CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010068-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: November 23, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday 23 November 1977
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 23 November 1977
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
ITALY: Violence and Pessimism
BENIN: Cuban and Soviet Attention
SYRIA: Western Arms Purchases
CAMBODIA: Party Purges Continue
USSR - NORTH KOREA: Kapitsa Visit
GREECE: Election Results
BRIEFS
Yugoslavia
Romania
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Spain - Western Sahara
Denmark
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ITALY: Violence and Pessimism
Italian politicians and officials are depressed and
pessimistic as they face an apparent worsening of political
terrorism and disorder. Some of them are suggesting that a
Larger role for the Communists might provide the government
with the enhanced authority it needs to deal with the situa-
tion.
For months, terrorists of the far left have been ar-
bitrarily attacking public figures--usually moderate editors
and politicians--by shooting them in the legs. The recent at-
tempt by the Red Brigades to murder the highly respected deputy
editor of La Stampa by shooting him in the head--together with
the terrorists' slogan of "aim higher"--may mean that the ter-
ror campaign, which has steadily increased over the past five
years, will be heightened even more.
Interior Minister Cossiga told the Italian Senate on
15 November that far left and far right terrorists had carried
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out 1,693 political crimes--shootings, bombings, kidnapings--
in the first ten months of this year. The toll in 1977 will be
roughly double that of 1976, itself twice that of 1975.
The Italian police forces are weary, discouraged,
and demoralized by what they see as an unequal struggle against
terrorism, disorder, and crime. Forty policemen and carabinieri
have been killed so far this year and 3,000 wounded. Law en-
forcement authorities still do not feel that they have the
legal means or the organization to handle their overwhelming
problems. The recent reorganization of Italian counterintelli-
gence has created confusion; improved efficiency will be slow
in coming.
The police also fear that they will be faced by mass
demonstrations they cannot control. Their record in this area
is much better than on the terrorist front, and the US Embassy
in Rome estimates that in most cases they will be able to keep
order.
Deteriorating economic conditions could aggravate
already critical tensions among the large masses of unemployed
youth and students and trigger violent demonstrations. Although
they have been able to contain such outbreaks in the past, the
police apparently are concerned that their disciplined but
hard-pressed forces might lose control and fire into a mob. If
this happened, law and order throughout Italy could break down
in a series of destructive retaliatory riots.
The preoccupation with public order is leading many
politicians to question whether Prime Minister Andreotti's
minority government has enough authority to deal with the sit-
uation. No other minority Christian Democratic government would
be stronger, however, and some leftist and centrist government
leaders now advocate Andreotti's replacement with a "national
emergency" coalition including the Communists.
Although Christian Democratic president Moro ruled
out such a government last week, he left the door open to a
larger Communist role in government policymaking. Moro argued
that a Communist push for actual government membership now
would destabilize rather than calm the situation. He suggested
instead that the limited agreement reached with the Communists
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last summer--under which they have a formal say in several key
policy areas--could be expanded to include problems not fore-
seen then. The original agreement produced numerous recommenda-
tions in the law and order field, but the feeling has grown
that the government will have to do more.
Moro's suggestion is likely to appeal to the Commu-
nists. The notion of an expanded policy role is consistent
with their desire to move gradually toward a formal governing
role, minimizing the possibility of a conservative backlash
and further rightwing violence. Moreover, it would permit them
to claim something less than full responsibility for any future
government measures that are labeled "repressive" by the left.
Given the resistance of both Christian Democrats and Communists,
only a very serious and prolonged breakdown of public order is
likely to lead a government of "national emergency." 25X1
BENIN: Cuban and Soviet Attention
//The Cubans and Soviets are paying in-
creased attention to the West African state of Benin, probably
in response to the regime's appeals in January for security
assistance.//
In January, exiled opponents of President Kerekou's
radical, self-styled "Marxist-Leninist" regime organized an
abortive raid on Cotonou. Since then, the Benin Government has
increased its contacts with Cuba. In April, a Cuban ambassador
took up residence and was given the place of honor at Benin's
May Day celebration. The Cuban and Beninese Foreign Ministers
have exchanged visits.
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Soviet naval vessels have been calling at Cotonou
port since early this year. The first Soviet vessel arrived in
February from Conakry, Guinea, a country that has welcomed the
protection symbolized by Soviet ships since an abortive, Portu-
guese-backed attack in 1970. Since February, the visits to Co-
tonou by Soviet ships operating off the West African coast--
formerly limited to calls at Conakry and Luanda, Angola--have
become routine. In light of Benin's instability, however, the
Soviets are likely to be cautious about establishing facilities
at Cotonou on the level of those they already have in Conakry
and Luanda.
Pro-Western leaders of West African states are likely
to become concerned that the increased Soviet and Cuban involve-
ment in Benin is a further expansion of Communist influence on
the continent.
From Benin's perspective, the military assistance it
has received from the Communists probably does not compensate
for the loss of French assistance. France decided last year to
withdraw its military attache and advisers and to suspend its
annual grant of materiel aid.
Although Kerekou's regime has embarked on a "revolu-
tionary" development path apparently modeled after North Korea
and China, the increased Soviet and Cuban attention to Benin
may lessen its identification with its Asian mentors.
SYRIA: Western Arms Purchases
Syria reportedly is negotiating the purchase of
military support equipment from several West European coun-
tries, but financing problems thus far have impeded the con-
clusion of contracts.
Syria is talking with the British about purchasing
radar, communications equipment, and a computer support fa.cil-
ity for its Air Force, and support items for the Army, includ-
ing night vision equipment, replacement gunsights for Soviet
T-62 tanks, and radios for armored vehicles. The Syrians are
also negotiating for the French MM-38 antiship missile system
for the Navy's Osa missile boats.
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The Soviets cannot be pleased with this develop-
ment, but there is no evidence that they have objected to se-
lected arms transactions with the West. In the judgment of the
US defense attache in Damascus, the Soviets' primary concern
is that Western contract or military personnel do not obtain
access to sensitive Soviet equipment. //Syria will continue to
rely on the USSR for major armaments.//
//Financial arrangements appear to be the main
stumbling block to the completion of contract negotiations.
Syria's chronic shortage of funds for arms procurement has been
exacerbated by the expense of retaining a military presence in
Lebanon. West European suppliers apparently are requiring siz-
able downpayments on purchases and in some cases asking for
cash on delivery.//
//Although Arab oil countries have made signifi-
cant contributions to the Syrian military in recent years, most
of the funds have been used for such activities as budget sup-
port. Unless more funds are provided, Syria may have to curtail
some of its planned arms purchases in the West.//
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CAMBODIA: Party Purges Continue
//Cambodia's Leaders have apparently carried out
a rect2 ication" campaign in the northern provinces that ex-
tends to the Lowest Levels of the party, and they are publicly
Linking the purges to an alleged plot against the regime.//
//Purges in the northern provinces began in early
1977, when senior military and party leaders there were arrested
and apparently executed. Many purged leaders were accused of
being CIA agents or of planning a coup.//
/The entire military and administrative structure
in t e nor was subsequently reorganized, and new leaders were
brought in from other areas. Lower ranking members of the party
leadership committees were also gradually demoted and replaced.//
/In mid-October, the regime reportedly expanded
its campaign against cadre suspected of disloyalty. All party
members in the military brigade in the north who had been ap-
pointed by the former leaders, and even party Youth League mem-
bers, were arrested and imprisoned.//
attempt.
//We have no firm evidence that there was a coup
the regime is actually
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moving against "bureaucratism" and weak discipline within the
party and is bringing in younger, more revolutionary cadre.
Charges that the purged party members are counterrevolutionaries
and CIA agents may be designed to undercut party resistance to
the harsh "rectification" program.//
/Rather than indicating a real concern over the
threat ot an internal uprising or coup attempt, the recent moves
in the north also may reflect increased leadership confidence.//
USSR - NORTH KOREA: Kapitsa Visit
/The head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far
as Department, Mikhail Kapitsa, recently returned from North
Korea. The visit may have been to plan future high-level ex-
changes between Moscow and Pyongyang.//
//In September, Kapitsa told
that a Soviet Politburo member would'visit North Korea
this year to reciprocate the visit of Premier Pak to Moscow in
January. This would be the first trip to Pyongyang by a Polit-
buro-level official since First Deputy Premier Mazurov went
there in 1971.//
K/No senior member of the Soviet Politburo has
visited Pyongyang since Premier Kosygin's visit in 1965, re-
flecting the cooling of relations and President Kim Il-song's
tilt toward Peking during the 1970s. The stature of the Soviet
Politburo representative will indicate the seriousness that
Moscow ascribes to the idea of improving ties with Pyongyang.//
//Kapitsa and one of his deputies have also said
recently that Kim may visit Moscow next year. Kim has not vis-
ited Moscow since 1961 and has been seeking an invitation to
the Soviet capital since last year as a gesture to restore some
balance in his ties with Moscow and Peking. The Soviets have
repeatedly put him off, in part because of their desire not to
be associated with his hostile attitude toward the US. Moscow
now may believe that Kim, having moderated his stance, will not
cause them serious embarrassment.
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The reduced popular vote for Greek Prime Minister
Caramanlis in Sunday's election, and the resulting Lower par-
liamentary majority together with the strong showing.of Left-
ist Leader Andreas Papandreou, probably will complicate but
not derail any plans Caramanl.is may have for bold domestic and
foreign policy initiatives. Papandreou's resurgence, however,
may eventually upset Greece's otherwise smooth transition to
democratic rule.
Caramanlis' center-right New Democracy received 42.2
percent of the popular vote and 174 of 300 parliamentary seats,
down from the 54.4 percent and 220 seats it won in 1974. Papan-
dreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement'won 25.2 percent of the
vote and 91 seats, up dramatically from 13.6 percent and 12
seats in the last election. George Mavros' Union of the Demo-
cratic Center lost its position as the main opposition party;
it obtained only 12.2 percent of the vote and 15 seats, com-
pared to 20.2 percent and 60 seats in 1974.
Running on its own-for the first time in 40 years, the
pro-Soviet Communist Party won 8.9 percent of the vote and 11
seats while the ultra-right National Camp received 6.9 percent
of the vote and five seats.
The voters' support for Caramanlis was somewhat less
who might otherwise have supported his party.
than he expected. He indirectly blamed the results on the Na-
tional Camp, which was a stalking horse for monarchists and
sympathizers of the junta and took away votes from rightists
Papandreou declared that he was the real winner and
promised to continue his policies emphasizing change and na-
tional independence. Papandreou's chauvinistic rhetoric, par-
ticularly on the economic drawbacks of EC membership, emphasis
on bread.and butter issues, and clear appeal for the protest
vote evidently impressed many Greeks.
Mavros attributed his party's poor showing to the po-
eclipse of his party's role as the main opposition by Papan-
dreou's more vociferous criticism of the Caramanlis government.
The Union's poor performance could mean that Mavros will have
to step down as party leader.
larization of Greek political life. This was an allusion to the
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With a parliamentary majority that would still be the
envy of many West European leaders, Caramanlis is not likely to
permit the election results to constrain him as he seeks to
solve Greece's pressing domestic and foreign policy problems.
His hopes of eventually moving up to the presidency have most
likely been dashed, since he probably can no longer muster the
requisite two-thirds parliamentary majority to be elected. But
he does have the absolute majority needed for approval of al-
most any domestic or foreign policy initiatives.
Papandreou, however, views parliamentary politics as
being complemented by street tactics, and this probably worries
Caramanlis. The Prime Minister must also contend with the right-
ists, some of whom might see Papandreou as enough of a threat
to resort to antidemocratic activity. Caramanlis may well see
a coalition with Mavros' party as the best means to broaden his
base and withstand pressures from Papandreou and the extreme
right.
Papandreou for his part clearly has ambitions to suc-
ceed Caramanlis. To do so, he would need not only an electoral
victory, but the acquiescence of the military, which intervened
to stop his bid for power in 1967.
Preliminary indications are that he will continue to
refuse to cooperate with the other opposition parties in an ef-
fort to set himself apart and retain the protest vote. By re-
fusing to cooperate with the Communists, he hopes to win the
confidence of the military. At the same time, he is likely to
make a pitch for the remaining constituents of Mavros' Union
of the Democratic Center by emphasizing legal opposition tac-
tics and moderating his social and economic programs.
So long as Caramanlis is in charge, Papandreou is
not likely to be anything more than a gadfly, particularly if
the economy continues to do relatively well and Caramanlis can
achieve at least some successes in foreign policy, such as
gaining EC membership for Greece. Papandreou could play a much
larger role in the post-Caramanlis era, however, especially
since there is no other Greek politician who can match his ap-
peal.
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Yugoslavia
The leader of the illegal pro-Soviet party in Yugo-
slavia, Mileta Perovic, has been arrested and put in prison to
await trial. Legal proceedings against Perovic, secretary gen-
eral of the anti-Titoist party formed in Montenegro in April
1974, promise to spark official leaks and rumors implicating
orthodox Communist Yugoslav emigres with the Soviets and their
East European allies.
Perovic's capture is a coup for the Yugoslav security
services. He was a co-founder of the illegal party and until
early 1976 enjoyed Soviet protection as a resident of Kiev. He
slipped back into Yugoslavia illegally sometime after
July
1976.
Leadership of the pro-Soviet "Cominformists" may now
fall
to
Bogdan Jovovic, an emigre who left Kiev with Perovic
last
year.
The subversive group is foundering under the Tito re-
gime's pressure, and the authorities will be somewhat more at
ease with Perovic in jail. Belgrade, however, is unlikely to
ease its vigilance since over 700 Cominformists, according to
recent Yugoslav estimates, still reside in Eastern Europe. The
regime, moreover, occasionally floats the Soviet threat to warn
Yugoslavs that their petty squabbles only invite foreign inter-
ference.
Dissident Romanian author Paul Goma, the central fig-
ure in the country's small and fragmented dissident community,
arrived in Paris on Sunday with his wife and child. They are
traveling on a one-year tourist visa.
It isnot clear whether the authorities will permit
Goma to return, although in 1972 they allowed him to depart
under similar circumstances and to return a year later. The re-
gime may be gambling that Goma's wife--who reportedly is weary
of his dissident activities--will prevail upon him to stay in
the West.
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The regime apparently allowed Goma to leave in order
to avoid embarrassing publicity about Romania's record on human
rights during the Belgrade talks on European security. Most of
the country's persistent activists have either received their
travel documents or have been told to expect them soon. Like
Goma, all the others have obtained tourist visas, but they had
to sign statements saying they no longer wished to emigrate.
If these dissidents do not return, they then become
subject to criminal penalties as defectors under Romanian law.
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Spain - Western Sahara
The Algerian-backed Polisario Front has admitted at-
tacking a Spanish fishing boat last week and capturing three
crewmen. A communique issued on Monday in Algiers warns that
any foreigners going into the "zone of conflict" risk becoming
"involved" in the dispute.
The Danish Government is urging the nomination of
former Prime Minister Poul Hartling to the post of UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees. Hartling's departure from Denmark would
open his Moderate Liberal Party to a policy debate and leader-
ship competition which might not be settled before the party
conference next fall.
The popularity of the Liberals has been declining
since 1973, when Hartling won the leadership of a center-right
government. The party was then second--it is now fourth--of
about a dozen parliamentary parties. Large farm owners, who
formed the party's traditional base, are a dwindling part of
the electorate, and the party's brief success in attracting
urban middle class voters in 1973 has not been sustained. The
choice of a new leader will turn on his ability to attract a
new following for the party.
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