NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: October 16, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

AV AW Adiv AV AV AV AW AV AV Apr
pprc W-
a ease :
TO:
AME: ND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPAR
E REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM:
NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Monday 16 October 1978 CG NIDC 78/241
'AL
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review
completed
IA-RDP79T00975AO309001 2S cret
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO.
Top Secret
(Security
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO309000100
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010024-2
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010024-2
 Approved For Releao
rational Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, 16 October 1978
The NID Cable is for the purpose of in orming
senior offici
als.
EGYPT: More Personnel Changes
Page
2
AFGHANISTAN:
NORTH YEMEN:
CHILE-CHINA:
Drift to the Left
Coup Attempt
Foreign Minister Visit
P age
Page
Page
3
4
5
Page
Page
8
USSR
Algeria
USSR
Approved For Releasel2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030100010024-2
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010024-2
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010024-2
 Approved For Re
EGYPT: More Personnel Changes
Egyptian President Sadat continues to make high-level
personnel changes in both the civilian and military sectors.
His reasons vary, but seem mostly based on his determination to
dramatize the beginning of a "new era" in Egypt. Attitudes to-
ward the Camp David accords did not appear to be a major factor
in most cases.
Sadat most recently fired two military service command-
ers and Ashraf Marwan, the head of the Arab Organization for In-
dustrialization. This organization, which is to build an Arab
arms industry, is financed by Saudi Arabia and several other
Persian Gulf oil-producing countries.
I Marwan, once a close adviser to Sadat and his chief
liaison to Saudi and Iranian leaders, had a reputation for ef-
ficiency but also corruption. The Saudis were comfortable using
Marwan as their channel to the Egyptian presidency and will add
his dismissal to their list of complaints against Sadat.
//In the space of 10 days Sadat has changed
e entire military high command except for air defense, where
change is likely soon. Sadat reportedly planned to introduce
new faces a year ago but delayed the move, probably because of
the border war with Libya and his trip to Jerusalem. The recent
changes follow an even larger army and division-level command
shift in June. The new commanders are considered strongly pro-
Sadat and back his Israeli policy.//
U1
Egypt for e Camp David accords, despite some scattered opposi-
tion. As far as we can tell, the military appears to support
broad popular support in
Approved For RIIease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03q900010024-2
 Approved For F
Sadat firmly, as do the business community and the urban workers
and rural masses. That support--built on an Egypt-first atti-
tude--appears to have greatly boosted Sadat's confidence and
perhaps his willingness to carry out the wholesale personnel
changes.
Muslim fundamentalists and leftist intellectuals con-
tinue to oppose the agreements. Sadat, however, has denied the
left a public forum, and the religious right has so far reacted
less vigorously than many in the government expected. The govern-
ment has postponed the opening of Cairo University--where the
religious groups are active and well organized--to preclude
demonstrations.
//The Foreign Ministry also appears to con-
tain several critics, though they do not publicly oppose the
accords. Sadat is said to be aware of the private sniping, and
he plans to reorganize the ministry.//
The pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan continues to
drift to the Zeft almost six months after it came to power. So
far, President Taraki appears to have dealt successfully with
his opponents both inside and outside the ruling People's Demo-
cratic Party.
On the domestic front, Taraki has been primarily con-
cerned with consolidating his position. Purges continue within
the government, the party, and the military. Many officials as-
sociated with the former regime--a good portion of the talented
and trained people available--are in jail or unemployed. Poli-
ticians too closely identified with Taraki's main rival for
party leadership, ex-Prime Minister Babrak Karmal, are in exile
or under arrest.
//Former Defense Minister Abdul Qader--a prin-
cipal leader in the coup on 27 April--has or will be tried for
plotting against the regime. Since his arrest in mid-August,
Approved Fo
 Approved For Releo
over 200 military officers and civilian officials may have been
arrested for involvement in his alleged coup attempt. The lack
of reaction within the armed forces to Qader's arrest suggests
that Taraki maintains control of the military.//
I I The regime has similarly moved against potential
rightwing opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood was severely weak-
ened this summer and fall by widespread arrests, and none of the
other reported conservative opposition fronts appear to have the
leadership and support within the military necessary to challenge
the regime.
The elimination of former supporters and skilled
government officials, the conservative Muslim nature of the Af-
ghan population, and the troublesome rebellion in the eastern
tribal provinces have all curtailed the government's implemen-
tation of socialist domestic programs. Foreign policy has not
been constrained, however. The Taraki government has taken po-
sitions identical to the US on many international issues.
17
NORTH YEMEN: Coup Attempt
//The North Yemeni Government put down a coup
attempt by dissident Army and police units yesterday morning
after some fighting around the capital city of Sana. The
motives for the attempted government overthrow are not yet
known. //
//North Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Salih
who
,
was out of the city, appears to be firmly in control thanks to
quick action by loyal military forces. The principal leaders of
the coup attempt reportedly have been captured. They are said
to include a leftist Baath Party sympathizer who apparently
was involved in a similar-effort in 1973, the commander of an
infantry brigade, and the commander of the military police.//
//Many members of North Yemen's substantial left-
ist movement are opposed to Salih's conservative politics, as
well as to his close ties to Saudi Arabia. A general crackdown
Approved For Releose 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0310900010024-2
 Approved For R~Iease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO34900010024-2 25X1
on these leftists could well ensue. We have no evidence of
South Yemeni involvement in the coup attempt, although Aden
does provide support to a variety of North Yemeni dissidents.
CHILE-CHINA: Foreign Minister Visit
Chilean Foreign Minister CubiZZos Leaves today for
China on a two-week official visit intended to foster closer
economic and political ties. He will carry an invitation to
Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to visit Chile and a hope that President
Pinochet will be invited to China; the Chinese will handle these
issues very cautiously.
elations between the two ideologically disparate gov-
ernmen s have been correct and modestly improving for some time.
The Chinese Ambassador in Santiago recently obtained Cubillos'
partial endorsement of his denunciation of Soviet "hegemonic
ambitions."
For Chile, improving ties with a leading Communist
power gives substance to its announced pragmatic, nonideological
foreign policy. The Chileans are also working to improve rela-
tions with other Third World nations to reduce US leverage and
to end Chile's international isolation.
I lAside from the political overtones of Cubillos' trip,
i can o ficials point out that economic and trade issues will
be high on the agenda. They believe that Peking's search for
more copper, iron, steel, and fertilizer will lead to further
Approved For F9elease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AQ30900010024-2
 Approved Fot Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30400010024-2 25X1
trade agreements and improvement of the already favorable
Chilean balance of trade; the Chileans may then buy Chinese
crude oil, an arrangement already under negotiation.
Z~]
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00971AO30900010024-2
 Approved For R
PHILIPPINES: Muslim Problem
//President Marcos is concerned that increased
host2 it2es against Muslim dissidents in the southern PhiZip-
pines, including well-publicized accounts of civilian casualties,
will help critics of his human rights policies and could compli-
cate the current US-Philippine base negotiations. In an effort
to head off this possibZity, Marcos has stated his intention
to hold elections for quasi-autonomous legislative councils in
two regions that include Muslim strongholds. He did not set a
date for the elections.//
//The upsurge in ambushes, firefights, and kidnap-
pings over the past several weeks appears to be caused by inten-
sified Muslim military activity. The Muslim forces are eager to
draw international attention to their plight as a persecuted
minority, while the Philippine armed forces, unable thus far
to suppress the insurgency, continue to wage a war of attri-
tion.//
//In recent conversations with Ambassador Murphy,
Marcos attacked the visit to the US by two old-line Muslim
spokesmen as an attempt to draw in the US as a mediator. He said
they lack any genuine popular support and are little more than
common criminals.//
Approved Fora Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOP0900010024-2
 Approved F
carrot-and-stick policies in the southern Philippines--a tough
military line against the more radical insurgents coupled with
vague promises of economic development programs--to deepen divi-
sions within the Muslim leadership.//
//The Philippine President clearly hopes that
eventually he will be able'to deal with a less militant faction
of the Muslim minority willing to reach an accommodation with
the government.//
//Marcos also told the Ambassador that Libya is
continuing to provide the insurgents with political support
and money for arms. The inflexibility of insurgent demands has
been reinforced by the Libyans, which the more moderate Arab
states such as Saudi Arabia have been unable to temper.//
//As if to underscore the importance Marcos attaches
to the Muslim problem, Defense Secretary Enrile told the Ambas-
sador that he would not attend the UN sessions this year in
order to direct his full attention to the insurgency. 25X1
//Marcos intimated that he will continue his
The Soviets fired an SS-18 Mod 4 ICBM from Tyuratam
some 9,200 kilometers to an impact area in the Pacific Ocean
some 650 kilometers north of Midway Island early yesterday.
They had previously announced plans to flight-test missiles
into the general area between 13 and 31 October but ended
their closure of the impact area after this one launch.
This was the first test into the Pacific for the new,
improved version of the SS-18 and indicates that it is close to
operational status.
Approved Fc
 Approved For
Algeria
Algerian President Boumediene is in Moscow. Official
Algerian sources claim that he will hold high-level talks
with Soviet leaders. Boumediene's absence from public view
for the last three weeks, however, is fueling speculation that
medical treatment is the real reason for the unheralded trip.
The authoritative Egyptian newspaper AZ-Ahram is
linking "events in Algeria" with Iraq's postponement of the Arab
foreign ministers' meeting, which had been scheduled for next
weekend in Baghdad. F -1
//The installation of blast doors at four recently
completed subway stations in Moscow indicates continuing inter-
est by the USSR in using subway facilities for civil defense
purposes. An estimated 3 to 6 percent of Moscow's urban popula-
tion could be sheltered in underground stations throughout the
city's subway system, assuming either 1.0 or .5 square meters
of shelter space per person. An additional 15 to 30 percent of
Moscow's urban population could be accommodated if subway tun-
nels were used as shelters.//
//The new stations are part of an eight-kilometer
subway extension to a northern suburb opened late last month.
The extension is close to the surface throughout its route, and
at places is just beneath the surface of the street; in the
older parts of the system in the center of the city, tunnels
and stations are more than 30 meters below ground.//
//The 178-kilometer Moscow subway system has 101
, 95 underground. By 1990, a total of 170 stations along
a 350-kilometer system are planned.
Approved Fq
25X1
25X1
 ,lAdw Aar /i///
Approved For Release 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010024-2
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
(Security elease 2007/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010024-2
ssi ication
'domw '411111111111111V ~r illy r
1
e
1
0
r
1
J