NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029800010020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 11, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

i
I 0
pprgpg W-
a ease 0610371
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPAR
E REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOM
MENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETUR
N
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM:
NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
IA-RDP79T00975A029800f1-0-0228 C r e t
(Security Classification)
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Friday February l?_, 1977 CG NIDC 77-034C
State Department review completed
w
0
1
1
1
0
0
25X1
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 0
1 0
Top Secret 25X1 0
(Security qlassmfirafinn
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0298000100 0-9
''' AW A'''
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29800010020-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29800010020-9
 Approved For (Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975JA029800010020-9
National Intelligence_ Daily Cable for Friday, February 11, 1977.
25X1
I The NID Cable is tor e purpose
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
Page 2
LEBANON: Heavy Fighting
Page 4
SIERRA LEONE: Continuing Unrest
Page 5
USSR-CHINA: "Observer" Article
Page 5
EC-PORTUGAL: Membership Bid
Page 6
ECUADOR: Relations with US and Peru
Page 8
NORTH KOREA: Reunification Plan
Page 9
Approved ForiRelease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T009754029800010020-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29800010020-9
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29800010020-9
 Approved For Rep
I Dutch employers and striking unionists appear to be
Ma King progress in settling a rapidly spreading labor dispute,
which has already idled some 20,000 workers. However, if nego-
t,iations break down, the Dutch government may find it necessary
to intervene. The strikes, which have broken several years of
general labor peace in the Netherlands, are aimed at forcing
employers to continue to accept the principle of indexing wages
to cost-of-living increases, but the unusual militancy of the
Dutch unions also reflects their determination to move now
toward achieving more influence over business policy.
wore-n ours through strikes than has any other country in the
European Community. A shift by labor toward tougher tactics has
been gathering steam, however. Disagreements have focused on
the unions' goal of further narrowing income differentials--
although the gap between rich and poor in the Netherlands is
already smaller than in any other country in the industrialized
West--and on the extent of worker participation in company in-
vestment decisions.
For several years, the Netherlands has lost fewer
I The latest strikes were launched early this week after
emp oyer maintained a solid front against union demands that
wage indexing be retained in a new national wage agreement. Em-
ployers, faced with diminishing profit margins and prospects of
Approved For
 Approved Fo
continued sluggish investment., insist that they no longer can
commit themselves to "handing out a blank check" every year.
The unions have responded by refusing to negotiate on wage in-
creases without employers' advance agreement to automatic
cost-of-living compensation.
I The unions are apparently willing to limit their gains
in real wages as long as the cost-of-living pay adjustment is
maintained. Employers, however, seem to fear that a new wage
agreement might open the door to further demands by labor. La-
bor leaders appreciate the need for wage restraint, but they
maintain that the government and employers must in return come
up with assurances that new employment-creating investment will
be forthcoming and that the workers will have a greater say in
corporate decision-making.
I IThe Dutch economy since 1970 has been faced with stag-
nanr to investment, falling rates of return on investment,
rapid inflation, and an increase in the size of the public sec-
tor. The basic cause is the government's expansion of the social
welfare system in advance of the nation's ability to pay for it.
The result has been a rising tax burden, particularly on busi-
ness, and inflation created by the competition among various
groups for an unreduced share of the national income.
I I So far, the government, abiding by the initial wishes
0 ot labor and employers, has not moved to resolve the dead-
lock. Pressures on the government, which faces a general elec-
tion in May, are mounting, however, and the opposing sides are
also showing signs that they want the government to step in.
The government could take a hand:
--By relenting in its determination not to let industry re-
flect the cost-of-living wage increase in product prices.
--By using a substantial excess in funds amassed last year
for social security payments to assist or pay for an auto-
matic wage increase.
--By reducing corporate taxes to offset the wage increase.
Approved ForiRelease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T0097541029800010020-9
 Approved For
I A compromise solution will probably soon be found that
wi satisfy the rank-and-file workers. There will be no easy
answer, however, to the longer range goals of the union leaders.
An even greater challenge to employers lies ahead. The
unions are pushing a bill now before parliament that would tax
"excess profits" to create a central fund, probably to be admin-
istered by the unions. Employers fear that this could lead to
union control over Dutch industry, although the bill's sponsors
assert that it would be used mainly to finance pension schemes.
LEBANON: Heavy Fighting
Troops of the largely Syrian, Arab peacekeeping
or e shed yesterday with commandos supporting the Pales-
tinian "rejection front" near the Sabra refugee camp in the
southern outskirts of Beirut. The fighting, the first involving
the peacekeeping forces since December 21, was heavy and in-
volved the use of tanks and artillery.
Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02p800010020-9
 Approved For
Arab diplomatic sources reported that the peacekeep-
ing torces were supported by commandos of the Syrian-controlled
Saiqa organization. While details are vague, the fighting may
have been caused by attempts by the peacekeeping forces to
seize heavy weapons held by the "rejectionists."
SIERRA LEONE: Continuing Unrest
I Demonstrations against the Sierra Leone government
continueU yesterday in outlying towns, but Freetown was calm.
25X1
I Primary and secondary schools in the capital have
reopened, but attendance is low. The university remains closed
pending completion of repairs necessitated by extensive damage
during the violent demonstrations last week.
I The current unrest has been building for some time.
Discontent over Sierra Leone's economic performance had already
been increasing. Although students initiated the demonstrations,
they apparently have considerable public sympathy.
The students have been calling for the resignation
of 71-year-old President Stevens, who came to power eight years
ago after a period of political instability. Stevens has erected
a strong presidential system and a de facto one-party state.
His party, however, has a narrow ethnic base and is badly
factionalized.
I IDeep divisions within the party and the country as
a whole are likely to remain, even if outward calm is restored.
Stevens has survived two coup attempts since he came to power,
and a succession struggle for his position seems likely.
I The Soviets on Wednesday rebutted China's continuing
propaganda attacks on the USSR, using as the vehicle an author-
itative "Observer" article in Pravda. It is the first time the
Approved Fot Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00974A029800010020-9
 Approved For Re
propaganda attacks on the USSR, using as the vehicle an author-
itative "Observer" article in Pravda. It is the first time the
Soviet press has responded to China's charges since the death
of Mao Tse-tung in September.
I I The more-in-sorrow-than-in-anger tone of the article
sucfges s that the Pravda piece is mainly for the record. Moscow
almost surely does not plan an immediate resumption of all-out
propaganda attacks on the Chinese because the Soviets may still
have some hope for an easing of Sino-Soviet tensions. The So-
viets probably also see some value in giving the US the impres-
sion that there is a possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
I The article is one more sign, however, of Soviet
1rus ra ion over the failure of efforts to start a dialogue
with China's new leaders. Last week, a Soviet radio broadcast
by a prominent Izvestia commentator, Aleksandr Bovin, attacked
Chinese policies in a way that had not been seen since Mao's
death. In a probable effort to produce some movement in the ap-
parently stalemated border talks, the Soviets also let it be
known that they are contemplating withdrawing their chief nego-
tiator from the talks in Peking.
I I Summary versions of the article indicate that it fo-
cused on answering the charges China leveled in a party circu-
lar in January at the Soviets' alleged desire to "subjugate"
China. "Observer" ridiculed the charge as one made in the
spirit of the cold war.
I To buttress his case that the USSR really wants bet-
e ons with China, "Observer" cited old Soviet proposals
to the Chinese for non-use of force and nonaggression treaties.
The article indicated that Moscow had made at least one new
proposal in recent months.
EC-PORTUGAL: Membership Bid
//Foreign ministers of the European Community
agreed in principle this week to accept a Portuguese bid for
membership but said that many economic and political problems
must be overcome before a date can be set to begin negotia-
tions.//
Approved For Rlelease 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0g9800010020-9
 Approved For
//The EC decision reflects an effort by the Nine
to develop a common position on the question of Portugal's
membership before Portuguese Prime Minister Soares begins his
tour of EC capitals on Monday. Soares plans to visit London,
Dublin, Rome, and Copenhagen next week; he expects to complete
his tour early next month with visits to Paris, Bonn, Amster-
dam, Luxembourg, and Brussels.//
I //Soares undoubtedly will proclaim the EC decision
as a persona victory, given the overriding importance he has
attached to securing an EC commitment to full Portuguese mem-
bership. The French and the Belgians had earlier resisted such
a commitment, suggesting "associate" status for Portugal.//
//The West Germans and the British, however, have
o ere thePortuguese stronger support, arguing in part that
the EC simply cannot refuse an application from a democratic
European state. They are also afraid that to offer anything
less than full membership would be seen as a European "rejec-
tion" of Portugal and that this would seriously undermine
Soares' political standing at home.//
//EC foreign ministers contemplate a lengthy
transition period prior to Portugal's membership during which
international and EC efforts would be made to help stabilize
the Portuguese economy. Although the Community, as such, has
no plans for increasing its economic assistance to Portugal,
it will probably play a role in coordinating its members' of-
fers of bilateral assistance. West Germany is likely to be the
major source of such aid.//
//A long transition would be welcomed by the Bel-
gians and e Dutch, who have complained that the Community's
internal decision-making machinery should be strengthened be-
fore the EC adds new members. French Prime Minister Barre has
also warned that major adjustments in the EC's agricultural
policy, particularly with regard to wine, fruits, and vegeta-
bles, will be necessary before any Mediterranean state joins
the Community.//
//The French and the Belgians are also concerned
over the prospects for long-term political stability in Portu-
gal and the embarrassment a major shift to the right or left
Approved Fora Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29P00010020-9
 Approved For
would cause if the Community moved precipitously in accepting
Portugal. Although the Nine discussed ways in which Portugal
could be drawn into their political consultations during the
IU:ransition period, this was rejected on the grounds it would
only lead to demands from other Mediterranean states for simi-
har treatment.//
//The foreign ministers undoubtedly intended their
:A-iLement on Portuguese accession as a signal to both Greece
and Spain that the Community's position in future negotiations
will be influenced strongly by both political and economic con-
siderations. Although negotiations with Greece are now well
under way, the Nine have only recently begun to consider seri-
ously the broader questions posed by enlargement. In a speech
to the European Parliament last week, EC Commission president
Jenkins cautioned that the Nine must carefully study institu-
'Jnnal as well as economic implications of enlargement.//
//The EC foreign ministers hope to take up these