NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 4, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
0 Wednesday 4 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/002C 0
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 4 January 1978.
T e a e is for the purpose -o-t--informing
senior US officials.
ISRAEL-EGYPT: Sinai Exercise
CHINA: Grain Harvest and Imports
USSR: Standards for Radiation
TUNISIA: Recent Cabinet Changes
GUINEA: Prisoner Amnesties
ETHIOPIA: Asmara Airport Attack
CHINA - EAST EUROPE: Rebuffed
MEXICO: Illegal Migrations
BRIEF
Argentina-Chile
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ISRAEL-EGYPT: Sinai Exercise
I I Israeli ground forces are carrying out a Zarge-
sca e exercise in the Sinai, possibly one of their largest
field maneuvers in two years. Israel apparently informed Egypt
and the UN peacekeeping force of the exercise in advance to
allay their concern over Israeli intentions.
//The two Israeli armored divisions stationed in
the western Sinai as well as various combat support and service
units are involved in the exercise.//
I I The main portion of the exercise began on Monday
ana probably will conclude tomorrow. //Preliminary phases may
have begun about a week ago, and parts of the exercise may ex-
tend into this weekend.//
CHINA: Grain Harvest and Imports
I IThe Chinese have admitted that 1977 was a second
consecutive year of little or no growth in grain production
with their claim that "despite natural adversities, grain pro-
duction reached Zast year's level." Grain output (including
soybeans) in 1976 was unofficially set at 285 million 1';ons;
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in 1975 the total was 284 million tons. China is likely to im-
port about the same quantity of grain this year as in 1977--
about 7 million tons--to compensate for the disappointing har-
vest.
ing off of grain production in China over the last two years.
A drought, which ran from October 1976 to last April, was the
major problem affecting production in 1977. The drought mostly
affected north China, and an estimated 10 percent--about 4 mil-
lion to 5 million tons--of the winter wheat crop was lost. An
abnormal degree of waterlogging and cool temperatures after
the drought had broken caused additional crop losses in the
summer and fall.
Bad weather was the fundamental cause for the level-
The fall harvest of 1977 was nonetheless much improved
over , when the pattern differed. After a good winter wheat
crop, early crops in 1976 were retarded by cool, damp weather
that in turn delayed planting of the fall-harvested crops. An
early winter and excess precipitation then caused harvest losses;
late rice was especially hard hit.
began to realize the extent of damage to the fall harvest from
cold and damage to the spring harvest from drought. Between No-
vember 1976 and June 1977, the Chinese purchased 11.7 million
tons of wheat for delivery through July 1978.
to avoid spending scarce foreign exchange for new grain pur-
chases. Purchases of wheat subsequently accelerated as Peking
Until late 1976, China had drawn down grain reserves
I IThe total amount of grain imported in 1977 was about
7 million tons, compared with the yearly average since 1970 of
5 million tons. During the first half of 1978, 4.5 million tons
of grain are scheduled to be delivered. Grain imports in 1978
will again be.about 7 million tons if the half-year average of
? 2.5 million tons is purchased for delivery during the second
half of 1978.
We doubt that more grain will be purchased for de-
livery during the first half of 1978. The Chinese need time
to evaluate prospects for the spring harvest, and the amount
of grain already coming in is well above the average. Wheat im-
ports mostly supplement the grain supply of China's northern
cities.
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The controversy within the Soviet scientific commu-
nity over safety standards for nonionizing electromagnetic ra-
diation appears to be growing more intense. On several recent
occasions, with US scientists present, Soviet scientists have
had heated exchanges about the establishment of risk versus
benefit criteria, the values of an experimental approach, in-
terpretation of experimental data, and the usefulness of cZini-
cal and epidemiological studies.
Scientists from the Ministry of Health, who are re-
sponsible for setting Soviet occupational and general popula-
tion safety standards, insist upon maintaining standards with
a large margin of safety. Scientists from the Academy of Sci-
ence, led by Dr. I. G. Akoyev, believe, on the other hand, that
the current standards are unrealistically stringent. These sci-
entists have been increasingly critical of the approach and re-
search methods of the Ministry of Health.
Dr. Akoyev believes that some risk may be warranted
and that risk versus benefit criteria must be a major consid-
eration. He also states that experimental results should be
evaluated statistically and that reliance on epidemiological
studies is not warranted. Earlier this year, Dr. Akoyev told
visiting US scientists that Soviet safety standards probably
would be eased. More recently, however, he said that efforts
are being made to tighten the standards. The Ministry of Health,
for example, is trying to make the one-microwatt-per-aquare-
centimeter exposure standard for the general population even
more stringent.
We believe that the experimental approach of the Min-
istry of Health groups has consistently reported effects at er-
roneously low nonionizing electromagnetic radiation levels.
This, coupled with the Ministry of Health's practice of setting
standards an order of magnitude below the level of any observed
effect, has contributed to the overly stringent standards in
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TUNISIA: Recent Cabinet Changes
I IThe recent governmental changes in Tunisia reflect
President Bourguiba's continued confidence in his designated
successor, Prime Minister Nouira, who will now exercise greater
control of the cabinet than before. The new members of the cabi-
net are political conservatives whose views are in close accord
with those of Nouira and Bourguiba. The changes also constitute
a warning to Habib Achour, head of the national labor union,
that the government will henceforth deal forcefully with labor
unrest.
In a surprise announcement last month, Minister of In-
terior Belkhodja and the police chief were relieved of their
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duties. Foreign Minister Chatti and several other cabinet and
subcabinet officials resigned or were fired during the ensuing
three days.
Belkhodja's dismissal was the result of his long
standing disagreements with Nouira and other hard-line govern-
ment ministers over whether to negotiate with striking workers
or to suppress recurring labor agitation by force.
Only three of the newly appointed ministers and sub-
cabinet officials are politically significant. Habib Bourguiba,
Jr., who shares Nouira's hard-line views on labor unrest, ac-
quired the title of special presidential adviser and is likely
to serve as a counterweight to Mrs. Bourguiba, his stepmother,
who has been a supporter of Belkhodja and labor leader Achour.
Newly named foreign Minister Fitouri and Minister of Interior
Hannablia are members of the party political bureau and the Na-
tional Assembly.
Formation of this basically conservative cabinet
should reduce chronic ministerial infighting and will almost
certainly result in strong action against striking workers who
resort to violence.
Achour recently told a US Embassy official that labor
agitation would increase over the next several weeks and that
he is considering the formation of a new labor-based political
party. He has had second thoughts, however, about leading an
early challenge to the Nouira government; railroad workers and
miners accepted government offers last week that fell far short
of their original demands. On several occasions in the past, the
blustery labor leader has predicted an imminent confrontation
with the government only to retreat in the face of unified party
and government opposition.
Guinean President Toure seems increasingly ??ensitive
about his country's poor human rights record and about the ad-
verse foreign publicity Guinea has received. In an unprecedented
gesture earlier this year, he offered amnesty to Guinean exiles.
He freed more than 160 domestic political prisoners last year,
and additional prisoner releases are likely this year---although
the mercurial Toure could easily change his mind.
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In his 19 years of dictatorial rule, Toure has built
one of e harshest regimes in Africa, although he is now show-
ing some signs of moderation. Last month, he released some 62
prisoners in the largest single amnesty in Guinea's history.
There are now probably less than 1,000 political prisoners in
the country. Guinea has also signaled its willingness to re-
ceive a human rights delegation from the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, and it may be considering ratifying
the Geneva convention.
domestic critics. The ministerial-rank officials who were ar-
rested in a purge after Guinean exiles attacked Conakry in
1970 have not been included in the prisoner releases. Some
ministerial-level prisoners and other senior figures arrested
in 1976, however, allegedly for plotting against Toure, may
be released this month.
Despite the amnesties, few Guinean exiles have re-
turned home in part because the regime has freed few of its
The Guinean President appears in part to be heeding
the advice of some of the more moderate members of the leader-
ship. After riots in August over the regime's unproductive
"socialist" economic policies, these officials urged Toure to
adopt more pragmatic policies. Toure is now tolerating a boom-
ing private market supplied with a variety of smuggled goods,
and the border with neighboring Senegal has been quietly re-
opened to traders. Both actions have helped ease internal
pressures.
Toure's response to quiet diplomatic pressure from
the US and from France on human rights probably also reflects
this more pragmatic approach.
I jIn recent months, Guinea has been strongly interested
in obtaining increased Western investment and aid to help over-
come its economic problems and to spur industrial development.
Toure apparently believes that Guinea's poor human rights image
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ETHIOPIA: Asmara Airport Attack
A spokesman for the Eritrean Liberation Front said
yester ay that its forces had overrun the airfield near Asmara
and that all flights had been halted. Another spokesman, however,
said that the facility is being shelled. An Ethiopian official
in London denied that the airfield had fallen.
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We cannot yet confirm the claim but believes the fa-
cility is probably under attack. The airfield, which lies sev-
eral kilometers outside the Eritrean capital, is a vulnerable
target and has been shelled by the insurgents in the past.
The closure of the airfield would be a serious blow
to the Ethiopian Government's attempt to hold Asmara, and loss
of the field would be a major breach of the garrison's defen-
sive perimeter. The city has been heavily dependent on air-
lifted supplies since insurgents closed the Asmara-Massawa
road in October. The airfield also supported the Ethiopian Air
Force's combat operations in Eritrea.[ I
CHINA - EAST EUROPE: Rebuffed
Moscow's principal East European allies have rebuffed
Peking's most recent efforts to improve state-to-state rela-
tions. Throughout the fall Chinese officials approached East
European representatives in Peking and abroad to express Chi-
nese desires for strengthened relations, but Poland, Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria all have rejected
the overtures.
I I The Chinese are under no illusions that any of the So-
viet oreign policy loyalists in Eastern Europe are going to
defy Moscow as Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania have. They may
hope that some movement in this direction is possible, although
the Soviets so far have been able to keep their allies in line.
Peking nevertheless has tried periodically iLo make
trouble for the USSR in this manner, and appeared to have con-
sidered last fall a particularly opportune time for another
round of overtures. During the past year, Chinese media paid
special attention to increased dissident activity in Eastern
Europe, to signs of differences over economic policies within
the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,
and to increased East European dealings with the West---includ-
ing preparations for President Carter's visit to Poland. Peking
clearly views these trends as working against Soviet interests
in maintaining control over Eastern Europe.
Peking may also have hoped that the slight im
rov
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ment in the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet state-to-state relations
would encourage some East European governments to consider a
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corresponding improvement in their own relations with Peking
and that this would create additional difficulties for Moscow
as it moved to squelch any such notions.
Since the Chinese diplomatic initiative got under way,
the Soviets have in fact stated publicly on several occasions
that they view Peking's efforts as anti-Soviet and have warned
their allies not to respond. The most recent such message ap-
peared in Pravda on 13 December. Moscow has also undoubtedly re-
peated its warnings in private.
The East Europeans would see advantages in closer
ties to China, particularly if there were a possibility of in-
creased exports. They may also see some political advantage in
Moscow's discomfiture about Sino - East European relations. But
the East Europeans are well aware of Moscow's hypersensitivity
about China and of Peking's motives in approaching them. Moscow's
most loyal allies--East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria--
were probabl the most concerned not to get out ahead of the So-
viets.
MEXICO: Illegal Migrations
Because of the Mexican recession and the 45-percent
devaluation of the peso in 1976--which increased US-Mexican
wage differentials--the number of illegal migrants to the US
this year jumped to 1.5 million from recent annual levels of
500,000 to 800,000. We expect the flow to drop back toward
the previous level by 1979. While most of the migrants return
home after several months, perhaps as many as a third of them
have stayed in the US each year.
Mexico is by far the largest source of illegal migrants
to the US. Unlike illegal migrants from other countries in Latin
America and the Far East, the Mexicans come mainly from small
villages in rural areas. They are different in other ways:
--They are strongly attached to their local area, and most
of them generally remain in the US only four to six
months.
--They make repeated trips to the US.
--They have been recently employed--many are small land-
owners or shopkeepers--and have the $200 to $300 needed
for transportation, food, and smuggling fees.
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--Like their fellow villagers migrating to Mexican cities,
they are more likely to be seeking higher wages than
fleeing unemployment.
These migrants probably come mainly from eight Mexican
states. n descending importance, the states are Michoacan, Zac-
atecas, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Durango, Chihuahua, Jalisco,
and Nuevo Leon.
The northern states that are not sources of migrants
are in a better position to absorb labor at relatively high wages
than are the migrants' home states.
Mexico's other 23 states and the Federal District pro-
fewer migrants in part because:
--The southern states are far from the US border and, more
important, their largely rural Indian inhabitants are
culturally indisposed to migration.
--The people living in the Federal District and surrounding
areas go to Mexico City to seek jobs.
Although some of the states that are sources of mi-
gration are among Mexico's richest, they all face serious prob-
lems. Agriculture is not expanding fast enough to absorb the
growth of their rural labor force. Industry is generally small-
scale, tends to pay low wages, and thus is not an attractive
source of employment.
Population and age characteristics indicate that mi-
gration pressures will increase most rapidly in Zacatecas, Mi-
choacan, and Guanajuato. Prospects for economic growth that will
create jobs are best in Nuevo Leon and Jalisco for industry and
in Chihuahua for both industry and agriculture.
While these eight states will continue to su
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legal migrants for many,years, we expect their relative import-
ance to decline. As Mexico becomes more urban, the number of il-
legal migrants from urban areas will increase.
Urban migrants will be similar to those from South
America and the Far East, who are relatively well-educated white
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collar or skilled workers. Unlike the rural migrants, they will
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Argentina-Chile
posture taken by Chilean Foreign Minister Carvajal during the
talks may reflect Santiago's reluctance to appear too concilia-
tory on a nationalistic question prior to today's referendum.//
ister Montes and his Chilean counterpart over disputed maritime
limits in the South Atlantic ended abruptly last week; neither
side was willing to make concessions. The stiff negotiating
//Argentina and Chile continue to maintain firm
pressure on each other over the conflicting claims. The dispute
arose over how the decision by the International Court of Jus-
tice last May awarding three small islands in the Beagle Chan-
nel to Chile will affect Argentina's maritime rights outside
the channel, a question not addressed by the court. Both coun-
tries reportedly have moved some troops and supplies to the
south.//
A major clash is unlikely. Relations between the two coun-
tries remain cordial, and Argentine and Chilean officials appear
inclined to continue ex lorin ways to resume discussions aimed
at a peaceful solution.
//Negotiations between Argentine Foreign Min-
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