NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010012-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 7, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Monday February 7, 1977 CG NIDC 77-030C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, February 7, 1977.
e NID Cable is tor the purpose o in orming
senior o icials.
CONTENTS
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USSR-CHINA: Ilichev to Moscow
Page 2
INDIA:
Political Wrap-up
Page 2
USSR:
NUCLEAR
JAMAICA
USSR:
SUDAN:
Technolo
COUNTRI
: Trans
Economic
Afterma
gy E
ES'
form
Tre
th o
xports to US
MEETING
ing the Media
nds
f Unrest
Page 4
Page 4
Page 6
Page 7
Page 8
BOTSWANA: Policy Toward Rhodesia
Page 10
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USSR-CHINA: Ilichev to Moscow
I the USSR's
c ie negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border talks, Deputy For-
eign Minister Ilichev, will return home later this month. Ili-
chev arrived in Peking on November 27, ending his 18-month ab-
sence from the talks. Since the talks began in 1969, it has
not been unusual for the chief Soviet negotiator to remain in
Peking for only three to four months.//
c any progress in the bor er ne-
gotiations. The Chinese, in fact, have been going out of their
way to tell foreign officials that their position at the talks
is as unyielding as before and that Ilichev had brought no
meaningful new proposals.
It is unlikely that Ilichev expected any progress.
His return to Peking appeared to be part of the Soviet effort
to build a public record of willingness to improve relations
with China. Moscow was also probing for any changes in Chinese
attitudes following Mao's death and was trying to provide some
appearance of movement in Sino-Soviet relations for the bene-
fit of the new US administration.
INDIA: Political Wrap-up
I I Prime Minister Gandhi so far has prevented any more
important members of her Congress Party from quitting and join-
ing former agriculture minister Ram, who resigned from the
party and the cabinet last week. Ram has established a new
political party and plans to cooperate with the non-Communist
opposition in the parliamentary election scheduled for March.
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Gandhi has obtained statements of support from most
key Congress Party members, including the leading potential
defector, the chief minister of populous West Bengal state.
These commitments, however, may have been obtained at some
cost to the support for her son Sanjay. Most older party mem-
bers have been unhappy with the rapid growth of Sanjay's power
since the imposition of the emergency in mid-1975. It is now
likely that the party will nominate fewer of Sanjay's followers
as candidates for parliament than had been originally planned.
I Although Gandhi has at least temporarily fore-
stalled e ec ions, some other aspects of the campaign are not
going well:
--A large rally in New Delhi on Saturday had been de-
signed to demonstrate popular support for Gandhi and San-
jay, who was to be the main speaker. The crowd was unen-
thusiastic and unruly and Gandhi spoke instead of Sanjay.
--A major rally in. New Delhi yesterday featuring Ram and
other opposition leader=; reportedly drew an enthusiastic
crowd significantly larcrer than Gandhi's.
--The press has been more outspoken since the lifting
of censorship than many expected.
//Gandhi still seems committed to holding the
election and allowing her opponents considerable freedom. She
has, however, likened the present situation to the conditions
that led to the imposition of the emergency and could reimpose
or more strictly enforce emergency measures.//
//The Prime Minister is aware that such a step
woula cast cloul5t on the validity of the election, which she
presumably still expects to win. Gandhi is even less likely to
cancel the election, which would require serious stretching of
the constitution and would be generally seen as an admission
of defeat.//
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In an unprecedented move, the USSR is allowing West-
USSR: Technology Exports to US
ern firms to examine Soviet research and development organiza-
tions in a search for advanced technology suitable for manufac-
ture under license in the West. Eduard Aykazyan, director of
the American desk of the Soviet State Committee for Science and
Technology, recently said one US firm has been given a license
to examine research results at various institutes of the Acad-
emy of Sciences, the Ministry of the Medical Industry, and the
Ministry of Instrumentation, Automation, and Control Systems.
The company already is doing a market survey for Soviet-held
patents on medical and measuring instrumentation.
Aykazyan attributed the new policy to dissatisfaction
with the amount of technology sold under exchange agreements
the Soviets have signed with 58 US firms. Technology sales to
the US have been limited by lack of US interest in Soviet tech-
nology and by Soviet bureaucratic regulations that permit minis-
tries to trade only their own technology in exchange agree-
According to the US embassy, Aykazyan admitted that
the USSR wants to sell only technology because Soviet engineers
are unable to get fundamental research achievements translated
into marketable products as quickly as their Western counter-
parts.
The research-production gap is partly the result of
poor organization that isolates researchers, designers, and
customers. There also is a critical balance of incentives for
industrial enterprises to assimilate new technology. Inviting
a US firm to look for advanced technology to exploit is a frank
admission of the plight of the research and development estab-
lishment in the USSR and exposes a glaring weakness of the So-
viet economy.
Attempts to upgrade formal controls on the export
of certain sensitive nuclear materials and equipment are meet-
ing resistance from some nuclear suppliers.
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I lAt a meeting in Vienna last week of the Zangger
Committee, some European states and Japan opposed expanding
export controls to additional categories of nuclear materials.
The Zangger Committee is a 20-member group of nuclear coun-
tries that have agreed in conformity with provisions of the
1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty to impose export controls on
specific categories of nuclear equipment and materials.
Japan asserted at the meeting that it could not
publicly reverse the export criteria it had already presented
to the Japanese Diet during recent hearings on ratification
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Tokyo, however, expressed its
willingness to conform informally to these export requirements.
The objections of some European states, notably
Switzerland and Belgium, were more fundamental and could have
an influence on other multilateral non-proliferation arrange-
ments--particularly the London Suppliers' Group. Although mem-
bership in the two bodies of nuclear exporting countries largely
overlaps, France has never participated in Zangger Committee
undertakings because of its opposition to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. France has participated, however, in the London group
from its initiation--a major factor in the group's success.
JIn their presentation to the Zangger Committee
meeting, the Swiss argued for "specificity" in the criteria
for export controls, indicating that they are prepared to ac-
cept only minimum requirements. Both the Swiss and Belgians,
moreover, expressed some dissatisfaction with the more compre-
hensive export controls that the London Suppliers' meetings
have worked out; these controls extend to nuclear technology
transfers as well as nuclear materials and equipment.
I I Switzerland participates only as an observer at the
London meetings because it has not yet formally accepted the
group's: strict export guidelines. Belgium has been a full
member only since last January and did not actually negotiate
the export guidelines it has committed itself to observe. Based
on their interventions at last week's meeting, however, both
countries may increasingly challenge the export control methods
of limiting nuclear proliferation or at a minimum attempt to
force some renegotiation of the export guidelines as the price
of their compliance.
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JAMAICA: Transforming the Media
I I In the month and a half since his re-election, Prime
minister Manley has moved to increase control over the media
in order to accelerate change to a "democratic socialist" so-
ciety.
I Late last month, Manley announced that the government
will purchase majority interest in Radio Jamaica, the British-
owned private radio network. The only other major network, the
publicly owned Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation, was trans-
formed into a government propaganda arm last year through
changes in its management.
I I These moves leave the prestigious newspaper, Daily
(Leaner, the only media organ inclined to criticize the govern-
ment. During the campaign, the government invoked its authority
under the state of emergency to demand review powers over polit-
ical statements and advertisements prior to their publication.
The Gleaner, which has had an important political influence for
over a century, refused to comply fully.
I I Jamaica's recently announced austerity program pro-
vides the government with economic leverage that could force
she (;Leaner into line. By manipulating the allocation of for-
oign currency and the granting of import licenses, the govern-
ment can control the paper's access to newsprint and its sub-
scriptions to US-based news services. The editor of the Gleaner
told the US ambassador last month that lack of advertising and
other revenues threatens the ability of his newspaper to survive
beyond the end of this year.
Public criticism of the Cleaner by Manley and other
government officials has helped spawn other kinds of pressure.
Members of that newspaper's staff sent a letter to the manage-
ment in late January stating that the views of one particularly
outspoken anti-government columnist did not reflect the opinion
Of the majority of Gleaner workers and demanding that the col-
umn be ended. A mob of ruling party supporters recently man-
handled one of the paper's reporters.
To underscore his need to control the media Manley
tias appointed Arnold Bertram, a leading party radical, to the
new post of minister of state for information, broadcasting,
=culture, and festival.
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After two years of large hard-currency deficits, the
Soviet payments position is likely to improve substantially in
1977. Export prospects are good because of Western economic re-
covery, and grain imports will fall sharply because of the rec-
ord 1976 grain harvest. Moscow should thus be able to increase
imports of industrial materials and equipment from the West.
I I Although the USSR will have to continue the cautious
approac it adopted last year when planning its trade and pay-
ments in 1977, it should be able to hold the trade deficit this
year to $3 to $4 billion and lessen dependence on Western com-
mercial banks. The Western economic recovery should allow the
Soviets to increase exports by 20 to 25 percent to $12 to $12.5
billion; grain imports are likely to be cut by up to $2 billion,.
The Soviets already have arranged for long-term credits from
Western governments to cover a substantial portion of their
equipment and pipe imports this year.
I I Moscow may be able to satisfy some of the accumulated
man or lower priority equipment and nontubular steel that
was created by hard-currency constraints last year. Credit mar-
ket conditions in the West will to a great extent determine the
mix between short-term debt repayment and increases in nongrain
imports.
With its net hard-currency debt now at roughly $14
i ion and with more Western banks at or near lending limits,
the USSR will continue to be c=onstrained in its ability to ob-
tain general-purpose credits on private money markets, partic-
ularly at acceptable interest rates.
I I The USSR incurred a hard-currency trade deficit of
i ion in 1975 because of its need to import massive
amounts of Western grain at a time when the Western recession
held down Soviet export earnings. Moscow initially reacted to
this unexpected combination of events with heavy, short-term
borrowing from the West. In 1975 alone, Soviet net liabilities
to Western commercial banks rose by $4 billion.
I By borrowing heavily rather than cutting back on non-
n imports or selling more gold, the Soviets soon found
themselves becoming overextended. Although Western bankers still
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regarded the USSR as creditworthy, Soviet borrowing in 1975
brought many major US and West European banks close to their
lending limits.
Moscow took several steps during 1976 to reduce both
the size of its trade deficit and its need to rely on Western
bankers for balance-of-payments financing. These steps included
reducing nongrain imports, increasing gold sales--despite fall-
ing prices for most of the year--and minimizing cash outlays,
including deferment of some payments until 1977. Nevertheless,
continuing heavy imports of grain resulted in a $5 billion hard-
currency trade deficit and a $2-billion rise in Soviet debt to
Western commercial banks. Most of the new borrowing, however,
was apparently medium rather than short term.
Prospects are far less certain for 1978. Continued
economic growth in the West and a good domestic harvest in 1977
would allow Moscow to continue to increase nongrain imports in
1978. Alternatively, a combination of a poor harvest and an
economic downturn beginning late in 1977 or early in 1978 could
force Moscow to follow a no-growth import policy or even reduce
nongrain imports.
//Sudanese government forces appear to have
restored order in Juba, the capital of Sudan's southern region.
Although the unrest there last week posed little immediate
threat to the central government in Khartoum, it reflects the
problems that continue to plague President Numayri's regime.//
//Fighting broke out in Juba on Wednesday when
rebel air defense units attempted to take control of the nearby
airport. This followed the arrest on January 31 in Juba of
25 Sudanese military men and civilians for allegedly plotting
against Numayri.
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'/Numayri probably will face more such chal-
lenges because of his inability to gain broad support. Since
he came to power nearly eight: years ago, there have been five
serious attempts to oust him. All but one were led by the mili-
tary, on which Numayri depends for his political survival..//
I //Sudan's three diverse Islamic groups remain
a source o ac ive dissidence. Student groups, although lim-
ited in number, also have been a source of considerable anti-
regime activity. They are kept in check only by the security
forces and frequent closings of Khartoum University.//
//The Sudanese Communist Party, officially
banned since 1971, is one of the largest and best organized
communist parties in the Middle East. The non-Arab, non-Muslim
blacks of the south are united only in their animosity for their
Arabic-speaking, Muslim countrymen of the north.//
//Numayri's success in maintaining his position
has been based primarily on the inability of his opponents to
cooperate against him. Most of the people are indifferent to
the regime and their voice is heard only when there are eco-
nomic problems such as rising prices or commodity shortages.//
I --U ] //Numayri is trying to gain the support of the
Majority by seeking to develop rapidly Sudan's agriculture.
Most projects, however, are long term, and it will take several
years before those that are already under way are completed-
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BOTSWANA: Policy Toward Rhodesia
25X1 //Botswana increasingly finds itself caught be-
ween i s somewhat reluctant role as a front-line state in the
Rhodesian conflict and its close economic ties with Rhodesia and
South Africa.//
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I This difficult position is exemplified by the recent
arriva of 400 to 500 black refugees from Rhodesia. The Rho-
desian government asserts that the group was abducted by guer-
rillas at gun point from a mission school near the border.
Botswana affirms, based on interviews with some of the students,
that they came voluntarily to escape harassment by Rhodesian
security forces.
//Refugees from Rhodesia are only part of the
problem. Botswana for some time has been a haven for refugees
from the civil war in Angola, the riots in South Africa, and
South African repression in Namibia. The Botswanan government
generally has tried to move the refugees on to other countries
as it lacks the resources to care for them itself.//
I //During the past six months, the flow into Bot-
swana as increased, primarily from .gni,*h a f,;'- -A -'
I I After considerable agonizing, President Khama recently
eci e that the refugees should be allowed to remain in Bot-
swana. He also will try to provide educational facilities for
them and is seeking international help.
//Khama's decision probably was made with domestic
pressures in mind, although other black African countries have
also urged him to take a more militant role. He probably hopes
that through assistance and training the refu
ees will b
g
e a less
disruptive force in the country, but their presence could serve
as a catalyst for opposition to his pragmatic policies.//
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//There is a vocal opposition in Botswana's multi-
party democratic political system, much of which focuses on the
government's wide use of expatriates and its encouragement of
Indian and other foreign entrepreneurs. This opposition has
strongly criticized Botswana's South African connection and
relatively weak support for African liberation groups.//
//By taking in refugees on a longer-term basis,
ama is putting his skill in handling the competing pressures
from within and without on the line. His country is booming
economically. Large numbers of Botswanans are employed in South
Africa, however, and Rhodesia operates the railroad, which is
crucial to exports of Botswanan beef and minerals as well as
imports of foodstuffs.//
//Khama's new refugee policy will help to still
both domestic and foreign critics. It is difficult to see, how-
ever, how Botswana with its small security force will be able
to prevent the refugees from supporting dissident activity
against either Rhodesia or South Africa.//
1//The emergence of active guerrilla operations
against Rhodesia, for example, may encourage the Rhodesians to
mount stronger cross-border attacks. This would present Khama
with a serious problem. He already has taken to the UN a com-
plaint about Rhodesian border infractions. Full-scale guerrilla
war, including substantial external assistance to the Rhodesian
nationalists, is likely to involve Botswana more directly in
the struggle.//
//President Khama himself is in fragile health and
while he appears capable of ruling for a considerable time, he
may not for long control as ably the disruptive force affecting
his country.// 25X1
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