NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 3, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

FF. AW Air
0
0
0
Tuesday 3 October 1978 CG NIDC 78/2]
0
1
0
1
AL
AW AV AV AV AAIV AAIV AAIV, APP
CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 OS cret' X, 9
pprq W
a ease :
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
.REMARKS:
FROM:
NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
(Security Classification)
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010 -
AW
State Dept. review completed
1
1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010004-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010004-4
 Approved For RO
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 3 October
1
1
e NID Cable is
or the purpose or intorming
senior US officials.
Page 1
EGYPT:
Sadat's New Prime Minister
Page 3
ZAIRE:
Mobutu's Reform Efforts
Page 4
EAST GERMANY: Aid Programs in LDCs Page 5
BRIEFS Page 6
Syria-USSR
Djibouti
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T0097541030900010004-4
 Approved For elease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975 030900010004-4
I /Fatah leader Yasir Arafat apparently is
opposed to an International conference on Lebanon. Palestinian
forces have avoided involvement in the current upsurge of fight-
ing in Lebanon, but significant Christian provocations could
draw them in.//
//Arafat probably fears that the results of a con-
ference wou adversely affect the Palestinian presence in Leb-
anon. He is probably apprehensive that attempts would be made
to restrict further Palestinian military activity in the country
and thus weaken the tactical position of the Palestine Libera-
tion organization and reduce the organization's political lever-
age on the West Bank and Gaza issues.//
//The PLO has not yet reacted to the latest round
o ristian-Syrian fighting in Lebanon but over the past sev-
eral months the Palestinians have avoided involvement in similar
clashes, partly to avoid jeopardizing their overall position in
Lebanon. In the past, the Syrians have counseled the Palestin-
ians to stay out of the fighting.//
//Significant Christian provocations against Pal-
estinian positions or against their leftist Lebanese allies,
however, could draw the Palestinians into the fighting. We
have no indications that the Palestinians deliberately plan to
25X1
25X1
Approved For Pelease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T009715A030900010004-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010004-4
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010004-4
 Approved For Re
I Egyptian President Sadat's detailed public defense
yesterday of the agreements he signed at Camp David is likely
to boost his stock further in Egypt. His naming of Dr. Mustafa
Khalil as Prime Minister should impart a new sense of direction
to a bureaucracy convinced since late July that Prime Minister
Salim was on his way out.
Sadat's speech to the People's Assembly was a hard-
hitting point-by-point counterattack against critics of the
Camp David agreements. Sadat attacked Syria, the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization, and Libyan President Qadhafi most strongly;
he handled Saudi Arabia and Jordan gingerly.
I I Sadat strongly denied abandoning the Arab position
that a been outlined at the Rabat summit, and catalogued the
gains for Palestinians under the agreement. He challenged re-
jectionist Arabs to offer realistic alternatives to what he
has accomplished. Sadat acknowledged that he did not conclude
a comprehensive agreement at Camp David but said the process
to end the Middle East stalemate was begun.
The Egyptian President skillfully played on two senti-
ments now prominent in Egypt--the unassailability of Egypt's
contribution to the Arab cause, and the right of Egypt to con-
trol its own destiny.
The appointment of Khalil to be Prime Minister was
not unexpected. The 58-year-old Khalil is a US-educated, pro-
Western, economist and engineer who has been prominent in
Egyptian political circles for more than 20 years. He has not
been tainted by the charges of corruption and inefficiency that
contributed to Salim's downfall. Khalil's most recent job has
been that of Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Union, the
umbrella organization that supervises the activities of all
Egypt's political parties.
Approved Fort
 Approved For Wlease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T0097fA030900010004-4
Khalil's appointment should reassure Egyptian politi-
cians who are nervous about how radical a change Sadat intends
in his current political restructuring. Egyptian leftists, how-
ever, will conclude that government attacks on them will con-
tinue.
Under Khalil, the government will probably place re-
newed emphasis on determining popular views. The Acting Secre-
tary General of Sadat's new party recently criticized Salim for
relying on "university professors and technocrats" instead of
politicians and thereby creating a political vacuum and isolat-
ing the government from its popular base.
In cautioning Egyptians that peaace would not be
translated into prosperity overnight, Sadat appeared to reflect
concern over unrealistically high expectations among the lower
classes.
ZAIRE: Mobutu's Reform Efforts
Zairian President Mobutu defended the pace of his re-
form efforts and solicited continued backing when he met last
week with diplomatic representatives of Zaire's Western sup-
porters. He attempted to separate the internal reform issue
from the question of Western financial assistance for Zaire and
made it clear that he would not be responsive to continued ex-
ternal pressure for reform.
Mobutu made it plain that Zaire is counting on its
friends to continue their support by participating in the meet-
ing in Brussels next week to discuss rescheduling Zaire's debt
and by pledging additional financial assistance. He defended
his appeal for continued assistance by citing the improvements
made in financial management and in implementation of internal
reforms.
I The Zairian President also made the point--primarily
inten e for the US--that he would not tolerate efforts to press
him on specific issues and that he would interpret such pressure
as an infringement on Zaire's sovereignty. US Ambassador Cutler
has reported that, in continuing to press Mobutu for reform, the
US is becoming isolated from Zaire's other Western donors.
Approved For
 Approved For ReIo
Mobutu referred to the "shocking" demarches made to
him in June when the US had taken the strongest position in in-
sisting on internal reform. He made it clear that he would con-
tinue to make reforms--such as the amnesty for Zairian dissi-
dents--but said that the success of the reforms ultimately would
depend on Western support of his government.
I I In response to the US insistence that the conference
in Brussels should be postponed until Zaire has worked out a
new economic stabilization program with the International Mone-
tary Fund, Mobutu said that Zaire has developed the major por-
tions of a program and that the draft would be ready for con-
sideration at the meeting. He also said that Zaire was making
progress in recruiting foreign experts to oversee government
budgetary and customs operations--part of the reform package
insisted upon by Zaire's supporters--and that he had taken
steps to curb corruption.
I During the meeting Mobutu made frequent references
to numan ights--obviously for US consumption. He told the
diplomats that he would restore civilian rule in Shaba Region
by the end of the year and that the government would this month
release detainees held for security reasons in Kivu..
Mobutu still has a long way to go. The government has
done little, for example, to improve the lot of the disaffected
Shaba residents it has long exploited. Neither has Mobutu done
much to prevent the military from treating the civilian popula-
tion harshly.
EAST GERMANY: Aid Programs in LDCs
//East German economic credits to developing
countries in the first half of 1978 totaled $780 million, more
than three times the recent annual commitment. This vigorous
aid effort reflects an East German campaign.to promote business
and political interests in. the Third World.
Approved For RelIease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AP30900010004-4
 Approved For R4
//As in the past three years, East Germany dis-
tributed its economic offerings fairly evenly geographically.
Some $350 million in new economic aid went to the Middle East,
$210 million to Africa, and $200 million to Latin America.
This brings East German pledges since the beginning of 1975
to $1.4 billion--nearly three-fourths of the total of credits
the East Germans provided in the 20 years of their Third World
program.//
//Most of the credits have supported East Ger-
man commerical activity in the developing world. In the Middle
East, which has received half of all East German commitments
since 1975, the East Germans provide credits to stimulate equip-
ment sales in a fast-expanding market area and to secure stra-
tegic commodities such as oil.//
//In Latin America, East Germany is financing
equipment sales obviously in hopes of correcting trade imbal-
ances incurred by raw materials imports. Brazil, which received
$200 million in credits this year, has run trade surpluses with
East Germany totaling $150 million since 1975.//
//In sub-Saharan Africa, East Germany believes
that it can stabilize leftist regimes through the trade and aid
mechanism and has followed the USSR into African countries
that have opted for a Marxist-type system. Ethiopia accounts
for $200 million of East Germany's $210 million of aid commit-
ments to sub-Saharan Africa this year. East Germany has empha-
sized technical and milit r assistance to the Marxist regimes
in Angola and Mozambique. 25X1
Syria-USSR
I TASS announced on Sunday that Syrian President Assad
will visit Moscow "early in October." Assad is currently in
East Germany, and he may travel directly to the USSR after his
visit in East Berlin ends tomorrow. Assad is seeking support
for the Arab Steadfastness Front that opposes the Camp David
agreements. The Arabs who formed the Front last month appointed
Assad to inform the Soviets of their views. 25X1
Approved For R~Iease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ac 30900010004-4 25X1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975,R030900010004-4
Djibouti
President Gouled of Djibouti, who dissolved his
troubled government two weeks ago, has preserved the delicate
tribal balance between the antagonistic Afar and Issa communi-
ties in a new cabinet announced yesterday. Gouled, however, has
disappointed many of those hoping for new initiatives and lead-
ership for the beleaguered country by appointing an uninspiring
old-line Afar politician as Prime Minister.
Gouled probably believes the new Prime Minister,
Barkat Gourad, poses no political threat because Barkat is not
believed to have serious political ambitions. Barkat has a rep-
utation as a playboy and has strong connections with France
where he still holds an honorary seat in the French Senate won
prior to Djibouti's independence.
There is already some speculation in Djibouti that
the new government will be short-lived.
Approved For
 Air Air Air AV Air AV AV. AV AV
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010004-4
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010004-4
(Security lassification
r dew IAW law Allow
1
1
1
r
J