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December 20, 2016
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May 15, 2006
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January 5, 1978
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OF AW AW ,AW 0 :0 CIA-RDP79T00975A03050t' QUQQecrat r 1 H (Security Classification) 25X1 PREPA RE REPLY APPROVAL RECOM MENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN INFORMATION SIGNATURE FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. Apr pApprftfft a ease 1 1 1 1 1 1 Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: Thursday 5 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/003C NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions MMMIMMNA State Dept. review completed Top Secret S urity Classification) Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975AO3~5~~010 - 1 1 1 1 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010006-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010006-6 Approved For Rel National. Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 5 January 19 25X1 25X1 The NID a e is for the purpose of informing senior US officials. Page 1 VIETNAM-CAMBODIA: Diplomacy INDIA: Gandhi Splits Opposition UK-USSR: Steel Imports Banned HUNGARY: Kadar The Middleman EAST GERMANY: Reaction to Spiegel CHILE: Pres. Pinochet's Victory BRIEFS 25X1 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 7 Page 9 Page 10 Page 11 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOPi0500010006-6 Approved For Re ARAB STATES: Possible Summit Boumediene who departed Baghdad on Wednesday en. route to uwait and perhaps other Arab states, was probably trying to determine Iraq's terms for making common cause with other hard-line Arabs against Sadat and the willingness of the Iraqis to call off their drawn-out feud with Syria--a situation Boumediene would like to mediate. (S) Iraq's motives for becoming involved again in efforts to counter Sadat's moves are not clear, but it may have.con- cluded that the results of the Ismailia summit have deepened Arab doubts about the wisdom of Sadat's negotiating process. It is just as likely, however, that the Iraqis see a vacuum they can exploit--if only to further Iraq's interests in its feud with Syria. The hard-line Arabs believe a Syrian-Iraqi rap- prochement is a necessity if an effective counter to Sadat is to be organized. There are some indications, according to the mmodation ma f acco US Embassy in Damascus, that some kind o -nnn be reached. Any onciliation, however, is likely only to be a temporary papering- over of the deep split between the rival Baathist governments in Baghdad and Damascus. Approved For Relea Approved For Rel Unless Asad does a complete and unexpected about- face--or the Iraqis come up with new formulations--he is un- likely to reach agreement with Baghdad on cooperating against Israel or for taking steps to derail Sadat's negotiations with Tel Aviv. I I Iraq has already proposed on many occasions the cre- ation o an eastern front--which would involve the stationing of a large part of the Iraqi Army in Syria. Asad would welcome Iraqi aid in case of another war with Israel, but he is not likely otherwise to risk having an Iraqi military presence in Syria. He knows too well that it might open Syria to an attack by Israel or to an Iraqi attempt to overthrow him. ponent of Iraq also has long considered itself the premier ex- "rejectionisism"--the doctrine that calls for no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition of Israel. Hewing to this line, the Iraqis also do not accept UN Security Coun- cil Resolutions 242 and 338. At the anti-Sadat conference held in Triopli early last month, the Iraqis walked out and refused to sign the final communique--which was signed by the other participants--on the grounds that it did not call for tough sanctions against Sadat and did not reject any form of negotiations with Israel. Although Asad has reacted harshly against Sadat's present tactics, we doubt that he is willing to adopt a full- fledged rejectionist stance. At the Tripoli meeting, for exam- ple, Asad reportedly persuaded the participants--except for Iraq--not to burn their bridges to Cairo. Approved For R$Iease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOPi0500010006-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010006-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010006-6 Approved For Rel VIETNAM-CAMBODIA: Diplomacy present its side of the conflict with Cambodia. The Vietnamese are promoting an image of aggrieved restraint and emphasizing Cambodian provocation and their own desire for a peaceful set- tZement. On Tuesday, the Vietnamese Embassy in Laos circulated in the diplomatic corps a "declaration" that summarizes Hanoi's version of the postwar history of territorial disputes with the Cambodians and Vietnam's attempts to reach a settlement. The Vietnamese describe their frustrated efforts to arrange high- level talks with the Cambodian leaders but urge again that the two sides meet to settle their border problem in a spirit of "fraternal friendship." made demarches to the Swedish Government, which reportedly agreed to issue a statement expressing its hope for a peaceful settlement. The Indian Government reacted in similar fashion following a briefing by the Vietnamese Ambassador in New Delhi. Even before Cambodia broke diplomatic relations with Vietnam last Saturday, Hanoi tried to establish its credentials as the aggrieved party--probably hoping to develop a persuasive rationale for its incursion into Cambodian territory--in brief- ings of foreign diplomats in Hanoi and in 0 communica- tions to foreign leaders such as Prime Minister Kriangsak of Thailand. Vietnam has begun a vigorous diplomatic campaign to Vietnamese diplomats elsewhere have sought support or at least a sympathetic ear for their position. They have position. In contrast to the generally neutral international reaction to the conflict, Moscow has come out with strong pub- lic support for Vietnam's position. Official Soviet media have only hinted at Chinese involvement, but the Moscow-sponsored Radio Peace and.Progress has explicitly charged that Peking pro- voked the decline in relations between Vietnam and Cambodia. While Peking has long supported Phnom Penh's side in the dis- pute with Hanoi, Chinese coverage of the most recent develop- ments has stopped short of direct endorsement of the Cambodian Approved For Reloase 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A040500010006-6 Approved For F elease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T009754030500010006-6 25X1 INDIA: Gandhi Splits Opposition I I The aggressive tactics former Prime Minister Gandhi evidently intends to employ are likely to disrupt Indian poli- tics. Her decision to split the Congress Party diminishes, if not destroys, the party's potential for establishing itself as India's first major opposition party since independence. The split in opposition ranks also increases the di fficult`:y the ruling Janata Party will have in staying together over the long term. I I Gandhi and about a third of her followers on the All- India Congress Committee, the Congress Party's general working body, called their own convention in Delhi this week attended by 1,500 to 2,000 supporters. They declared their independence of the present Congress leadership--after having failed in ear- lier attempts to take over the party's organization--and issued a program condemning the government's domestic and foreign pol- icies. The rebels were promptly expelled from the party by Con- gress President Brahmananda Reddy and Parliamentary Leader Y. B. Chavan. The week's actions parallel events in 1969 when Morarji Desai and others broke away from the then governing Congress Party and expelled Gandhi. At that time, however, by exercising the powers of government and patronage Gandhi was able to retain the loyalty of a large majority of Congress Party members and to solidify her control over the party. Neither wing of Congress has that power now. The future outline of Indian politics is once again fluid. We are not yet sure of the extent of Gandhi's support in the Congress, or of where the bulk of her strength lies in India. Both wings of the party are sure to begin wooing poten- tial supporters. If Gandhi can muster sufficient popularity in three southern states where elections are to be held in the spring, she could emerge as a leader with at least regional strength. If the Reddy-Chavan Congress appears to be losing popular support, many of its members might give in to the temptation to join the Janata Party--especially in the north where the governing party is strongest. Approved For 25X1 Approved For Flelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A04 I On the other hand, the old Congress Party might ap- pear more attractive now that it is dissociated from the stigma of Gandhi and emergency rule, and disgruntled Janata factions in some states may be tempted to join with it in new political coalitions. UK-USSR: Steel Imports Banned I //The British Government has banned the import of virtually all Soviet steel in 1978. Under pressure from the troubled British steel industry, Secretary of State for Trade DeZZ invoked emergency provisions of the European Coal and Steel Community against Soviet steel exports.// I I //Brz is p rolled products--reportedly increased from 16,000 tons in 1976 to about 100,000 tons last year. This volume, about the same as total Soviet steel exports to the West in 1976, earned Mos- cow an estimated $30 million to $40 million.// 't h im orts of Soviet steel--mostly flat //London hoped that the Soviets would agree to limit exports, as had most East European countries, but Moscow would not agree to a level acceptable to the British. Given the glut in Western steel markets, the USSR will have diffi- culty finding another customer in the West and may have to divert the steel to domestic uses.// itish expect some retaliation, possibly B r //The in the form of reduced Soviet purchases of British steel. The Soviets import large amounts of steel from the West--including d a wide variety of large-diameter pipe, specialty steels, an ewhere l . s other products--and could easily buy e HUNGARY: Kadar The Middleman I //Recent reports indicate that Hungarian party leader Kadar has been acting as a "mediator" between the USSR and the independent-minded West European Communists. Last fall the Hungarians received visits from the leaders of the French and Italian parties; they reportedly have also invited Spanish Communist leader Santiago Carrillo to visit Budapest. Approved For Re Approved For Releo Kadar is doing this to gain favor with Moscow and because he knows that a split between the Eurocommunists and Moscow would force him to sever ties with the Western parties.// //The specific purposes of Kadar's "mediating" have not been spelled out. One likely aim is a toning down of the West Europeans' anti-Soviet rhetoric. Hungarian press arti- cles on Eurocommunism have consistently called for an end to public polemics and for private discussion of differences over the strategy and tactics of revolution.// //Moscow clearly cannot stomach the strident anti- Sovietism of such people as Carrillo, which they see as under- mining their authority with Communist parties throughout the world and which they fear as a potentially disruptive influ- ence in Eastern Europe and at home. Moscow has had a bit of success in getting some Eurocommunists to dampen their public anti-Soviet statements and may see advantages to following up this partial success with a lobbying effort by the Hungarians.// //The Hungarian activity may be part of a ovie strategy designed to impede the development of a Western Communist identity. The Soviets have long sought to deflect the West European parties from organizing regional meetings by pro- moting broader gatherings to deal with noncontroversial topics in which the Soviets and their allies would have a voice.// From the Soviet perspective, such sessions could help intensify any dif- ferences among the Eurocommunists and provide a forum in which Moscow could exert influence.// Approved For Pelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T0097541030500010006-6 Approved For RO //Apart from his own desire to see the "in- , nal movement" hold together, Kadar probably wants to ti o terna do a favor for Moscow that the USSR may reciprocate on bilat- eral issues at some future date.// //Some Hungarians may also believe that the phenomenon o Eurocommunism is in Hungary's interest because it helps to expand the limits of what the Soviets are willing to tolerate and thereby allows Hungary more latitude in domes- tic or foreign affairs.// //Eastern Europe, however, occupies a spe- cial place in Soviet thinking, and Moscow seems likely always 25X1 to demand more in the way of loyalty and orthodoxy from the countries in the region than it could hope to get from other Communist parties farther removed. EAST GERMANY: Reaction to Spiegel East Germany has reacted swiftly in denouncing the i Went German news magazine Der Spiegel's publication this week osition manifesto" that purports to represent the a:n "o f pp . o work of a dissident group of "medium and high-level" East Ger- man party officials. East German media have labeled the document an "atro- cious fabrication" designed to upset relations between West The government has also refused to accredit d East Germany . an Spiegel's new correspondent in East Germany. Spiegel has been unusually critical of East Germany since the arrest in August of dissident critic Rudolf Bahro, whose criticism of the re- gime Spiegel published. The "manifesto" asserts that "democratic and human- itarian Communists" in East Germany have organized an illegal ue of Democratic Communists of Germany" to work for a "L eag democratic Communist order, a unified and neutral Germany, and the realization of basic human rights for each citizen. The document is strongly anti-Soviet, nationalistics, and critical of East Germany's political system and its leaders. 25X1 Approved For RelIease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03p500010006-6 Approved For Re The rambling and clumsily worded "manifesto" claims to represent the culmination of a line of German Marxist theo- reticians from Karl Liebkneecht through Ernst Bloch, Robert Havemann, and Wolfgang Harich. The latter, however, has pub- licly described the manifesto as "completely lacking in credi- bility." Harich said that its language clearly does not repre- sent that used by East German party officials. It also seems 25X1 highly unlikely that any reasonably serious dissident group in East Germany would take on the Soviets in so straightforward, abusive, and dismissive a manner as the manifesto. I F CHILE: Pres. Pinochet's Victory I I Chilean President Pinochet appears to have won a an some personal victory in yesterday's plebiscite. The vote surpassed his own best hopes for the outcome. The latest avail- able figures indicate that about 78 percent of the voting popu- lace approved his rule. We expect Pinochet simply to ignore critics of the voting process, which was heavily loaded to ensure a favorable result. He will make the most of the victory as evidence of the regime's legitimacy and of his own political wisdom. In months to come, Pinochet is likely to have reason to regret this exer- cise in manipulating public opinion, which probably has raised political expectations that the government will not want to meet. But for now, Pinochet is in a privileged position. Having consolidated his superior position in the junta, Pinochet will have a free hand in many areas. Probably at least the more outspoken of his critics on the junta, Air Force General Leigh, will be obliged to retire. Another junta member, Admiral Merino, might also step aside. I Pinochet's win will galvanize support in the mili- tary, were doubt about his judgment and leadership was begin- ning to spread. Options on the domestic scene are broader. Pinochet is almost certain to be tougher toward opponents in political and labor circles, but he could go either way toward the public generally. He might loosen some of the more onerous security restrictions such as the curfew, but he will see no need to narrow his definition of subversion. Approved For R~Iease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AP030500010006-6 The effect of the plebiscite on Pinochet's approach to foreign policy is harder to judge. Elated by the popular 25X1 denigration of international criticism, he might go so far as to pull Chile out of the UN. He is more likely, however, to wait to see what impact the vote has internationally. BRIEFS Approved For Releo Those responsible for the assassination yesterday of the Palestine Liberation Organization representative in London, Said Hammami, have not yet been identified. Hammami was a mem- ber of the moderate faction of Fatah and apparently was chosen for the post in London because of his ability to present the moderate Palestinian position to Western audiences. In the past, he apparently had participated in semiclandestine meetings held between nonofficial Israeli doves and moderate Palestinians to discuss conflicting Palestinian and Israeli views on settlement issues. He may have been killed by Palestinian extremists be- cause of this activity. Approved For Re! proved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010006-6 0 Top Secret (Security Classification) 0 0 0 Top Secret (Securt 9 MINtFAI Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010006-6 j Aw 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 J k