NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010026-4
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• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: January 17, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday 17 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/013C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 17 January 1978.
25X1 The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior . o icials.
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CONTENTS
CHINA: Attacking High Officials
ISRAEL: Naval Construction
USSR-NORWAY: Fishing Agreement
NORTH KOREA:
Finland
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CHINA: Attacking High Officials
One or more members of the Chinese Politburo are
apparentLy the targets of recent articles in the official army
newspaper attacking people who shift with the political winds.
In an apparently orchestrated campaign, similar articles have
appeared in Peking-controlled newspapers in Hong Kong, and wall
posters have gone up in the capital that also seem to attack
high officials.
Among the possible targets are Peking party boss Wu
Te, party Vice Chairman Wang Tung-hsing, and Peking. Military
Region commander Chen Hsi-lien. There have been rumors for the
past year that all three were being criticized for their alleged
opposition to party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping. In fact, the
articles quote from Teng's speech at last summer's party con-
gress, leaving little doubt that the attacks are coming from
Teng's supporters. An alternate member of the Politburo who
was quick to join the attacks on Teng in 1976 has apparently
already been purged.
The articles denounce opportunists who threw in their
lot with the "gang of four" in order to retain their own posi-
tions. One article says such people have a "sharp brain," an
expression used in a poster that appeared in Peking a year ago
attacking Chen Hsi-lien. An accusation in another article that
these individuals have tried to show their innocence by saying
they were victimized by the gang could. refer to Wu Te and Wang
Tung-hsing. Wu was heavily attacked by the gang in 1974, and
Wang complained that the gang interfered with the running of
the party's General Office, which he heads.
Wu appears to be under especially heavy attack. The
Hong Kong Communist press has attacked his speech of April 1976,
in which he called on pro-Teng rioters in Peking to disband. A
poster accusing the Peking city government, headed by Wu, of
suppressing publication of a book commemorating Chou En-tai re-
cently appeared in the capital.
It seems likely that these and possibly other offi-
cials Have been criticized privately in party councils. The
articles render many of the charges and excuses in quotation
marks, implying that the articles are in fact revealing the con-
tent of actual criticism sessions.
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Although the articles leave open the possibility that
suc in ividuals can retain their positions by admitting their
mistakes--and the likeliest targets appeared in public after the
articles were published--the weight of the argument is that
this is unlikely because they cannot be trusted, are adept liars,
and have persistently denied any wrong-doing.
The timing of the attacks seems to be related to the
coming i th National People's Congress. The congress rubber-
stamps decisions made by the party on appointments to positions
in the government and on policy questions. Both Wu Te and Chen
Hsi-lien currently hold government positions and may lose them
at the congress. Wang Tung-hsing, however, holds no government
post. It is possible that the current attacks will result in
all three losing their Politburo positions.
These attacks reflect the increasing efforts of Teng
siao-ping to consolidate his own power by undercutting those
who have opposed him. By going public with his attacks on his
opponents, he has probably enhanced his chances at the People's
Congress of being named premier, a post currently held by Party
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. Teng is planning to visit Burma and Nepal
later this month, and his decision to leave the country suggests
his confidence that his own position is secure and that the at-
tacks will have the desired results.
Israeli naval shipyards are currently constructing
a grea er number and variety of major. combat boats than ever
before. Six guided-missile. patrol boats, including the first
examples of a new type of boat., are under construction at Haifa,
and the prototype of a new small, multipurpose patrol craft is
undergoing sea trials in the Red Sea. Some of the new boats
probably are destined for the Israeli Navy, while the Israelis
probably hope to market others abroad.
I According tol the US Naval Attache in Tel
Aviv, tour new Reshef missile boats are being built, the first
scheduled to be launched in October. The two other missile boats
under construction are enlarged versions of the Reshef, out-
fitted to carry a helicopter. This new type boat reportedly will
be faster than the Reshef and have about two-thirds greater
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range. With the addition of the helicopter platform, however,
the boat will have room for only four antiship missile launchers.
The Reshef can carry six to eight.
The boat undergoing sea trials in the Red Sea, called
the Dvora, is a modification of the Dabur coastal patrol boat
and is outfitted to carry two antiship missiles. The conven-
tionally armed Dabur is itself a copy of the US Swift boat and
has been produced in Israel since the early 1970s.
We do not know how many of the new boats will be
added to the Israeli inventory. The four Reshefs probably are
for the navy, although the Israelis almost certainly would be
willing to sell them abroad if a customer were found. Tel Aviv
authorized an increase in the size of the Reshef fleet from six
to 12 boats about three years ago, but no new ones have yet
entered the inventory.
I I Neither the modified Reshef nor the Dvora was re-
ques e the Israeli Navy. They were produced independently
by Israel's shipbuilding industry, mainly in an effort to keep
the industry operating. The industry finds itself in a dilemma
much like that of Israel's domestic aircraft industry. It must
pursue follow-on projects or close down production facilities.
The prospect for sales abroad are slim, however, and there is only
a limited market at home for the industry's products.
I The modified Reshef was intended from its conception
to be so on both the domestic and foreign markets. Israeli
shipbuilders hoped that they would have more success in attract-
ing foreign customers with the new, larger boat than they had
with the smaller Reshef, which to date has been sold only to
South Africa.
I Although larger than the original Reshef, and having
greater range, the new boat offers no significant improvement
in capability that is likely to induce potential customers--
notably in Latin America and Asia--to buy it. Most of these
customers have little need for a long-range patrol boat capable
of supporting helicopter operations, which, as the Israelis
have already learned, are difficult to master.
I IThe Israeli Navy reportedly rejected the new type Re-
shef originally because it was incompatible with the navy's op-
erational philosophy centering on small, fast patrol boats. Be-
cause of the potential loss of jobs in Israel and the resulting
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effect on the national economy, pressures reportedly were put
on the navy to buy the boat and apparently have borne fruit.
Late last year, the Israeli Navy began testing the feasibility
of flying helicopters from missile boats, temporarily modifying
one of their original Reshef boats to carry a helicopter plat-
form.
I IThe Israelis appear to have a better chance of finding
customers or the smaller Dvora. The Dvora can provide close-in
coastal defense and, when armed with antiship missiles, can pro-
vide significant firepower at minimum cost in terms of manpower
and investment. The Dvora also could be of value to the Israeli
Navy as a replacement for the conventionally armed Dabur, pro-
viding a cheap way of bolstering coastal defenses and freeing
the larger missile boats for operations more distant f m Is-
raeli shores. F I
USSR-NORWAY: Fishing Agreement
The recent signing by Norway and the USSR of a pro-
visional agreement governing fishing in the disputed "gray
zone" of the Barents Sea underlines growing Soviet pressure
on Norway on a number of bilateral political and economic is-
sues. The fishing arrangement sidesteps the broader issue of
defining the two countries' maritime economic boundary and
comes at a time of renewed Soviet suggestions for an agreement
on regular poZiticaZ consultations with Norway.
The need for a fisheries agreement arose when both
sides c aimed overlapping 200-mile economic zones in the
Barents Sea early in 1977. Norway contends that no such tem-
porary agreement for orderly fishing can prejudice its claims
in the area, including claims related to.the economic exploita-
tion of the continental shelf.
A contentious clause was dropped from the Einal
document. The clause was an apparent effort by the Soviets to
undermine the Norwegian position in any future talks on a final
resolution of the maritime boundary issue.
The gray zone agreement, which was initialed last
year, has been popular with Norway's domestic fishing interests
because it allows unimpeded access to a rich fishing .area. It
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has also been controversial, however, because it seems to ac-
cord legitimacy to the Soviet case as well by calling for joint
regulation of waters that are clearly Norwegian.
The Norwegians had expected that a visit to Oslo by
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister'Zemskov the week before the in-
terim fishing agreement was signed would result in Soviet pres-
sure to open talks on the broader territorial issues between
the two countries. Instead, Zemskov, who is known as a tough
bargainer, sought primarily to arrange a visit by Foreign
Minister Gromyko.
Zemskov told the Norwegians that Gromyko was in-
terested not in making a "courtesy call" but in a substantive
visit that would conclude with the signing of a formal bilat-
eral agreement acknowledging that either side could request
joint political consultations on problems of mutual interest.
The Soviets have raised this prospect before, but
Zemskov s approach was apparently more intense. The Norwegians
turned aside the proposal but indicated that they are prepared
to receive Gromyko at any time. The Soviet Foreign Minister
has had a standing invitation to Norway for 12 years, but he
has yet to visit Oslo.
The new pressure on Norway underlines Moscow's un-
happiness over the lack of movement in bilateral relations as
well as Soviet perceptions of increased Norwegian military co-
operation with West Germany and the US. This attitude was evi-
dent in Premier Kosygin's unusual outburst to Scandinavian
leaders during celebrations of the 60th anniversary of Finnish
independence last month. He singled out Norway for its accept-
ance of West German participation in NATO exercises held on
Norwegian territory and lectured all the Nordic heads of gov-
ernment against cooperation with NATO.
The basic message the Soviets have been trying to
deliver is that the USSR is itself a Nordic country, fully en-
titled to participate in all regional arrangements. As such,
the Soviets have sought to introduce the most restrictive in-
terpretations of Norwegian and other Scandinavian security pol-
icies and agreements while stressing as often as possible that
their viewpoint must be increasingly considered.
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Norwegian parliamentary debate over ratification of
the gray zone agreement, which is scheduled for later this
month, may indicate the country's receptiveness to further
overtures from the Soviets during 1978.
//There is some potential for oil reserves off
North Korea's west coast in Korea Bay. The Chinese are beginning
to produce oil nearby in the Pohai Gulf. North Korea signed a
mutual aid agreement with China in 1973 concerning oil explora-
tion in the area, but there has been little evidence of Chinese
assistance. The USSR and Romania have helped somewhat with on-
shore exploration, but without success. Pyongyang also has made
several previous unsuccessful attempts to purchase Western oil
technology, equippment, and services.//
North Korea has already begun a limited oil explora-
tion program. A permanent drilling platform is under construc-
tion 20 kilometers off the west coast in water 18 meters deep.
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Presumably, the platform will house an exploration rig. This
structure is unlikely to be. a production platform because no
offshore exploratory drilling has been observed there in the
past.
North Korea's declaration of a 200-mile economic zone
and a 50-mile security zone last year was in part related to
beginning offshore exploration. Off the west coast, the economic
zone was limited to 50 miles because of Chinese territorial
claims.
//North Korea's interest in developing domestic
oil supplies stems from its desire to reduce both import depend-
ence and its very serious foreign debt problem. A significant
oil discovery, even if development took several years, would
markedly improve the country's credit rating.//
//Although domestic requirements are small--30,000
to 40,000 barrels per day--they are increasing. North Korea has
had some difficulties importing oil from the USSR and China, its
principal suppliers. After raising oil prices sharply in 1976,
the USSR curtailed exports because of North Korea's large trade
imbalance. North Korea has recently been trying to line up non-
Communist supplies, but apparently without success.//
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Finland
Finnish President Kekkonen won another six-year term
yesterday as the six parties supporting his reelection won
more than 82 percent of the popular vote and will have 260 of
the 300 electors who will formally choose the President on 15
February. Despite a weak field of opponents, the reported turn-
out of around 70 percent of eligible voters approximated that
of the previous presidential election in 1968 and indicates
that the Finns continue to support the 77-year-old Kekkonen,
who has been President for 21 years.
Apparently there has been little movement in voter
preferences, either overall or within the broad spectrum--Com-
munist'scto anti-Soviet Conservatives--of parties supporting
Kekkonen. Non-socialist parties won 58.4 percent of the vote,
a gain of 2.5 percent over their showing in the most recent
parliamentary electiop- percent from their share
of the vote in 1968.
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