NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010080-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 80
• Publication Date: November 18, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Saturday 18 November 1978 CG NIDC 78/269
A
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 18 No-
vember 1978.
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The Nil) a e is
or the purpose o informing senior officials.
IRAN: Situation Report
VIETNAM-USSR: Economic Ties
RHODESIA: South African Views
SPAIN: Rightist Activities
ARGENTINA-CHILE: Stalemate
ISRAEL: Likud Faction Splits
YUGOSLAVIA: Terrorists
SUDAN: Numayri's Problems
BRIEFS
Rhodesia
USSR-CEMA
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IRAN: Situation Report
//Former Iranian Prime Minister Ali Amini
is attempting to arrange political discussions between
the Shah and the moderate opposition in the hope of be-
ginning the process of political reconciliation before
the potentially dangerous Moharram--the Muslim month of
mourning--starts on 2 December. The current polarization
of Iranian politics and Amini's reputation as a tool of
the US will be grave impediments, however, to any effort
to launch serious negotiations.//
//Amini, himself a prominent moderate
opponent of the Shah, said on Thursday that he has been
meeting separately with the Shah and opposition groups.
He hopes to bring the Shah into contact with influential
dissidents, especially students and leading bazaar mer-
chants, to provide the impression that the Shah still
wants to continue political liberalization. National
Front politicians, according to Amini, would eventually
be brought into the process, presumably to discuss the
formation of a coalition government that would make prep-
arations for elections in June.//
//Amini recognizes the urgency of his
task. He believes moderate religious leaders can maintain
relative calm until Moharram, but he is worried that ex-
tremist religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini may produce
chaos then if efforts toward a political settlement
fail.//
//Dissidents sparked minor incidents in
e ran an a ew other cities yesterday, but the secu-
rity situation remained generally quiet. The government
yesterday held a military parade marking armed forces
day, reversing an earlier decision to cancel the event.
The Shah apparently wanted both a show of force and a
martial display that might inspire support.//
//There was an anti-US incident on Tuesday
in emman, ilometers east of Tehran, where an empty
bus of a US contractor was blown up near the residences
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of US employees. There were no injuries. According to un-
confirmed press reports, hundreds of Soviet technicians
and dependents are leaving Iran, apparently out of con-
cern for their safety.//
pointed eight civilians to his cabinet, making it now a
predominantly civilian group. Azhari has had difficulty
in recruiting prominent civilians, and in many cases has
elevated undersecretaries. Military men continue to hold
key posts--defense, interior, energy, labor, and informa-
tion.
//Prime Minister Azhari yesterday ap-
VIETNAM-USSR: Economic Ties
Vietnam's conclusion early this month of a
friendship treaty with the USSR, along with several new
economic agreements, was but its Latest step toward
cZoser ties with the USSR. In June, Vietnam joined the
soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
after fending off Soviet pressure to do so for several
years. Vietnam's leaders have evidently concluded that
their problems with China and Kampuchea and their weak
economy require them to compromise the independent, non-
aligned image they had been cultivating in favor of the
greater economic security offered by closer ties with
the USSR.
Benefits to Vietnam from CEMA membership, at
least initially, are not likely to go much beyond the
bilateral aid and trade programs Hanoi had already de-
veloped with most major CEMA members. These bilateral ac-
cords are reported to commit CEMA members to support
Vietnam with some $640 million annually through 1980--
almost three-fifths of all aid and credits promised to
Vietnam during the period. Most of the economic aid is
in the form of bilateral credits, which Hanoi presumably
hopes will ultimately be written off.
Vietnam no doubt wants CEMA members to take
over the aid projects abandoned by China earlier this
year and offset China's withdrawal of $300 million in
annual aid. CEMA members will probably be very selective
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in providing aid, however, to avoid straining their own
resources. So far, the USSR has agreed to help complete
a major Chinese bridge project near Hanoi, and Poland
has bowed to a Soviet request to take over two small in-
dustrial projects.
Vietnam may gain in other ways from CEMA mem-
bership. it may receive food aid on more favorable terms
and possibly in greater amounts. Bilateral programs may
be better coordinated. Vietnam will receive guidance
from CEMA in formulating economic plans. Vietnamese
leaders also probably hope that trade with CEMA members
may be enhanced by improved shipping and clearing arrange-
ments on a multilateral basis. The implied institutional
backing of CEMA may improve Vietnam's creditworthiness
in the eyes of Western bankers.
Vietnam has not been received enthusiastically.
by all CEMA members, many of which believe Vi,etnam's,mem-
bership was rammed through by the USSR and believe Viet-
nam has little to offer Eastern Europe..
We believe Vietnam's leaders have moved closer
to the USSR with reluctance and are concerned about the
growth of Soviet influence over them.
RHODESIA: South African Views
South African Prime Minister Botha, at a meet-
ing this week with Leaders of Rhodesia's transitional
government, apparently expressed South Africa's concern
over the Zack of progress toward a settlement in Rhodesia.
The South Africans are frustrated over delays in the in-
ternal settlement and the poor prospects for progress
under the UK-US plan, and they are worried that their
interests in the region could be adversely affected if
the Rhodesian conflict drags on indefinitely.
//Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and
his three black partners in the transitional government
were invited to South Africa by Botha for the meeting on
Wednesday. Although we know little about the substance
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of the discussions, a South African Foreign Ministry of-
aicial told the US Embassy that Botha had "laid it on
the line" to the Rhodesians.//
//The official said the Rhodesian
situation is getting worse and is affecting South Afri-
ca's interests. He asserted that Smith's repeated delay-
ing tactics are trying South Africa's patience and that
Rhodesia should make up its mind between the internal
settlement and the UK-US plan and move ahead toward a
settlement.//
At the meeting, the Rhodesians probably tried
to get South African support for their decision--announced
the following day--to postpone elections under the inter-
nal settlement. Although the South Africans probably were
not happy, Smith and his colleagues may have persuaded
them that the postponement could not be avoided and that
Rhodesia would make every effort to meet a new timetable.
In any case, South Africa is unlikely to make an early
cutback in its current military and economic aid to Rho-
desia.
SPAIN: Rightist Activities
Spanish ultrarightists will gather in Madrid
e,his weekend to mark the third anniversary of Franco's
death on Monday amid growing tension as Spain prepares
Lo ratify the new constitution on 6 December. More mod-
rate rightists, meanwhile, have split over the constitu-
!ion--possibly presaging a realignment of forces on the
eight half of the political spectrum.
Franco has been rapidly transformed into a dis-
tant historical figure rarely mentioned by name. Two
years ago, on the first anniversary of his death, the
King and the entire cabinet attended a memorial mass at
his tomb. Last year, however, the King attended a private
mass, and most government members were conspicuously ab-
sent. Francoist extremists won less than one percent of
the vote in last year's parliamentary election, and the
so-called "civilized right," represented by Manuel Fraga's
Popular Alliance, also apparently suffered at the polls.
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I Nevertheless, by trading on common fears that
democratization is somehow responsible for the terrorism,
economic problems, and high unemployment that have plagued
Spain in recent years, the extremists have consistently
turned out large crowds including many young people--
for their rallies. Escalating terrorist attacks this
month and parliamentary passage of the draft constitution
gave them new focus for their diatribes.
As the ultraright steps up its campaign, the
"civilized right" appears to have splintered. In late
October, the main body of Fraga's Popular Alliance. en-
dorsed the new constitution, albeit unenthusiastically.
Its action provoked two small groups that oppose the
charter to "suspend" their membership.
Thus divested of some of the most embarrassingly
Francoist members of his party, Fraga has apparently agreed
to form an alliance with the "New Majority"--a nondescript
electoral coalition of center-right politicians led by
former ministers Areilza and Osorio--in the hope of carry-
ing more political weight.
If the "New Majority" is to develop into a real
political force, however, its leaders must first settle
their personal rivalries--all three have prime ministerial
ambitions--and then develop the image of a modern con-
servative party. They presumably hope that the right wing
of Prime Minister Suarez' party would then press him to
turn to them as a logical ally for his minority govern-
ment. Suarez, however, has strong reasons for wanting to
keep Fraga and his colleagues at arm's length--not least
in order to preserve his own hard-won centrist creden-
tials.
//Argentina and Chile have made no progress
toward resolving their differences over the Beagle Chan-
nel, despite their contention earlier this month that
they were willing in principle to accept outside media-
tion. Neither country wants to give the impression that
it is caving in to pressure, and each is now accusing
the other of acting in bad faith.//
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third-party mediation formula proposed by Chile in order
to allay international fears that it was preparing to
attack. Last week, however, it publicly conditioned its
acceptance on a preliminary round of strictly bilateral
talks--a condition Chile is unwilling to accept.//
//Although the Argentine Ambassador to
Chile has been recalled twice for high-level consulta-
tions, there is no evidence that serious efforts are
under way to select a mediator. Argentina has hinted
that it is willing to approach Spanish King Juan Carlos
during his state visit later this month, but Chile re-
portedly views the King as biased in Argentina's favor
and, therefore, as unacceptable.//
tina's conditional acceptance of mediation indicates
that President Videla is making every effort to defuse
the issue. He is still under strong pressure, however,
from conservative generals and younger officers to resort
to arms if the impasse is not broken. Tensions are re-
ported to have subsided somewhat, but both nations are
maintaining their military forces in a high state of
readiness.
//Argentina apparently seized upon the
//Despite the apparent stalemate, Argen-
o , nowever, rea ize a the nation
cannot continue indefinitely on a war footing because of
the high costs involved.//
//In spite of Argentina's obvious mili-
tary superiority, the Chileans are apparently willing to
risk a brief clash rather than concede their territorial
claims. Indeed, Chile has become increasingly adamant in
its refusal to compromise, and its diplomats are pressing
to take the issue back to The Hague for a new arbitration
ruling. President Pinochet and his advisers know that
they have strong international support and believe the
Argentine Government is becoming increasingly isolated
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ISRAEL: Likud Faction Splits
The small rightwing Laam faction of Prime Min-
ister Begin's dominant Likud bloc reportedly split yes-
terday into two groups, each holding four seats in par-
liament. Members of the dissident group that apparently
precipitated the split, Zed by former Commerce Minister
Yigal Hurvitz, and the Laam rump, headed by Health Min-
ister EZiezer Shostak, have indicated their desire to re-
main within Likud and the Begin coalition.
Laam was organized only a couple of years ago
by a disparate group of secessionists from other parties.
The faction shared little more than a fairly hard line
on peace negotiations, and its leading figures had become
repeatedly embroiled in recent months in bitter personal
rivalries and ideological disputes.
Laam's split has been expected since Shostak
voted in favor of the Camp David accords during the
Knesset debate in September, in violation of his faction's
decision not to support them. Hurvitz resigned his port-
folio in protest against the accords and thereafter
launched into angry attacks on Shostak for failing to do
the same.
I Hurvitz and the others in his new party are
strong supporters of Israeli settlement activity in the
occupied territories. They adamantly opposed Begin's
agreement to abandon the Sinai settlements, an action
they regard as setting a dangerous precedent for future
West Bank and Gaza Strip negotiations.
YUGOSLAVIA: Terrorists
Yugoslavia's announcement yesterday that it
has dented West German extradition requests for four
Baader-Meinhof terrorists arrested in May and has released
the terrorists will probably usher in a period of uneasy
bilateral relations.
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Although the Tito regime maintains that the
case was decided solely on its legal merits, the outcome
was clearly in retaliation for an earlier West German re-
fusal of a Yugoslav extradition request for eight Croat
emigres.
According to the West German Embassy in Bel-
grade, the decision to release the German terrorists was
fought by the Yugoslav Foreign ministry, which is prob-
ably concerned about refurbishing the country's poor rec-
ord in such matters. Two years ago, the international
terrorist "Carlos" passed safely through Belgrade while
the government ignored West German extradition requests.
Yugoslavia is braced for a storm of press crit-
icism from West Germany, although German officials are
likely to play down the incident in their private dealings
with Belgrade in order to limit damage to bilateral re-
lations. Yugoslavia's reaction is likely to be self-right-
eous, and it will be indiscriminate in its insinuations
of Western backing for anti-Titoist terrorism. Belgrade
radio, in announcing the extradition refusal, has already
reported that a Yugoslav citizen was killed recently by
unidentified terrorists in West Germany.
The whereabouts of the Baader-Meinhof four is
unknown, but they may already have left the country. The
official announcement said onl that they had en de-
clared personae non gratae.
SUDAN: Numayri's Problems
//Sudanese President Numayri's prob-
lems, both at home and abroad, are increasing. He has
been unable to achieve a reconciliation with his con-
servative opponents, and his attempts to improve relations
with Libya and Ethiopia have hit snags.
Continued Army sup
i.. none e ess probably enable Numayri to deal
with any threats over the short term.//
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//Numayri's endorsement of the Camp
David accords and the likelihood that he will renege on a
promise to hold "open and early" elections for the Sudan
Socialist Union, the country's only legal political or-
ganization, have caused a serious rift between him and
Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar Muslim sect who
returned from exile last year. Although Sadiq appears to
have backed off from a threat to resign from the central
committee and politburo of the Socialist Union, he remains
unhappy with Numayri's failure.to allow him to play a
meaningful role in the government and may again go into
exile.//
//The President's stand on the accords has
also offended Libyan leader Qadhafi and ended, at least,
for the time being, progress toward a rapprochement.
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(Relations with Ethiopia have also worsened.
Numayri has complained to US officials of cross-border
raids from Ethiopia, has charged that the Ethiopians were
behind the distribution of anti-Sudanese leaflets in Eri-
trean refugee camps in Sudan, and has said there is evi-
dence of Ethiopian support for dissidents in southern
Sudan.
//The key to Numayri's survival remains the
loyalty of the Army. Although there have been several re-
ports indicating that morale among senior officers is low,
there is no evidence that discontent is widespread, and
most sources agree that the Army is basically loyal to
the President.// 25X1
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Co-Minister of Defense Roger Hawkins resigned
yesterday, reportedly for reasons of ill health, and was
replaced by Hilary Squires, who had been serving as Jus-
tice Minister. As Justice Minister, Squires took. a no-
compromise position regarding the guerrillas, and he can
be expected to advocate an aggressive military policy,
including stronger retaliation against Zambia and Mozam-
bique.
Squires' appointment comes at a time when Prime
Minister Smith's security advisers have concluded that
they can strike at guerrilla bases in neighboring coun-
tries without incurring strong military or political op-
position. Squires' stand against compromising with the
guerrillas is well-known to Patriotic Front leaders Joshua
Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, and his appointment will make
them even more wary of a political settlement
Salisbury regime.
A French aerospace magazine, Air and Cosmos,
has published a tentative schedule for visits to the
USSR's Intercosmos Council, as saying that cosmonauts
from five of the remaining Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance countries that have yet to participate in
the space venture. The magazine quotes Boris Petrov,
chairman of the USSR's Intercosmos Council, as saying
that cosmonauts from Bulgaria, Hungary, Cuba, Mongolia,
and Romania will be ferried to the orbiting station in
that order.
Radio Havana has announced that the Cuban cos-
monaut is scheduled for 1979, which suggests that the
Bulgarian and Hungarian cosmonauts will also be sent to
the space station next year. We expect that Salyut-6 will
be remanned by a Soviet crew early in the year and that
the other cosmonaut visits will begin next summer.
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