NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010070-3
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Document Creation Date:
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Sequence Number:
70
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 22, 1978
Content Type:
REPORT
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0
Thursday 22 June 1978 CG NIDC 78/145C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 22 June 1978, 25X1
The
a e is tor a purpose informing
senior officials.
USSR: Oil Production Problems
SYRIA: Reaction to Assassination
Page 1
Page 3
USSR: Composites in Aircraft
Page 5
ROMANIA: Hungarian Minorities
Page
GHANA: Economic Conditions
NAMIBIA: Voter Registration
ETHIOPIA: Eritrean Policy
Page 9
Page 10
Page 10
USSR
Cuba
Page 12
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I I The industrial press and the front pages of Pravda
during the past few months have highlighted mounting diffi-
culties in the USSR's West Siberian oilfields. A Soviet offi-
cial for the first time has acknowledged that Soviet oil de-
liveries to Eastern Europe might decline after 1980.
I In an article on 5 June, Pravda emphasized that a new
stage in West Siberian oil is approaching. The official Com-
munist Party paper said that the Samotlor oilfield, the largest
in the country, has reached its projected capacity and probably
will peak this year. Other large West Siberian oilfields--Ust
Balyk and Mamontovo--have reached or are near peak capacity.
I I As production at these fields levels off, an average
o six to eight new smaller fields must be developed each year
through 1980 to maintain the planned annual increases in West
Siberian output. According to Pravda, the annual drilling plan
in Tyumen Oblast may not be met, and the new fields in West
Siberia are not fulfilling production targets..
I I Because of the lower yields in the new fields, three
times as much drilling is required to provide the same growth
in production achieved when Samotlor and other large fields
were under development. Between 1978 and 1980, 21 million meters
of wells must be drilled in West Siberia; 9 million meters were
drilled there during the preceding three years.
I ITo meet these targets, the Soviets will have to fly
in additional drilling crews from the Urals-Volga oilfields
and elsewhere. Such crews are already scheduled to drill more
than half of the additional 1.3 million meters planned for
1978. To date, however, they have fallen behind because of a
lack of drilling equipment, tools, and housing. The Soviets
have assigned drillers in Tyumen only 55 additional drilling
rigs instead of the 100 they need this year.
Despite the high priority the Soviets give to West
5i erian petroleum development, their efforts appear extremely
disorganized. According to the Pravda article, the most acute
problem of the Siberian petroleum workers is an old one: the
lack of coordination between the Ministry of the Petroleum In-
dustry and other ministries operating in the region.
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The other ministries have failed to supply the neces-
sary rigs, construction materials, electric power, and railroads
required to develop new fields remote from the major developed
areas. Hard-surface roads and electric power have been supplied
to only two of the 10 new oilfields put into production in 1976
and 1977. The lack of infrastructure for an additional 23
planned fields will limit production increases unless most of
these problems can be overcome quickly.
West Siberian oilfields provided almost all of the
growth in national oil output in 1974 and 1975 and offset de-
clines elsewhere in the USSR of 100,000 barrels per day in 1976
and 200,000 barrels per day in 1977. Production declines in
older fields are likely to continue at an increasing rate as
drilling crews are moved to West Siberia. So far in 1978, oil
production has risen at an average annual rate of some 4 percent.
With the problems in West Siberia, it is unlikely that the So-
viets can attain their 1978 production goal of 11.5 million
barrels per day--a 5.3-percent increase over 1977.
Oleg Bogomolov, Director of the Institute of Economics
of the World Socialist System, has made the first official
acknowledgment of a possible Soviet cut in oil shipments to
Eastern Europe after 1980. He indicated to US Embassy personnel
that the total Soviet supply of energy sources to Eastern Europe
will remain at the 1980 level; he did not promise that the USSR
would cover any increases in East European energy needs.
Bogomolov said that the mix of products to Eastern
I urope would change, with oil exports dropping and gas and
electricity deliveries rising enough to compensate. He also
said that the Soviets will continue to sell some oil to the
West. Other Soviet officials have indicated that oil deliveries
to Eastern Europe would level off in the 1980s, but this is
the first indication of a reduction.
I If Bogomolov's statement proves accurate, East Euro-
pean countries with balance-of-payments problems will find it
difficult to acquire their increased energy import needs from
the West. F77 I
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SYRIA: Reaction to Assassination
Syrian forces in Lebanon have wor e to restore order in
the north. Syrian Foreign Ministry officials have told the US
Embassy in Damascus that Syria will not engage in rash acts
against the Phalanges.
Assad is well aware that a major confrontation with
the Phalanges might unite most Christians against Syria and
provoke a bloody street battle in Beirut. He probably prefers
to maintain ties to the Phalanges, the largest and most powerful
Christian militia group.
I 4The Syrian President may not be able to prevent his
brother from giving some assistance to the Franjiyahs. Two
battalions of Rifaat's elite Defense Companies are stationed
in the north,
1 r
which he may use to assist the Franjiyah clan.
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USSR: Composites in Aircraft
//Soviet scientists continue to advocate the use
o graphite composites in military and civilian aircraft,
despite their apparent familiarity with the inherent dangers
to electrical systems and human health. Soviet aircraft experts,
however, reportedly are resisting using graphite composites in
primary aircraft structures, such as wing spars, despite the
significant weight and cost savings that could be realized.
The use of such composites is an effective means of increasing
aircraft payload and performance, as well as protecting mili-
tary aircraft against gunfire and laser radiation.//
//The Soviets apparently are aware of two hazards
associa e with the fibers contained in graphite composites.
Such fibers may be released from the composite by burning and
then transported over long distances by normal atmospheric
turbulence. The graphite fibers can cause damage to electrical
equipment by shorting, arcing, or resistive loading. The
fibers can also be inhaled by factory workers in the manufac-
turing process and may cause long-term lung damage.//
//The USSR is nonetheless likely to continue its
eve opment of graphite composites for structural use in air-
craft because by using them the Soviets can decrease aircraft
weight and increase payload. The current Soviet state of de-
velopment of graphite composites and the reported resistance
of aircraft experts to their use, however, suggests that any
large-scale use of structural composites will not occur before
the mid-to-late 1980s. F77 I 25X1
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ROMANIA: Hungarian Minorities
Romanian President Ceausescu's inspection tour of
the main ethnic Hungarian regions of Transylvania suggests of-
ficiaZ concern over restlessness among the country's 1.8
mil-ion Magyars. The government is determined not to allow foreign
interference in its handling of the nationality problem.
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In speeches on Tuesday in counties with large Magyar
Ceausescu offered assurances on the availability
concentrations
,
of education in minority languages. His tour of the region,
soon after his return from major foreign visits, may be an ef-
fort to still ethnic Hungarian grievances prior to the renewal
date for most-favored-nation status by the US next month.
In recent weeks the Romanians pub-
licly accused intellectuals in Hungary and emigre groups in the
US of trying to revive irredentist and revanchist claims to
Transylvania.
In a major speech early this month, Ceausescu reiter-
ated Romania's determination to oppose any foreign attempt to
interfere with its handling of the minorities. Ceausescu's warn-
ing was probably directed at Hungary. Although the Hungarian
Government has probably had private discussions with the Ro-
manians on the situation of the Magyar minority, it has publicly
maintained a low-key attitude toward the problem. There is no
evidence that Hungary has done anything to encourage discontent
or unrest among the ethnic Hungarian community in Transylvania.
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Worsening economic conditions in Ghana could generate
another political crisis for General Acheampong's unpopular
military regime. In recent weeks, prices have shot up as short-
ages of basic foodstuffs and gasoline have become more critical.
Acheampong's mismanagement has resulted in triple
digit inflation, the collapse of public services, misuse of
scarce foreign exchange, corruption, and declining agricultural
production. Growing popular discontent with the economy may
well give civilian opponents--who seek Acheampong's replacement
by a civilian government--a new lease on life.
I I The government has responded to the economic problems
by adopting a more flexible exchange rate system, which devalued
Ghana's badly overvalued currency by a modest 13 percent, but
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this has not gone far enough. Acheampong may grudgingly approve
some other stabilization measures if he concludes that his power
is jeopardized by impending economic collapse.
Basic economic reforms, which are required before the
governmen can expect help from the International Monetary Fund
aad other Western creditors, will be painful, unpopular, and
hard for Acheampong to undertake. He took advantage of unhappi- 25X1
ness over economic reforms--particularly devaluation--to over-
throw his predecessor in 1972 and fears that in similar circum-
stances he could be ousted by another officer.
NAMIBIA: Voter Registration
The South African Administrator General for Namibia
cs ,ca ounced that voter registration will begin next Monday
aid continue for three months. The registration is for an eZec-
!;i n tc select a Namibian constituent assembly; it is to be
con.lueled by the South African authorities in Namibia in ac-
cordance with a detailed plan the Administrator General pub-
lished last week.
The Western members of the UN Security Council have
repeatedly warned South Africa that conducting voter registra-
tion unilaterally will complicate efforts to gain international
acceptance of the Western settlement proposal that South Africa
accepted last April. The Western proposal stipulates that voter
registration is to be conducted with the participation of a UN
special representative to be appointed after the Security Council
accepts the settlement proposal.
The South Africans, however, have argued that it will
necessarily take several months to complete an initial registra-
tion of Namibia's adult population, and that an initial roll of
eligible voters can be revised after a UN representative arrives.
The Administrator General's latest announcement stressed the
importance of completing the-balloting before the rainy season
begins in December. 25X1
ETHIOPIA: Eritrean Policy
I The Ethiopian ruling military council on Friday con-
vened a 10-day seminar on its Eritrean policy. The meeting
seems designed to line up support for pursuit of a military
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solution to the Eritrean conflict rather than for a political
compromise. The fact that the council felt it necessary to or-
ganize the seminar, however, probably reflects increased sen-
sitivity to international opposition to an attempt to crush
the guerrillas by force.
Those attending the meeting include representatives
rom e government and mass organizations and Ethiopian envoys
to many West European and some African countries. Except for
the Ethiopian representative to Yugoslavia, no chiefs of mission
to Communist countries were required to attend.
I I The US Embassy believes the council wants to associate
leaders of Ethiopian mass organizations with its Eritrean policy
in order to mobilize public opinion and avoid criticism if--as
seems likely--the planned military offensive proves costly in
men and resources. A complementary reason for the seminar is
to decide on a coordinated public line to explain the council's
policy, especially for the benefit of Western countries that
want Ethiopia to seek a political compromise in Eritrea.
There is some speculation in Addis Ababa that the
council is considering ways short of military conquest to end
the Eritrean conflict and that it convened the seminar to pre-
pare public opinion for a shift in policy. The council's secre-
tary general undermined this interpretation in his opening re-
marks by reiterating the government's uncompromising stand. He
made the usual condemnation of the Eritrean guerrillas by call-
ing them tools of reactionaries bent on destroying Ethiopia's
"socialist" revolution.
The decision -to convene the seminar probably reflects
the council's increased awareness that its pursuit of a military
victory in Eritrea is unpopular with most foreign countries, in-
cluding many friendly ones. The seminar, an attempt to improve
the government's image, may even produce a revised version of
the council's vague "nine-point plan" for Eritrea that it will
tout as a new attempt to reach a peaceful solution. It is un-
likely, however, to offer significant concessions to the guer-
rillas.
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Two Soviet Jews who have long been refused permission
to emigrate to Israel were convicted of "hooliganism" in separate
trials in Moscow yesterday; they were sentenced to five and four
years of "internal exile."
The trials took place at a time when the USSR's policy
owar refuseniks" is hardening. In spite of the overall in-
crease in Jewish emigration this year, those previously denied
exit permits are having more difficulty than in past years. The
trials reflect the Soviets' determination to stifle dissent
while conveying the message that the publicity generated by
the highly visible and activist "refuseniks" can only hurt
them.
One of those convicted yesterday, Vladimir Slepak,
is a member of the unofficial group monitoring Soviet compliance
with the Helsinki accord. 25X1
Cuban President Castro announced this week that Cuba's
1978 sugar harvest will exceed 7.3 million tons--15 percent more
than last year's crop? This is unwelcome news for the already
glutted international sugar market, where prices are holding
at about 7 cents a pound, compared with the 1974 peak of 65
cents.
Cuba will have stocks approaching 900,000 tons after
meeting export commitments and domestic needs this year. While
Cuba's 2 million-ton free market quota will earn only $400
million, total sugar sales will yield about $3.3 billion largely
because of Soviet purchases at the heavily subsidized price of 25X1
about 41 cents a pound.
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