NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010014-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 8, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

'AMW Ad1W AGW 1AW Al
Approved 2li flf tease 20
05/01/05 : CIA
TO:
NAME D ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPA
RE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOM
MENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETUR
N!
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM:
NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
0
25X
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE -
Tuesday February 8, 1977 CG NIDC 77-031C
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
&Emma
Top Secret
(Security Cl
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010014 6 25
,off off ,W off off ,W JW "W
RDP79T00975A02980001 14-6
lop Secret
(Security Classification) 25X
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29800010014-6
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29800010014-6
 Approved Fo4 Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AP29800010014-6
National Intelence Dail Cable for Tuesday February 8, 1977.
25X1
mlly
s.
CONTENTS
CHINA: Political and Economic Developments
Page :1
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Pressure on Charter 77 Dissidents Page 3
YUGOSLAVIA: Yugoslav Dissidents Active
Page 5
Approved F+r Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T0097PA029800010014-6
 Approved For R
CHINA: Political and Economic Developments
I I An editorial published over the weekend in China's
leading party and army journals underlines the top priority
China's new leaders are giving to continuing the campaign
against the four purged leftist Politburo members and their
lower ranking supporters. The editorial, and a commentary
printed in the party's monthly ideological journal and broad-
cast over the weekend, charges that local leaders have been
underestimating the serious nature of the current political
campaign and have not exercised adequate leadership to advance
it.
The articles seem to reflect Peking's concern that
local leftists will go unidentified and unreformed and will be
free to continue to create local political disturbances. There
is no evidence of any serious violence, //but low-level left-
ists have caused some embarrassment in Peking and elsewhere.
They may have been responsible for wall posters that attacked
Politburo members last month during activities honoring the
late premier Chou En-lai.// They also apparently continue to
cause trouble for some provincial leaders as well as local
leaders in Shanghai.
While the level of disturbances is probably restricted
to divisive wall poster writing and rumor mongering, it appar-
ently is serious enough to divert attention from pressing eco-
nomic matters. In apparent recognition of this, the regime's
most recent slogan "to bring about great order across the land"
seems to have supplanted temporarily the "four modernizations"---
China's economic goals announced in 1975--as a leading propa-
ganda theme.
Peking's bid to increase local political activity
against leftists may pose a threat to certain provincial leaders
who last year were in the forefront of the leftist-inspired cam-
paign against former vice premier Teng Hsiao-ping. So far none
has been publicly associated with the fallen leftists but some
may still have to clear themselves of responsibility for either
their own actions or those of their subordinates.
Approved For R4
25X1
25X1
 Approved For R4
k/A poster that appeared late last year charged
the civilian leaders of one province where the propaganda was
particularly leftist in orientation with obstructing criticism
of leftist influence. If such accusations continue, they could
become the basis for the removal of some high-ranking provin-
cial leaders.//
I I The editorial also seems to bring Teng Hsiao-ping
another step closer to rehabilitation. It calls "deepening ex-
posure and criticism of the "gang of four" the current "key
link," but makes only passing reference to "class struggle,"
which through 1976 had been the "key link." Teng previously
was criticized for failing to take "class struggle" as the "key
link."
The editorial's unreserved and defensive pledge to
protect "whatever" Mao Tse-tung had formulated suggests that
the regime is being accused of not following policies that Mao
had approved. Although such charges so far are only vaguely
documented, they may refer to plans to rehabilitate Teng. They
also may refer to aggressive steps to rebuild China's economy.
A significant indicator of China's economic condition--
industrial production--rose less than an estimated 5 percent
last year. Gross national product increased only an estimated 3
percent. These growth rates at best are half of those achieved
annually over the past decade.
I I According to the Chinese-controlled Hong Kong weekly
Economic Reporter, the value of China's industrial output
"showed an increase" last year. No specific figure was cited,
but the results reportedly were less than anticipated because
of the disruption by the discredited leftists. "Rather large
increases" during the fourth quarter are claimed for provinces
most seriously affected by political disruption, indicating
some recovery there.
The Economic Reporter earlier had claimed increases in
gross industrial production of 13.4 and 7 percent for the first
quarter and first half of 1976, respectively. By the end of the
third quarter, the economy obviously had begun to slow because
25X1
25X=1
Approved Fo4 Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AI29800010014-6
 Approved For
of political instability and the Tangshan earthquake. Although
overall industry began to recover during the fourth quarter,
industrial production has by no means fully recovered.
I Nationwide increases in production are thus far
c aime only for petroleum, natural gas, and coal
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Pressure on Charter 77 Dissidents
I Czechoslovak authorities are maintaining pressure
on e supporters of the Charter 77 human rights manifesto,
but they remain wary of issuing indictments against any of
the dissidents unequivocally :Linked to the document. The num-
ber of "unofficial" messages to activists warning them of their
vulnerability to punitive legal action has increased.
I Although the number of signers has grown the last
ew ays, the impact of Charter 77 on the Czechoslovak public
does not appear to be significant. The government has tried to
demonstrate that a substantial segment of the populace is op-
posed to the charter, and efforts to get workers to sign anti-
charter statements should prevent widespread open support for
it. Such pressure, however, could cause resentment.
On the international side, the campaign to gain le-
gitimacy and respectability for the Husak regime has run into
serious problems. The Italian foreign minister canceled a
planned stopover in Prague en route home from the USSR, and
the Norwegians canceled a ministerial visit. Other planned offi-
cial visits also may now be in doubt.
I ISoviet press coverage of Charter 77 thus far has been
relatively low key. The USSR has tried to depict Charter 77 as
having little popular support, especially from the workers,
and has attacked "reactionary circles" in the West for inter-
fering in the internal affairs of another state. The Soviets
clearly hope that the lack of popular enthusiasm for Charter
77 will enable the Czechoslovak leaders to emerge with little
damage.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For R4Iease 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AQ29800010014-6
 Approved For Rel~ase 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T009754029800010014-6 25X1
So long as the Charter 77 controversy persists, how-
ever, it creates the potential for serious problems for the
USSR and the other East European states with the approach of
the Belgrade conference on the Helsinki accords this summer.
Soviet propaganda commentary reflects this concern and, rather
than focusing on the Charter 77 issue, devotes more space to
alleged Western failures in the human rights field and on the
"enemies of detente" who are using the human rights issue to
sabotage East-West relations.
Approved For Wlease 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29000010014-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
 Approved Folr Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T009754029800010014-6
YUGOSLAVIA: Yugoslav Dissidents Active
I The Tito regime's hopes of gaining prestige by serv-
ing as nost for the follow-on European security talks in June
are dimming because of a resurgence of open political dissent.
The dissenters are cautiously playing on increased Western
criticism of Yugoslavia's performance on human rights to press
Belgrade to relax its ideological and political strictures.
I I The first public step by the dissenters came last
week, when a document protesting travel restrictions on trou-
blemakers was leaked to the Western press. Sixty Yugoslavs
signed the document, which had been privately circulated since
last summer. Several dissidents have recently told Westerners
that the document is only the tip of an iceberg.
I ISince a major purge of liberals in 1972, the Yugoslav
regime as shut down dissident journals, given stiff prison
terms for a wide range of political "crimes," and gradually
restored the arbitrary police powers that it had scrapped after
a period of abuse in the mid-1960s. The regime rationalizes
that such measures are needed to help prevent problems in the
post-Tito era.
I I Some Yugoslav leaders would like to ease the "vigi-
lance campaigns" and rein in the secret police. Tito, however,
and many of the men who came to power following the 1972 purge
have adamantly opposed any concessions-to the "hostile forces."
The more moderate leaders have thus been unable to accomplish
much more than a feeble propaganda effort touting "socialist
democracy" and mildly rebuking authoritarians in general.
The moderates can still make gradual headway if the
dissidents keep up the pressure and continue to avoid excesses
that might trigger a sharp reaction from Tito. The dissenters,
however, are loosely organized, and hotheads among them could
take intemperate stands that would amount to a direct challenge
to Tito's authority.
25X1
Approved For'Rela2ma 2005101105 CIA-RD
 Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29800010014-6
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
An roved Far Release 2005/01/05 ? CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010014-6
(Security classification)