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January 20, 1978
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AMW Adw AW 'AW 'AW 'AW 149 0 0 RhIIQase 2007/02/08: CIA TO. NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 1 RDP79T00975AO30500011o32-7 p Secret ~ 3 8 (Security Classification) CONTROL NO. RECDMMENDATIDN RETURN Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE Friday 20 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/016C DIA review(s) completed. w NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Top Secret 25X1 (Security Classifiratinn) Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO3050001003 -7 --J"AJ 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7 Approved For Release National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 20 January 1 The NID Cable is tor the purpose o in orming senior US officials. CONTENTS ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Rapprochement IRAN: Violence from the Right PORTUGAL: Soares Appointed ITALY: Formal Negotiations INDONESIA: Political Situation FRANCE: Election Campaign Issue BRIEFS Rhodesia New Zealand Bolivia Argentina-Chile Spain - North Africa Page 1 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 8 Page 8 Page 9 Approved For Releas+ 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010032-7 Approved For Relo LEBANON: Shaturah Accords The failure of Palestinian forces to with- draw from areas near Lebanon's southern border, as stipulated in the Shaturah accords of Last summer, is contributing to concern in Lebanon that fighting' between the various factions may resume. Almost daily shooting incidents in the south are feeding this concern, as are rumors that Christian militants are planning renewed fighting. Prospects for a full implementation of the Shaturah accords were never bright. Only Syrian pressure on the Pal- estinians could have overcome a deadlock that developed late last year over mutually unacceptable conditions attached by the Palestinians and the Israelis. In the aftermath of Egyptian President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, however, the Syrians have not been pressing the matter. They are unwilling to jeopardize support by the Pal- estine Liberation Organization for President Asad's stand against the Sadat initiative. I Exchanges of artillery and small arms fire between Christian and Palestinian positions in the south diminished somewhat earlier this month, but sporadic firing is again oc- curring on virtually a daily basis. The Palestinians are already well equipped an nave I17f immedi- ate need for large amounts of new supplies. According to sources of the US defense attache in Beirut, however, the Palestinians are worried about a possible Israeli attack, and they want to stock up now because the Israelis could easily shut off the flow. /We do not believe the Israelis are preparing to go into sou Lebanon in force, nor that they would want to stir up more trouble there at this delicate point in their ne- gotiations with the Egyptians. They do not seem unusually con- cerned about the situation, although they are monitoring it Approved For Rele*se 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030590010032-7 Approved For - 75AO30500010032-7 7. closely and are prepared to deal with any cross-border inci- dents by Palestinian terrorists. An Israeli officer recently told a US Army attache that the Israelis have sent a paratroop unit from the Golan Heights to the Lebanese border because of its special capabilities for operating in the area.// Developments in south Lebanon have contributed to the edginess already evident in Beirut over the lack of sus- tained progress toward national reconciliation. President Sarkis has taken the position that such a reconciliation is not feasi- ble until the problem of the Palestinians in the south is re- solved. //Several sources have told the US defense attacne in ecru that they expect serious trouble within the next few months between the Christian militias and the Pales- tinians or the Syrian peacekeeping force. The US attache has heard that the Christians wou attack small, dispersed Syrian units and provoke an up- surge of incidents throughout Lebanon.// The bravado evident in such rumors is badly out of proportion to actual Christian strength. The 30,000 men of the Syrian-dominated peacekeeping force are more than adequate to put down any force the Christians could muster--barring major Israeli intervention. Most Christian leaders probably recognize this, and would be loath to provoke a confrontation. The Christians, who initially welcomed the Syrian intervention, are increasingly restive at the continued Syrian presence. Some Christian militants would welcome renewed fight- ing if it would draw in the Israelis and lead ultimately to the partitioning of Lebanon. The S rians aware of the rumors of Christian plotting, are edgy Approved F Approved For Release ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Rapprochement Talks between Zairian and Angolan delegations on the possibility of easing strained relations are scheduled to start today in Brazzaville Congo. There are major obstacles to a real reconciliation. I IThe talks grew out of a recent exchange of public sig- na-Es y airian President Mobutu and Angolan President Neto of a willingness to consider a rapprochement. Relations between the two Presidents, never good, reached a nadir last year as a result of the invasion of southern Zaire by anti-Mobutu exiles from Angola. The exploratory talks in Brazzaville, encouraged by Congolese President Yhombi Opango and other leaders, will review the numerous problems in bilateral relations and determine whether there is a basis for a more detailed dialogue, perhaps including a meeting between Mobuto and Neto. Both Presidents face severe domestic problems--such as Zaire's nearly bankrupt economy and Angola's inability to suppress insurgents--that might stand more chance of solution if their bilateral strains were eased. Approved For ReleaseI2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030500910032-7 Approved Fc I I In authorizing talks, each President probably hopes to persuade the other to stop supporting his insurgent enemies. In view of the longstanding acrimony and ideological differences between the two Presidents, however, any real reconciliation be- tween them will have to overcome serious obstacles and is not likely to be reached anytime soon. IRAN: Violence from the Right I /New information indicates that disturbances staged by fundamentalist Muslim protesters in Iran Last week resulted in heavier Loss of Life than the government has been willing to admit pubZiclj. //The incident, the most serious of its kind in years, is a pointed reminder to the Shah that conservative re- ligious opposition to his modernization program is still. an important force. The attempt to storm the police station capped a three-day protest by Muslims on the occasion of the anniver- saries of the Shah's land reform program of 1963 and the out- lawing of the veil for women in 1936. Last October, fanatically religious rightwing students at Tehran University went on a rampage in protest against co-education, which is proscribed by traditional Islamic doctrine.// //The Shah, always sensitive to a possible resur- gence of opposition to his views on Iranian modernization, no doubt is closely watching the violent demonstrations of sympathy with the Qom demonstrators that have been mounted in several other Iranian cities. Proponents within the regime of a tough policy toward dissidents may well argue that the recent events call for a reversal of the Shah's program of political liberal- ization, which has been aimed in part at refurbishing Iran's image on human rights.// I //Religious dissidents would be considered a more serious threat if they were known to be allied with the leftist political opposition and terrorists. The task of the security forces, who now have the situation under control, could be com- plicated if the various dissident groups mounted a coordinated effort on a national scale. 4 Approved For a ease - Approved For Release PORTUGAL: Soares Appointed //Portuguese President Eanes yesterday formally named Mario Soares Prime Minister, an office Soares has held as a caretaker since his minority Socialist government fell six weeks ago. The new cabinet, which the President is expected to name shortly, will probably include at least three Center Democrats, whose participation in the government will assure Soares majority support in the legislature. Socialists and Center Democrats are already agreed on a government program and will probably not need the 10 days the constitution gives them to present their program to the national assembly. Soares may, however, use this time to continue talks with the Commu- nists and Social Democrats in hopes of bringing them out of op- position and winning broader support for economic measures he plans to implement.// //Soares, following party orders, insists that the new government will not be a coalition. Center Democrats are participating as "personalities" rather than as party leaders. While the arrangement may technically satisfy the Socialists' "no alliances" policy, it in fact reverses a stance adopted by them since the national election campaign in April 1976.// //Leaders from both parties say the government will last until 1980, when a new election must be held. Most members of the military Revolutionary Council, however, do not feel that the government can weather opposition from both the left and right, and some say it will fall within a month. The Social Dem- ocrats, who count northern financial and business interests among their supporters, give the alliance six months, and the Communists, who control 80 percent of organized labor, think it has "no fu- ture at all."// //Such negative evaluations are probably pessimistic. The programmatic accord worked out by the Socialists and Center Democrats will promote government stability in the early going, and the two parties apparently have resolved many differences on economic policy that might have created problems later. In the loosely formed coalition, the Center Democrats are likely to find occasion to oppose Soares, but they are pledged to sup- port essential legislation.// //The government's long-term prospects are more ou u ; i s staying power will depend in large measure on the impact of its economic policies. Many Portuguese fear that the Approved For ReleaseI2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030500p10032-7 Approved Fo4 Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T0097514030500010032-7 austerity measures Soares has promised--and to which he will be committed if negotiations with the International Monetary Fund are concluded--will prompt labor unrest and bring on a recession that will alienate business concerns.// //Soares feels that side agreements with the Commu- nists and Social Democrats could help him win labor-management cooperation. At the same time such agreements would help him preserve unity in his own party, which was divided on the is- sue of a Socialist-Center Democratic alliance.// //The Prime Minister's efforts to negotiate the additional agreements may strain relations with his alliance partner. The Center Democrats say they will allow the Socialists to reach a separate understanding with the Communists so long as the governmental accord is not affected. They will not, however, allow the government itself to be linked with a Socialist-Commu- nist pact.// //Talks with both the Communists and Social Demo- crats have bogged down in recent weeks. Social Democratic insist- ence on participating in the government on an equal footing with the Socialists continues to be an insurmountable barrier. The Communists, who see the center-right alliance as a sinister omen, want some kind of guarantee that leftist interests will not suffer if conservatives in government become too ambitious. ITALY: Formal Negotiations Giulio Andreotti, chosen yesterday by Italian President Leone to try to form another government, will begin formal negotiations with major parties, including the Commu- nists, next week. The bargaining promises to be protracted and complex as Andreotti searches for a formula that can satisfy Communist demands for a Larger role but still permit his Chris- tian Democrats to deny having violated their electoral mandate to keep the Communists out of government. I the Christian Democrats want Andreotti to tocus is initiai talks on govern- ment policies rather than formulas and to emphasize economic Approved Fair Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ap30500010032-7 Approved For Release 4 and public order issues in particular. This presumably will help him to gauge the flexibility of the Communists and others and to exploit the Communists' desire for agreement on certain government actions.// The Communists, for example, are probably even more eager than the Christian Democrats to find a way to cancel a series of national referendums slated for the spring. The par- ties would then have to take clear public positions on several difficult issues, such as whether to abolish recent law-and- order legislation characterized as repressive by leftist groups critical of the Communists. //If-and when the parties get down to discussing government formulas, the bargaining will become particularly delicate and complicated. Communist leaders continue to signal their willingness to settle for less than cabinet status, but their minimum condition for renewed cooperation with Andreotti appears to be formal membership in a new government's parlia- mentary majority--a role that has traditionally signaled a party's eligibility for full participation.// Andreotti plans to hold a strategy session with the Christi an Democratic directorate tomorrow and to spend the weekend drawing up an agenda for negotiations likely to begin on Monday. 17 1 25X1 Approved For Release12007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO30509010032-7 Approved removal. The generals apparently are divided over whether the government should continue its moderate approach or order a crackdown. Harsher measures run the risk of sparking large- scale demonstrations and violence. This would probably not threaten Suharto's reelection in March, but heightened insta- bility might eventually create fissures within the military sufficient to undermine his power. Top Indonesian military officials reportedly held an emergency meeting Wednesday to discuss the increasing political tension between the government and student activists, who for the first time are publicly calling for President Suharto's Although students thus far have heeded the military's warning not to take to the streets, their sharper and more personal attacks on Suharto have been well publicized. Students have criticized Suharto for his inaccessibility, refusal to share power with civilians, and tolerance of corruption. Stu- dents in Bandung recently made an unprecedented public call for Suharto's ouster, a demand that others in Jakarta are expected to repeat. moderate approach probably stems from a desire to obtain even- tual consensus for his reelection and his belief that severe measures will only stiffen opposition. Prolonged student demon- 25X1 strations in the streets could undercut the President's already declining prestige and encourage the beginning of a uiet but active search within the military for a successor. Suharto has allowed the opposition a degree of free- dom against the advice of some senior military officials.. His FRANCE: Election Campaign Issue 25X1 The recent warning by the US against the growth of Communist influence in Western Europe has quickly become an important election campaign issue in France. The Communist Party has denounced both President Giscard and Socialist leader Mitterrand and accused them of having sought President Carter's endorsement during his recent trip to Paris. Approved Approved For Releas4 French Foreign Minister Guiringaud's statement that "it is normal for Washington to have an opinion on the ques- tion" has also come under sharp attack from the Communists, who assert that such comments invite US interference in France's internal affairs. This line is consistent with the Communists' longstanding effort to portray themselves as the most important defender of French independence--an issue on which they have heavy competition from the Gaullists. I I In the wake of the US warning, the Socialist Party has at y affirmed that it has no intention of governing with- out the Communist Party if the Left wins the election in March. Given the acrimonious public debate between the two former al- lies over economic policy, defense, and now the proper attitude toward the US, the prospect of their governing together becomes increasingly dim. Against this background, the fact that a majority of the French still say they intend to vote for the Left is viewed by the conservative daily Le Figaro as a de- cision "made solely out of spite." //Rhodesian Patriotic Front co-Zeaders Joshua Nkomo an Robert Mugabe have agreed to meet with British For- eign Secretary David Owen on Malta on 26 January to discuss the UK-US proposals for a Rhodesian settlement. The two Zeaders rejected an invitation from Owen for such a meeting Zast month on the grounds that the British Government was not prepared to turn over political power in Rhodesia to the Front. Both Zeaders oppose the national elections that are a key aspect of the plan.// //Since then they have come under heavy pressure from the frontline states and from Nigeria, which are concerned that Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith may reach an independent 25X1 settlement with black nationalist leaders inside Rhodesia. De- spite that pressure, Nkomo and Mugabe do not appear to have softened their stand against elections. F7 I //The hospitality accorded the crew of the US nu- clear submarine visiting Auckland this week reflects the less- ening of nuclear fears among the New Zealand public. Except Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A039500010032-7 Approved F4 for efforts by a flotilla of private pleasure boats to impede the submarine's entry into the harbor, incidents have been min- imal. Trade union opposition has been limited to a refusal to work at the wharf where the submarine is berthed, despite agi- tation by the local union boss, an avowed Communist. Two visits by US nuclear-powered vessels in 1976 triggered port shutdowns.// //The opposition Labor Party's attempt to stage protests lects its lack of issues on which to attack the government. Labor has been unable to offer solutions to New Zealand's economic problems, and its baiting of the US may further erode its prospects in the national election late this year. A three-week hunger strike in Bolivia by more than 1,200 persons has ended following some political concessions by the government. These reportedly include a general amnesty for political exiles and those involved in the strike. The strikers received widespread support from church, tabor, an student groups. Even though their demands apparently were not completely met, strike leaders believe they have won a majority victory. Government leaders have thus far refrained from comment although an official in the President's office said the strike settlement has paved the way for holding the presidential election in July as scheduled. Approved F4 Approved Fort Argentina-Chile President Videla of Argentina and Chilean President Pinoc e met in Mendoza, Argentina, yesterday to explore ways to settle the dispute over the Beagle Channel. Both leaders plan to meet again in Chile next week, presumably to seek a basis for continued bilateral talks or to agree on further arbitration. The announcement of a second round of presidential discussions suggests that both are interested in reaching some sort of agreement before the Argentines formally reject a de- cision by the International Court of Justice favoring Chile. Spain - North Africa King Juan Carlos of Spain has asked his father, Don Juan e orbon, to go to Libya today in an effort to persuade President Qadhafi to help ease growing tension between Spain and Algeria. I IRelations between Madrid and Algiers have been' strained since 1975, when Spain ignored Algeria's interest in the Spanish Sahara and signed the territory over to Morocco and Mauritania. In hopes of forcing Spain to renounce the 1975 agreement, Algeria has sought to apply pressure through indirect aid to the tiny, violence-prone Canary Islands Independence Movement. Algeria has also supported a proposed inquiry by the Organization of African Unity into the "colonial" status of the Canary Islands. Madrid rejects the inquiry out of hand, arguing that the Canaries are an integral part of Spain in- habited by people of Spanish descent. Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0310500010032-7 ..A razed For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7 (Security Classification) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Top Secret (SecurjtpOI ,sft0 elease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7 0 Aiw Aiw Aiw Agw Aw Aw Aw Aw Aw 1