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December 20, 2016
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May 15, 2006
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January 3, 1978
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ppq Release TO: NAME A 14D DDRESS l RECOMMENDATION RETURN (Security Classification) Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: 0 0 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Top Secret (Security Classification) Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03050001 002-0 AW 'Aw 'Aw IMF AW AW low IMF AW AJ Tuesday 3 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/001C CIA-RDP79T00975AO305O9p Q Stcret 2, c 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010002-0 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010002-0 Approved For PaFinnal Tntellicrenr'e nails Cable for Tues January 1978, 25X1 rune NID Ca e is for the purpose of informing senior US officials. CONTENTS USSR: Additional Grain Purchases CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Situation Report TURKEY: Coalition Government CHILE: Plebiscite Consequences Page 1 Page 1 Page 2 Page 4 Approved For R4 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 USSR: Additional Grain Purchases //We believe that the Soviets have contracted for 23.5 mi ion tons of grain in 1977, an estimated 22.5 million of which will be delivered in the October 1977 - September 1978 marketing year. The bulk of the deliveries will be evenly divided between wheat and corn; there are also small amounts of barley, rye, and oats.// //We estimate that the Soviets are already committed to buy 10 million tons of corn and 5 million tons of wheat. Because supplies of non-US grain are short, the Soviets will probably have to make a formal request to the US to raise the 15-million-ton purchase limit established by the long-term US-USSR grain agreement if they are to make substan- tial 25X1 additional purchases. ket for additional rain or delivery in the current marketing year, CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Situation Report Vietnam's public reaction to Cambodia's severing of Zp omatic relations on Saturday has been more of sorrow than anger. Meanwhile, Vietnamese troops are mopping up Cambodian units in Svay Rieng Province. I I Recalling their common struggle for. independence, Hanoi expressed regret that Cambodia soured the relationship with armed incursions into Vietnam. Detailing past efforts to bring the Cambodians to the negotiating table, Hanoi urged an early meeting to discuss the current situation. Phnom Penh radio late yesterday broadcast official statements that Cam- bodia would not consider talks unless Vietnam withdraws its forces and creates "an atmosphere of friendship and mutual confidence." China, although Cambodia's mentor, has taken an im- partial stance by broadcasting without comment both Cambodian and Vietnamese statements. Moscow, on the other hand, sharply Approved For Rel //The Soviets may soon be in the mar- Approved Fort criticized Cambodia's action and supported Vietnam's call for a meeting to settle the dispute. The Soviet response also clearly implied that Peking fully supported Cambodia's action. Initial Soviet reaction ignored. Cambodian intimations that So- viet advisers are with Vietnamese forces. The Vietnamese continue their militar o er ti y p a ons in the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng but are encountering Since the Vietnamese invaded Svay Rieng in early December, they have destroyed several Cambodian combat units, captured a large number of Cambodian troo s and now occupy key positions throughout the province. TURKEY: Coalition Government //President Koruturk on Sunday named opposition leader BuZent Ecevit to form a new coalition government. Prime Minister DemireZ, who resigned Saturday when his coalition failed to win a vote of confidence, will remain as caretaker until Ecevit wins acceptance for his cabinet and program, pos- sibZy within two weeks.// 1//Ecevit's efforts to bring down Demirel and his three-party coalition succeeded Saturday when he mustered 228 votes against the government in a no-confidence motion. Weakened by the defection of 11 Justice Party deputies last October, Demirel's government polled only 218 ballots, eight short of a majority.// //An informal coalition headed by Ecevit and his Republican People's Party might be able to count upon 227 votes, one more than a majority. Aside from two small splinter parties possessing three votes and his own party's 213, Ecevit has received support from 11 of parliament's 14 independents.// Approved Approved For RoIease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 //While questions remain about Ecevit's ability to hold his prospective allies together, his success in unseat- ing Demirel will probably strengthen the commitment to forming a stable government. Furthermore, Ecevit's allies might fear that a failure to put together a government could precipitate a political crisis in which the military might intervene--de- spite the recent statement by the Chief of the General Staff that the military intends to stay out of politics.// //Ecevit's highly personal approach to politics makes it i icult to predict his actions on foreign and domes- tic issues. He believes austerity measures are essential if Turkey's serious economic problems are to be solved and will probably accept the International Monetary Fund's conditions for granting a loan in order to reassure other international lenders.// //In order to solve Turkey's continuing prob- lems with Cyprus and the Aegean, Ecevit might opt for a dra- matic move, such as an immediate meeting with Greece's Prime Minister Karamanlis. On Cyprus, Ecevit would probably be in a better position to make concessions than his predecessor.// //Domestic security may prove a more difficult problem for Ecevit to solve. Turks have become accustomed to a high level of political violence, much of which is the work, of individuals or small groups acting spontaneously and with lit- tle allegiance either to larger organizations or to ideologies. Ecevit, usually cast as a social democrat, might placate left- ist elements but incite rightists to more violence.// the Cyprus situation could well //Nevertheless , en to compromise than are Turkish claims in the s o l p es prove Aegean. The military might quietly press Ecevit to make.prog- ress on Cyprus in order to improve chances for US ratification of the $1 billion Defense Cooperation Agreement, but they too are divided as to how much Turkey should concede. 1 -1 Approved For Re Approved For elease 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975 030500010002-0 25X1 CHILE: Plebiscite Consequences The Chilean public will respond by plebiscite on Wednesday to President Pinochet's appeal for support in the face of "foreign aggression" on the human rights issue. De- spite dissent within the junta, and against the judgment of his civilian supporters, Pinochet is determined to gamble on this "national consultation." The consequences of exposing the regime to popular judgment will almost surely exceed what Pinochet had in mind when he submitted his political brainchild. He evidently fore- saw an easy personal victory in playing on nationalistic sen- timent against foreign criticism. He may also have counted on the pervasive fear that has developed among the public that the military will somehow know how each individual votes. Pinochet did not anticipate either the immediate or longer range risks in this venture. Unless the vote is over- whelmingly favorable and the election unquestionably clean, the prestige of the regime will suffer and Pinochet's personal chance to enhance the power of the presidency will falter. Air Force General Leigh still refuses to support the plebiscite. With the junta's division now in the public domain, some shakeup in the governing body will almost certainly be required after the vote is in. No clear mechanism exists to prevent this shakeup from becoming another embarrassing con- frontation within the leadership. A longer range risk arises from Pinochet's implicit acknowledgment that the regime depends on popular support. The plebiscite on Wednesday is likely to create demands for other expressions of popular will. According to the US Embassy, many Chileans believe the plebiscite will have a major impact on the country's future. The junta will not be able to i nore these expectations without further political cost. 25X1 Approved For 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010002-0 Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010002-0 AW i AW / A j Top Ar oveu or Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T 00975A030500010002-0 ecet (Security Classification) Top Secret (Security CI Ii yff or Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010002-0 1 1 1 1 1 J