allies do
not compensate them enough for moving Allied trains to West
Berlin, and they conceivably might slow down the processing of
these trains.
Such an action would directly involve the Soviets, as
the Allied right to access derives from four-power agreements.
The Soviet ambassador to East Berlin has vaguely hinted
that he is disturbed about the number of Allied--particularly
US--patrols that come into East Berlin, and the Soviets them-
selves, or the East Germans on their behalf, might take some
action to impede these patrols. Four-power agreements are also
involved here and, again, the Soviets and East Germans would
move very cautiously.
/--Rumor Three--The East Germans are being
called up in preparation for a Soviet "invasion" of Poland.
I I Such an "invasion" presumably would be in reaction to
deteriorating internal security in Poland. But the Polish scene
is relatively quiet. There is no evidence of significant dis-
turbances or that such disturbances are in the offing. There is
no evidence of unusual activity associated with Polish security
forces or of Soviet troops near, or in, Poland.
I I Party leader Gierek returned to the country, as ex-
n January 28 from a routine trip to India and Iran.
Prime Minister Jaroszewicz has also been out of the country,
signing trade agreements in Romania. The regime was able to put
enough consumer goods on sale during the sensitive Christmas
season and avoided trouble. The public mood was much more vola--
tile last July and August than it seems at the present time.
Gierek knows that he must avoid making the kind of
ace triat precipitated the riots last summer. Thus, he has
promised no price increases this year, and he is trying to put
into effect economic reforms that will encourage the private,
and more efficient, sector of the Polish economy. He has also
handled Polish dissidents with kid gloves.
I But the potential for serious unrest remains undimin-
is e an the Soviets would use their forces if necessary to
maintain Communist rule in Poland.
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President Sadat's harsh criticism of the USSR in the
ware or oscow's postponement of discussions on a 1977 trade
protocol. will exacerbate the strains in Soviet-Egyptian rela-
tions.
Since the postponement late last week, Sadat has pub-
ic y accused the Soviets of responsibility for the antigovern-
ment riots that took place in mid-January. Sadat's allegations
probably are a response both to the postponement and to the So-
viets' extensive and prolonged media coverage of the rioting,
which marked a sharp departure from their circumspect treatment
of Egyptian domestic disturbances during the past several years.
Before the postponement, Cairo had accused Egyptian
communists and leftists of instigating the riots. Soviet com-
mentary termed these charges "flagrant lies" designed to obtain
increased assistance from Arab oil producers and the US.I
The introduction of a bill in the Egyptian parliament
on January 26 calling for severing diplomatic relations with the 25X1
USSR may well have played a part in the Soviet decision to call
off the trade mission.
I Trade relations will continue even if the two sides
never g,-- around to initialing the 1977 protocol. Soviet-Egyp-
tian trade reached a high level in 1974, for example, without
a formal trade protocol.
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The Soviet moves reflect Moscow's determination to
p pressure on Sadat and to refrain from any significant in-
ducements to the Egyptians as long as Cairo gives priority to
its ties with the US and ignores Soviet complaints. Moscow has
been particularly incensed at Sadat's domestic policies, which
continue to de-emphasize socialist institutions in favor of the
entry of Arab and Western capital.
BRAZIL: Nuclear Development
//The Brazilian government is increasingly adamant
in its re usal to consider any revisions in its nuclear develop-
ment program.//
//Earlier this week, the government publicly re-
jected a suggestion by Secretary Vance that Brazil temporarily
suspend its agreement with West Germany under which the Germans
are to provide plants for uranium enrichment and spent fuel re-
processing. The government statement comes at a time when prom-
inent congressmen in both Brazilian parties as well as senior
foreign policy officials are denouncing US criticism of the
accord as outside interference and an insult to their national
prestige.//
//The statement was apparently based on a decision
by the else government not to consider any alternatives to
present plans for obtaining plants for enriching uranium and
recycling fuel. Brazil is seeking energy alternatives to petro-
leum, coal, and natural gas, which it must now import at great
expense. It intends to obtain a full nuclear fuel cycle, in-
cluding reprocessing, in order to reduce its dependence on for-
eign sources for nuclear fuel.//
//The Brazilian press has been strongly critical
of US statements that warn against nuclear proliferation, arguing
that the Nonproliferation Treaty is discriminatory. The govern-
ment insists that it will not be bound by any agreement that
could restrict its economic and technological development. 25X1
Brazilian officials have said, moreover, that the government
will not sign the Nonproliferation Treaty so long as Argentina,
Brazil's regional rival, refuses to do so.
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ITALY: Political Activity
Political maneuvering has become more intense within
both the Christian Democratic and the Socialist parties--the
two groups that must cooperate if an Italian government not de-
pendent on the Communists is to be formed.
I I Although many Christian Democrats are critical of the
extent o the government's cooperation with the Communists,
they have been reluctant to challenge Prime Minister Andreotti
head-on, and for the moment his position seems secure. His ac-
ceptance of last week's labor-management agreement on labor
costs, however, triggered criticism from a wide array of lead-
ers from across the party's political spectrum.
lAndreotti appears to have quieted his critics for now
with a promise of further government action on labor costs--ac-
tion he may have intended to take in any case. The government
move, which is likely to combine an assumption of part of in-
dustry's social security expenses with some offsetting tax in-
creases, should be announced after tomorrow's cabinet meeting.
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These maneuvers seem likely to inaugurate a period of
eig ene political activity. Many Italians believe that An-
dreotti's minority government: will be lucky to survive the
spring. The obstacles to major changes, however, are still for-,
midable:
Although the center of gravity among Christian
emocrats may be moving to the right, party leaders know
that ousting Andreotti would open a wide range of politi-
cal and economic uncertainties.
--The Socialists, whose votes or abstentions would be
critical in any effort to freeze out the Communists, remain
a question mark. Craxi says he would like to move the party
back toward the Christian Democrats, but he views this as a
long-term operation involving the strengthening of his own
authority, the curbing of numerous party leftists who want
closer ties with the Communists, and the enhancement of
the party's image so as to avoid the subaltern role it
played in recent center-left governments. For now, the
Socialists could not be counted on even to deliver a cohe-
sive block of abstentions--much less positive votes--if
the Communists went into opposition.
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Finally, the Communists are strongly opposed to a
c ange of government. Believing the time is not ripe for
further Communist political gains and reluctant to go back
into the opposition, they have let it be known that they
regard the Andreotti government as the best available. The
other parties realize that reconstituting a government in
the face of Communist parliamentary opposition would be
chancy and also that Communist commitment to the auster-
ity program is a prerequisite for the program's success;
thus they will feel compelled to move carefully.
I IWith the various parties feeling their way, a full-
fledged government crisis does not appear imminent. Neverthe-
less, the political maneuvering--with the risk of crisis at
some point--seems likely to continue into spring, when the
populace will be feeling the effects of the austerity ro ram
more intensely.
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SPAIN: Situation Report
The Spanish government's handling of the outbreak of
terrorism in Madrid last week has led to some unhappiness among
opposing political factions as well as renewed threats of vio-
lence from extremist groups of both the left and right.
I
Earlier
this week, there were complaints from some
oppose ion partie
s that a police dragnet in res
ponse to the
slaying of three
police and civil guards on Fri
day was unduly
harsh against members of far-left parties and trade union organ-
izations. The preponderance of suspects detaine
d were in fact
leftists, and there was speculation that the la
rge number of
arrests was carried out to pacify rightist generals who have
been particularly upset by the recent kidnaping of the head of
the military tribunal. By midweek, the government had released
many of the leftist suspects.
I In another important gesture to the right, King Juan
1a --w o has played a key role in keeping the military loyal
to the government and out of politics--was pictured prominently
in Spanish newspapers on Tuesday having lunch with General Jaime
del Bosch, a Francoist hard-liner, and his troops.
I I Despite the government's attempt to placate the right,
Lnere we e further demonstrations of dissatisfaction yesterday.
Defying a police ban, about 250 rightists gathered outside the
church where a mass was held for the dead policemen and shouted
slogans against the government and the King.
Consistent with its declared policy of refusing to
p ay avorites between right and left, the government has de-
ported several foreign right-wing extremists. The rightist sub-
director of the navy war college also has been dismissed for 25X1
an act of insubordination. He shouted antigovernment taunts at
Deputy Prime Minister Gutierrez Mellado when the latter was es-
corting the bodies of the slain policemen on Saturday.
IRAQ: Policy Statement
I Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn may be signaling some
change in Iraq's uncompromising opposition to a negotiated set-
tlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.
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In an interview widely publicized domestically and in
a spy obviously intended as a major policy statement, the
Iraqi leader expressed in general terms tolerance of discus-
sions between Arab leaders and Israelis to achieve interim
aims as long as Arab negotiators did not lose sight of the
final goal. His position seemed to be to acquiesce reluctantly
in negotiations as a temporary expedient because conditions do
not permit the Arabs to reach their final objective at this
time.
I IIraq's position has, until now, been wholly negative
towar e idea of a negotiated settlement with Israel. The US
interests section in Baghdad believes Saddam Husayn now real-
izes that continuation of this policy in the face of an Arab
consensus in favor of entering into negotiations with Israel--a
consensus that includes most of the Palestinian leadership--
would only isolate Iraq further. In the view of the interests
section, Saddam Husayn is preparing the Iraqi public and the
country's rejectionist Palestinian allies for a shift by Bagh-
dad to a more passive stance on the subject of a negotiated
settlement.
I At the same time, the Iraqis will probably continue
to remin Arab leaders that, for Baghdad, the "final goal" is
eventual replacement of Israel with a "democratic state of Pal-
estine" and will advocate a very hard line in any negotiations.
IRAN: Countering Dissidents Abroad
I The Netherlands government and Amnesty International
are the latest targets in Iran's campaign to counter the activ-
ities of Iranian dissidents abroad.
I I An Iranian consumer organization--almost certainly at
the direction of the government--has publicly threatened a boy-
cott of Dutch goods if the Netherlands permits "anti-Iranian
groups under the sponsorship of Amnesty International" to hold
a conference in Amsterdam on February 18.
The threatened boycott is meant to carry an essen-
Dutch exports.
tially political message. Dutch exports to Iran account for
less than 3 percent of Iran's total imports and 1 percent of
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The Dutch Foreign Ministry has reiterated that the
governmen cannot legally block the conference. This will not
satisfy the Iranians, who have made clear in recent weeks that
they expect friendly governments to find some way to prohibit
anti-Iranian actions on their territory. Iran's foreign minis-
ter delivered this message--more tactfully worded--to the US
ambassador on January 20 in response to activity by Iranian
dissidents in the US.
Iran's parliament also rejected a "petition" Tuesday
trom Swedish legislators on behalf of Iranian political prison-
ers. The rejection asserted that a more balanced view is neces-
sary for the preservation of close ties between Iran and Sweden.
Iran, stung by repeated criticism from Amnesty Inter-
ns ions on the question of human rights, struck back last month
with a major press attack. Editorials in Iran's semicontrolled
press charged that the organization is planning a worldwide cam-
paign against Iran and insinuated that it is in league with
Marxist groups sympathetic to Iranian terrorists.
I lIran also sought to answer its critics by reportedly
re easing 66 prisoners on Tuesday, including several convicted
of terrorism and political crimes. This was the second such re-
lease this year.
Nearly 4,000 Iranians remain in prison for terrorism
or co unist activity, according to a recent statement by the
Shah to French reporters..
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INDIA: Congress Party Defections
I IPrime Minister Gandhi could face a serious challenge
in e in ian parliamentary election scheduled for next month
if the resignations yesterday of several influential members
of her Congress Party are followed by further defections.
Gandhi had appeared headed toward a certain election victory.
Agriculture Minister Ram, a veteran cabinet member
and the spokesman for India's "untouchables," resigned from
both the party and the cabinet, charging that Gandhi is lead-
ing India toward despotism. Ram was joined by five other members
of the party, including former chief ministers of the states
of Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. A prominent member of the party
in West Bengal reportedly has also resigned, possibly fore-
shadowing the defection of that state's chief minister, who
has been at odds with Gandhi.
Gandhi, who survived a serious split in the party in
still enjoys substantial personal popularity and con-
siderable political leverage as prime minister. Moreover, she
retains control over a party organization that is active in
almost every village. Still, the defections raise serious
questions about her chances in four states--Uttar Pradesh, West
Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar, Ram's home state--which together
have about 40 percent of the seats in the parliament.
I hIf Ram and the other defectors can retain the loyalty
o eir ollowers and if they can work out an election arrange-
ment with the main opposition parties--most of which have joined
together for the campaign--Congress Party candidates would be
threatened in many constituencies. In the past, Congress candi-
dates have frequently won elections with pluralities or small
majorities.
I Gandhi's public reaction so far has been limited to
a statement regretting Ram's "surprising decision;" but the US
embassy expects her to counterattack strongly enough to deter
some potential defectors.
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