CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Saturday 12 November 1977 CG NIDC 77/263C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 12 November
1977.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of
in forming senior US officials.
CONTENTS
ISRAEL: Begin's Speech to Egypt
Page 2
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Stiuation Report
Page 3
USSR: Supreme Commander Brezhnev
Page 3
ETHIOPIA: Security Situation
Page 4
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Tensions Continue
Page 6
UPPER VOLTA: Lamizana's Future
Page 7
THAILAND-CAMBODIA: Communique
Page 8
INTERNATIONAL: Co
ffee Price :Policy
Page 9
BRIEFS:
Page 9
Arab States
USSR
Spain
Portugal
North Korea - Japan
Philippines
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ISRAEL: Begin's Speech to Egypt
Israeli Prime Minister Begin's radiobroadcast to
Egypt yesterday was almost certainly an attempt to wrest the
propaganda initiative from President Sadat and demonstrate
that Israel is no less interested than Egypt in peace. Egypt
has characterized Begin's broadcast as "unsuccessful" because
his remarks were confined to Egypt.
Begin welcomed the readiness Sadat had rhetorically
professed in his speech on Wednesday to address the Israeli
parliament and offered to go to Cairo to address the Egyptian
legislature. Appealing to the Egyptians to revive their ancient,
biblical friendship with Israel, Begin suggested that the two
sides take a "silent oath" not to shed any more blood.
The Israelis have been impressed by what they regard
as the latest in a long series of clever public relations gam-
bits by Sadat. Begin himself had frequently criticized the
previous Israeli Government for remaining on the defensive in
responding to Sadat's public overtures for peace, and he doubt-
less was determined not to let that happen this time. By offer-
ing the hand of peace to Egypt, Begin also seemed to be trying
to aggravate differences over peace negotiations between Egypt
and Syria and to stoke Syrian fears of a separate Egyptian-
Israeli deal.
An official Egyptian Government spokesman said yester-
day, in fact, that Begin may have been trying to drive a wedge
between Egypt and other Arab states. He reiterated Sadat's re-
marks that any serious call for peace must address the restora-
tion of Palestinian rights and Israeli withdrawal from Arab
territories occupied in 1967.
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Situation Report
The Israeli-Lebanese border quieted following the
Pa estinian shelling yesterday morning of the Israeli town of
Yiron and Israel's subsequent shelling of the Bint JubayZ area
in Lebanon.
USSR: Supreme Commander Brezhnev
Soviet President and Communist Party chief Brezhnev
has been pu icZy identified for the first time as Supreme
Commander in Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces.
The identification came in an article in the Defense
Ministry monthly Voyenny Vestnik by Colonel General Sredin who,
as first deputy chief of the armed forces' political administra-
tion, is clearly in a position to know about this subject. In
asserting that Brezhnev's speeches have made a major contribu-
tion to Soviet military thinking, Sredin noted that Brezhnev is
General Secretary of the Communist Party, Chairman of the Pre-
sidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Supreme Commander in Chief
of the Soviet Armed Forces, and a Marshal of the Soviet Union.
We have long known that Brezhnev would become the
Supreme Commander in Chief in the event of war and would then
have authority to issue direct orders to the Soviet armed
forces. //The evidence available, however, had suggested that
he would have such authority only in the event of war or an
attack upon the USSR and that in peacetime he would iissue such
orders only with the concurrence of the other members of the
Politburo--and even then would act through the Minister of De-
fense.//
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he decision to identify Brezhnev as Supreme Commander
in Chief may be a sign that the situation has changed and that
he now has the authority during peacetime to direct the armed
forces himself, rather than through Defense Minister Ustinov.
In any event, it clearly enhances his public standing on defense
matters both within the USSR and abroad. It could also strengthen
his hand both in dealing with any objections by the military to
compromises on SALT or other arms control negotiations and in
any talks with President Carter on such issues.
In this respect, the move is fully in keeping with
previous steps that have been taken to enhance Brezhnev's
public stature in defense matters. In the past few years he
has been given publicity for his efforts as a political officer
at the front during World War II, identified as Chairman of the
Defense Council, promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union
awarded military honors on his 70th birthday last year.
ETHIOPIA: Security Situation
The security situation in Addis Ababa is deteriorat-
ing rapt y, apparently because of a power struggle among un-
derground and semi-official leftist groups. These groups are
jockeying for leadership of what they see as the next phase of
the Ethiopian revolution. New charges are being levied that
the Mengistu regime has relaxed its revolutionary fervor. There
is heightened nervousness at all levels, and governmental re-
prisals are beginning to increase.
If the insecurity in Addis Ababa continues even on
the present level, public morale will suffer, as could govern-
ment efforts to mobilize support for the war effort in the
Ogaden and Eritrea. Unchecked escalation of the violence or,
alternatively, the use of brutal repressive measures could also
threaten the cohesion of the ruling military council.
So many people have weapons that it is difficult to
fix responsibilities for shootings, although the government
charges that the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party is be-
hind much of the violence. The EPRP, an underground extremist
organization dedicated to the imposition of civilian revolution-
ary rule, opposes the ruling military council and the political
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institutions it has created. Local leaders of these organiza-
tions are its main targets for assassination, although several
higher ranking officials, including a leading member of the
ruling military council, have been killed during the past 10
days.
The EPRP's supporters are mainly students, teachers,
and trade unionists. After several major government efforts to
suppress the party, we no longer know its size or leadership,
but its financial support still appears to be channeled through
Ethiopian student associations abroad, notably in the US.
The current buildup of tension dates from August,
when Chairman Mengistu called for a general mobilization of
the Ethiopian masses to meet the military threat from Somalia.
Mengistu also shifted the regime's political rhetoric by omit-
ting appeals to Marxism and stressing more traditional patriotic
themes. This was reinforced by the decree establishing the
National Revolutionary Operations Command, which emphasized
cooperation between military authorities and local civilian or-
ganizations and further diminished the role assigned to Marxist
civilian advisers.
The conversion to a full war footing in mid-September
and the appointment of technically skilled personnel to key
positions were seen by the leftists as confirmation that the
regime was no longer giving priority to revolutionary purity.
Several mass organizations are now advocating harsh
measures against "counterrevolutionary terrorists." The All-
Ethiopian Trade Union--which has lost two successive chairmen
to assassination--has taken the lead in calling for renewed
city-wide operations to weed out enemies of the revolution. The
last such operation, in March, left hundreds of dead, mostly
students.
The government remains wary of repeating excesses com-
mitted during the March search and destroy operations. Its pa-
tience appears to be wearing thin, however. Several students
were killed in late October when police fired on a group of
antigovernment demonstrators, and two more students were shot
a few days later for refusing to produce identity cards. Eight
alleged members of the EPRP were recently executed after a
court martial. The government-controlled media have published
accusations of subversive meddling by Western countries to under-
mine the Mengistu government.
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MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Tensions Continue
Morocco's King Hassan told newsmen yesterday that
his recent threat to have his forces pursue PoZisario Front
guerrillas from Western Sahara into Algeria also applies to the
guerrillas' violations of Mauritania's frontiers. He added a
conciliatory note, however, professing a preference for a dia-
logue and welcoming any constructive mediation effort. The Al-
gerians have moved to increase their military capabilities near
the Moroccan border.
Hassan again charged that Algerian regulars were
fighting with the guerrillas and placed the onus entirely on
Algeria for current tensions and any hostilities that might
ensue. He repeatedly accused Algeria's President Boumediene of
duplicity and of rejecting several Moroccan offers for a settle-
ment.
The King seemed to rule out once and for all any fu-
ture consultation with the Saharan people; such consultation
has long been demanded by Algeria. His conditions for a dialogue
with the Algerians--cessation of the guerrilla war and acceptance
of Moroccan sovereignty in Western Sahara--remain unchanged.
Egyptian Vice President Mubarak meanwhile held talks
with Moroccan officials yesterday in another effort to mediate
the Sahara dispute. He is scheduled to confer with Boumediene
today and then go on to Mauritania. In his conversations, Mubarak
is likely to concentrate on getting all parties to agree to
avoid direct military hostilities; neither side is yet disposed
to negotiate seriously to resolve the dispute.
Hassan's warnings to Algiers suggest that he will
dispatch irregular commandos to raid guerrilla sanctuaries in
the Tindouf region of Algeria if the recent increased guerrilla
attacks continue. //We believe he will avoid conventional mili-
tary retaliation. Moroccan forces in the south are mostly sta-
tioned away from the Algerian-Moroccan border area, and have
shown only a limited capability to find or pursue Polisario
forces. The Moroccan Air Force is also limited in its ability
to support such action.//
Algeria is clearly concerned about Morocco's sabre-
rattling and the recent French pressure for the release of
French hostages held by the Polisario. The Algerians have sought
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to forestall Moroccan or French military intervention with dip-
lomatic demarches to foreign governments. Foreign Minister
Bouteflika also sent a note to the president of the UN Security
Council on Thursday, laying the groundwork for a possible appeal
to the Council in the future. 25X1
Upper Volta's Foreign minister would like the US to
encourage President Lamizana to be a candidate for president
in a proposed civilian government, rather than retiring next
year when Lamizana says his military-based regime will step
down. If he runs for election, he is likely to win.
General Laminana's pro-Western regime has ruled
Upper Volta since he overthrew a corrupt civilian government
in 1966. As part of its oft-delayed plan for restoring civilian
rule, the regime on 1 October lifted its three-year-old ban on
politics. It scheduled a referendum on a draft constitution
for 27 November and elections for president and a National
Assembly next May.
Lamizana has talked of retiring after the elections
but has become discouraged by the maneuvering for influence by
some of the same Upper Voltans whose misrule led to the mili-
tary takeover in 1966.
oreign Minister Kargougou, who probably aspires to
be prime minister under Lamizana in a civilian government, re-
cently told the US Ambassador that it could be a disaster
should any of the political figures who are beginning to vie
for position win the presidency. He said that the squabbling
among them would result in chaos, and the military officers
who would probably intervene to restore stability might be
led by a radical similar to President Kerekou of Benin.
The draft constitution on which Upper Voltans will
vote this month would restrict the number of political parties
in an effort to limit factionalism. The long preamble is devoted
mostly to human rights and basic freedoms which Lamizana has
not seriously curtailed.
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THAILAND-CAMBODIA: Communique
Cambodia has finally broken its long silence on
its border problems with Thailand. In a communique issued
yesterday, Cambodia agreed to talks by the two countries'
ambassadors in Laos and raised Thai hopes that tensions
might be reduced.
//The Cambodian Foreign Ministry communique is
the first indication of Phnom Penh's willingness to discuss
the border problem since Foreign Minister Ieng Sary's visit
to Bangkok in October 1975; it refers to the joint communique
issued then as the basis for future talks. Recent talks be-
tween the Thai and Cambodian foreign ministers at the UN and
subsequent contacts in Vientiane may have laid the groundwork
for the Cambodian demarche. Chinese counsel to Cambodian Prime
Minister Pol Pot during his visit to China last month may also
have contributed to Phnom Penh's decision to begin talks.//
The statement included a forceful presentation of
Cambodia's case, accusing Thailand of encroaching on Cambodian
territory and organizing "traitors" to carry out activities
against the Cambodian regime. Conflicting claims over the de-
lineation of the border and the continuing activities of Cam-
bodian resistance groups operating from Thai territory clearly
lie behind Cambodian attacks on Thai villages.
Thai hopes that relations might improve after the
meeting of the foreign ministers at the UN were dashed in late
October and early this month, when Cambodian forces launched
widespread attacks against Thai border villages. The attacks
may have been designed to increase Cambodian leverage before
engaging in talks.
Thailand's interim Foreign Minister, Wonq Phonnikon.
responaea promptly to the Cambodian demarche, calling the
communique a good sign and promising to present the matter
to the Prime Minister as soon as the new cabinet is formed.
In the meantime, the Thai Embassy in Vientiane is being in-
structed to contact the Cambodian Embassy, presumably to work
out arrangements for negotiations.
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INTERNATIONAL: Coffee Price Policy
Coffee-producing nations will meet in London on Mon-
day to discuss policies for defending coffee prices. This
meeting follows a series of agreements by regional coffee pro-
ducer groups to coordinate marketing efforts. News of these
agreements has pushed the December futures price up more than
40 cents per pound to $2.00 in the Last two weeks.
withhold coffee from the market to bolster prices; coffee
lately has been selling at about $1.70 per pound. Last Friday,
Brazil and Colombia--the world's largest coffee producers--
agreed to coordinate marketing procedures. Mexico, El Salvador,
and Ivory Coast also have joined the latter agreement and,
pledged to hold the minimum price of coffee to $2.00 per pound.
African producers announced on Monday that they would halt
sales until prices improve.
Central American producers agreed in late October to
tive for only a short time because most of these countries need
foreign exchange. Producers in the Dominican Republic already
have announced opposition to the Central American agreement.
As prices become firm, the temptation to sell coffee will mount.
For the longer term, prices will probably decline, reflecting
the ample supply of coffee available to meet reduced world
Unity among coffee producers will probably be effec-
demand.
in Tunis seems primarily intended to achieve greater coordina-
tion on Arab-Israeli settlement issues. Among other topics, the
participants may discuss Syrian and Egyptian differences over
US proposals for reconvening the Geneva peace conference. The
Palestinian delegates probably will seek assurances that the
Palestine Liberation Organization's interests will be protected
during the Middle East negotiation process.
The Arab foreign ministers' meeting that begins today
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Efforts may be made to arrange a meeting of the heads
of state of those countries most concerned with the Arab-Israeli
problem. Egyptian President Sadat, however, already has signaled
that he is lukewarm toward this idea. The deteriorating situa-
tion in southern Lebanon may also be examined.
The granting of a six-month exit visa to a leading
dissident, former General Petr Grigorenko, and his family to
visit the US reflects primarily the continued Soviet tactic of
further weakening the dissident community by depriving it of
leadership. Grigorenko is the last prominent member of the
Helsinki monitoring group who is not under arrest. The move
probably is also part of an effort to deflect what Moscow con-
tinues to assert is a confrontational US posture on human rights
at the Belgrade conference. Finally, the gesture toward Grigorenko
could reflect Soviet satisfaction over what they perceive as
some improvement in US-Soviet relations.
Grigorenko told Western newsmen in Moscow that he in-
tends to return home and would not have accepted the visa with-
out assurances of a return. His poor physical health in recent
years, however, has often been accompanied by marked shifts in
mood and in his outlook toward the future. He and his family
would, in any event, have little recourse but to stay in the
West if the Soviets refuse to readmit them. Grigorenko will
leave within the next 10 days.
Spain
//Spain has canceled a naval exercise and placed
on a ert ships of its fleet stationed at Rota naval station on
tlantic.
the alert is in response to growing tension
in northwest Africa.//
//The action may be part of an effort to show con-
cern for Spanish citizens still in Spain's former colony of
Western Sahara and to be prepared for their possible evacuation
ld it become necessary
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