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December 20, 2016
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April 10, 2006
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March 9, 1977
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Pr AV AV AV AV AV AV AV Aar AAF Aq 1 1 1 1 1 1 11ppoolirm Rele ase 200 t03t06 TO: NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 2 3 4 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPAR E REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOM MENDATION COMMENT FILE RETUR N CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE REMARKS: FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE CIA-RDP79T00975AO299010dr-96cret 21..7 (Security Classification) CONTROL NO. Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE, Wednesday March 9, 1977 CG NIDC 77-055C State Dept. review completed w 2 1 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 0 25X1 Top Secret 0 Classification) Approved For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T00975A02 001 - 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010016-3 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010016-3 Approved For Rp' I National Intelligence Cable for Wednesday March 9, 1977. 25X1 l e NID a e is for a purpose ot informing senior o icials. CONTENTS CUBA-US: Human Rights Page 1 NAMIBIA: Constitutional Talks Page 1 RHODESIA: Nkomo's Military Plans Page 3 USSR: Winter Grain Crops Page 4 ROMANIA: Ceausescu's African Trip Page 5 BRAZIL: Technology Transfer Page 6 LIBYA-EGYPT: Relations Page 7 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T009754029900010016-3 Approved For 4elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02 900010016-3 25X1 CUBA-US: Human Rights I ICuba has begun a campaign in its press aimed at call- ing a en ion to alleged questionable human rights practices in the US. President Castro probably wants to signal the US that the human rights issue can be a two-edged sword and that, while he may be willing to discuss the issue in a general way with the US, the subject of Cuban political prisoners should not be pressed in any negotiations. I Both the official daily Granma and the Cuban news agency rensa Latina are using material originated by Cubans as well as items from the Soviet news agency Tass that high- light alleged US violations of human rights. a US me association that denounced substandard hygienic conditions in US penitentiaries. The Cuban paper also repro- An article in Granma last week quoted a report from duced a Tass report that harshly criticized the US for not de- fending human rights in "countries where it had helped estab- lish dictatorial regimes," such as Chile. Cuba's communist youth newspaper has taken the US to task for its activities in Vietnam. The campaign is a reaction to official US comments 25X1 25X1 on the human rights situation in Cuba. Car os Rafael Rodriguez, the number-three man in the Cuban hierarchy, reiterated Cuba's official position in a BBC-TV interview last month that there are no political prisoners in Cuba. NAMIBIA: Constitutional Talks An interim government in Namibia could be established in the next several months--before South Africa comes under in- ternational pressure to negotiate with the South-West Africa Peoples Organization. SWAPO is recognized by the UN and OAU as the authentic representative of Namibia. Approved For'2elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02p900010016-3 Approved For I I The so-called Turnhalle conference--the multiracial constitutional talks on an interim government that would lead Namibia to full independence--reconvened last week in full plenary session for the first time in several months. The one white and 10 nonwhite delegations are reviewing those parts of the proposed constitution that have been approved by consensus of a small drafting committee. The committee is now concentrating on one remaining problem the functions of the prime minister, or chairman of the council of ministers. I I The committee last week quickly reached a consensus a a proposed bill of rights, which might have seriously eroded apartheid in Namibia, would not be legally enforceable. Instead, a constitutional court will merely advise the various levels of government, if requested, whether a law might conflict with the bill of rights. The nonwhite delegates clearly are un- happy, but reportedly realize that this compromise was neces- sary to keep the talks moving. The compromise may also have overcome another poten- tial stur ling block. White leaders had called for a referen- dum in the white community to approve the final Turnhalle pro- posals. Provision of an enforceable bill of rights might have led to white rejection of the proposal and the breakup of the conference. I IThe referendum will presumably still take place as soon a e conference ends, possibly because South African Prime Minister Vorster wants to ease the concerns of his con- servative supporters and thus facilitate passage through the South African parliament of enabling legislation for the in- terim government. From the beginning of the Turnhalle conference in the fall of 1975, Vorster seemed willing to let it drift along. Last fall, however, some nonwhite delegates threatened to break up the talks over continued white stonewalling. Vorstex reluc- tantly intervened to prevent a collapse of the conference. We believe that Vorster had determined by the end of last year that it was time to forge ahead. When Turnhalle re- sumed in January, the delegates were probably given to under- stand that Vorster wanted progress. During the past two months, Approved For (Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02V900010016-3 Approved For several thorny issues have been resolved, mostly by compromise on the part of the nonwhites, who probably believe a government: of their own devising is preferable to one imposed from out- side. Vorster also views the new US administration as deter- mined o- see Namibian independence realized through an inter- national conference at which SWAPO is represented--SWAPO is not participating in the Turnhalle talks. Vorster would thus probably prefer to establish Namibia's interim government and use fait accompli as a bargaining lever in future internation- ally sponsored negotiations. He may also believe that SWAPO will not be able to mount much of a guerrilla offensive for many months, and that international pressure would therefore force SWAPO president Sam Nujoma to negotiate on terms more acceptable to South Africa than those Nujoma has insisted on since last year. I IThis course of action is risky for South Africa. The nonwni-fe population may be unwilling to accept Turnhalle's likely formula--a loose federal system that would enable whites to retain control of the country's rich mineral resources. In addition, Vorster could be underestimating SWAPO's capability. There is a good possibility that SWAPO will be able to begin a serious insurgent effort within the next several months. While South Africa will be able to deal militarily with any in- creased activity SWAPO can mount, Vorster will face additional political pressures he does not need, primarily from abroad, such as the UN. RHODESIA: Nkomo's Military Plans Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union is try- ing to improve its military capabilities and expand its rela- tively small guerrilla force. Although ZAPU has increased its recruiting in recent months, its guerrillas are much less numer- ous and its military activities in western Rhodesia are on a much smaller scale than those of the Zimbabwe African National Union in eastern Rhodesia. Approved For Wlease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02P900010016-3 Approved For Re Although Nkomo is allied with ZANU's Robert Mugabe in the Patriotic Front, Nkomo realizes that if a settlement can be reached with Rhodesia's whites, ZANU and ZAPU will probably be rivals for power in a black government. Without a strong mili- tary force, Nkomo could be at a disadvantage. I I Nkomo probably has been seeking more military aid dur- ing the past week while he was in the USSR and East Germany. He may have asked the Soviets to channel equipment to ZAPU through Angola. USSR: Winter Grain Crops Prospects for Soviet winter grains in 1977 remain favorable. We estimate that less than 4 percent of grains sown 25X1 Approved For elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 29900010016-3 Approved For loss last year exceeded 25 percent, and normal winter losses run about 16 percent. In contrast to last year, the fall-sown crops this year went into dormancy in good condition with fa- vorable plant development and high soil-moisture reserves. I ISince mid-February, warm temperatures in the southern part of European USSR have caused the resumption of vegetative growth in Moldavia, the southern Ukraine, and the northern Cau- casus. Crops in these regions have lost their winter hardiness, and about one third of the winter grain area now is vulnerable to cold snaps that frequently occur in March and April. Weather conditions through mid-June will determine the final size of the crop. I IWinter grains were sown on about 38.5 million hec- ares, e largest area sown since 1968 and 1 million hectares greater than last year. Normally, fall-sown grains account for one third of total Soviet grain output. ROMANIA: Ceausescu's African Trip I I President Ceausescu stressed Romania's third world ties an sought expanded bilateral trade during his 12-day trip to Africa, which ended on Saturday just before the earth- quake. It was Ceausescu's first.trip to Africa in three years. He visited Mauritania, Senegal, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria and was accompanied by foreign affairs and industrial officials. The regime is presumably pleased with the visits. At every opportunity, Ceausescu highlighted Romania's support for a new international economic order and the elimination of co- lonialism, racism, and apartheid. He also emphasized noninter- ference in internal affairs, national sovereignty, equal rights among states, and renunciation of the use or threat of force in interstate relations. While the Soviets have come to expect such language from the Romanians, they nonetheless will find it irritating. Approved For R4lease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02$900010016-3 Approved For P,,elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975k I lAt each stop, the Romanians signed trade or economic pro torn s pledging greater bilateral cooperation. Romania agreed to reschedule Ghana's $1.4-million debt, and established a joint economic commission with the Ivorians. Ceausescu may have secured increased supplies of raw materials, but he ap- parently could not convince the Nigerians to sell oil to Ro- mania. Ceausescu hopes that the trip will help to secure African support for Romania's bid to become an "observer" in the nonaligned movement. In the past, some African states strongly opposed Bucharest's candidacy, and, at last August's summit in Colombo, Romania was admitted only as a "guest." BRAZIL: Technology Transfer //Brazil will probably choose a French proposal for construction of a large petrochemical facility over other proposals because the French bid encompasses more effective technology transfer. The $30-million contract will be the ini- tial step in construction of a $1.2-billion complex.// //The research arm of the Brazilian state petro- chemical company, Centas, evaluated the technology transfer elements of the various proposals. Although we do not know the specific criteria used, they probably included the amount of local engineering to be used, training to be provided,, and the actual level of the technology.// I The French firms apparently accurately perceived Bra- zi s attitude toward technology transfer and geared their pro- posal accordingly. I I The Brazilians have explicit criteria for judging the likely e fectiveness of technology transfers, and these judg- ments evidently can be decisive in contract awards. This is not only a measure of Brazilian sophistication about technology transfer but is an example of the importance internat:_onal technology transfer is assuming among the more advanced devel- oping nations. 25X1 r.. Approved For 4elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 29900010016-3 Approved For I Radio Tripoli reported on Sunday that Egyptian author- ities 1a closed the border between Libya and Egypt. The Lib- yans also said the Egyptians were interfering with Libyan air- craft and had turned back a number of scheduled flights. The immediate cause of the Egyptian actions probably was a speech by Libyan leader Qadhafi at last week's People's General Congress in which he denounced the Sadat regime as cor- rupt and as the puppet of the US CIA. Qadhafi also said Libya stands ready to come to the aid of the "downtrodden masses of Egypt." A Libyan media campaign against Egypt has been in full swing since the popular demonstrations and riots in Egypt in mid-January. Libyan broadcasts beamed to Egypt appear to be aimed at inciting students into demonstrating against the gov- ernment. Approved For Approved For gyp was expecting more Egyp- tians to be expelled from Libya in the near future including all Egyptian teachers in the primary school system and most Egyptian technicians in senior positions in the Libyan govern- ment. an increasing number of Egyptian residents in Libya, main y professional people, were turning in their passports in order to accept Libyan na- tionality, allegedly under pressure from the Libyan government.// Approved For FRelease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T009754029900010016-3 PV AW AW AAV AIV AIV AIF AV AV AW 7 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010016-3 Top Secret 0 (Security Classification) 10 0 1 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0, ,0 0 0 0 0 Top Secret 0 0 Adw AOW (Security 61tl@11llildr Release 2007/03/06 CIA-RDP79T00975AO29900010016-3 Aw Aw Aw Aw Aw Aw Aj