NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010026-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 15, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday March 15, 1977 CG NIDC 77-060C
State Dept. review completed
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
lSecurlty u
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National Intelli ence Dail Cable for Tuesday March 15, 1977
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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior~U ~of~icials.
CONTErdTS
USSR-US: Human Rights
ZAIRE: Situation Report
CUBA-ETHIOPIA: Castro's Visit
PAKISTAN: Opposition Campaign
SOUTH AFRICA: Economic Measures
ROMANIA: Earthquake Assistance
Page 1
Page 3
Page 5
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
POLAND: World Bank and IMF
FRANCE: Possible Economic Delay
PHILIPPINES: Plebiscite Negotiations
CHINA - NORTH KOREA: Trade Agreement
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Page 10
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USSR-US: Human Rights
The Pravda article on Sunday that indirectly warned
t at t e distrust created by recriminations over the human
rights issue could affect Secretary Vance's trip to Moscow
later this month was the first such reference in public, al-
though the deputy director of the USA Institute took a similar
line in private late last montYi.
Pravda used its authoritative weekly review of world
a airs to reject the view, which it ascribed to the U5, that
criticism of the USSR on human rights does not interfere with
the pursuit of detente, including tal}:s on limiting strategic
weapons. The Pravda commentator, Vladimir Bolshakov, cited the
views of unnamed 44est European leaders, who have allegedly
warned that the human rights i;~sue could have an adverse im-
pact on the Belgrade meeting this summer to review progress on
implementing the 1975 Helsinki accords.
In addition to Bolshakov's guarded language, there
have een other Soviet efforts to link human rights and the
strategic arms limitations talks in the past several days. An
article in Izvestia on Saturday by USA Institute chief Georgy
Arbatov warned that the "noisy campaign" by the US could harm
the political atmosphere and place additional blocks in the
path of ending the arms race.
He also told the US ambassador last week that the
"concrete campaign" by the US has created a situation in which
Secretary Vance "will need to bring more to Moscow in his bags"
than would otherwise have been necessary.
Red Star contended that the current "anti-Soviet
ysteria in the US could seriously "poison" the atmosphere
surrounding strategic arms limitations talks and that success-
ful talks with the USSR could not be conducted w}iile an un-
friendly campaign was under way.
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The linking of the human rights issue to b~.lateral
concerns is accompanied by an increase in Soviet criticism of
the new US administration. In addition to Bolshakov's article,
Pravda on the same day accused the President of "encouraging"
Israel's territorial claims against the Arab states. The So-
viets' press coverage of the President's news conference on
March 9 was also more critical than their comments on the
President's two me_e-tings with the press in February.
A Soviet public lecturer recently took a particularly
negative view of the US administration, which has hitherto been
portrayed as seeking progress on bilateral issues, particularly
arms control. The lecturer charged that there has been no im-
provement in the US position on disarmament and accused the
President of trying to revise a previous understanding by ex-
cluding the cruise missile from current negotiations.
The lecturer added that the human rights campaign in
the US, which he described as "slanderous," was supported in
"high government circles," citing the President's letter to
dissident spokesman Andrey Sakharov and the meeting with Vladi-
mir Bukovsky.
The harsher public line has been supported in recent
days by private Soviet intimations that the association be-
tween human rights and bilateral issues could mean negative
consequences for the latter. A Soviet Foreign Alinistry official
remarked last Wednesday that, for the sake of detente-, public
comments on human rights should be ended and "quiet diplomacy"
pursued. An of-ficial of the USA Institute called the President's
meeting with Bukovsky a "particularly bad move."
After a lull of several days, the Soviets have thus
returned to the human rights issue with renewed vigor, includ-
ing some of their most direct and critical commentary on the
US administration. The Soviets continue to stress their commit-
ment to detente, however, and have indicated that Secretary
Vance's trip is particularly important. The Soviets, neverthe-
less, are clearly perplexed by the US emphasis on human rights, 25X1.:
which they did not anticipate, and want to end mutual recrim-
inations before the high-level talks be in so that the issue
does not dominate the exchanges.
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ZAIRE: Situation Report
~ Some military assistance from Belgium and France may
soon be forthcoming. The Belgian airlift of over 700 tons of
ammunition, small arms, and other supplies reportedly was ex-
pected to start late yesterday or today. France apparently is
studying a `Zairian request for five heavy transport helicopters,
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If Zairian forces are unable to throw back the Katan-
gans wit in a short time, the reverberations will be felt through-
out the military and political hierarchy, as well as among al-
ready disaffected elements in Shaba and elsewhere. Economic life
has virtually come to a standstill in Shaba, the main industrial
area of Zaire.
The Zairian President meanwhile has begun a low-key
ip oma is effort to explain the Shaba situation to other Afri-
can countries. His only hope of: obtaining diplomatic support is
to convince other Africans thaw the Angolans are fosi'~ering a
separatist movement in Zaire.
Pdobutu has notified the UN of the attack, but he does
no ye p an to make a formal complaint either to the UN or the
Organization of African Unity.
Kinshasa radio has sharply attacked the "front-line"
s a es, probably because Angola is a key member, charging them
with hypocrisy in their policies toward "South Africsx and their
neighboring countries." Zambia reportedly has held up selling
vital fuel supplies to Zaire until Zaire puts up hard cash.
//The presidents of the front-line states met yes-
ter ay in P4ozambique, and they undoubtedly discussed the Zaire
problem. We do not expect the presidents to make concrete ro-
posals to ease the situation. 25X1
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//Cuban President Fidel Castro's arrival in Ethiopia
yester ay may be an indication that the Cubans have decided to 25X1
extend military assistance to the Ethiopians.//
~ //The Cubans' recent interest in Ethiopia parallels
an increasingly pro-Soviet bent on the part of the beleaguered
military regime in Addis Ababa. Although Cuba established diplo-
matic relations with Ethiopia in July 1975, it did not get around
to staffing an embassy until a year later.//
//Castro's visit to Ethiopia follows his three-day
official visit to Somalia, a traditional antagonist of the Ethi-
opians, where Cuba has maintained a limited presence for a num-
ber of years. Between 200 and 300 Cuban advisers provide para-
military training and political indoctrination for the Somali
people's militia, and a handful of Cuban civilian technicians
staff small sugar cultivation and medical assistance programs.//
/Castro's tour, which began on March 1, has also 25X1
inclu e visits to Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen.
PAKISTAPd: Opposition Campaign
The Pakistani opposition's campaign against Prime
Minister Bhutto has the potential to threaten his leadership,
but so far it does not appear to have sufficient popular sup-
port to mount a significant challenge.
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The opposition has charged that Bhutto rigged the
national assembly election last week and has demanded that he
resign and a new election be held. The US embassy believes that
Bhutto's commanding majority in the new assembly was due to
electoral fraud but that his party might have emerged with a
majority, although smaller, in an honest election.
The opposition so far seems to be testing its strength
ra er an making a direct effort against Bhutto. It apparently
will concentrate for now on the cities, where it is sure of its
strength, but it presumably hopes eventually to organize a na-
tionwide mass movement that would include the rural areas where
Bhutto won his majority.
In a speech on Saturday, Bhutto appeared to be offer-
ing a compromise. Although he said the national assembly elec-
tion would stand, he implied that the opposition might be able
to double its representation by challenging the results before
the election commission. Bhutto offered to hold talks with the
opposition without pre-conditions and implied that the provin-
cial assembly elections--which the opposition boycotted--could
be held a second time.
The opposition refused to meet Bhutto and continued
its campaign. yesterday with small demonstrations, apparently
designed to force the arrest of most opposition leaders.
Although there has been some violence sincE~ the elec-
tion, the opposition so far has sought to avoid major disorders.
Should the opposition organize massive demonstration:, clashes
would be likely. The opposition would have difficults~ bringing
Bhutto down without at least threatening serious civil disorder.
Bhutto can count on the support of the sec~~rity forces
only so long as the believe he has the su ort of a majority
of Pakistanis.
South Africa increased sales taxes and rai;~ed rate
sc e u es on the government-owned railroads last wee}: in an-
ticipation of revenue shortages for the next budget. This will
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raise the cast of living for everyone, but the heaviest impact
will fall on urban blacks. Income taxes, which mostly affect
whites, already are considered extremely high.
Minister of Finance Harwood announced that the sales
tax, which covers nearly all manufactured goods, will range
from 8 to 33 percent. Harwood indicated that the new rates
were imposed before the full budget presentation, which is ex-
pected later this month, to prevent panic buying.
Freight rates will increase by about 22 percent and
passenger fares by an average of 16 percent. Railroads are the
major freight carriers in South Africa; the rate hike will spur
a price increase for almost all goods, including food. Urban
blacks in particular will suffer because a large number of
them commute by rail.
Several white business leaders and prominent blacks
have come out against the actions. Economic criticism has fo-
cused on the adverse effects the measures will have on the re-
covery from the current recession. The English-language press
has commented that the increases are likely to contribute to
black bitterness. The new measures may be more defensible,
however, if the full budget contains provisions to increase
overnment s ending in black urban areas.
ROPIANIA: Earthquake Assistance
The USSR is donating abaut $13 million worth of con-
struction equipment and materials to help Romania recover from
the devastating LRarch 4 earthquake. The Soviet donation report-
edly exceeds Western assistance already delivered or pledged
and ends speculation in Bucharest that Moscow would not help
out because of Romania's independent foreign policy.
Moscow's major contribution will be a plant capable
o pro ucing up to 80,000 square meters of prefabricated con-
crete building slabs per year. Substantial quantities of lumber,
insulation materials, glass, water and gas pipe, and other
building materials are also promised, as well as a large number
of trucks, buses, tractors, bulldozers, and ambulances.
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The items to be contributed by Moscow are consistent
wit e-types of construction equipment and materials speci-
fied by t3ucharest as necessary for reconstruction. Moreover, the
aid focuses on rebuilding housing, which is critically needed.
The effectiveness of the aid, however, will depend o:a its timely
delivery.
The sizable amount of Soviet aid contrasts with P~1os-
n assistance to Romania during the disastrous floods
of 1970 and 1975. On those occasions, China, West Germany, and
the US provided substantial relief to Romania.
The Soviets may feel it prudent to provide more help
now ecause of Romanian President Ceausescu's current "rapproche-
ment" with the USSR. The Romanian leader took an oblique jab
at PZoscow during a news conference last Thursday, whE~n he im-
plied that the USSR had not yet furnished any economic assist-
ance. He said that, except for Czechoslovakia and Ea,~t Germany,
foreign countries had delivered or pledged only emergency medi-
cal relief.
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The Romanian media have prominently reported the So- '.
vie gran , and this treatment fits the pattern of improved bi-
lateral relations. Cearsescu may also calculate that the an-
nouncement will stimulate further Western assistance,. 25X1
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POLAND: World Bank and IMF
//Poland reportedly is considering membership
e or Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The
World Bank has long regarded Poland as a prime candidate for
membership but has apparently attributed its failure to apply
for membership to a combination of Soviet and domestic pressure
against highly visible involvement in "capitalist" institutions.//
//Polish exports could benefit from World Bank
mem ership. In the past, Poland has been excluded from partici-
pating in projects sponsored by the UN International Develop-
ment Organization and funded by tree World Bank because the
bank's rules require that bidders on projects must represent
nations that are members of the bank.//
//Electric power generating equipment, sugar
ee re'ining plants, and textile machinery are included among
the items that Poland has particular competence in producing
and that are in demand in the developing countries.//
Poland must first join the International Monetary Fund
o e eligible for membership in the World Bank. Poland's in-
centive for joining the institutions may in fact be influenced
more by the advantages accruing from IMF membership than from
World Bank membership, because it would be able to tap the IMF's
resources for balance-of-payments assistance.
Warsaw's hard-currency problems have increased dra-
ma lca y in recent years. Last year, Poland had a record $3.3-
billion trade deficit with the developed West, contributing to
a hard-currency indebtedness of $10.2 billion and a debt-service
ratio of almost 50 percent by the end of the year, Membership in
the IMF would enhance Poland's flexibility in dealing with its
chronic balance-of-payments problems.
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Yugoslavia, Romania, Cuba, and Vietnam are the only
communist members of the IMF and the World Bank. Cuba's member-
ship predates its communist-government; Vietnam took over the
seat formerly held by South Vietnam. Comrnunist countries--
particularly the USSR--have spurned IMF membership in the past,
largely because of financial disclosure and other IMF require-
ments.
Opposition from the USSR to Poland's membership re-
mains a distinct possibility. The US5R has considerable levera e,
in view of its recent aid commitments to Poland. 25X1...,
FRANCE: Possible Economic Delay
//France may not implement the major economic
stimulus program widely anticipated for later this year, ac-
cording to a source with good contacts in the government.//
//President Giscard reportedly fears that a stim-
u us program adopted just before the 1978 parliamentary elec-
tion would be seen as a purely political move. It has generally
been expected that a broad economic expansion program will be
implemented later this year to convince voters that the govern-
ment is dealing effectively with the country's economic prob-
lems, especially unemployment.//
//Giscard, whose term runs until 1981, reportedly
believes that a low rate of inflation would best serve his
long-term political interests. He is afraid that expansionary
economic measures at this time would lead to continued budget
deficits and upward pressure on prices.//
//The French government reportedly will continue
to prove e se ective financial assistance to hard-hit sectors--
measures that probably will not give much of a boost to the
French economy.//
//At the same time, the government has keen hold-
ing interes rates at artificially high levels in anticipation
of leftist gains registered earlier this week in municipal
elections. Such gains normally would be expected to 1;ead to
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capital-outflows and exert downward pressure on the franc. By
temporarily maintaining elevated interest rates, the government
hoped to forestall capital outflows and thus minimize the de-
stabilizin ec effects of election losses.
PHILIPPINES; Plebiscite Negotiations
Philippine President P~arcos may be preparing to post-
ne .e plebiscite set for Thursday on a proposed Muslim auton-
omous zone in the southern Philippines.
Marcos raised the possibility of such a move in a
engt y television interview late last wee}:. The Philippine
leader may-think that a postponement could lead Muslim rebel
leaders to back down from some of their more extreme demands,
such as calling for their own armed forces.
A high-level Philippine delegation, led by the Presi-
dent's wife, is now in Libya in an attempt to break the impasse
between Manila and the Libyan-supported Philippine Muslim rebels.
Talks under way there intermittently since December had resulted
in a cease-fire and an initial agreement, which included an au-
tonomous zone, but Marcos' subsequent call for a plebiscite--
which in effect would reduce the size of the proposed region by
leaving out several Christian-dominated provinces--brought ne-
gotiations to a stalemate.
In his nationwide television interview, Marcos pro-
fessed optimism about an eventual solution to the Muslim ques-
tion, but-his remarks were generally self-serving and pointedly
aimed at placing the blame for any new outbreak of hostilities
on the Muslims and their Libyan backers. The President labeled
the conflict an "exported war" in which Libyan President 4adhafi
called the shots, and Marcos warned the Muslim rebels a ainst
any further cease-fire violations. 25X1
CHINA - PdORTH KOREA: Trade Agreement
China and North Korea signed a long-term trade agree-
ment on Saturday in Peking. The pact covers trade in "major
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commodities" between the two countries from 1977 to 1981, ac-
cording to the North Korean news service. It replaces a similar
agreement for the period from 1971 to 1976. North Korea imports
coking coal, crude oil, and petr-oleum products from China, and
exports iron ore, anthracite coal, and machinery to China.
North Korea's continuing forei-gn debt problem has in-
creased its dependence on China and the USSR. Both China and
the USSR appear anxious to avoid any increased tensions on the
Korean peninsula, and both doubtless consider favorable economic
ties a useful means of maintaining their influence in Pyongyang.
The North Koreans signed a trade protocol with the
Soviets ast month, but the USSR apparently was not as generous
as the North Koreans would have liked.. As in the past,: no de-
tails of the Ch' se - North Korean agreement have beE~n released
by either side.
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 e "I
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'i Top Secret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
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