CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010036-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2008
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: March 21, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CARTE 0
Monday March 21, 1977 CG NIDC 77-065C 0
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National Intelligence D Cable for Monday, March 21, 1977.
e D Cab is r e purpose o in orming
senior o icials.
AUSTRALIA: Prime Minister to US
Page 2
ITALY: Political Tension
Page 4
CONGO: Aftermath of Assassination
JAPAN: New Nuclear Fuel Use
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//Reporting from the US embassy in Canberra indi-
cates that Australian Foreign Minister Peacock will use his
official visit to Washington this week to seek assurances that
the new US administration does not take Australia for granted.
Since coming to office 15 months ago, the Liberal government
headed by Malcolm Fraser has prided itself in having freed the
US-Australian alliance from the strains that developed under
the preceding Labor government.//
//The Fraser government has been disturbed, how-
ever, by e absence of references to Australia and the South-
west Pacific in US pronouncements. It sees this omission as a
possible sign of diminished US interest in the post-World War
II ANZUS alliance, the foundation of Australia's foreign pol-
icy.//
//Australia's feeling of being cast adrift has been
increased by its assessment that the US considers Japan its
major Pacific ally and has not taken into account the role Aus-
tralia feels it can play in the Asia-Pacific region.//
//Australia's fears that it has slipped in the US
estimation were heightened by President Carter's recent sug-
gestion that the Indian ocean be demilitarized. The danger of
Soviet military activities in the Indian Ocean has been a cen-
tral theme of Prime Minister Fraser, and he has strongly sup-
ported a countervailing US military buildup there.//
//The announcement from Washington surprised and
embarrassed the Fraser government--which sets great store on
"closer consultations" with the US--and prompted Australian
press laments that Washington had forgotten campaign promises
to consult allies before acting on issues of mutual concern.//
//Although Peacock is not as conservative as Fraser
and aspires to succeed him as Liberal Party leader, Peacock
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shares the Prime Minister's uneasiness over Soviet intentions.
In a foreign policy speech to parliament last week he echoed
Fraser's statement that any US withdrawals from the Indian
Ocean must be matched by the Soviets. While in Washington, he
will seek reassurances on this score.//
//Peacock will try to complete arrangements for
Prime Minister Fraser's visit in June. Fraser has been nettled
by Australian press carping that the lack of an official an-
nouncement of the visit reflects a reluctance by the US admin-
istration to receive him.//
//The foreign minister may request that a prominent
American attend the annual commemoration in June of the Battle
of the Coral Sea. This event is of considerable psychological
importance in Australia, for it amounts to an annual reaffir-
mation of Australian ties to the US. Australians will see the
level of US representation this year as a measure of their
country's standing with the new US administration.//
//Peacock may solicit additional US aid to the South
Pacific nations to help counter Soviet and Chinese probings in
the area. Australia hopes the fourfold increase in its own aid
commitment will spark a larger US outlay.//
//The Australian foreign minister will try to get
a reading on US and Japanese interest in closer relations with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Australia, which
has been only moderately successful in getting closer to its
Southeast Asian neighbors, wishes to be included in any arrange-
ments ASEAN may make for informal relationships with nonmembers.//
//Peacock. may hope to mute US congressional reac-
tion to renewed publicity by Australian political activists
about alleged Indonesian excesses in East Timor. Strong Aus-
tralian public disapproval of the Indonesian takeover has posed
a recurring dilemma for the government, which--in the interest
of good relations with its northern neighbor--had informally
signaled to Jakarta that it would acquiesce in Indonesian ab-
sorption of the former Portuguese colony.
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Prime Minister Andreotti will hold talks this week
with various political parties and organized labor in an effort
to win broad support for the terms attached to a $530 million
IMF standby credit the government negotiated Thursday. Politi-
cal tensions are rising, and the talks will provide a measure
of Andreotti's ability to retain the cooperation of the Commu-
nists, Socialists, and other parties that permit him to govern
through their abstention in parliament.
The controversy over the IMF terms--which include
guidelines for reducing Italy's inflation rate--is over meas-
ures the government has proposed to meet IMF conditions. The
Communists, Socialists, and labor unions are determined to
amend a government decree that limits certain labor costs and
excludes proposed tax increases from the list of items used to
calculate automatic cost-of-living wage increases. To stay in
effect, the decree must win parliamentary approval by the first
week in April.
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Both sides appear to have hardened their positions
lately, despite indications in earlier talks that a compromise
is within reach. Andreotti's Christian Democrats, reacting
largely to the Communist role in parliament's recent indictment
of a former Christian Democratic defense minister in the Lock-
heed affair, are urging the Prime Minister to take a more com-
bative stance in dealing with the Communists. For their part,
the Communists are under increasing pressure from their rank-
and-file, particularly in labor, to take a tougher line with
the government.
Andreotti, whose main strength continues to be the
absence of agreement on any alternative to his minority govern-
ment, will meet today with the leaders of the Communist, So-
cialist, Social Democratic, Republican, and Liberal parties
and will hold talks tomorrow with representatives of the major
labor unions.
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Brazzaville remains outwardly calm following the as-
sassination of Congolese President Ngouabi Friday. The 11-man
military junta that assumed power seems in control of the situ-
ation. The junta probably includes most of Ngouabi's top mili-
tary associates, and is unlikely to deviate from the leftist
course charted by Ngouabi.
The extent of the plot against Ngouabi remains unclear.
According to Radio Brazzaville, the assassination was carried
out by a four-man team of "suicide commandos." The radio has
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charged that the assassins were followers of former president
Massamba-Debat, whose southern-based regime was ousted by Ngo-
uabi, a northerner, in 1968. The ex-president and several of
his associates have been arrested.
Japan's Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development
Corporation is investigating a new method of reusing spent re-
actor fuel without separating plutonium. The method would allow
Japan to use the energy contained in spent reactor fuel while
conforming to US non-proliferation policy.
The Japanese have been conducting studies of the
process tor over 10 years, but they have recently given the
program increased attention. The Japanese think the program
could become a final fall-back position in negotiations with
the US on fuel reprocessing.
Even if the Japanese adopted this method of repro-
cessing reactor fuel, however, it is unlikely that they would
rely on it exclusively or would accept a complete ban on ex-
tracting plutonium from spent reactor fuels.
In the conventional method for reprocessing spent
reactor uel, the fuel is dissolved and the highly radioactive
fission products are removed; the uranium and plutonium are
then separated from each other. The uranium can then be re-en-
riched and used again as fuel in power reactors. The plutonium
can be either stored for later use in fast breeder reactors or
recycled with the uranium as fuel in the current generation of
light-water reactors.
The new process, which the Japanese call co-precipi-
tation, eliminates the second separation step--thereby produc-
ing a mixture of plutonium and uranium unsuitable for a nuclear
explosive. The plutonium in this mixture could be separated by
an additional chemical operation, however, and used for nuclear
explosives.
The mixed-oxide fuel produced from the uranium-plu-
tonium product of the separation plant is suitable for a heavy-
water-moderated reactor but less satisfactory in the current
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generation of light-water reactors. The Japanese nuclear devel-
opment corporation has already conducted successful irradiation
experiments of test fuel pins made from mixed oxides similar
to those expected from the co-precipitation process.
It is unlikely that Japan could use the co-precipi-
tation method exclusively for very long because plutonium will
eventually be required for Japan's fast-breeder reactor pro-
gram. The first such reactor, which will be operational soon,
will use plutonium separated in conventional reprocessing fa-
cilities in the UK. As their reliance on fast-breeder reactors
increases, the Japanese will want their own capability to sep-
arate plutonium.
Japan has other reascns for opposing a complete ban
on p utonium extraction. It has already constructed a fuel re-
processing pilot plant using conventional methods at a cost of
about $200 million; there would be considerable opposition to
spending the additional money necessary to convert this plant
to the co-precipitation process. Some Japanese leaders believe
that the prestige of their government would be undermined by
such action, particularly if it resulted from US pressure.
The Japanese admit that the economic benefits of re-
processing are uncertain, but they consider spent reactor fuel
an important energy resource that should be utilized regardless
of cost.
Although the Japanese are concerned about nuclear
proliferation, they do not believe that US actions to prevent
proliferation should interfere with Japan's overall energy
needs. Japanese leaders view their energy needs and resources--
and hence the policies governing these matters--as vastly dif-
ferent from those of the US.
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//The French municipal elections, which ended yes-
ter ay, reinforced important trends in the nation's politics.
--The Communist-Socialist alliance increased its strength.
--President Giscard's weakness was highlighted despite a
respectable showing by his Independent Republicans.
--Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac's challenge to Giscard
was heightened by Chirac's success in Paris.
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--The Gaullist losses nationwide showed that the governing
majority--which that party dominates--will be vulnerable in
the legislative elections next March.//
//The municipal runoff elections in France brought
additional gains for the Communist-Socialist alliance, which
according to incomplete results has won 21 more towns from the
center-right, giving the leftists more than three quarters of the
220-odd cities with populations over 30,000. The governing coa-
lition apparently won 30 runoff contests for a total of 33 such
cities. In Paris, Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac can claim a
majority of the 109 seats on the city council, and he will be
formally installed as mayor on Wednesday.//
//President Giscard's hand-picked candidate for
mayor of Paris, Michel d'Ornano, failed to win election to the
city council, a serious blow to Giscard's personal prestige.
The latest nationwide projection from yesterday's voting gives
the leftist alliance 51 percent and the center-right coalition
46 percent.//
//The opposition alliance of Communists, Socialists,
and e t Radicals disagrees on key policy issues, but has been
able to set aside differences and concentrate on gaining the sup-
port it needs to win in 1978.//
//Opinion polls have been indicating that the left
can win the approximately 53 percent of the vote it needs to
overcome gerrymandering and gain control of the Assembly in 1978.
The results of the municipal elections, which are not directly
comparable to legislative balloting, show the left drawing closer
to its goal and have given it a strong psychological boost.//
//Comparative analyses of French economic conditions
and voting trends show that after 1962 the left's electoral gains
have resulted from popular discontent with gaps in a generally
prosperous system. The economic conditions in France, where
voters now are concerned about high inflation and unemployment,
appear to strengthen the left's chances for 1978.//
/The government's austerity measures--the Barre
plan--are designed to limit inflation at the cost of some reduced
economic growth, but they may not be enough to preserve the
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right's hold on the Assembly. An extrapolation of the economic
and voting trends since 1962 indicates the left could win about
54 percent of the first round vote next March.//
//The prospect of defeat in 1978 has not had the
uni yang effect on the right that the hope of victory has had
on the left. The governing majority--Gaullists, Independent Re-
publicans, and centrists--is driven by ideological, strategic and
personal differences, many of which center on attitudes toward
the left. These problems have come to a head in the rivalry be-
tween Giscard and Chirac.//
//Discard apparently realizes that there is no im-
me iate chance of success for his long-standing hope of forming
a coalition government that would include moderate leftists. But
he wants the 1978 campaign run on, a reform platform, led by pop-
ular, nonpartisan Prime Minister Barre, that will not foreclose
that option. The French President reportedly believes that he
would gain something by working with a leftist government should
the Communist-Socialist alliance win next year.//
//Giscard hopes to blur warty lines and signifi
can y weaken the Gaullists. The President's lack of effective
leadership, a strong political base and personal popularity,
and the conservative image of his Independent Republican Party
make it difficult to achieve these goals. The fact that his
party did well in municipal races where it opposed the Gaullists
should be some consolation to the President, but it is not a sign
that his efforts to modify the French political spectrum are be-
ginning to take hold.//
//Chirac, on the other hand, wants to preserve and
increase Gaullist power--and his own. He believes that the gov-
ernment's only hope of success in 1978 rests on a hard-hitting
anti-left campaign under his leadership. While Chirac might ad-
vocate reforms if he were in power, he clearly believes that
Giscard's platform is now only encouraging votes for the left.//
//These ideological and strategic differences have
been compounded by the personal confrontation between the two
men in which each sees the other as personally responsible for
the majority's problems. The denouncement of their rivalry in
Paris will give some early indication of whether the two sides
will be able to moderate their hostility.//
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//Both Giscard and Chirac probably agree there
should not be an early election. Chirac has let it be known that
he will not direct Gaullist deputies to withdraw their support
for the President in the Assembly over the next year. The Gaull-
ists need time to try to limit their expected losses in 1978.
Giscard, for his part, expects that the continued application
and success of the Barre plan will strengthen the chances of
his majority and especially of his supporters.//
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valry, the coalition will face a very difficult time in the leg-
islative election and the government will be increasingly vulner-
able to the left opposition and to the Gaullists.
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