NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010037-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: June 22, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Wednesday June 22, 1977 CG NIDC 77-144C
DIA review(s) completed.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
(Security Classification
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Cable for Wednesday, June 22, 1977.
The NID Cable is for the purpose o i
senior officials.
USSR: Carpathian Military Exercise
ISRAEL: Four Cabinet Leaders
ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Beating War Drums
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USSR: Carpathian Military Exercise
The Soviets told military attaches in Moscow on Mon-
day that their military forces will hold an exercise in the
Carpathian Military District in JuZy. This is the fourth exer-
cise that the Soviets have announced in accordance with the
guidelines set forth in the Helsinki accord. The Soviets have
invited all Warsaw Pact countries, Yugoslavia, and five West
European countries to send representatives to observe the ex-
ercise.
This is the largest number of non-Pact countries in-
vited to a Soviet exercise; it is also the first time that coun-
tries other than those near the exercise area have been invited.
Although such exercises may be scheduled well in advance, the
timing of the invitations appears planned to coincide with the
Helsinki followup talks now under way in Belgrade.
I The exercise will take place from July 11 to 16 near
Po an . It will involve both ground and air force units, with
as many as 27,000 men participating. The Helsinki accord calls
for notification 21 days in advance of maneuvers involving more
than 25,000 troops and taking place within 250 kilometers of a
frontier with another European conference participant.
According to the Helsinki Final Act, invitations to
observers are not required. This spring, the USSR announced an
exercise in the Odessa Military District, but issued no invita-
tions to non - Warsaw Pact members. Four of the five non-Pact
nations invited to the July exercise--West Germany, France,
Italy, and Switzerland---had never before received invitations
to observe a Soviet maneuver.
I There have been other indications the Soviets are
easing eir opposition to an expansion of the military-related
"confidence-building measures." The head of the Soviet delega-
tion to the talks in Belgrade told West German diplomats ear-
lier this month that "some" had previously approached the sub-
ject of the confidence-building measures too fearfully, and in-
dicated that the Soviets might now advance some proposals of
their own.
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The USSR's desire to divert the focus of attention
I
at e ks in Belgrade from the subject of human rights is
an influential facto in its effort to appear more accommodat-
ing on other issues.
ISRAEL: Four Cabinet Leaders
I The senior members of the new Israeli cabinet appear
to share generally similar views on crucial foreign policy is.-
sues. Within his cabinet, Prime Minister Begin's most influen-
tial advisers will be Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, Foreign
Minster Moshe Dayan, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, and
probably Education Minister Zevulun Hammer. All four are strong
personalities, and their differences in ideology, personality,
and background may encourage considerable jockeying for rela-
tive positions, particularly if Begin's health deteriorates.
I I Defense Minister Ezer Weizman was Begin's number-two
man in the Herut faction of Likud and probably will play the
same role in the cabinet. The two have long been political al-
lies, but they are not personally close and neither has forgot-
ten that Weizman was dropped from the Herut executive in late
1972 after trying to oust Begin as head of the party. A certain
amount of uneasiness continues to mark their relationship.
I I Like Begin, Weizman thinks peace negotiations should
focus on he Sinai and the Golan Heights where certain conces-
sions might be possible. He also shares Begin's views on the
occupied West Bank and Gaza; both men argue that, for security
reasons, Israel must retain them.
As defense minister. Weizman will be responsible for
administering the occupied territories, and he has stressed
that he plans no major changes in policy. Specifically, he in-
tends to maintain the status quo on interfaith relations and
police restrictions on Jewish prayers in the Temple Mount in
Jerusalem. On domestic issues, Weizman, a former air force
head, is likely to give priority to developing the Israeli
aircraft industry and aggressively marketing its products.
f Weizman's time will probably be spent keep-
h
M
o
uc
ing an eye on Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, probably his main
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rival for influence in the Begin government. Although he pub-
licly denies it, Dayan probably thinks he has an excellent
chance to succeed to the leadership of Likud should Begin leave
the scene. Weizman also sees himself as Begin's successor and,
should Begin suffer another heart attack or have to delegate
substantial authority, the rivalry between Weizman and Dayan
is likely to come into the open.
I Dayan was brought into the government largely because
of his good ties with the West European and US Jewish communi-
ties, where his reputation as the hero of the 1967 war still
stands. It is unlikely that Begin, although he respects Dayan's
abilties, will delegate substantial authority to his foreign
minister. Dayan, a pragmatist and original thinker, may grow
restless under Begin, although his corcern about his political
future--he clearly cannot return to the Labor Party--will keep
Dayan from publicly expressing any discontent.
The brillianti griculture minister,
Ariel Sharon, also will apparently nave a major voice on de-
fense and foreign affairs matters. Sharon, a military hero of
the October 1973 war, will not be restricted by his agricul-
tural portfolio from serving in Begin's inner cabinet.
I ISharon's views on foreign policy issues are basically
compati e with Begin's. Sharon is an outspoken opponent of any
concessions on the issue of the West Bank. Sharon has, however,
suggested a plan for negotiations with various Arab states in-
volving concessions in the Sinai and the Golan Heights; the
plan is somewhat more flexible than what Begin has advocated.
Sharon also has advocated talks with the Palestine
Liberation Organization, but his purpose was to expose the
PLO's "immoderate" positions and thereby discredit it as an
acceptable partner in negotiations.
I Sharon, who rejoined Likud after the election, has
had an uneven political career. He was a founder of Likud, but
split from the party and later joined the Rabin government as
an adviser. His relations with some Likud partisans, notably
members of the Liberal faction, are not good.
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I I A fourth major force in the government will probably
be the outspoken head of the youth faction of the National Re-
ligious Party, Education Minister Zevulun Hammer. A skillful
politician, Hammer led the National Religious Party away from
its relatively flexible position on West Bank concessions and
toward its current position opposing any withdrawals. Hammer
and the youth faction are closely allied to the militant Gush
Emunim settlement organization and have actively supported the
Gush's right to settle in the West Bank.
In certain respects, Hammer may even be to the right
of Begin; he is, for instance, on record as opposing the re-
moval of any settlements in Golan, although he is willing to
offer Syria certain unspecified "arrangements" regarding Israel's
role in that area.
Hammer has already successfully challenged Begin over
the appointment of a deputy minister of education. The National
Religious Party has long coveted the education portfolio, and
Hammer is unlikely to tolerate any interference in ministry
affairs.
ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Beating War Drums
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Tensions between the two countries have risen consid-
era y since Somali-backed guerrillas destroyed at least three
bridges on a key Ethiopian railroad early this month, but we
do not believe Ethiopia is preparing to invade Somalia in the
near future. Ethiopian troops are hard pressed to keep open
lines of communication against the Somali-backed guerrillas in
eastern Ethiopia, and they are ill-prepared for an attack on
Somalia, which has the military edge in the border area.
I lAddis Ababa is conducting an offensive against the
emocra is Union in northern Ethiopia and is training large
numbers of militia units, some of which are to be sent to fight
in eastern Ethiopia. Ethiopia is unlikely to open another major
front while the offensive is under way and before the militia
is ready for battle.
Somalia's concern may have been aroused in part by
the Ethiopians' recent dispatch of approximately two new bat-
talions to Hararge Province. Mogadiscio may also have learned
of Ethiopia' intentions to move M-47 tanks to Jijiga. Addis
Ababa, however, has not returned to the Third Division some im-
portant units transferred several months ago to fight Eritrean
and Democratic Union insurgents.
I Somalia probably also prefers to avoid a general con-
ic soon. We believe, however, that President Siad has con-
cluded that the time is opportune to regain the portion of
Ethiopian territory inhabited by ethnic Somalis and claimed by
Mogadiscio before Ethiopia's manpower expansion and acquisition
of military equipment begins to tilt the military balance in
Addis Ababa's favor. Siad probably prefers a further increase
in guerrilla activities, but he would be prepared to commit his
regular troops if the guerrillas suffered serious reverses.
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I The coming independence of the FTAI, scheduled for
next on ay, has also contributed to the two countries' in-
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Ethiopia and Somalia beTI-eve the o er wi a r-
tempt to asser its control of an independent Djibouti, but
neither appears for now to want a war over the territory. The
presence of French troops after independence will help deter
direct aggression against Djibouti.
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