NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010086-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: April 19, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday 19 April 1978 CG NIDC 78/091C -
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 19 April 1978
e a e is or e purpose o zn orming
senior U o icials.
SPAIN: Communist Party Congress
POLAND-USSR: Gierek's Visit
INTERNATIONAL: Oil Consumption
INTERNATIONAL; Common Fund Talks
PORTUGAL: Uncertainty on the Right
ARGENTINA-BOLIVIA: Nuclear Accord
BRIEFS
China
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The Spanish Communist Party Congress that opens to-
day in Madrid promises to be a watershed in the history of
the party. During the next five days some 1,500 delegates from
? aZZ over Spain will debate new statutes proposed by Secretary
General Santiago Carrillo that would do away with some major
ideological shibboleths and assert the party's commitment to
SPAIN: Communist Party Congress
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democratic pluralism. Debate ~iZZ be open and heated, but
CarriZZo's proposals u~iZZ almost certainly be accepted.
Carrillo's proposal to drop the term ?'Leninist"--
wit all its symbolic overtones-?-from the party label, and
his rejection of other outmoded Leninist tenets such as the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the validity of armed
revolution in industrialized democracies have drawn heavy fire
from orthodox party members.
This uproar has tended to obscure other changes that
may be more significant. The loosening up of "democratic cen-
tralism'? within the party and the defining of both world blocs
as equally hegemonic have farreaching implications and will be
particularly upsetting to Moscow. Moreover, the specific com-
mitment to pluralistic democracy--including the concept of
peaceful change in government--though old hat to Eurocommunists,
has never before been stated so explicitly in a Communist party
program.
The clear rejection of the Leninist model of a rigidly
iscip fined national party closely tied to a centralized inter-
national movement is also likely to disturb the Soviets. Other
articles of the statutes press for Spanish membership in the
EC, while opposing entry into NATO in favor of non-alignment.
In pressing for these changes, Carrillo is attempt-
ing in part to enhance his party's standing with the Spanish
electorate--the Communists obtained only 9.4 percent of the
vote in the parliamentary election last December. The proposed
revisions also reflect his own longstanding beliefs--beliefs
that triggered a Soviet effort to oust him from the party
leadership in the early 1970s and that have since fueled a
running controversy between him and Moscow.
The provincial-level meetings held to prepare for
e congress have shown a revealing mixture of ferment and dis-
cipline. Debate has been open and virulent; the party's Catalan
branch even voted--in Carrillo's presence--to retain Leninism.
At the same time, although new procedures such as the election
of all officers by secret ballot have been introduced, the
old leadership has maintained an inconspicuous but firm con-
trol--especially in the closed sessions devoted to drawing up
election lists for delegates to the congress.
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Carrillo has made it clear that he has no intention
o permitting any challenge to his own position, or that of
the party leadership, and he will not hesitate to use the con-
siderable power at his disposal to get his own way. He can
.almost certainly count on the eventual ac uiescence of the bulk 25X1
of the rank and file. 25X1
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25X1 Polish party leader Gierek arrived in Moscow on Monday
or a previously unannounced visit. Gierek was met at the air-
port by President Brezhnev and, according to a brief TASS re-
port, held talks with him yesterday.
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~Gierek's previous trips to the Soviet Union were not
reef working visits and were announced well in advance. More-
over, Brezhnev's busy schedule--which includes a forthcoming
trip to West Germany and a probable Central Committee plenum--
as well as limitations imposed on his activities for health
reasons suggest that he would meet with the Polish leader only
if it were deemed essential.
The initiative for the visit probably came from
Gierek. We are aware of no Polish internal matters of crucial
concern to Moscow or strictly bilateral issues that would lead
the Soviet leader to ask for a meeting at this time.
Poland, on the other hand, faces intractable economic
problems, and Gierek may be seeking substantial new Soviet
economic assistance. As another possibility, Gierek may be con-
sidering some significant new policy initiatives or high-level
personnel changes and would want Soviet approval--or at least
acquiescence--before proceeding.
In the presence of the Soviet party leadership,
Brezhnev presented Gierek with the Order of the October Revolu-
tion and was effusive in his raise of the Polish leader.
INTERNATIONAL: Oil Consumption
The growth of oil consumption in the major developed
countries as a group slowed Zast year, reflecting mainly slug-
gish economic activity. The expanded use of alternative energy
sources and conservation efforts also contributed to the sZo~a-
down.
Oil use in the US, Canada, Japan, UK, West Germany,
France, and Italy, which together account for three-fourths
of Free World oil consumption, rose only 3 percent in 1977
compared with a 6-percent gain in 1976. From 1968 to 1973, oil
consumption in these countries had grown at an average annual
rate of 7 percent.
Oil consumption showed widely divergent trends among
in ivi ual countries. The US registered the sharpest increase
with consumption climbing 5 percent in 1977. Strong economic
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growth, a reduction in hydropower production, cold weather,
and the substitution of fuel oil for natural gas by industrial
users boosted US oil demand.
Oil use in the other six countries combined increased
only 1 percent last year. The four major West European countries
as a group reduced oil use by 2 percent. France registered the
sharpest decline--5 percent--partly because of intensified con-
servation efforts. Smaller declines occurred in Italy and West
Germany. Oil consumption in Japan rose 4.5 percent, only
slightly less than in 1976. In Canada, the growth in oil con-
sumption slowed to about half the 3.5-percent advance of 1976,
largely because of the country's poor economic performance.
Sales of gasoline, light fuel oil, and heavy fuel
oil in the seven countries as a group grew 2 percent each in
1977. Diesel fuel sales advanced 6 percent. The increase in
gasoline sales was well below the-pre-embargo rate of 5.5 per-
cent in all countries except West Germany, where consumption
had increased 6 percent.
A sharp increase in US fuel oil consumption offset
a decline in light and heavy fuel oil use in the other six
countries combined. In Western Europe, natural gas substitution
and increases in hydroelectric power production were primarily
res onsible for declines in light and heavy fuel oil use.
//The final communique of the Commonwealth min-
zsterza on the Common Fund held in London Zast week reflects
a degree of compromise by the four industrialized-nation par-
ticipants--the UK, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia--on the
proposals of the developing nations. The results of the dis-
cussions between these four nations and 28 developing countries
should facilitate the resumption of negotiations on the Common
Fund, under the auspices of the UN Conference on Trade and
Development.//
//As a result of mounting pressure from the devel-
oping-nation participants, the UK and Canada agreed to consider
favorably, at the appropriate stage in the UNCTAD negotiations
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on a Common Fund, proposals for both direct government contribu-
tions and indirect resource pooling from international commodity
agreements. The final communique also mentions the possibility
of the Common Fund financing such "other measures" as export
diversification, market promotion, and productivity improvement.//
//Australia, which had already shifted closer to
t e - position, tacitly backed the LDCs at last week's meet-
ing. New Zealand softened its position on the provision for
"other measures." Only the UK and Canada originally attempted
to maintain the inflexible approach adopted by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development. The UK, however, has
been under pressure from some other members of the European
Community and its acquiescence in the compromise language of.
the communique therefore is not surprising.//
//The UK now will have to argue hard for its inter-
pretation t at the communique is not a commitment but rather a
hint of flexibility. Even so, the communique will be interpreted
by developing countries and by those OECD members favoring com-
promise as an important olic shift and as a lever for pressing
the US for concessions.
PORTUGAL: Uncertainty on the Right
Portugal's opposition Social Democratic Party has
called on Franc2seo Sa Carneiro to resume the party presidency
he vacated after a dispute with party moderates late Zast year.
The erratic Sa Carneiro has not announced his intentions and
may decide that his influence will be greater Zf he turns down
the fob. The party's governing political committee resigned
last weekend and for the time be2ng leadership rests with a
committee composed mostly of Sa Carneiro's supporters. A per-
manent split between party moderates and right2sts could under-
cut Prime Minister Soares' efforts to gain broad support for
his economic rec-overt' program,
Moderates still control a majority of the party's
legislative delegation and some key positions in the party's
bureaucracy, and they will look for ways to reassert themselves
before the national congress, which is to be held within 90
days. If rural conservatives succeed in forcing the party fur-
ther to the right, however, urban-based moderates could bolt,
taking with them. as much as 20 percent of the party's voting
strength.
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Ironically, the splintering of Portugal's largest
oppose ion party could increase rather than decrease the dangers
to Prime Minister Soaves' struggling centrist regime. Moderate
Social Democrats had been trying--against Sa Carneiro's wishes__
to steer the party toward an accommodation with the government
on economic policy. Soaves' chances of enlisting essential
northern support far his economic recovery programs--never very
great--will decline further in the absence of the moderates'
tempering influence.
As the most influential politician on the right, Sa
arneiro holds the key to the party's future. He seems to en-
joy operating as a rogue politician, and he could resist efforts
to reinstall him as party president. Regardless of his formal
status, however, he will remain the party's dominant force and
will probably push it into a policy of systematic opposition
to the government.
The agreement for nuclear cooperation between Argen-
tina an Bolivia, which u~as signed Zast week in La Paz, serves
several Argentina interests--diplomatic and technical.
The accord enhances Argentina's rapidly growing
reputation both as a major supplier of nuclear technology and
material to Latin America and as the leading South American
nuclear power. In the past year, Argentina has also signed
nuclear cooperation agreements with Peru and Ecuador and nego-
tiations are under way with Uruguay. This means that within
the next few years Argentina will acquire major influence over
four foreign nuclear programs and will probably gain access to
new uranium reserves.
The new agreement, similar to the Argentine-Peruvian
nuclear accord reached in 1977, includes the supply of a re-
search reactor, the training of Bolivian personnel at Argentina's
Bariloche Research Center, and cooperation on developing Bolivia's
uranium reserves. Additionally, the two parties are studying the
possibility of developing a nuclear power installation sometime
in the future.
The deal also appears to be part of a broader diplo-
ma is campaign to solidify Argentina"s friendship with Chile's
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neighbors at a time when Buenos Aires is trying to resolve a
longstanding dispute with Santiago over the Bea le Channel and
territorial waters in the South Atlantic. 25X1
Chinese fishing vessels reappeared yesterday in the
territorial waters that Japan claims around the Senkaku Is-
lands. According to press reports, the Japanese Foreign Minis-
try will protest the violations and ask for the results of an
investigation promised earlier by the Chinese. Tokyo will con-
tinue to rel on di lomatic means to deal with the incursions.
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