NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010046-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: June 8, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 Thursday 8 June 1978 CG NIDC 78/133C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 8 June 197A_
25X1
11113 ITED a i for tne purpose or informing
senior officials.
USSR-JAPAN: Military Exercise
IRAQ-USSR: Communists Executed
COLOMBIA: Turbay Apparent Winner
UK: Buying French Missile Engine
MALTA: Neutrality Negotiations
BRIEF:
Libya-Chad
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ETHIOPIA: Eritrean Offensive
//Ethiopians plans for major offensive operations
against the Eritrean insurgents appear to be encountering delays
that may postpone the start of heavy fighting into the summer
rainy season or beyond. The delays have apparently been caused
by the Zack of Soviet and Cuban support for a full-scale offen-
sive, the need to mass large numbers of Ethiopian forces in the
region, and the stiff opposition offered by insurgent forces to
recent government probing actions.//
Except for a brief upsurge in ground fighting in the
Asmara area in mid-May and continued fighting at the isolated
government garrison of Barentu, the level of sustained combat
activity on the Eritrean front is considerably less than might
have been expected at this point. We find this somewhat puz-
zling, given the fact that the rainy season--which will inhibit
Ethiopian air operations--is likely to begin in a few weeks and
continue through early September.
//The recent abortive effort by Ethiopian forces
to rear e insurgents' nine-month siege of Asmara may have
dimmed the government's. confidence about starting a full-scale
offensive. The Ethiopians
may now be concerne tnat 'increasing
pressure on Havana and Moscow from the Arabs and members of the
nonaligned movement not to become involved in Eritrea has raised
the threshold at which Cuba would send troops to rescue a stalled
Ethiopian offensive.//
I I An estimated 2,200 Cuban military advisers and techni-
attached to Ethiopian armor, artillery, and air units
cians
in Eritrea and nearby Tigre Province, but no Cuban air or ground
combat units appear to have been deployed to northern Ethiopia
thus far.
//Chairman Mengistu is almost certainly determined
to pursue military option in Eritrea, but he may have some
doubts about Ethiopia's ability to conduct a sustained offensive.
Mengistu may calculate that by limiting the scope of operations
in Eritrea, he will not need as much direct Cuban assistance.//
I If operations in Eritrea go sour, however, the Ethi-
opians will not hesitate to ask the Soviets and the Cubans to
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bail them out. The USSR would probably agree to increase its
direct support to Ethiopia, but at the same time would intensify
its search for a negotiated settlement. Cuba, with casualties
and diplomatic costs in mind, would be reluctant to commit com-
bat troops but would nevertheless do so if convinced such action
was necessary to preserve the Mengistu regime.
I lEthiopia's Ambassador to Kenya told a Nairobi press
con erence last Friday that recent probes in Eritrea by govern-
ment forces were not a "general" offensive along the lines of
that conducted against Somali forces in the Ogaden, but rather
were targeted against "selected" military objectives occupied
or encircled by Eritrean insurgents. More important, the Ambas-
sador ruled out the use of Cuban troops in Eritrea--the first
time any Ethiopian official has said this.
The envoy also repeated the government's offer to ne-
gotiate with the Eritreans on the basis of its nine-point peace
plan of May 1976, a vaguely defined formula for regional autonomy
that the insurgents have steadfastly rejected in favor of com-
plete independence.
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USSR-JAPAN: Military Exercise
Soviet military exercises near the four islands
Japan refers to as the northern territories is ZikeZy to add
new strains to Soviet-Japanese relations. The Japanese Govern-
ment, as it has done in similar situations in the past, has
been giving considerable attention to the recent Soviet naval
maneuvers. Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe charged yester-
day that it would be "unreasonable and unlawful" for the Soviet
Union to designate this area as a danger zone and conduct war
games there. The military maneuvers may well serve the purpose
of showing Moscow's displeasure over Japan's proposal to China
on 31 May to resume talks on a peace and friendship treaty at
the earliest possible date.
Moscow gave Tokyo advance warning of the exercises
last Thursday, the day after the Japanese Government announced
its proposal to resume the Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations.
According to press reports, the Soviet Union has indicated
that live firing drills would be conducted from 6 to 12 June
off Iturup Island, largest of the four Soviet-held, Japanese-
claimed islands that comprise the northern territories.
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By conducting these exercises, the Soviets may be
displaying their irritation with Tokyo's proposal to China that
the two sides resume negotiations as soon as possible on a
peace and friendship treaty. Moscow vehemently opposes the
treaty because the Chinese insist that it include a clause
against the establishment of hegemony in Asia and the Far East--
a thinly veiled allusion to the USSR.
Soviet officials in recent days have stepped up at-
tacks on the proposed treaty, charging that Peking will use it
to forge closer political and military ties to Japan in support
of its anti-Soviet foreign policy. Soviet media have also
charged that the US welcomes the resumption of the treaty talks
and is pushing Japan into an alliance with China to exert
greater pressure on the Soviet Union.
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IRAQ-USSR: Communists Executed
//Iraq has confirmed that last month it executed 21
Iraqi Commune aed with attempting to establish ceZZs in
the m ' 25X1
I Imi i ary personne are pro-
s i e from joining the ommunist Party or engaging in any po-
liticaZ activity except: that sanctioned by the ruling Baath
Party. The government denies that the executions indicate it is
reassessing its relations with the USSR.//
//The executions serve to underline Iraq's concerns
over e 's activities in the area and to warn the Soviets
against getting involved in Iraq's internal affairs. There is
no evidence, however, to support recent Syrian press speculation
that Iraq is re-examining its 1972 Treaty of Friendship with the
USSR and is considering expelling Soviet advisers. The Syrian
charges were undoubtedly intended to embarrass Iraq and put it
on the defensive.//
I /Relations between Iraq and the USSR have nonethe-
less been seriously strained over Soviet-Cuban activities in the
Horn of Africa--Iraq has long supported the Eritreans in their
struggle with Ethiopia---and Iraqi diplomats have voiced concern
about Soviet involvement in the'recent coup in Afghanistan.//
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I Soviet Ambassador Barkovskiy and a special Soviet
oreign Ministry emissary visited Baghdad this week and Iraq may
have used the occasion to reassure them that formal relations be-
tween the two governments will remain stable. The Iraqis seem to
be trying to link the executions to internal security precautions.
The local Communists were charged with circulating the National
Front charter that brought the Communist Party into the government
in 1973 and with conspiring in the military to overthrow the re-
gime.//
//Newspaper editorials are warning the military about
the dangers of illegal political activity, and Iraqi leader Sad-
dam Husayn has railed against "hostile forces using religion to 25X1
achieve political objectives." This is probably a warning to the
large Shiah Muslim population, which has been a source of support
for the local Communist Party. F77 I
COLOMBIA: Turbay Apparent Winner
//Liberal Party candidate Julio Cesar Turbay seems
to have won a narrow victory in Sunday's election in Colombia;
he will face major challenges in convincing his countrymen that
he is presidential timber.//
//The lead seesawed between Turbay and his Conserv-
ive opponent, Belisario Betancur, and both contestants claimed
victory before the National Registry--which maintains the offi-
cial vote count--announced Turbay's win on Tuesday. The final
count must yet be ratified by the Electoral Court, a process
that will take some time, particularly if it involves investiga-
tion of fraud charges and recounting votes in several contested
districts. In the end, Turbay will probably be declared presi-
dent-elect and be inaugurated on 7 August to begin a four-year
term.//
//Turbay apparently took 48.7 percent of the votes
to Betancur's 46.9 percent. Spokesmen for Betancur have chal-
lenged the authenticity of this count, and Betancur has yet to
concede. If he contests the results in the courts, an extended
period of political uncertainty will follow.//
//A Conservative Party leader has discounted the
possibility of violence over the disputed returns, but he
stressed that the situation will remain tense for some time.
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Senior leaders in both major parties appear to be counseling
patience to their supporters and seem ready to abide by a final
decision.//
//Political and social turmoil preceding the voting-
had led the government to mobilize 200,000 soldiers to maintain
order on election day. As a precaution, the Defense Ministry
is keeping the troops on duty until further notice, but the
postelection atmosphere has been calm.//
/Turbay's poor showing--a margin of 86,000 votes
4.7 million ballots cast, compared with earlier predic-
ou o
tions of up to a half-million majority--appears to rest as much
with his pedantic style and poor campaign tactics as with pop-
ular enthusiasm for his Conservative challenger. Turbay's in-
ability to resolve divisions within his own party or to put to
rest corruption charges against him and his family were addi-
tional liabilities and will continue to be so during his presi-
dency.//
//As expected, popular apathy was high. Approxima-
tely 68 percent of the eligible voters failed to cast ballots.
Turbay's lack of a popular mandate, coupled with the Conserva-
tives' nearly equal performance at the polls, may force him to
continue certain aspects of the biparty National Front coali-
tion in order to preserve national unity.//
//Most Colombians expect Turbay will largely con-
tinue the policies initiated by President Lopez. Turbay has in-
dicated, for example, that he intends to support Lopez' drug-
control program. Unlike Lopez, however, Turbay will begin his
term as a weak and unpopular president, and serious labor, crime,
and student problems await him. 25X1
UK: Buying French Missile Engine
//The UK has selected a French engine for use in
an air-to-surface missile,
oug the mtssi e is
pro a y in en e or short-range use against air defenses,
the French engine has been successfully tested for use in
long-range cruise missiles. It has been apparent for some time
that the Callaghan government is giving more thought to llong-
range cruise missile deployment than recent public statements
by British officials would indicate.//
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//The French engine, made by Microturbo, is simi-
ar in size and thrust to the engine the US developed for its
song-range cruise missile program, but its range is shorter
because of relatively high fuel consumption. Microturbo's con-
tract with the British requires that the engine be assembled
in the UK.//
//There are strong pressures on the British to
retain their nuclear capability, and they could do so more
cheaply with a long-range cruise missile than through other
options. Although long-range cruise missiles can be launched
from ground or sea platforms, deployment of an air-launched
missile would preserve the UK's strategic air capability by
using obsolescent British Vulcan bombers or newer Jaguar or
Tornado fighter-bombers as launch platforms.//
I //The US has preserved the option of providing the
UK with ongrange cruise missiles, but the UK may prefer to de-
ploy its own cruise missiles or those produced in cooperation
with another West European power. Last month, a leading British
Conservative Party defense spokesman proposed that collabora-
Lion between the UK and France in the nuclear weapons field be
seriously considered. The UK will. probably decide whether to
proceed with an inde endent cruise missile program within the
next year or two.
MALTA: Neutrality Negotiations
//Multilateral negotiations on Matta's status after
the British withdraw their military forces from the islands next
year are apparently entering a decisive phase. Matta, France,
taty, Libya, and Algeria are attempting to devise a declaration
f neutrality for Malta that would effectively exclude both So-
>iet and US military vessels from Maltese shipyards after 1979.
The main obstacle is Prime Minister Mintoff's continued attempt
1o link guarantees of Maltese neutrality to pledges of economic
rtssistance from EC and Arab countries.//
//A negotiating session last month produced several
positive developments, according to Italian diplomats involved
in the talks. The Maltese agreed that neutrality should be made
a matter of law rather than a political concept. This presumably
is designed to prevent Mintoff from giving the agreement an in-
terpretation different from that intended by the negotiators.//
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//The Maltese have also agreed that the nations in-
volve in e neutrality negotiations should ratify identical
agreements; the Maltese had earlier argued that because certain
participants, such as the Libyans, were willing to provide more
explicit guarantees of Maltese neutrality, they should be allowed
to issue their own version of the declaration. The Italian ne-
gotiator believes, finally, that the agreement will deny the
Soviets access to Maltese repair and basing facilities, thus
protecting Western interests.//
/From the US point of view, the most acceptable
Maltese neutrality declaration would be one that specifically
barred all Soviet and US naval vessels and auxiliaries from
Maltese facilities. We have not seen the full text of the agree-
ment but, according to most reports, it merely bars military
vessels of countries belonging to "major alliances."//
//This version could give the Maltese Government
greater freedom to interpret the treaty than it would have if
US and Soviet ships were explicitly excluded. A liberal inter-
pretation might prove advantageous to the Soviets, because of
their frequent use of commercial cover for military support
ships and quasi-military vessels.//
//In any event, Mintoff has made clear that he is not
prepare to complete the discussions until there is agreement on
an economic aid package to offset the financial. loss Malta will
suffer when the British leave. Although the West Germans are ex-
pected to take the lead in sounding out EC members on the issue,
a letter Mintoff sent to Chancellor Schmidt six weeks ago asking
about economic assistance is still unanswered. The Italian Am-
bassador in Valletta says his government will try to pin down
West German Foreign Minister Genscher on this subject when he
visits Rome later this month.//
//In a related development, a high-level Soviet
trade delegation arrived in Malta on 1 June to discuss enhanced
commercial relations. It is unclear whether Malta will derive
any substantial economic benefit from these contacts, but they
do serve Mintoff's broader interests by hinting at other policies
he could pursue if the negotiations on the neutrality agreement
and economic assi fail to meet Malta's perceived needs.
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Libya-Chad
I The second phase of the peace talks among Chad, anti-
governmen rebels, and their Libyan benefactors, scheduled for
yesterday in Libya, apparently did not take place. The US Em-
bassy in Ndjamena has learned informally from the Chadian
Government that the negotiations may be held later. Because
of a recent increase in fighting, it is doubtful that a meet-
ing would accomplish much right now.
Despite two recent military successes by the French-
support e Chadian forces against the rebels, the position of
President Malloum's government remains precarious. The regime's
inability to cope with the insurgency and simultaneously deal
with pressing economic and social problems remains unchanged
and continues to fuel antigovernment sentiment. 25X1
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