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Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
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August 12, 2005
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November 9, 1978
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FV AV AdIF AV AV AIV AIV AIV AV AV Apr 0 0 1 TO: NAME AN A DRESS DATE INITIALS AppWdfqMU Release 2005108117, DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION -- - I I i COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE REMARKS: FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO. CIA-RDP79T00975A0309 f 001po 6 6 t 2 19 (Security Classification) Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: Thursday 9 November 1978 CG NIDC 78/262 L 25X1 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions Top Secret 0 0 0 1 (Security Classification Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO3 90001 Ubb-b -1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010066-6 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010066-6 Approved For 25X1 National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 9 November 1978. The NID Cable is or a purpose or i-nzormay senior UT-officials. IRAN: Political Situation Report Page 1 USSR-IRAN: Political Relationship Page 2 ARGENTINA: Government in Disarray Page 3 UGANDA-TANZANIA: Ending the Impasse Page .4 LIBYA: Economic Aid to LDCs Page 5 Approved Fair Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T009754 030900010066-6 Approved For Rel base 2005/08/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A0 IRAN: Political Situation Report //Tehran continues to be calm as troops from ou yznq garrisons in Iran patrol the streets. Iran's military leaders are more confident of the dependabiLtty of the Army rank and file following the adverse reaction by the troops to the widespread destruction caused by the Approved For Rellease 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00971AO30900010066-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For F elease 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975,p030900010066-6 25X1 USSR-IRAN: Political Relationship I I Neither the USSR nor any other foreign power appears to be omentinq or encouraging the current disturbances in Iran. The Soviets, nevertheless, are now acknowledging publicly that the Shah's position has become precarious and are becoming some- what more sympathetic toward the demonstrators. The Soviets probably would not serve their interests by becoming actively involved against the Shah. Antagonizing the Iranian leadership would presumably threaten considerable Soviet economic interests in Iran as well as the serviceable political relationship that exists between Iran and the USSR. Moscow's restraint thus far is particularly evident in the So- viet media's careful treatment of the Shah and his opponents as well as their infrequent replay and neutral handling of statements by Iran's outlawed Communist Party. I I On balance, however, the USSR's public commentary that it has made a reassessment of the Shah's staying power and has downgraded its appraisal of his chances of sur- vival. Soviet media treatment of the disturbances in Iran is not nearly so circumspect as it has been during the past year. The weekly Literary Gazette has raised the prospect of a mili- tary coup, and during the past week Pravda treated Iran's in- fluential leftist National Front more favorably than usual. Previous Soviet commentary has not tried to discriminate among the various groups opposing the Shah. The Soviets perceive that the removal of the Shah would weaken Iran's ability to thwart Soviet objectives in the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean regions. Soviet interests, for example, would be served by Israel's increased political isola- tion in the area as well as a possible weakening of Oman's po- sition in any renewal of hostilities with South Yemen--two de- velopments which could result from the Shah's loss of power. Approved ForiRelease 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0309g0010066-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ab30900010066-6 25X1 For these reasons, the Soviets might eventually be tempted to assist dissidents in Iran if they perceived that the Shah was in real danger of being overthrown. The USSR's primary concern in such an event would be to try to make certain that the Shah was replaced by a more leftist--rather than rightist--regime. ARGENTINA: Government in Disarray //Regardless of how Argentina deals with Chile in its e or s to negotiate a settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute, the issue has focused domestic attention on the in- efficiency of President VideZa's system of consensus government. Conservative military leaders, who have Zong criticized Videla's moderate and conciliatory style, now appear to be gaining ground at the President's expense.// //Official embarrasment over the handling of the Beagle C annel affair has increasingly divided the Argen- tine Government and prevented it from deciding on its next move. Since the bilateral commission reached an impasse on 2 November, both nations have maintained their military forces in a high state of readiness. While no hostile moves have occurred in the past few days, both sides are still seriously concerned over the possibility of an armed confrontation. //Many senior Argentine officers see the present system of government--in which Videla is supposed to share power with the military -junta--as unworkable. //The recent cabinet shuffle--in which Videla failed to make good on his promise to appoint prominent civil- ians to top posts--provides fresh evidence of his inability to assert his authority. Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T0097 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved ForiRelease 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00915A030900010066-6 //At this point, the disarray in Buenos Aires is seriously complicating the development of a politically accept- able compromise to the Beagle Channel dispute. Even if both governments agree to further negotiations, the long-term pects for resolution of the basic differences remain poor. I 25X1 UGANDA-TANZANIA: Ending the Impasse Ugandan President Amin has taken a first step toward ending t e military impasse on the Tanzanian border. He declared to an assembly of foreign diplomats and senior Ugandan officials in Kampala yesterday that he would withdraw his forces to the recognized border if he were guaranteed that Tanzania would never again invade Uganda and would prevent Ugandan exiles in that country from engaging in subversive activities against his regime. I lAmin's initiative apparently was in response to the e or s o the organization of African Unity and several in- dividual African countries to get the contending parties to negotiate. Amin again claimed that Uganda had been forced to seek a secure natural boundary along the Kagera River because Tanzania has encouraged and assisted Ugandan exiles to engage in subversive activities in Uganda. E Tanzanian President Nyerere apparently believes the international community, which in the past has vilified Amin on moral and humane grounds, supports his condemnation of the 25X1 Approved For (Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0P0900010066-6 Approved Fo Ugandan President's actions and will help redress Tanzania's grievances. Amin's conditions for withdrawal are likely to be unacceptable to Dar es Salaam at this time, but his offer may encourage further diplomatic efforts to end the current con- tention. LIBYA: Economic Aid to LDCs //Libya is significantly increasing its economic a2 to e' oping countries both to advance its foreign poZiti- cal aims and to meet domestic economic needs. Libya's disburse- ments to Third World governments and multilateral aid institu- tions will rise to about $300 million this year from about $130 million in 1976 and just under $200 million in 1977. This in- crease in aid will place Libya fourth among aid donors from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.// I //The Libyans continue to give much of their economic assistance to revolutionary and socialist countries with whom Tripoli feels an ideological affinity. Included in this group are Angola, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, South Yemen, and Syria.// Libya also has supplied considerable amounts of aid to a select group of developing countries in order to expand its political influence--sometimes at the expense of Western in- terests--or to facilitate its economic develo ment. //Libya's efforts to buy political influence have requen y peen poorly conceived and therefore unsuccess- ful. Its courtship of the "progressive" government of Ethiopia, for example, earned it the unwanted label of Soviet surrogate 25X1 Approved Fort Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T0097AA030900010066-6 Approved in the Ethiopian-Somalia dispute and put the Libyans in the awkward position of undermining fellow Muslims in Ethiopia's 25X1- 25X1 Approved ForiRelease 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010066-6 I Air Air Air Air Air Air AV AV AV AA- Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010066-6 0 Top Secret (Security Classification) 0 .0 O 0 0 0 Top Secret (Security N oRr Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010066-6 J 0 Iddw 'Aw IAW Iddw IAW IAW IAW Adw 'Awr