CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010012-8
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday 7 March 1978 CG NIDC 78/054C
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
4WMENA
0 Top Secret
(Security Classification 25X1
IF 'iff'off off "ff off "ff "ff or
EPLY
DATION
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 7 March 1978.
The NID Cable is for the purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
25X6
ISRAEL-IRAN:
Oil Vulnerability
Page 2
CHAD-FRANCE:
Military Involvement
Page 3
GHANA: Problems in the Regime
Page 4
EC-CANADA: Economic Cooperation
Page 6
SWEDEN-USSR:
Missile Submarines
Page 7
NORTH KOREA:
Protest Statement
Page 9
CHINA: United Front Campaign
Page 10
CHINA-UN: Session on Disarmament
Page 11
Page 13
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ISRAEL-IRAN: Oil Vulnerability
Israel's vulnerability to the Iranian oil embargo
hinted at by the Shah Zast weekend is Zess than might at first
seem apparent.
The Shah publicly implied that he might consider em-
bargoing oil exports to Israel in order to make the Israelis
more flexible in peace negotiations. Israel relies on imports
for all but a tiny fraction of the 140,000 barrels of oil it
consumes per day. It gets 70 percent of its oil from Iran. It
is, however, not as vulnerable as this would suggest.
After the agreement with Egypt in 1975 that returned
the Sinai oilfields to Cairo, Israel received nearly all of its
crude from Iran. Subsequently it began importing oil from
Mexico and other countries. Israel currently could satisfy
its needs by buying oil on the spot market and relying on its
stockpiles. It has a five-month supply at normal consumption
rates.
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Equally important, Israel this month will begin com-
year or so.
mer is production at the rate of about 20,000 barrels per day
at a new oilfield in the southern portion of the Gulf of Suez
off the occupied Sinai. Preliminary Israeli estimates put pro-
duction at this site at up to 80,000 barrels per day within a
CHAD-FRANCE: Military Involvement
France 25X1
zs rezn orcing 2 s military contingent in C a . T e French
are sending an additional 360 men to the country, many of them
in operational combat units. The men will help defend southern
Chad against a rebel offensive if fighting resumes. The rein-
forcement is being carried out quietly in an attempt to avoid
criticism from President Giscard's leftist political opponents,
who have strongly attacked his activist African policy.//
rench hope to avoid drawing attention to the ad iti.onal
defensive line--Abeche, Ati, and Moussoro. The last, a key road
junction and a probable target of a renewed rebel offensive,
will receive more than 150 of the reinforcements, including a
130-man airborne commando unit supported by armored cars and
armed jeeps. The French already have a small military advisory
team in the town.//
troops y sending them directly to towns in the south along the
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//Some 44 military advisers and two.missile-armed
helicopters are going to Abeche, where they will join a French
commando company already in place. Abeche, the largest town in
eastern Chad, has a sizable French civilian community that al-
most certainly would be endangered by renewed fighting.//
//In addition, several small French command and
support units have already gone to Ndjamena, along with an Air
Force detachment of four military transport aircraft and 40 Air
Force personnel. An advisory team slated for use in Mongo and
several other support units are said to be on standby in France.
If all of the troops arrive in the country, the size of the
French military presence there will more than double, to over
650 men.//
//Giscard still hopes to avoid any direct involve-
ment in the fighting, but the quick collapse of Chadian forces
during the fighting last month apparently has convinced him that
France must play a more direct--if covert--role to defend the
more heavily populated southern part of the country.
GHANA: Problems in the Regime
Ghanaian leader General Acheampong is worried that
his proposal for a nonparty form of government could be de-
feated in a national referendum on 30 March. Acheampong sees
his vaguely defined concept of "union government"--a partner-
ship between civilians and the military--as a way of ensuring
that he continues in power as an elected president. His op-
ponents may be gaining strength as they step up their campaign
against the proposal.
The referendum is an outgrowth of Acheampong's prom-
ise to restore constitutional rule by July 1979. He made the
commitment last summer in response to antigovernment demonstra-
tions by student and professional groups.
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Popular support for Acheampong's proposal now seems
to be eroding in at least some areas as a result of Ghana's
continuing economic decline and of the opposition generated
by the newly formed People's Movement for Freedom and Justice
led by retired General Afrifa. Despite Acheampong's control of
the government media and his ban on political rallies, Move-
ment leaders are busy campaigning for a "no" vote and apparently
are drawing good crowds in some places. Afrifa--a key partici-
pant in the coup that overthrew President Nkrumah in 1966 and
a leader of the military regime that ruled until 1969--and
other leaders of the opposition group advocate a return to
civilian government based on party politics.
Recent intensified campaigning by Acheampong and his
c lleagues on the ruling military council suggests he is con-
cerned over the Movement's potential strength. If he concludes
that the referendum might go against him, Acheampong may well
manipulate the electoral process to try to ensure his victory.
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EC-CANADA: Economic Cooperation
//EC Commission President Jenkins is in Canada
this week to discuss trade issues and attend the second meeting
of the EC-Canada Joint Cooperation Committee.//
//Under their 1976 economic and trade cooperation
agreement, the EC and Canada have tried to remove trade barriers
and have identified areas for cooperation such as uranium exploi-
tation and nuclear energy, aerospace, telecommunications, nonfer-
rous metals, and forest-based products.//
//The two parties have made little headway to date
in expanding trade or investment, but their agreement emphasizes
Canada's desire to lessen its dependence on the US by develop-
ing closer economic ties with other countries. The EC hopes to
gain access to Canadian raw materials in order to be less vul-
nerable to the Third World suppliers. The agreement with Canada
offers the EC a model for future links to other resource-rich
countries like Australia.//
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SWEDEN-USSR: Missile Submarines
Sweden last week criticized the USSR for stationing
ballistic missile submarines in the Baltic Sea.
The demarche
probably was prompted by Swedish concern over Soviet policy
toward Scandinavia and is also related to the domestic Swedish
debate on production and deployment of the neutron warhead in
Western Europe.
A senior official of the Swedish Foreign Ministry in-
formed the Soviet Ambassador earlier last week of Sweden's
"anxiety and dissatisfaction" over the presence in the Baltic
of six submarines armed with nuclear missiles. Swedish officials
explained their sudden concern by saying that the submarines'
presence, now apparently permanent, could encourage NATO to in-
troduce similar weapons into the area. The Foreign Ministry
offical told the Soviet Ambassador that Sweden considers the
submarines to be a "whole new weapons system" in the area and
that their nuclear armament contradicts Moscow's professed wish
for a nuclear free zone in the northern region.
The basing
in the Baltic eliminates the need for the submarines to make
the dangerous week-long transit from the Northern Fleet around
Norway to get within range of many West European targets.)
The Swedes may be trying to demonstrate how tough and
balanced their neutrality can be in advance of planned Foreign
Ministry meetings with the Soviets this year. Swedish officials
are expected to meet shortly with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Zemskov, the usually hard-line Soviet official who smoothed over
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Norwegian-Soviet relations following Premier Kosygin's blast in
December against Norway's role in NATO. Foreign Minister Soder
will visit the USSR later in the year.
The Swedish Government may also have shown its concern
in order to head off further criticism from the opposition
Social Democrats who, in a parliamentary debate later this month,
are already expected to try to embarrass the government by charg-
ing that its opposition to the development and deployment of the
neutron warhead in NATO countries has been only lukewarm. The
government also may be reacting against President Brezhnev's
letter urging opposition to the neutron warhead, which the Swedes
have criticized as a Soviet effort to manipulate their foreign
policy.
TASS' political commentator Yuriy Kornilov yesterday
noted the "noisy propoganda campaign" in Sweden over the issue
of the Soviet submarines in the Baltic. He defended their pres-
ence there as "quite natural" and termed the alleged campaign
an attempt to "whitewash the actions of those forces that would
like to turn Western Europe into a testing range for neutron
weapons."
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North Korea has strongly protested a joint South
Korean - US military exercise, Team Spirit '78, that begins
today. Pyongyang has characterized the exercise as a serious
attempt by the US to threaten the North, but the rhetoric stops
short of that used in August 1976, just prior to the Panmunjom
incident, when the North Koreans charged that the US was ac-
tively preparing to attack.
A protest statement yesterday by a Foreign Ministry
spokesman was the first official North Korean pronouncement
prompted by US military actions on the peninsula since mid-1976.
Between 1974 and 1976 the North routinely issued several such
statements each year.
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North Korea has been stepping up its diplomatic ac-
tivity around the world in an apparent effort to regain the
initiative in its competition with South Korea. The North clearly
hopes to exploit the South Korean - US exercise in its diplo-
matic and propaganda campaigns.
CHINA: United Front Campaign
The Chinese Government is now emphasizing
"united front" tactics cooperation with non-Communists--in its
30-year-old struggle to gain control of Taiwan. Peking appar-
ently sees the "united front" campaign as part of a tong-term
"softening up" process during which it will highlight political
rather than military means to achieve the integration of Taiwan
with the mainland.
//The Chinese have emphasized political action
against e Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan since the
fall of the "gang of four" in October 1976.
Isolation of the Nationalist Government also is a
publicly proclaimed goal of Peking's new, more open policy
toward overseas Chinese. By emphasizing patriotism and an or-
derly China that extends a warm welcome to "compatriots from
Taiwan," Peking hopes to recruit more supporters from overseas
Chinese communities throughout the world, and to tap the pool
of professional and technical people who have left Taiwan over
the years. Peking's recent publication of the rewards to be
given military defectors from Taiwan is another facet of the
broad effort to undermine Taipei's prestige and play on any
grievances among the island's citizens.
In the US, Peking hopes to use increased influence in
Wiese-American community to generate broad support for
normalization of Sino-US relations. This long-term approach
seems to reflect recognition of the resistance that normalization
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faces in the US. It includes promoting the establishment of pro-
Peking organizations in the US and placing advertisements in
leading US newspapers urging early normalization. In its own
publications, Peking also has been attempting to improve its
image by painting China's future in glowing colors and empha-
sizing the government's unity and stability.
Peking in the past has achieved only limited success
in gaining the allegiance of pro-Taipei overseas Chinese. While
overseas Chinese sometimes exhibit pride at Chinese accomplish-
ments such as space satellites and the development of atomic
weapons, they often remain suspicious of Peking's intentions.
This is particularly true of overseas Chinese businessmen, many
of whom had relatives in China who lost property or were other-
wise mistreated during past political campaigns.
A speech last month by Liao Cheng-chih, an important
official in overseas Chinese affairs, took these concerns into
account by playing down any hostility to the "bourgeoisie" and
emphasizing that visits to China would not entail any risks to
property or personal safety. Liao also stressed the importance
of the "united front" in completing China's reunification. He
attempted to reassure the people of Taiwan that reunification
would not hurt their interests.
Peking's increased activity faces vigorous competition
from Taipei's own efforts to maintain or improve its influence
among the overseas Chinese. While professing unconcern about
Peking's effort, the Nationalists will probably increase their
activity in order to meet the challenge. Although the National-
ist Government faces more vigorous political opposition at home,
few people on Taiwan endorse the island's integration with the
mainland.
China-is preparing to participate in the special UN
General Assembly session on disarmament in May. This will be the
first time the Chinese have become involved in any of the UN's
disarmament forums.
We do not expect the Chinese to present any new pro-
posals at the session. China's UN representatives, who have been
uncharacteristically active in recent weeks informing themselves
on the disarmament issue, have stated that the basic Chinese
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position remains unchanged. That position calls for the nuclear
powers to declare that they will not be the first to use nuclear
weapons. The Chinese also advocate the eventual destruction of
all nuclear weapons.
Peking will probably try to mobilize Third World sup-
port behind its call for total nuclear disarmament and its cri-
ticisms of the strategic arms limitation talks. While the Chinese
consider SALT a "fraudulent" exercise by both the USSR and the
US, they doubtless will aim their sharpest rhetorical barbs at
the Soviets.
China also apparently wants to improve its image as a
response le nuclear power. Foreign Minister Huang Hua told a
Western leader last month that,Pekina had turned down a Libyan
request to buy an atomic bomb.
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Returns from Guatemala's presidential election on
Sun ay have been delayed and clouded by charges of fraud in the
Guatemala City mayoral vote that was held at the same time. The
elections apparently were conducted without violence.
Fernando Romeo Lucas, the government's candidate, and
conservative candidate and former chief of government Enrique
Peralta Azurdia are running a surprisingly close race. The lead
has seesawed between them. Ricardo Peralta Mendez--whose Christian
Democratic party won a plurality in the last presidential election
but was denied victory by vote rigging--is unexpectedly running
a distant third. With close to one-half of the anticipated returns
announced, Lucas and Peralta Azurdia have 37 percent each, and
Peralta Mendez trails at 26 percent.
Peralta Mendez will probably disavow the results; he
has previously said he would encourage civil violence if he felt
he had been defrauded. If his position in the race were to re-
main poor, however, he would have to persuade followers that a
massive fraud--which is not apparent at present--had been per-
petrated.
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