NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010070-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: September 21, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

1
1
1
1
1
0
Aa rB fII Relea
se 2007/02/07
TO:
DRESS
NAME A D
ATE
D
TIALS
INI
1
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPAR
E REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOM
MENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETUR
N
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM:
NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
CIA-RDP79T00975A030300grWOSecret
(Sarnrity Classifiratinnl
0
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities: 0
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday 21 September 1977 CG NIDC 77/220C
1
0 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions 0
dhommom
0 State Dept. review completed Top Secret
(Security Classification)
0,JMF Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03030001 70-7 AW ;0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30300010070-7
Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30300010070-7
 Approved For
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 21 September 1977.
T e NID Cable is or t o pur
po
se o
in orming
senior US o
icials.
USSR-SOMALIA:
Military Aid Cut
Page 1
SOUTH AFRICA:
General Elections
Page 3
NIGERIA: Garba Under Attack
Page 4
PORTUGAL:
Economic Policy
Page 5
BRIEFS:
Page 7
PLO
Japan
Approved Fora Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A039300010070-7
 Approved Fo
USSR.-SOMALIA: Military Aid Cut
According to the Soviet Ambassador to Soma-
ta, the-7777----is apparently moving closer to cutting off all
military aid to Somalia in hopes of curtailing Somali military
activity in Ethiopia.
In a conversation with Ambassador Loughran on Monday,
Soviet Am assador Samsonov said that, although the USSR
continues to honor existing agreements with Somalia, it has
stopped supplying the "strategic armaments" the Somalis need
to continue their war with Ethiopia. He said the Soviets are
now supplying Somalia only with nonessential, previously
contracted military hardware and that no agreements with the
Somalis will be renewed until Somali troops are withdrawn
from Ethiopian territory. The US Ambassador interpreted the
reference to "strategic armaments" to mean tanks, aircraft and
armored personnel carriers.
Samsonov implied that the decision to stop deliveries
of "strategic armaments" was made during Somali President Siad's
visit to Moscow in late August. He said that Siad underestimated
the Soviet commitment to Ethiopia and refused to meet their
conditions, leaving Moscow little choice.
I Samsonov argued that the Soviet commitment to Ethiopia
is rea because Ethiopia's population, size, mineral wealth,
agricultural base, and commitment to socialism makes it a
vitally important African state which, unlike Somalia, has a
bright future.
Approvedi For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T0097PA030300010070-7
 Approved Fo
I I Samsonov took note of Somalia's attempts to locate
new supp iers, and argued that while Siad's recent trips to a
number of Arab states were obviously aimed at finding new sources
of support, it is unlikely that the Arabs could provide enough
of the type of weapons Somalia needs to continue its efforts in
the Ogaden. He conceded that China might offer Somalia arms but
said that this was really not a viable alternative for the
Somalis.
Approved Folr Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T009754030300010070-7
 Approved Forl
SOUTH AFRICA: General Elections
South African Prime Minister John Vorster has caZZed
for a national election on 30 November. Vorster is clearly seek-
ing to reinforce his mandate in the face of international criti-
cism; the next general election was not due until 1979 and he
faces no internal political challenge.
Approved Igor Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T0097PA030300010070-7
 Approved F
Vorster also wants popular support for his plans for
a new constitutional system of government and intends to take
advantage of the current disarray in the political opposition.
Vorster told a press conference yesterday that attempts
by foreign governments and organizations to dictate South Africa's
domestic policies were a factor in calling the election. He said
it is time for the electorate to protest foreign demands in order
to show the world that the government accurately reflects white
South African opinion. Vorster said he also wants support for
proposals for a new constitution giving wider rights to Coloreds
and. Asians.
Recently, the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet
have spo en out strongly against. external pressure, and they
have been exhorting the nation to prepare for increasing isola-
tion and possible sanctions, themes that will play a large part
in the ruling National Party's political campaign. Calls for
white unity will also increase as the National Party tries to
solidify further its control of the government: by seeking the
votes of the fragmented white opposition.
I Vorster won a large overall majority in the last elec-
ion, w ich took place in 1974, long before serious racial, un-
rest began to plague the country. If he can increase this major-
ity in the November election, it will harden his resolve not to
be intimidated by the West.
NIGERIA: Garba Under Attack
I Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba has come under in-
arp criticism in recent weeks by the Nigerian
press for his recent warm praise of UN Ambassador Young and
for his strong public support of the UK-US initiative on Rho-
desia. The attacks on Garba eventually could have an adverse
effect on the position of Head of State Obasanjo.
I I The criticism has been spearheaded by the Daily
mes, a national paper that has long had an anti-US bias. The
Nigerian press acts independently of the government at times;
editorials do not always reflect the official line. So far, no
one in the collegially run government has felt. the need to call
off the attacks.
Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975P,030300010070-7
 Approved Fo4 Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ap30300010070-7
The criticism of Garba could be a calculated attempt
by its many enemies to embarrass and remove him.
IThe a ac may a so be an errort y e press
to project an image of Nigerian independence on the foreign
scene in an effort to offset the government's recent support
of US initiatives. In any case, Nigerians are sure to continue
voicing doubts about US policy toward southern Africa until
they are satisfied that the policy has yielded concrete results.
We are not certain whether the attacks on Garba are
25X1
25X1
being encouraged by fellow members on the ruling Supreme Mili-
tary Council. Many influential Nigerians in the press, public
life, and the government remain skeptical of US motives toward
Africa and Nigeria. They are concerned that the country's non-
aligned image and aspirations to African leadership may be com-
promised by too close an association with the US.
Some have opposed the substantial improvement in
Nigerian.-US relations that Obasanjo initiated last February.
They want Nigeria to maintain greater distance in relations,
particularly in the event US initiatives in southern Africa
fail.. Garba could then be made a convenient scapegoat, and
Obasanjo, who has been gaining in political strength, could
find himself in a weakened position. 25X1
PORTUGAL: Economic Policy
//Disagreement within Portugal's minority So-
c2a zst government over the weak austerity measures announced
last month may require Prime Minister Soares to make more ex-
tensive changes in the government this fall than he reportedly
intended. Finance Minister Medina Carreira, who advocated
fairly stiff economic measures, has said he will leave office
no later than October, and some disgruntled subordinates will
probably foZZow his Zead. Without an economic team that is
willing to take strong action to promote recovery, the Socialists
will have even more difficulty negotiating with the International
Monetary Fund and working out a legislative agreement with op-
position parties.//
Approved Fo
 Approved ForiRelease 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOP30300010070-7 25X1
//Medina Carreira told Ambassador Carlucci last
wee that he was tired of arguing for strong measures and los-
ing out to cabinet members who are less involved in financial
matters and who appeal to Soares' optimism. He said Soares pre-
fers to believe such advisers as Economic Planning Minister
Sousa Gomes, who contend that development will continue even
without devaluation and that the balance-of--payments problem
will eventually take care of itself.//
/In opting for increased interest rates and a
foreign-exchange float, Soares apparently hoped to avoid the
public criticism that would follow a decision to devalue. He has
provoked criticism from across the political spectrum and has
expended valuable political capital on measures that are too weak
to attract much capital back into the country or to promote sub-
stantial investment. Rumors of a devaluation had prepared the
public for such an announcement, and many now suspect that
another package of austerity measures is inevitable.//
//Soares told Ambassador Carlucci this week that
he had received conflicting advice on devaluation and was not
convinced by the central bank's argument that devaluation would
increase exports. Soares further said that if the IMF insists
that Portugal devalue to obtain the stand-by credit, then he
will do so.//
//Medina Carreira has told Soares he cannot re-
main in a government that has policies he does not support. His
resignation will complicate the government reshuffle rumored
for this fall, but Medina Carreira expects Soares to select
another "optimist" to round out his economic team. Some lower
level officials are likely to follow the Finance Minister's
lead, and the head of the central bank is also said to be con-
sidering resignation.//
I A weakened economic team will complicate Socialist
efforts Jto maintain single-party rule. Soares apparently plans
to seek a multiyear agreement on a legislative program with the
centrist Social Democrats and to concede some posts in a re-
shuffled government to Social Democrats who would serve as in-
dividuals, not as party representatives.
The Social Democrats are certain to demand concrete
concessions for their votes, reportedly including Socialist ap-
proval for their entry into the Socialist International,. They
6
Approved Fqr Release 2-007102-107 . - 300010070-7 25X1
 Approved For
reportedly hope to force an understanding with the Socialists
within six months and expect the continuing economic decline to
buttress their position.
(C) President Eanes, meanwhile, is showing more interest 25X1
in the economy and has created a special working group to analyze 25X1
the situation and to prepare options for him to use in discus-
sions with the parties.1
I IThe Palestine Liberation Organization Central Coun-
cil., to owing a meeting in Damascus that concluded yesterday
morning, issued a final communique implying the PLO's continued
strong interest in establishing a dialogue with the US. Accord-
ing to press reports, the Council examined the Department of
State's "new step"--its recent comments on the importance of
resolving the Palestinian issue as part of an Arab-Israeli
settlement.
The Council noted that the US remarks failed to re-
fer to Palestinian "national rights," but it did not employ
the anti-US rhetoric used following the previous Council meet-
ing in late August. Also unlike the previous communique, this
statement failed to mention the PLO's stand toward UN Security
Council Resolution 242, suggesting that the organization con-
tinues to consider how best to work around the obstacles
created by its nonacceptance of the resolution.
I I
Japan announced an import promotion package yesterday
ue5lgnea educe its current-account surplus, which will exceed
Approved Fora Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T009p5A030300010070-7
 Approved Fq
$7 billion this year. The new measures will have little impact
in. 1977, but they could hold down a projected increase in the
1978 surplus.
I I Under the new program, the government will increase
oil stoc piles, accelerate imports of uranium ore, and help
finance purchases of foreign aircraft. Japan also will speed
up imports of feedcorn and sorghum and increase import quotas
on some other agricultural goods. In addition, the government
will ask private industry to increase stockpiles of copper and
zinc; firms will be reluctant to do so because of high inven-
tories and sluggish demand.
I The impact of the package will depend largely on the
extent o quota liberalization. If Japan doubles all existing
quotas, imports could expand by roughly $800 million.
01
Approved f{or Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOP0300010070-7
 proved For Release 2007/02/07 CIA-RDP79T00975AO30300010070-7
0 Top Secret
(Security Classification) 0
0 0
0 40
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Top Secret
(Security kediIF* Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30300010070-7
4