NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 11, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday 11 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/008C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed
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25X1 e NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior officials.
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 11 January
CHINA-VIETNAM-CAMBODIA: Relations
ITALY: Political Strategies
EAST GERMANY - WEST GERMANY
CHILE: Referendum Perspective
OAU-ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Report
LESOTHO: Surrounded by Apartheid
NORTH YEMEN: Government Changes
Nicaragua
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CHINA-VIETNAM-CAMBODIA: Relations
//The Chinese are drawing back somewhat
from their public tilt toward Phnom Penh in their coverage of
the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict. The move probably results from
Peking's desire to avoid a further decline in Sino-Vietnamese
relations and to make clear China's preferences for a negotiated
settlement of the dispute. Privately, however, the Chinese
continue to express support for Cambodia.//
This week, Peking for the first time printed long-
standing Vietnamese charges that Cambodia was guilty of border
violations. Earlier Chinese press accounts of Hanoi's position
had excised Vietnamese references to Cambodian forays into
Vietnam. Peking continues to give more prominence to Cambodian
charges of Vietnamese aggression.
Despite Hanoi's private assertions that China en-
couraged Cambodian aggressiveness, the Vietnamese also appear
to be anxious to avoid further straining their relations with
Peking. The signing of a Chinese-Vietnamese trade agreement in
Peking yesterday underscores the desire of both sides to keep
relations on an even keel.
Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's effusive greetin
g
of China's Ambassador to Bangkok Chai Tse-minh on Monday and
the subsequent spectacle of Ambassador Chai vying with his So-
viet counterpart to introduce Trinh at a Thai reception that
evening also suggests that neither Hanoi nor Peking wants Cam-
bodia to separate them further--a development they believe
would serve only the interests of Moscow.
ITALY: Political Strategies
Each of Italy fs three major parties,, anticipating
the early fall of the A ndreotti government, will hold a strat-
egy session in the next few days to prepare for negotiations
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over the government's successor. Whatever the makeup of the
latter, the Communists are certain to emerge with a broader
and more direct role--although still probably without formal
inclusion in the cabinet. Nearly all political leaders are
against an early parliamentary election, but that may be the
only solution if the politicians fail to find a formula that
meets the Communist demand for new concessions without aggra-
vating internal Christian Democratic differences to the point
of risking a split in the party.
Andreotti's position has weakened markedly since
Communist leader Berlinguer's pre-Christmas demand for member-
ship in an emergency government. The reasons are not only Ber-
linguer's evident seriousness but also the acceleration in re-
cent weeks of various trends that have been pushing the Commu-
nists and Christian Democrats toward closer cooperation.
The impression has grown rapidly, for example, that
the country's problems, particularly in the areas of public
order and the economy, require a stronger government.. Meanwhile,
the growing disarray in the Socialist Party has led Christian
Democrats increasingly to view it as an unreliable partner. At
the same time, the Communists have been cooperating with the
government and conveying the impression that they are evolving
away from orthodoxy.
All of this, combined with the desire of leading
Christian Democrats for Communist support in the next: presi-.
dential election, has led to a sharp decline in Christian Demo-
cratic resistance to closer collaboration with Berlinguer's
party.
Christian Democratic leaders may face their toughest
job in selling such ideas to lower level officials in their
own party. More than 60 of the party's 398 legislators, for
example, have signed an open letter against any new concessions
to the Communists.
Most of the signers are reform-minded first termers
who were elected largely on the basis of their anti-Communist
views. They are trying to convince the party leadership to try
a new election before taking another step toward the Communists
that would be extremely difficult to reverse. Top Christian
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Democrats see a strong possibility of gains in an election,
but they argue that the Communists would hold their own or gain
slightly and that the balloting would solve nothing.
The Socialist leadership, meanwhile, will meet on
Friday and the Communist Central Committee will convene early
next week to evaluate the Christian Democrats' official posture.
The Socialists are also pushing for Communist inclusion in the
government, but their ability to affect matters will be hindered
by an internal power struggle that has been forcing party chief
Craxi to devote most of his energy to keeping his job.
For their part the Communists have said little
officially since Berlinguer's demand for a cabinet role. Signs
continue to appear, however, that the communists will take less;
they now place the emphasis on merely obtaining a demonstrable
"change" in the government. Membership in the Parliamentary
majority may therefore satisfy them.
Berlinguer's tough talk has probably raised high
hopes among the party rank and file, and he may now feel it
necessary to demonstrate that he has at least a toe hold in
the cabinet. In that event, he might press for the inclusion
in the cabinet of several "technicians" who are close to--but
not necessarily members of--the party.
The coming round of meetings will help clarify the
terms on which the interparty negotiations will proceed. The
bargaining is hardly under way, but at this point the Commu-
nists stand a better-than-even chance of moving closer to for-
mal share of power than at any time since their expulsion from
the government in 1947.
East Germany, yesterday closed the East Berlin office
of the West German news magazine Der Spiegel. The closure
follows the refusal Zast week to accredit a Spiegel corre-
spondent newly assigned to East Berlin, and is clearly in-
tended as retaliation for Spiegel's publication on Monday of
part two of a purported "opposition manifesto" that contained
biting personal attacks on top-level East German officials,
including party chief Erich Honecker.
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The manifesto is said to have been composed by East
German party members opposed to the political and economic
policies and "bourgeois" lifestyles of top East German and So-
viet leaders. Highlights of the second part, concerning the
East German internal situation, include:
-- Charges that workers and peasants pay for the "inepti-
tude of the bureaucratic apparatus" with a standard
of living lower than that in the West.
-- Claims that workers must support an "immense host of
good-for-nothing parasites in the party apparatus."
-- Biting attacks on Honecker and other top leaders, who
are accused of having "shamelessly corrupted and en-
riched themselves," and of being "clowns" and "girl
chasers."
-- Charges that party discussions consist merely of "per-
sonal adulation by lickspittles" instead of construc-
tive dialog.
-- Allegations of mismanagement of the economy, including
a defective price system that precludes rational plan-
ning, and poor quality products.
The'East Germans have charged Spiegel with "wicked
slander" of East Germany and its allies and with "deliberate
attempts to poison relations" between Bonn and East Berlin. The
East Germans nevertheless continue to express their desire for
good relations with Bonn and are keeping their anger focused
on Spiegel. East Berlin offices of other West German media re-
main open and are unlikely to be closed unless bilateral rela-
tions worsen seriously.
The West German Government is protesting the actions
against Spiegel, which violate journalistic arrangements con-
tained in the Treaty on Basic Relations but will seek to limit
the damage to relations. Bonn's press spokesman made clear there
will be'no retaliation against East German correspondents.
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CHILE: Referendum Perspective
//The endorsement of the Chilean government's po-
sition in the national referendum Zast week was a clear per-
sonal victory for President Pinochet that exceeded his own ex-
pectations. The turnout was exceptionally heavy--about 5.4 mil-
Zion of almost 6 million eligible voters, with 75 percent fa-
voring the government's rejection of the UN resolution censur-
ing Chile for human rights violations.//
//We have no evidence that the government em-
ployed fraud in the plebiscite. The government position was
carefully worded to appeal to the strong nationalism of the
Chileans; Pinochet thereby assured himself of an overwhelming
advantage against those groups that urged a negative vote.//
//Pinochet's victory will consolidate his support
within the military, particularly the army, where doubt about
his judgment and leadership was beginning to spread and will
reaffirm his preeminent position in the junta. As a result, he
will have a freer hand in many areas.//
//Pinochet will not hesitate to point to the ref-
erendum results as evidence of his government's legitimacy and
of his own political astuteness. He has remarked that there
will be no more elections or voting for a decade and evidently
intends to act as though he now has a mandate for the slow
transition to civilian rule that he outlined last July.//
//His remarks on presidential and congressional
elections have been inconsistent, however, and he may show some
flexibility on this point. The Chileans, having been allowed to
exercise the vote, are now likely to be more strident in de-
manding greater political participation.//
//We expect no harsh crackdowns, but Pinochet will
almost certainly be tougher toward his opponents in the out-
lawed political parties and in labor and church circles. Al-
though he has proclaimed that the curfew and the state-of-siege
restrictions will remain in force, there is a good chance that
he will relax them when he thinks he has made the point that
Chile is not bending to foreign pressure.//
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//Pinochet will, however, weed out dissenters
within the government. He has announced his intention to reor-
ganize the Foreign Ministry, in which a number of officials--
including the Foreign Minister, Admiral Carvajal--had protested
the call for the referendum. The two junta members who opposed
the vote--Air Force chief Leigh and Navy chief Merino--may be
forced to step aside.//
//Leigh is still sniping at Pinochet. Although he
has publicly reaffirmed his loyalty and brushed off suggestions
of a split in the junta, he has confided to a few newsmen that
Pinochet is becoming a power-hungry dictator. Leigh also al-
leged that the CIA is backing hard-liners in hopes of toppling
the President.//
//Leigh's motives are far from clear, but his
statements--almost certain to leak--will make his position even
more untenable. Leigh may be trying to provoke Pinochet into re-
moving him, perhaps on the assumption that such a step would
catalyze opposition within the armed services and lead to
Pinochet's removal.//
I /Pinochet has stressed that his government will
now adopt a more aggressive foreign policy, presumably includ-
ing a harder line toward the UN and other critics.//
//It is difficult to judge how he will play the
relationship with the US. Although improved relations with
Washington remain a fundamental objective of his government,
Pinochet probably believes that a specific quid pro quo--such
as support for Chile's requests for loans through international
organizations--should be forthcoming in return for further
responses on human rights issues. The Chilean approach to the
US for mediation on the Beagle Channel dispute with Argentina
demonstrates some hope for good relations with the US.//
//Chile has made substantial progress in improving
its human rights practices, and most Chileans probably resent
what they regard as a lack of recognition of this change. Among
the improvements noted by the US Embassy as well as by the Red
Cross and other international organizations are:
-- A marked reduction in reports of torture, illegal de-
tentions, and "disappearances."
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-- Considerable improvement in treatment of political
prisoners. About 250 persons remain imprisoned on
security-related charges.
-- The release of 4 000 political prisoners over the past
several years.
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OAU-ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Report
Secretary General Eteki of the Organization of African
Unity told the US Charge in Addis Ababa on Monday that the OAU
is helpless to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia.
Eteki said he now believes direct negotiations between
the US and the USSR are necessary before a settlement can be
reached. He suggested that the direct antagonists, Ethiopia and
Somalia, and the indirect ones--"Iran, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps
Kenya"--could subsequently join in the negotiations. He left no
doubt that the OAU secretariat considers Somalia the agressor
and that Ethiopia has every right to defend its territorial in-
tegrity.
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Eteki, a Cameroonian, has long been pessimistic about
the OAU's ability to bring about a peaceful solution. His views
would probably not carry much weight, however, in the event that
the OAU special mediation committee should be reconvened. Eteki
is one of the few ranking African officials to suggest that the
implications of the conflict extend beyond the African context.
LESOTHO: Surrounded by Apartheid
The recent decision of the Lesotho Government quickly
to grant political asylum to Donald Woods, the banned South
African editor, points up the anomalous position of a country
that is both an outspoken critic of South Africa's domestic
policies and totally dependent on South Africa for its survival.
fter his escape to Lesotho, Woods and his family
were a e to travel on toward the UK only by a chartered flight
over South African territory. Lesotho has no international air-
port and depends on South Africa as a transit point for all its
dealings with the outside world.
The incident will increase the pleas of Lesotho's
Prime Minister, Chief Jonathan, for international aid in estab-
lishing an international airport for an air bridge over what
he calls "an ocean of apartheid." Lesotho has long wanted such
an airport, despite the absence of passenger and freight poten-
tial to support long-range flights. It Stresses the political
justification of the project as a means of lessening its depen-
dence on South Africa.
The airport project is only one part of Lesotho's
effort to lossen its ties with South Africa. In seeking finan-
cial help for everything from roads to hydroelectric projects,
Lesotho has made frequent overtures to the US, the UK, the UN,
the EC, and the Arab bloc. It has also selectively and cautiously
approached several Communist countries for development assist-
ance.
An extremely poor country--one of the least developed
in the world--Lesotho is unable to provide for its population
of more than 1 million. Its chief export is labor, and nearly
half its total work force is employed in South Africa.
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I I Despite its overwhelming dependence on South Africa
for jobs, revenue, and food, Lesotho has been a harsh and out-
spoken critic of South Africa's apartheid policies. Lesotho
has refused to recognize either Transkei, with which it shares
a common border, or Bophuthatswana, the newest of the nominally
independent homelands--despite its striking physical and eco-
nomic similarity to both.
Last year, Lesotho brought a complaint to the UN that
Transkei had closed its borders, and alleged that South Africa
was squeezing it economically. Such actions strengthened Le-
sotho's credentials as a black African state victimized by
apartheid. The UN Security Council commended it for resisting
South African pressure and appealed to member nations for fi-
nancial, technical, and other aid for Lesotho.
The effort to promote its image as an independent
A rican member of the UN worthy of assistance recently led
Lesotho, despite its total dependence on South Africa for pe-
troleum supplies, to support a UN resolution for an oil embargo
against South Africa.
here are limits, however, to how far Lesotho will
go. While it will grant political refuge to South Africans it
will neither serve as a haven for guerrillas nor as a base for
anti-South African terrorist operations.
There are a few South African refugees living in the
country, but they are not allowed to engage in political ac-
tivity. Chief Jonathan knows that while he criticizes South
African racial policies and seeks international support for
Lesotho's economic development, he must continue to deal with
South Africa, to which Lesotho is inextricably tied for the
foreseeable future.
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NORTH YEMEN: Government Changes
I /Major changes in the structure of the
North Yemen Government may be in the offing as Command Coun-
cil Chairman Ahmad aZ-Ghashmi attempts to legitimize and con-
solidate his rule. Ghashmi will probably use the planned resig-
nation of North Yemen's Foreign Minister to shore up his posi-
tion./1
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//Lack of popular support has been a major
problem for Ghashmi since he assumed the chairmanship of North
Yemen's ruling Command Council after the assassination of his
predecessor in October 1977.
//The reorganization may call for the estab-
lishment of a long-contemplated consultative assembly--the old
legislative body was dissolved after the military takeover in
1974. The assembly probably will not be directly elected and
is unlikely to have a major voice in public affairs, but it
apparently will be nominally representative of Yemen's diverse
society and will provide some outlet for various political
views.//
The three-man Command Council may also be replaced
by a presidential system under which the vice president would
act as prime minister.
The proposed changes will be developed during the
next few weeks and submitted to the Yemeni people in a refer-
endum. The new system will stress continuity, and the referen-
dum may provide for the election of Ghashmi as president and
the current Prime Minister, Abd al-Aziz Abd al-Ghani, as vice
president.
//Foreign Minister Asnaj probably will not
participate in t e new government; he has submitted his resig-
//Asnaj's departure, however, may be partly
motivated by political considerations. He does not have as much
influence with Ghashmi as he had with the former leader, and he
may also be apprehensive that Ghashmi's tenure will be limited.
It is in fact questionable that Ghashmi has the necessary
skills to maintain his current position over the longer term.//
//In any event, Ghashmi will look for some
way to gain politically from the appointment of a new foreign
minister. He could, for example, offer the troublesome leader
of Yemens northern tribes, Abdallah al-Ahmar, some voice in
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choosing a replacement. In a further effort to gain al-Ahmar's
cooperation, and perhaps to curry favor with his Saudi backers,
Ghashmi could give him some symbolic post in the new government,
but 'Probably not the vice presidency as was rumored earlier.//
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Nicaragua
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of the large daily
newspaper La Prensa and longtime opponent of the government,
was shot and killed from ambush yesterday. Neither the identity
of the assassin nor his motive has yet been determined. It is
unlikely that President Somoza would condone such an act.
Chamorro's death will remove a major and very vocal
obstacle to opposition unity and the national dialogue demanded
by more responsible opponents of the government.
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