NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010122-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 22, 2006
Sequence Number: 
122
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 10, 1978
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010122-6.pdf367.41 KB
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Tr 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AEV A1W AdW AdW AMIF AA1V AAW A.dW AAW Ar A ro\*6tFUNJp Iease 2007 TO: NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 2 3 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPA RE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOM MENDATION COMMENT FILE RETU CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNAT URE REMARKS: FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. DATE IA-RDP79T00975AO3060001 f102p 2- Secret (Security Classification) Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: Wednesday 10 May 1978 CG NIDC 78/109C w NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION 1 Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Top Secret State Dept. review completed (Security Classification) 0 1 1 4 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T009754 030600010122-6 for Wednesday, 10 May 1978. 25X1 I The NID Cable is for the purpose or in senior o icials. SYRIA-LEBANON: Problems Continue ITALY: Consequences of Moro's Death Page 2 Page 3 USSR-SUDAN: Ambassador Returning AFGHANISTAN: Food Crisis BURMA-BANGLADESH: Refugee Problem Page 5 Page 6 Page 6 Page 8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010122-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For I Syria is urging Lebanese President Sarkis to include e ea,er of the pro-Syrian Lebanese Baath Party in the new cabinet that Prime Minister designate Huss is trying to form. The Syrians are wary of the declaration of principles endorsed by the Lebanese Parliament last month that calls for restric- tions on the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Syria has been press- ing Sarkis to have Baath leader Assam Qansu and perhaps other pro-Syrian Lebanese brought into the new government. Sarkis accepted the resignations of Prime Minister Huss and the cabi- net in mid-April, but later called on Huss to form a new cabi- net. Several small pro-Syrian Lebanese parties, such as the Baath, were not represented in the old cabinet. The Syrians would like to use Qansu to influence the Lebanese Government, which they believe is swayed by Christian interests. The con- troversy over Qansu--he is opposed by the Christian rightists-- is apparently a major issue preventing Huss from naming a new cabinet. The US Embassy in Damascus believes the Syrians are ambivalent about the Lebanese Parliament's declaration of views on the Palestinian presence. While Damascus welcomes any signs, such as the declaration, of Lebanese reconciliation that might permit Syria to withdraw troops from the country, the Syrians are unenthusiastic about the declaration's provision for dis- arming the Palestinians. They fear that any Lebanese effort to enforce this provision could spark a major crisis in which they would have to choose sides. The US Embassy sees little likelihood that Syria will be willing to rein in the fedayeen in the absence of ma Palestinian provocations. Syria is also encouraging some Christian leaders to keep National Liberal Party leader Camille Shamun and other hard-liners from sparking a renewal of fighting. Nonetheless, the clashes in Beirut last weekend suggest that more skirmishes between Christian militiamen and Syrian troops are likely. 2 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved For ITALY: Consequences of Moro's Death The murder of Aldo Moro opens a new period of un- certainty in Italy. The government has won a negative victory by remaining firm, but the Red Brigades are untouched and can be expected to strike again. Maneuvering to take the power seat Moro occupied will break out in the open almost immedi- ately. The government regarded its firmness as the only possible course, but this has caused considerable bitterness. Moro's family refuses to permit a state funeral and objects to the participation of state functionaries in a public com- memoration. The Red Brigades did not achieve their apparent goal of provoking the government into an indiscriminate roundup of extreme leftists--and thereby causing an antigovernment backlash--but the security situation cannot be expected to improve rapidly, and Italy waits for the terrorists to strike again. I I A major unknown is the public reaction to the murder. Although initial reports speak of a nationwide shock wave, only revulsion on the part of the radical groups that aid the Red Brigades would reduce the potential for further terrorism--and this seems unlikely. I I Political maneuvering to fill the power vacuum left by Moro's death has already begun, although the exact lineup of contenders is unclear. It is also uncertain whether any grouping will coalesce around a policy of trying to halt the Communist Party's move toward full governmental power. Having taken a firm and responsible position against negotiating with terrorists, the Communists are presumably in a strong position. The likelihood of more terrorism poses the need for strong and united government, and it is doubtful that any Christian Demo- cratic government can do without the Communists. The provincial elections in small towns that will take place Sunday will be watched closely for indications of mood and for signposts of what can be done next. Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved Fo USSR-SUDAN: Ambassador Returning I The Soviets have decided to send their Am- assaaor acc o dan after a year's absence. They are respond- ing to recent indications by the Sudanese of willingness to normalize bilateral relations. //Ambassador Fedotov was re- caZZed Zast June after a series of measures taken against the Soviets in Sudan by President Numayri, who charged that they were supporting a Libyan-Ethiopian plot to overthrow him. Fedotov's return, however, does not indicate that Soviet- Sudanese relations will improve significantly.// I I In spite of their continued hostility toward each other, both the USSR and Sudan have reason to want normal re- lations. Concerned by what he perceives as a combined threat against him, Numayri has moved in the past year to disarm his opponents. He has sought reconciliation with domestic opposi- tion groups and has moved to improve relations with Libya and Ethiopia. He has also tried to mediate between Libya and Chad in order to defuse the Libyan-backed rebellion in northern Chad, which he perceives as a threat to the stability of the region. The return of the Soviet Ambassador probably does not portend a significant improvement in relations. Although Numayri's most recent public criticism of the USSR was more restrained than usual, he has continued to attack the Soviets for their policies in North Africa. He almost certainly remains convinced that the USSR, in league with Libya, seeks to encircle Sudan and overthrow him. //For their part, the Soviets undoubtedly would applaud the downfall of Numayri. They have seen their position in Sudan deteriorate gradually after 1971, when the Sudanese Communist Party participated in a coup attempt against Numayri, and precipitately after J-htm - T,ihvaft-backed attempt to overthrow Numayri in July 1976.// Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved For 4elease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00974030600010122-6 25X1 I Afghan President Taraki is apparently instituting a grain distribution plan in order to offset food deficits in rural areas. Such a plan might meet the immediate food needs of the rural poor and could win some popular support for the new regime. Last Thursday, a government radiobroadcast ordered all individuals who own grain products to turn them over to the government "to meet the needs of the people." Because food prices have risen approximatley 10 percent, the government action might be an attempt to stop food speculation. On the other hand, inadequate rainfall last year has reduced wheat production and caused shortages of food and livestock feed in some areas. In other areas, there is increas- ing hunger, and livestock conditions in the northern part of the country are said to be very poor. To date, the international response in food aid has not met Afghanistan's projected needs, perhaps because govern- ment estimates are too high. The Afghans may see the food short- age as an opportunity to demonstrate their concern for the popu- lation. During an extensive food shortage in 1971 and 1972, an emergency government pro ram for food distribution helped al- leviate the problem. 25X1 BURMA-BANGLADESH: Refugee Problem I Burma's efforts to root out illegal residents LZvzng a Tong its border with Bangladesh have resulted in a flow of refugees into Bangladesh that has complicated bilat- eral relations and could lead to increased tension. The Burmese Government has been conducting citizen- snip checks throughout the country since March. It asserts that 75,000 Muslims of Bangladeshi origin are residing ille- gally in Arakan State, about one-half of them recent arrivals. These include some who fled Bangladesh in 1971 during that country's war with Pakistan. Representatives of UN organiza- tions who visited the refugee camps in Bangladesh last weekend support the statements of the Bangladesh Government that 70,000 refugees have been registered so far and that 20,000 to 30,000 others remain to be registered. Approved For Release Approved For I The Bangladeshi Government and press allege that the predominantly Buddhist Burmese fear the indigenous Muslim mi- nority in the border area and want to oust them. The Burmese operation, probably conducted in a heavy-handed manner, appar- ently did cause the exodus of those with no proof of Burmese citizenship. Bangladesh has further charged that atrocities committed by the Burmese military precipitated the exodus. A Burmese Government statement released last weekend, on the other hand, alleges that Bangladeshi insurgents and bandits are responsible both for the atrocities and for inciting the local Muslims to flee Burma. and organizations for assistance in coping with the refugee in- flux and in persuading Burma to take back most of the refugees. say Bangladesh is exaggerating the prob- however The Burmese , , lem for political purposes and seem unwilling to postpone their operation. Although neither side seems to want a confrontation a Ts tage, Burma's determination to rid itself of the al- leged aliens--coupled with Bangladesh's need to appear nation- alistic and support its ethnic kin--has brought bilateral nego- tiations to an impasse. Moreover, reporting in the Bangladesh press of the refugees' stories of atrocities has grown increas- ingly hysterical, and US and UN officials in Bangladesh are ex- pressing concern that Bangladeshi Muslims might retaliate against d er area. the nearly 80,000 Buddhists living in the bor Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6 Pr AV AV 'ar AV AV AV AV AV Ar- AVI 1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07. CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010122-6 Top Secret (Security Classification) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Top Secret (Security Classification) AV AV AV AV AV AV AV AV AV Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600010122-6