NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 11, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Thursday August 11, 1977 CG NIDC 77-186C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday August 11, 1977.
The NID Cable is tor e purpose
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
US-USSR: Bilateral Relations
Page 1
EGYPT-SOMALIA: Support and Aid
LEBANON: Shelling Intensifies
Page 4
Page 5
CHINA-USSR:
Border River Talks
Relations Cooling
Page 6
Page 7
Page 9
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US-USSR: Bilateral Relations
the head of the USA Insti-
Arbatov
i
or
I//G
,
y
g
e
ld US Ambassador Toon on Monday that there
tute in Moscow, to
was a need for a continuing dialogue nd his communications"
between the USSR and the US and offered personal
the next two or three months would be "crucial" for bilateral
relations. Arbatov's private remarks seem to hold out a hope
for improved relations, despite his pessimistic and severe ar-
ticle in Pravda Zast week.//
25X1 I //Arbatov, Moscow's major public proponent of
detente, was particularly careful in responding to the possi-
bility of a summit meeting between President Carter and Presi-
dent Brezhnev. Unlike other Soviet spokesmen, Arbatov said
that it would not be necessary to sign important documents at
such a meeting but that something positive should come from
these talks. He stressed that any summit must be carefully pre-
pared with the understanding that it would contribute to future
progress.//
25X1 1 -1 Just as his Pravda article was presumably cleared at
the politburo level, Arbatov's remarks on several issues that
have received much public attention from the Soviets in recent
months also seemed to convey an authoritative endorsement.
-7 On the neutron bomb issue, Arbatov said there was
sincere concern in responsible Soviet circles that the
weapon would lower the nuclear threshold in Europe.
--= On cruise missiles, he hoped that the Vienna
talks--presumably between Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Secretary Vance next month--could be used to limit the
"range and application" of these weapons, but he dodged
the ambassador's effort to elicit a possible Soviet com-
promise for limiting cruise missiles.
//On broadcasts to the USSR from the West,
Arbatov noted that the Voice of America had become "some-
what better."//
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//On human rights issues, he stressed that
the Soviets had a "good case" against dissident leader
Anatoly Shcharansky and seemed to be warning the US not
to get involved.//
//The only other subject discussed by Arbatov
at any length was Secretary of State Vance's trip to Moscow in
March, which he treated as a lost opportunity. Detente could
have been "put back on the rails," according to Arbatov, if
the Secretary had brought with him an acceptable SALT package.
As it was, the US proposals had "surprised" Moscow and had
even convinced some Soviet leaders that Washington had delib-
erately put together an unacceptable package in order to pro-
ceed with new weapons systems.//
It is possible that Arbatov's waxing and waning on
the subject of detente reflects the mood of the Soviet leader-
ship.
He has written three major articles on Soviet-US re-
lations since December, expressing pessimism in the first arti-
cle and in his most recent effort last week. In a February ar-
ticle, however, Arbatov was cautiously optimistic because he
saw the US and Soviet leaders as sharing a common understanding
of the realities of the nuclear age. His remarks to Ambassador
Toon on Monday seemed similarly designed to convey optimism--
but only predicated on a recognition by the US that adjustments
on its part are necessary.
The Soviet foreign affairs weekly New Times has also
registered optimism with regard to policies of the US adminis-
tration. For the second time in a month, the journal has writ-
ten that Washington may be "rectifying" its line he
USSR.
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EGYPT-SOMALIA: Support and Aid
//The Egyptian ambassador to Somalia briefed
US Ambassador Loughran in Mogadiscio on Tuesday on his recent
talks with Egyptian President Sadat in Cairo and his subsequent
report to Somali President Siad. Sadat pledged Egyptian support
for Siad, but made no specific military commitments. The Egyp-
tians have the impression the US is proceeding with plans to
provide arms to Somalia. Siad expressed disappointment with the
delay in receiving arms from the US and Arab countries. He ex-
pects an Ethiopian counteroffensive in the Ogaden in October,
and the Egyptians believe Siad may ask for troops from Arab
League members.//
//The Egyptian ambassador said Sadat had pledged
his full support for Siad and had promised soon to put his as-
surances in writing. Sadat did not provide a reply to Siad's re-
quest for additional weapons and MIG-21 pilots. Siad told the
Egyptians that, apart from weapons, Somalia's most urgent needs
were for uniforms and medical supplies.//
//The Somali leader said he could put 100,000
more men into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia if he had enough
weapons to arm them. Siad had also asked the Egyptian ambassa-
dor to ask Sadat to provide rocket launchers and spare parts
for surface-to-air missiles. The Somali President did not ask
for heavy weapons.//
//According to Siad, the Somalis believe that
large numbers of Soviet-trained pilots and officers will join
the Ethiopian forces by October and that Addis Ababa will then
launch a counterattack. Siad said he could not understand the
US delay in providing military support, and he also complained
that Arab states--Saudi Arabia in particular--were slow in fur-
nishing weapons.//
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The Egyptian ambassador told Ambassador Loughran
that, during his talks in Cairo, Foreign Minister Fahmi had said
the US would provide military aid to Siad but had not yet de-
cided on a means of delivery. Fahmi had asked whether Siad would
consent to the transfer of US arms through Egypt, to which the
Egyptian ambassador replied affirmatively. Fahmi said he would
take this up with Secretary Vance.//
I //Siad told the Egyptians that if Somali forces
encountered Cu ans or East Europeans aiding the Ethiopians on
the front lines, he would ask Arab League nations for troops.
The Egyptian ambassador believes Siad will shortly ask for Arab
League forces, even in the absence of evidence that foreign ad-
visers are aiding Ethiopia in the fighting.//
//Siad said that the town of Dire Dawa was
Somalia's nex target in the Ogaden and that he was confident
it could be taken within a week or so. He declared his deter-
mination to keep the territory his forces had already seized
in Ethiopia. Siad was adamant in his refusal to deal with
Ethiopian Chairman Mengi.stu, under any circumstances, but in-
dicated he might be willing to talk to a successor.
LEBANON: Shelling Intensifies
The ZeveZ of shelling between Palestinians and
ris tans in southern Lebanon has intensified in the past
several days, as has shelling from Israel directed against
Palestinian positions across the border, but there has been no
indication of movement on the ground, nor of any impending
Israeli military move into Lebanon.
I The Palestinians yesterday accused the Israelis of
massing troops along the border, of beginning massive shelling,
and of moving gunboats near Tyre.
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A Chinese Foreign Ministry official has confirmed
that Chinese and Soviet representatives recently resumed the
border river navigation talks that had been suspended for more
IThe official commented that there was no possibility
of a change in overall Sino-Soviet relations, whatever the out-
come of the navigation talks.
The river talks, which began in 1951 to discuss rou-
-1 tine navigational matters, have been stalled since 1974, when
the Chinese attempted to add to the agenda an item related to
their territorial claim to Hei-hsia-tzu island. Earlier report-
ing had indicated that the talks would resume--probably in late
July--after the two sides had agreed to an arrangement that
would not prejudice either's claims to Hei-hsia-tzu and other
disputed islands in the border rivers.
I IThe move to reopen the talks indicates that both
sides are interested in dealing with practical problems con-
nected with the border rivers, but both Chinese and Soviet: of-
ficials have pointed out that reopening talks is not an indica-
tion of significant improvement in their long-hostile relation-
ship.
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rang of other issues has not changed. 25X1
anti-Soviet rhetoric in Chinese propaganda on a nroaa
CHINA-INDIA: Relations Cooling
//An official Chinese protest to the Indian
government concerning Prime Minister Desai's reception on
July 22 for Tibet's exiled Dalai Lama signals Chinese irrita-
tion but will not seriously weaken the intention of either na-
tion to improve relations. The protest., delivered last week,
accuses the Indian government of interfering in Chinese "in-
ternal affairs" and of supporting "traitorous" activities by
exiled Tibetans. The Indians have rejected the protest and
denied supporting refugee activities directed at any other
country.//
I /The Chinese had hoped for a slow improvement
,n~t,___. _ the new Indian government. Some progress had
been made while Indira Gandhi was prime minister with the re-
turn of a Chinese ambassador to New Delhi last September. Trade
relations were reestablished between the two countries last
month.//
//The Chinese also undoubtedly took as a hope-
ful sign e ee ermination of the Desai government to moderate
India's close relations with the USSR.//
I /The reception of the Dalai Lama, however,
clearly irritated the Chinese. Peking is not convinced that
India fully accepts China's control of Tibet.//
//Peking has also noted that the Desai govern-
ment as marxea out a tough position on the border issue. In
May, Desai said publicly that the Chinese must take the initia-
tive in solving the border problem "because they were the ag-
gressors" in the 1962 border war.
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]//Nevertheless, Peking wants to avoid increas-
ing tensions with New Delhi if only to avoid pushing India
closer to the USSR. Having made its point about the Dalai Lama,
China probably will not dwell on the matter if the Indians do
not.//
//The Indians, for their part, went out of
eir way to snow that they wish to normalize relations with
the Chinese. Their rejection of the Chinese protest was rela-
tively mildly stated. The fact that the two nations have en-
gaged in a dialogue, however negative, is an indicatio
both sides are seeking some lessening of tensions.
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 Uruguay
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Uruguayan President Mendez' announcement on Tuesday
that Uruguay will hold general elections and return to civi-
lian rule in 1981 is unlikely to bring about a quick resumption
of political activity. The military-dominated government will
continue its ban on politics until some time in 1980.
1 The announcement was the first specific public con-
irmaion of what had been only a vague commitment when Mendez
became president last summer after the ouster of former presi-
dent Bordaberry. Uruguay joins three other Latin American mili-
tary governments--those of Peru, Bolivia, and Chile--that have
announced their intention to hold elections early in the 1980s.
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