NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010020-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 11, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Saturday 11 March 1978 CG NIDC 78/058C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 11 March 1978.
The NID a e is for the purpose o informing
senior o icials.
CONTENTS
NAMIBIA - SOUTH AFRICA: SWAPO
USSR-FRANCE: View of Elections
BRIEFS:
Morocco
Chile
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There are growing signs of divergence between
the Leadership of the South-West Africa People's Organization
inside Namibia and Sam Nujoma, the group's exiled Leader.
Nujoma has said SWAPO will seize power by armed force, but
SWAPO Leaders in Namibia appear to be planning to contest the
preindependence election. South African Prime Minister Vorster
apparently hopes to focus international attention on SWAPO's
militants and thus move the Western contact group toward ac-
ceptance of a stronger South African residual force than the
present settlement package allows.
South African leaders are citing Nujoma's interview
with South African television in New York last month as proof
that the nationalist movement is not interested in a peaceful
solution for Namibia. Nujoma said, "We are not fighting for
majority rule. We are fighting to seize power in Namibia for
the benefit of the Namibian people."
South African television has repeatedly shown Nujoma's
interview, and Vorster has publicly challenged the Western con-
tact group to denounce Nujoma's statement. Foreign Minister
Botha has also cited Nujoma's statement and asserted that SWAPO
agents instigated the recent rioting in Windhoek. He said this
might require South Africa to reinforce--rather than partially
withdraw--its troops and police in Namibia.
I I Botha urged the Western contact group to reconsider
i s approach to the Namibia problem and to complete its settle-
ment package "within a few days." In discussing tentative re-
visions-of the Western package, however, the South Africans
have shown enough flexibility to keep the talks going.
Nujoma's remarks have also caused some problems for
the leaders of SWAPO's internal wing, which is allowed to
operate legally inside Namibia. The South African - supported
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance has declared that SWAPOs internal
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wing should not be allowed to compete in the election unless it
repudiates Nujoma's leadership. In a press conference called
by the internal leadership, SWAPO's information secretary said
he suspected Nujoma's remarks were reported out of context
because they contradict official SWAPO policy.
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The information secretary also released a statement
giving the views of the internal leadership on SWAPO's talks
last month with the Western contact group in New York. The
statement is consistent with the position taken in New York,
although it takes a more positive line on the prospects of re-
solving the remaining issues. The internal leadership said it
would not oppose releasing disaffected SWAPO leader Andreas
Shipanga and 10 of his supporters who are now being detained
in Tanzania and appeared flexible about the location of a re-
sidual South African military force and the size of a UN mili-
tary contingent.
I I There have been other signs that SWAPO's internal
lea ers are trying to be more accommodating. In an unprecedented
action, they agreed this week to sit down at the same table
with representatives of the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance and
other groups to discuss how to curb rising political violence,
which has resulted in at least 15 deaths and over 100 injuries
this month. They decided to create a "watchdog committee" of
representatives of SWAPO, the Turnhalle Alliance, another polit-
ical alliance, and the church to monitor pre-election activities
and to try to forestall further violence.
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USSR-FRANCE: View of Elections
The USSR appears cool toward the prospect of a left-
ist victory in the French election. Publicly, the Soviets have
hinted they are Zess than enthusiastic about a Communist-
Socialist majority in the National Assembly, an impression
that is reinforced by the private remarks of Soviet officials.
One of the clearest public expositions of Soviet
views appeared in the foreign policy weekly Za Rubezhom ear-
lier this month. The article was noteworthy for its relatively
hostile treatment of the French Socialists, who would dominate
a government of the Left.
I I The article charged that the Socialist Party has
long supported "the US line" on foreign policy questions, at-
tacked its close relations with the West German Social Demo-
crats, and went on to suggest that the party's membership in
the Socialist International placed in question its commitment
to cooperation with.the Communists and to detente with the So-
viet Union and other Communist states.
I I The article also implicitly criticized the French
Communists by referring to their willingness to accept con-
tinued French cooperation with NATO and membership in the EC.
Both positions come very close to the "compromises of princi-
ple" the Soviets have previously called unacceptable.
In striking contrast to its open criticism of the
Socialists and seeming coolness toward the Communists, the
article had high praise for President Giscard and even more
for the Gaullists. It hailed the French Government for continu-
ing an "independent foreign policy line," and praised the
Gaullists for their "policy of national independence" and sup-
port for a policy of "harmony and cooperation with the Soviet
Union."
The Soviets have been more candid in private. A So-
viet Army attache told a US colleague late last month that he
did not expect nor want the Left to win and said that the
French Communists were incapable of governing France at this
time. A few days earlier, the Soviet defense attache expressed
similar sentiments to a group of French Air Force officers. He
said the right is a "known quantity," and the Soviets "cannot
tell what will happen if the Left wins."
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In spite of their qualms, the Soviets are likely to
make their peace quickly with the new majority if the Left
emerges triumphant. They will try to minimize their own differ-
ences with the French Communists and the Socialists, and at the
same time will attempt to move them in directions favorable to
Soviet interests.
The USSR yesterday signed an agreement with Morocco
to provide $2 billion in 20-year credits to help develop Mo-
rocco's Meskala phosphate deposits. The Soviets will receive
10 million tons of phosphate rock annually for 30 years in
repayment of the credits and in exchange for Soviet goods. The
agreement will be reviewed every five years. The total value
of trade and credit transactions could eventually rise to $10
billion.
Negotiations on the Meskala project dragged on for
tour years.
Morocco and the USSR signed an agreement in February
on fisheries after several years of negotiation. In return for
access to Moroccan waters, the Soviets will provide Morocco
with fishing trawlers, aid in the construction of a fish pro-
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cessing center, and train Moroccan personnel.
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Chilean President Pinochet's decision to revoke the
state of siege seems intended to soften a new resolution on
Chile now under consideration by the UN Human Rights Commission
in Geneva and possibly to counteract the damaging implications
of the Letelier murder case.
The reduction to a state of emergency will remove
severa of the government's powers including exile by executive
fiat, detention without charge for more than five days, and re-
voking citizenship. The government will still have wide latitude
to restrict trade union activity, political meetings, and free
expression.
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Pinochet also promised there would be no further
trials of "a military nature." Until the complex patchwork of
existing decrees is replaced by a new code, however, it is
unclear where the lines of civil and military ustice will
be drawn.
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