CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010086-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: November 22, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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,~E~F~, Director of ~l~Op ~eCret
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review
completed
NGA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
CC NLDC 78-0272C
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ovem er
COPY ~`
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CUBA-US: Reaction to SR-71 Flight . 1
IRAN: No Political Progress . 2
PORTUGAL: Returns Spell Trouble . 9
BRIEFS . 11
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CUBA-US: Reaction to SR-71 Flight
Havana has reacted in a relatively restrained
way to the special US SR-71 reeonna2ssanee mission that
recently overflew the island and to US press coverage of25X1
MIG-23 aircraft in Cuba.
o confirmatio
of press reports -EFi~ ie en irk
ban military was put on alert in reaction to the SR-71
mission.
In any case, no regime spokesman teas
pu icly commente on the overflight or on the presence
of the MTG-23 aircraft.
Mid-level Cuban representatives, in conversa-
tions with US officials in Washington, have expressed
amazement that the US was making an issue,of,the MIG-23s,
which the Cubans stress are only for defensive ,purposes.
They also say the MIG-23s are the standard follow-on to
MIG-21s such as those now in tree Cuban inventory.
The Cuban officials implied that the US was
making an issue of the MIG-23 presence for domestic po-
litical reasons. Havana press assertions that Cuban Presi-
dent Castro may soon announce the release of _a large num-
ber of political prisoners--a move the Cubans expect to
be well received by the US--suggest that Havana does not
want to adopt a provocative stance toward Washington at
this time and thus endanger prospects for improved rela-
tions over the longer term.
1 Top Secret
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i op secret
support to take over as long as opposition leader
Khomeini retained his strength.//
//Moharram will be the critical time. Ser-
ious bloodshed during the month could severely test the
military's loyalty to the Shah. If the military is able
to control the situation, however, the current belief in
the inevitability of a Khomeini victory might be reversed
and a new government successfully formed.//
At a news conference yesterday, President
Giscard referred to Khomeini's presence and stated that
calls to violence cannot be launched from France. He
added that Khomeini, whose visa expires in early January,
is not in France as a political refugee.
//Despite these remarks, the French
probably continue to see more advantages than disadvan-
tages in having Khomeini on hand
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IRAN: No Political Progress
Iran has been relatively successful in reestablishing law
and order during the past ttva weeks, there has been no
progress toward a political solution. The Shah still
hopes to ,form a civilian coalition government sometime
after Moharram, the Muslim month of mourning that begins
on 2 December. It is unlikely that any civilian ,govern-
ment could function effectively, however, unless opposi-
tion leader Khomeini here neutralized. Observers generally
agree that Moharram will be a severe test for the govern-
ment and for the military's ZoyaZty to the Shah.//
//Although the military government in
cities has been greatly reduced, and most strikers in
the key petroleum industry have returned to work. There
are reports, however, that some of the returnees are not
25X1 working productively and that hard-core strikers are
still trying to intimidate their colleagues.//
Prime Minister Azhari, in a newspaper interview
yester ay, outlined three phases of his governmental pro-
gram--end street violence, return strikers to work, and
end government corruption. Azhari said he hopes to hand
over his office to a successor once these are accomplished.
this time as the only alternative to chaos, suspicion is
widespread that the military's failure to prevent the
rioting on 5 November was deliberate in order to give the
Shah the rationale for installing a military government.//
an is not seen as a long-term remedy for the country's
ills. Although many welcomed the military's new role at
//Military control is not popular in Iran
search for a coalition government that would allow
eventual progress toward elections. Like Azhari, he sees
military government as only a temporary expedient. The
Shah has indicated that the Azhari government refers all
issues to him for decision and that the military will not
stand in the way of an eventual political solution.//
//The Shah, meanwhile, is continuing to
evisage circumstances any time soon in which the military
would be able to turn over control to a civilian govern-
ment without a renewal of violence. It is also unlikely
that any civilian government would have the necessary
//Nonetheless, it is difficult to
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PORTUGAL: Returns Spell Trouble
Results of a municipal election on Sunday in
southern Portugal will fuel speculation that the country
is becoming increasingly polarized. The Communists won
handily in Evora, a leftist stronghold, but the rightist
SoeiaZ Democrats--campaigning for a nationwide center-
right alliance to curb leftist influence--finished a
surprisingly strong second. The vote for Socialists and
Center Democrats was dramatically reduced compared with
the 1976 election. The agricultural policies of Prime
Minister Nobre da Costars caretaker regime were the ma-
~or issue, and the election outcome could mean trouble
for Prime Minister - designate Mota Pinto who has pledged
to continue these policies.
The caretaker government has been returning
agricultural lands, seized by the Communists in 1975, to
the legal owners. To both Nobre da Costa and Mota Pinto,
this effort is a step toward the basic agricultural re-
forms Portugal needs to increase productivity in the
south and reduce dependence on food imports.
A leading Socialist spokesman stated, however,
that in their vote Sunday the people had rejected this
approach and that their will should now be taken into
account. If the Socialists should lend their weight in
the National Assembly to Communist efforts to stop the
devolutions, the reforms could be postponed indefinitely.
The election results provide one more indica-
tion that the Socialists are in trouble. Their ineffec-
tiveness in government, their compromises with both the
right and left, and their more recent run-ins with Presi-
dent Eanes have cut significantly into their popular sup-
port and added to public disillusionment with politics
in general.
The results from Evora virtually mirror those
of a northern provincial election two months ago. While
these samples may not be representative of the country,
they do strengthen the possibility that Socialist losses
in the next legislative election--to be held perhaps as
early as mid-1979--could be much heavier than previously
expected.
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Such a decline in the strength of the single
3?ortuguese party capable of bridging the gap between left
and right would be particularly worrisome as the Portu-
guese address the political and institutional reforms
that many observers consider necessary over the next sev-
eral years. Unless the decline can be checked, or unless
some other moderate force emerges, polarization--which
could bring with it political confrontation, continued
government instability, and economic difficulties--would
he likely.
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.,Y ...,.,. et
Chal3ian President r2alloum, who visited France
last week, has decided to replace a 29-man Soviet medi-
cal assistance program--part of a relatively modest So-
viet aid effort in Chad--with French personnel. Moscow
has reacted by canceling plans for the return of some 60
vacationing Soviet teachers, doctors, and other techni-
cians; another 30 are in Chad pending further develop-
ments. Thus far there is no indication P~Zalloum is con-
sidering canceling Moscow's military program, which in-
cludes planned deliveries next year of ammunition and
some outdated combat equipment.
Malloum's decision emanates from a longstand-
ing dispute with Moscow over how much the financially
strapped Chadian Government should pay for Soviet help.
The issue has held up negotiations on a new aid package
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>;ince January. The minimal Soviet demands are consider-
ably more expensive than the aid provided by France,
Chad's principal overseas donor and major military bene-
factor. Malloum has shown increasing interest in recent
months in lining up development assistance to revive
Chad's war- and drought-ravaged economy.
25X1 Q Besides Paris, Malloum recently visited Peking,
where he negotiated both. economic and military agreements.
He also plans to visit Bonn, Brussels, and several Arab
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Top Secret
-Top Secret
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