NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010104-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 104
• Publication Date: October 12, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Wednesday 12 October 1977 CG NIDC 77/237C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 12 October 1977.
The NID Cable is or the purpose o in orming
senior o icials.
USSR: Views on China's National Day
USSR: Grain Harvest Estimate
NORTH YEMEN: President Assassinated
MOROCCO: New Cabinet Announced
CHILE: Uneasy Truce with Critics
BRAZIL-ARGENTINA: Arms Sales
WEST GERMANY: Nuclear Moratorium
BRIEFS:
Uganda-Kenya
Brae
Namibia
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USSR: Views on China's National Day
Soviet Premier Kosygin's meeting yesterday with the
C znese Ambassador was the first between a top Soviet official
and the Chinese Ambassador since January 1971. The meeting ap-
parently was a routine follow-on to Ambassador Wang Yu-ping's
presentation of credentials Zast month. It complied with diplo-
matic practice and was similar to the procedure followed by
Wang's predecessor. The Soviet account of the meeting--Kosygin
had "a conversation" with Wang--contrasts with Peking's ver-
sion, which did not refer to a conversation. The USSR has re-
cently moderated its anti-Chinese propaganda, but the Chinese
continue to criticize the Soviets in strong terms.
The Soviet Government message and an authoritative
article in Pravda on 1 October, issued on the occasion of
China's national day, were notably milder in tone than Moscow's
attacks on the Chinese during their 11th Party Congress in
September. The government message declared that Moscow is ready
to "improve relations"--a line absent from last year's anni-
versary greeting--and the article Pravda highlighted the
mutual "advantages" of recent Sino-Soviet agreements on trade
and border-river navigation.
I I The Soviets may believe that, having responded to
e rnese leaders' anti-Soviet statements at the September
party congress, they have the political leeway to take a more
conciliatory tack. A Soviet expert on China told a US Embassy
official last week that the government message reflects a So-
viet desire to improve the "atmospherics" in Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. He stressed that Moscow will continue to reply to Chinese
propaganda attacks but will also remain patient and encourage
Peking to respond to Soviet "initiatives."
I I By contrast, the Chinese have sustained their vehe-
men public and private criticism of Moscow. On 29 September
Peking broadcast in Russian an attack against the new Soviet
constitution and declared that the Soviet people eventually
will rise up and "bury forever the Brezhnev renegade clique."
Hu En-tsai, a Chinese Embassy official,
in Moscow on 3 October that Si.no-Soviet relations
have not improved. Hu acknowledged differences in language be-
tween the 1976 and 1977 Soviet Government messages but said
that the "spirit" of both messages was similar.
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The Chinese official conceded that the article in
Pravda was "mild" in contrast to Moscow's recent anti-Chinese
propaganda but attributed this to Moscow's alleged intention
to justify itself to the Soviet people by adopting a "peaceful
pose." He also played down a reference in the article to the
navigation talks and characterized them as completely technical
matters that do not reflect a real change in the Soviet atti-
tude toward China.
I uIn discussing the temporarily recessed border talks,
u complained that the article in Pravda used a "disgusting"
Soviet tactic by taking an earlier Chinese package proposal,
discarding from it a key Chinese requirement--a withdrawal of
Soviet troops from the border--and pretending that th
package is a Soviet "initiative."
USSR: Grain Harvest Estimate
/CIA now estimates this year's Soviet grain crop
at 215 million to 220 million tons, a range somewhat below our
estimate in early September of 220 million tons. Such a harvest
would be exceeded only by that in 1973 and by last year's
record of about 224 million tons. The most recent US Depart-
ment of Agriculture estimate puts the crop at 215 million tons.
We now estimate that Soviet grain imports between now and the
end of next year will be 20 million to 25 million tons, up by
5 million tons over our estimate in late September. Imports
of this magnitude would be comparable in size to those follow-
ing recent Soviet crop failures.//
-]There have been no official Soviet statements on the
size o this year's grain crop. Grain yields reported in the
Soviet press, however, have thus far supported our estimate of
a second consecutive bumper crop.
Winter wheat yields reached a new high in Moldavia
an were excellent across most of the Ukraine. Unusually wet
conditions in parts of the northern Ukraine, Belorussia, and
the Baltic republics increased harvesting losses, but available
reports indicate that yields remain above the average of the
past five years.
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Yields in areas east of the Urals have not been
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th.e yie s wi a goo to excellent or areas in eastern
Kazakhstan and West Siberia, average in much of the Urals, and
below average in southern Kazakhstan and in the southern Urals.//
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e middle Volga region continue to lack adequate
moisture. We have reduced our estimate of wheat production in
this region by 1 million to 2 million tons.//
//Our new forecast reflects greater than normal
uncertainty, primarily because of late-season conditions in
Kazakhstan. Because there was insufficient rainfall in much
of this area, we cut our estimate of grain production in that
republic from 22 million tons to between 18 million and 21
million tons, with most of the shortfall in wheat. More favor-
able conditions in the north, however, could offset some of
the losses sustained in other parts of the republic.//
More than normal uncertainty also marks our estimate
of the Soviet corn harvest. Our new estimate puts production at
10 million to 12 million tons; our last estimate was 12 million
tons. Harvesting progress reports in the Soviet press indicate
that the portion of the grain area planted in corn may be as
much as a half-million hectares less than official seeding
statistics earlier indicated. Harvesting some corn normally
used for ensilage, however, could increase grain output by 1
million to 2 million tons.
I I Although the Soviets may have a near-record grain
arves , a substantial portion of this year's wheat is of poor
quality. Available information suggests that in much of the
north European USSR the moisture content of this year's winter
grain was as much as twice the standard amount. Much of this
grain can be dried, but excessive drying will. substantially
reduce its milling and breadmaking quality.
//New information from trade sources in contact
with Soviet trade officials leads us to estimate Soviet grain
imports at 20 million to 25 million tons to be delivered be-
tween 1 October 1977 and 31 December 1978. These imports are
likely to be about evenly divided between wheat and feedgrains
with about 15 million tons coming from the US.//
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I Even with a large harvest, the Soviets could use im-
ports o this magnitude to continue stock rebuilding, to com-
pensate for domestic wheat quality, and to continue the expan-
sion of livestock herds.
//US grain traders reportedly are going to the
USSR within the next two weeks at Soviet request. Shipping
schedules could be the only item on the agenda, but additional
purchases are possible.// 25X1
//North Yemen has solved the immediate succes-
sion pro em created by the assassination yesterday of Command
Council Chairman Ibrahim aZ-Hamdi, but the Chairman's death
nevertheless removes an important force for political stability.
ti>audi Arabia is ZikeZy to be pleased with Hamdi's successor;
the USSR will fear a further deterioration of its position
in the country. We do not yet know who was responsible for
killing Hamdi and his brother.//
//Hamdi was a key figure on the Yemeni political
scene w o was skilled at isolating extremist opponents while
acting as a rallying point for moderates of both the left and
the right. The new Chairman of the three-man Command Council,
Chief of Staff Ahmad al-Ghashmi, lacks Hamdi's sophistication
and probably some of his ability to keep Yemen's delicate po-
litical situation in balance. This raises the possibility of
a prolonged period of political uncertainty as elements from
both the right and the left vie for a stronger role in the gov-
ernment than they were allowed under Hamdi.,//
I - j //Ghashmi has a strong position within the Ye-
men mi itary, and late last year reportedly was working to ex-
pand his influence with key military units. At times Ghashmi
apparently has been at odds with another member of the Command
Council, paratroop commander Abdallah Abd-a.1-Alim.//
//Although probably disappointed by the death of
Hamdi, with whom they had established a close working relation-
ship, Saudi officials will be pleased to see a pro-Western Ye-
meni such as Ghashmi take Hamdi's place. Some Saudis, however,
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may seize this opportunity to press for a prominent role in
the government for their protege, tribal leader Abdallah al-
Ahmar, who has long been a rival of Hamdi's.//
L //Soviet officials are likely to be dismayed over
Gas m1. s appointment. Since becoming Chief of Staff in 1974,
Ghashmi has worked to lessen the country's reliance on Soviet
military aid and advice.//
/No details of the assassination are yet available.
e assassins are not immediately found, Yemeni officials
could blame leftist sympathizers for Hamdi's death. Hamdi's
relationship with Saudi Arabia and his recent rapprochement
with the conservative al-Ahmar had embittered some Yemeni left-
ists.//
//Other suspects could be those in the pay of the
arx. :- nted South Yemen regime, refugees from South Yemen
unhappy that Hamdi was planning a trip to that country later
this week, or dissident tribal elements.
The new Moroccan cabinet announced on Sunday is, Like
2 s predecessor, a government of technocrats. The Leaders of the
two Moroccan political parties that made the best showing in the
parliamentary election last June were also given cabinet posi-
tions.
The most significant change was the appointment of
Mohamed Boucetta, leader of the conservative Istiglal Party,
as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Mohamed Osman, the
King's brother-in-law, remains Prime Minister, the post he has
held since November 1972.
The cabinet shuffle sets the stage for the opening of
parliament on Friday, the first since 1972. King Hassan presum-
ably hopes the appointment of leaders from the Istiglal and the
palace--supported Popular Movement parties will create the ap-
pearance of a popular-based government. The head of Morocco's
main leftist party, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, re-
portedly declined palace demarches to join the cabinet.
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King Hassan remains unwilling to share significant
power with political parties and will continue to be his own
foreign minister. The King has used the dispute with Algeria
over Western Sahara to co-opt the parties and take advantage
of the irredentist sentiments of many Moroccans.
CHILE: Uneasy Truce with Critics
I I The Chilean Government's recent moves to ameliorate
human rig is practices have begun to remove a major irritant in
relations with some of its domestic critics, particularly the
Catholic Church and--to a Lesser extent--labor. The government's
Long-term intentions--such as the plan for eventual return to
democratic processes--inspire skepticism, but many Chileans
concede that the government seems to have ended the worst as-
pects of repression.
//The Church has adopted a more conciliatory at-
ti uce an is studiously avoiding a confrontation with the gov-
ernment. The warming trend has been most evident in comments
by Cardinal Silva, a liberal who has frequently voiced opposi-
tion to the government's policies. The Cardinal, an astute po-
litical observer, is urging Church leaders to be cautious in
applying pressure on the government since he judges that such
tactics would now be counterproductive.//
//Cardinal Silva is advocating that Church views
be communicated privately to President Pinochet and other top
officials. He believes this approach offers a better chance
of moderating government practices. The election last month of
a conservative bishop, a good friend of Pinochet's, to head the
Church's permanent episcopal committee reflects the new mood.//
//One prominent liberal Church spokesman believes
t e newly elected bishop, a clever and capable administrator,
may be able to exert a positive influence on the President.
The improved relations between church and state, however, will
not prevent Church liberals from speaking out bluntly if they
conclude that the government is backsliding on human rights.//
On the labor front, a threatened showdown between
]?inoc et and a group of democratic trade union leaders seems
to have been averted when the President shelved--at least for
the moment--any plans for the government to oust them from
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their union positions. Under the current political moratorium,
union e:Lections are prohibited and the government can remove
and replace labor officials at will.
I The government's antipathy for the labor leaders in
question stems from its conviction that they are being used
by the Christian Democratic Party and are engaging in political
activity to embarrass the government. While this does not appear
to be the case, misgivings about the political motives of the
group's spokesman may cause some of the labor leaders to re-
assess their role. A consensus may be developing among them to
avoid provocations that could further jeopardize their status.
E The government will continue to look askance at free
la or activity, but the current truce at least suggests a more
tolerant policy. Both sides, in fact, seem disposed to avoid
extremes and to seek a modus vivendi.
Like the Church, labor may perceive that it has more
to gaim by ending an adversary relationship and switching to
more subtle forms of protest. At a minimum, both groups appar-
ently believe that changed conditions in Chile could provide
the climate for a gradual relaxation of harsh restrictions.
BRAZIL-ARGENTINA: Arms Sales
//Brazil and Argentina are increasing their
efforts to supply arms to their neighbors. Key factors prompt-
ing these efforts include the continued phasing down of US
military aid to Latin America, the high cost of sophisticated
European weapons, and widespread reluctance in the region to
turn to the Soviets for weapons.//
I /Both Brazil and Argentina produce, under license,
models of European-designed weapons systems that they can ex-
port along with other, locally developed equipment. Both also
have the capability to develop their own sophisticated weapons.//
I /Brazil has the largest domestic arms industry
in Latin America. It produces jet ground-attack aircraft, light
transport planes, patrol boats, support ships, and a family of
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armored vehicles. Argentina has a large manufacturing base for
weapons and produces light turboprop counterinsurgency aircraft,
rockets, mortars, and heavy automatic weapons.//
I//The two countries are also beginnin
to develop tanks.
//Brazil has sold arms worth over $75 million
to i e, w is accounts for about one-third of the Brazilians'
total arms export revenue since 1970.
//Argentina, on the other hand, has chosen to
supply Peru. This policy is probably due, at least in part, to
the uneasy relations between Argentina and Chile that arise
from lingering territorial disputes.
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WEST GERMANY: Nuclear Moratorium
At their National Convention next month, West Ger-
many's governing parties will consider resolutions calling for
an official moratorium on the construction of nuclear power
facilities. Resolutions that have the best chance of passage
would deny construction permits for such facilities pending
the development of satisfactory reprocessing and waste dis-
posal procedures. Regardless of any convention resolutions,
Chancellor Schmidt apparently will push for parliamentary ap-
proval of his nuclear construction program.
I West German nuclear power construction has been at a
near ndstill for the past year because of unfavorable court
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rulings and protest demonstrations. In recent months, grass-
roots resistance to the government's nuclear program has fos-
tered strong opposition within the governing Social Democratic
and Free Democratic parties, increasing the likelihood that
party conventions will call for an official moratorium. The
many citizens groups seeking to block nuclear power expansion
are popular with young people and have found particularly sym-
pathetic hearings in the left wings of the governing parties.
I uIn June, the Free Democratic national executive com-
mittee called for suspension of nuclear power plant starts un-
til construction of the planned waste disposal facility has
begun--perhaps in three to five years. Last month, the Social
Democratic national executive committee made a similar recom-
mendation.
In addition, the government of North Rhine - Westpha-
ia, w.i h is controlled by the two parties, has filed a suit
challenging Bonn's right to bypass state authorities in approv-
ing construction of a fast breeder reactor. This suit has
prompted the administrative judges to ask the Federal Consti-
tutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the 18-year-
old Federal Nuclear Law.
Not surprisingly, the business-backed Christian Demo-
cratic - Christian Socialist opposition strongly favors nuclear
expansion as advocated by the Schmidt government.
I As the party conventions approach, pressure is build-
ing against a moratorium. Leaders of the governing parties and
the labor unions are working hard to defeat the expected reso-
lutions. Union leaders, who wield considerable influence among
the Social Democrats, stress the adverse impact a moratorium
would have on employment. They argue that a moratorium would
generate uncertainty about the future availability of energy,
thus discouraging job-creating investment in a broad range of
activities. More directly, it would mean a loss of potential
jobs in construction and in industries that equip nuclear fa-
cilities.
Schmidt is likely to fight for parliamentary approval
of nuclear power plants regardless of events at the conventions.
If the issue is not made a test of party loyalty, the Chancellor
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apparently could attract enough votes from the opposition par-
ties to win in parliament. Any effort by moratorium advocates
to bring down the government would probably be self-defeating,
because a Christian Democratic government would likely be domi-
nated by nuclear power proponents.
I I The least restrictive moratorium would permit Bonn to
achieve about two-thirds of the 30,000 megawatts of nuclear ca-
pacity targeted for 1985. Under the most restrictive conditions,
only about 40 percent of the target capacity would be available.
I I In the "best" case, from the viewpoint of those favor-
ing a government's program, construction permits would be is-
sued for the planned nuclear waste disposal. facility at Gorleben
in three years, and only permits for new power plants would be
held up in the interim. In the "worst" case, construction of
the waste disposal facility would not start for five years and
work on all nuclear plants would be halted until then.
To meet the Schmidt government's goals, all planned
consrrudtion must resume this fall, when the design for the
disposal unit is to be approved.
I I A five-year halt to all nuclear construction would
stymie onn's efforts to reduce dependence on imported oil. A
direct trade-off between nuclear power and oil imports would
probably occur because the government energy program calls for
maximum feasible increases in other forms of energy. Assuming
that total energy consumption grows as projiected, the "worst"
case scenario would boost 1985 net oil imports nearly 20 per-
cent above the government's target.
L A three- to five-year moratorium would slow or stop
e growth of employment in the nuclear industry. In the ab-
sence of a moratorium, direct employment would increase from
an estimated 39,000 last year to some 50,000 in 1980; with a
:ban, attainment of the 50,000 level would at least be delayed
a few years.
Combined with new court-mandated safety measures,
i~ event year-long delay in the construction of nuclear
power plants has raised costs by an estimated 20 percent. if
:fewer plants are built, of course, total costs could fall be-
low the estimated $42 billion that would be needed to achieve
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the 30,000-megawatt capacity goal by 1985. Even so, the sums
and the risks involved may be so great that the government
will find it necessary to underwrite the financing of nuclear
investment.
Uganda-Kenya
Ugandan President Amin yesterday publicly threatened
military action against Kenya. He said it is time to fight
Kenya and to teach it and its British allies a lesson. In
issuing what he termed a "final warning" to Kenya, Amin threat-
ened to send the Ugandan Air Force to destroy the offices of
newspapers in Nairobi that have criticized his regime. Amin
also said Uganda is willing to assist any country that might
be hostile to Kenya. This was a clear reference to Somalia.
Kenyan officials are concerned that Somalia, which claims the
northeastern region of Kenya, may move against their country.
Amin's remarks are mostly bluster, and we have no firm
evidence that he is planning any specific military action against
Kenya in the near future. The Kenyans realize that Amin is capable
of boasting, but they do not discount an attempt by Amin to ex-
ploit their preoccupation with Somalia by staging some military
action on their western border. If Amin becomes more threatening,
the Kenyans might ask for emergency military help from the US
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Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Tzipori announced the
al-.s Monday of the government's plans for settling members
of the ultraconservative Gush Emunim on the West Bank over the
next several months. The settlers will be allowed to move into
eight sites--all of them within military camps.
One group has already settled near Nabulus, and another
group will move into a site farther north next week. Some of the
settlers will work at the camps as civilian employees of the De-
fense Ministry, and all of them will be subject to military law
under the agreement reached between the government and Gush
leaders.
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Tzipori implied that the government has grudgingly de-
vised this arrangement under pressure from the US.
Namibia
Sam Nujoma, president of the South-West Africa People's
Organization, has agreed to meet in New York on Friday with the
Western contact group that is working on an independence program
for Namibia. The meeting will open a second round of exploratory
talks between SWAPO delegates and representatives of the US, UK,
France, West Germany, and Canada.
Since the first round in August
SWAPO's Central Co
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m
mittee has reviewed the basic issues and the South Africans
have submitted a plan for a partial withdrawal of their troops
from Namibia.
Nujoma had delayed meeting with the contact grou
while
p
seeTforeign support for SWAPO's guerrilla struggle in
Namibia. Last week he appeared in Moscow--his first visit there
since August 1976--and met with candidate Politburo member Boris
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Ponomarev. A bland Soviet announcement indicated that the meetin
went well but did not imply an increase in military aid.
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