NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010041-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: August 22, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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A rove*farj'ase 2005/06109: Gif
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-RDP79T00975A03080001 f 0411 secret
(Security Classification) 25
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0 Tuesday 22 August 1978 CG NIDC 78/196 0
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable 22 Auaust
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Crisis Continues
ISRAEL: Political Poll Results
AFGHANISTAN: Domestic Situation
SYRIA: Reaction to Aid Vote
BRIEF:
Chad
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Portugal's government crisis is dragging into its
ourt week, and it is still doubtful that Prime Minister-
designate Nobre da Costa will succeed in putting together a
government that will last. The legislature is convening today
to begin debate on legislation to pave the way. for early elec-
tions if Nobre da Costa's effort fails. The Socialist Party,
Portugal's largest, remains the key. Its power struggle with
President Eanes, which has greatly exacerbated the crisis, does
not appear to be losing steam.
I lAfter a second round of talks with the major politi-
cal parties on Thursday, Nobre da Costa was.expected to sound
out independents and technicians for cabinet posts. Bank of
Portugal Governor Silva Lopes has already accepted the post of
Finance Minister, and Firmino Miguel will continue as Defense
Minister. He was rebuffed by Vitor Constancio, the highly suc-
cessful outgoing Socialist Finance Minister. It is still doubt-
ful, however, that Nobre da Costa will be able to bring promi-
nent party figures into his government.
I Both the Socialists and the Communists, who together
control a majority in the legislature, are skeptical about Nobre
da Costa's plans to establish a government of independents and
technicians. The Socialists claim that the concept of a govern-
ment divorced from the political parties is not valid. The Com-
munists maintain that individuals claiming to be independent
still have political preferences; they believe Nobre da Costa
has a predilection for the right that will lead to the forma-
tion of an anti-left government.
The Communists have special reason to worry. As the
independent Minister for Industry in a former Socialist govern-
ment, Nobre da Costa played a key role.in extricating several
industries that had been seized by the Communists in.1975. A
major demonstration staged by the Communists Friday was prob-
ably aimed at reminding Nobre da Costa of their strength.
I I Portugal's conservative parties, the Social
Democrats and the Center Democrats., believe Nobre da Costa's
efforts should be supported. They are withholding official
endorsement until the final cabinet list is known, but have
agreed to allow second-ranking party members to participate in
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the government.
25X1 The convening of the legislature to update and re-
write Portugal's election law reflects a growing consensus that
Nobre da Costa's government will probably serve only as a care-
taker until an early election is held, perhaps as early as Feb-
ruary or March.
25X1 This consensus emerged after the Socialists flatly
refused to allow party members to participate in a non-Socialist
government. With the Communists and Center Democrats agreeing
that no stable government is feasible without the Socialists
firmly in tow, Socialist leader Soares appears to have struck
a severe blow to President Eanes' hopes of preserving Nobre da
Costa's non-party government in office until regularly sched-
uled elections in 1980. F7 I
ISRAEL: Political Poll Results
25X1 I A recent poZZ indicates that a significant majority
of Israelis are satisfied with the Begin government's efforts
toward peace.
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A poll published Sunday by a major Israeli news-
paper showed that 54 percent of those questioned believe the
government is doing all it can to achieve peace, while another
15 percent feel the government is doing "more or less" every-
thing necessary. The poll also disclosed that 63 percent of
those surveyed believe the chances of peace are better under
Prime Minister Begin's administration than under the previous
Labor government; only 7 percent feel chances for peace are
Although the questions in this poll differ from
those in one taken on 26 July, one week after the talks at
Leeds, England, both indicate solid majorities supporting
Begin's conduct in the negotiations.
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//President Taraki appears to be. dealing ef-
ec-ivey with his opponents, although he still faces threats
from several sources.//
I I There has been no indication of an adverse reaction
within the military to the arrest last week of Defense Minister
Abdul Qader, a major figure in the overthrow of President Daoud
and a potentially strong rival of Taraki. Although Taraki ap-
pears to have control over the armed forces, the removal of
Qader, a strong Afghan nationalist, is likely to add to un-
happiness in the military. The armed forces' continued loyalty
to the new regime is still far from certain.
I IThe Syrians view the vote in the US House of Repre-
sentatives against the proposed $90 million US economic assis-
tance program as an effort to punish President Assad for his
opposition to the Egyptian peace initiative. A termination of
US aid is not likely to affect significantly Assad's policies
toward the peace process and Lebanon. Syria may, however, be
less responsive to US interests on other issues such as human
rights.
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25X1 Conversations between US and Syrian officials in
Damascus indicate that the House vote has already damaged US-
Syrian diplomatic relations, which were restored in 1974. Assad
told a visiting Saudi official last week that he views the vote
as a blatant pressure tactic.
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I The House vote has undermined Assad's policy of
cautiously improving relations with the US and the West. If
the Senate does not restore the aid, this policy would undoubt-
edly be further damaged. In the ruling Baath Party, leftist
critics of Assad's opening to the West feel vindicated by the
vote and will probably counsel Assad to upgrade relations with
the USSR. Nonetheless, Syria's official radio announced yester-
day that Assad is going ahead with a visit to West Germany in
early September.
I ssad is unlikely to alter significantly his policy
toward t e peace talks or Lebanon because of the aid cutoff.
Reports that Assad considered breaking relations with the US
are probably exaggerated. He will probably be more suspicious
of US motives and actions in Lebanon and may be less willing
to compromise on issues such as the status of Syria's small
Jewish community, whose situation has been improving in recent
years. He may now oppose further steps towards freer Jewish
emigration, for example.
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25X1 he wounding of two people in a grenade attack on a
theater in Ndjamena, Chad, this weekend was the first instance
of indiscriminate terrorism by antigovernment rebels. A radi-
cal faction claimed responsibility for the action.
25X1 The rebels, who lost the military initiative after
major oss-es to French-supported government forces earlier this
year, have until now confined their terrorism to government
officials and security personnel. Insurgent leaders have shied
away from indiscriminate attacks to avoid losing the support
of Ndjamena's substantial Arab population. Increasing rebel
frustration with the military situation and friction within
the rebel movement may prompt additional attacks.
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