NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010094-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2006
• Sequence Number: 94
• Publication Date: November 28, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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m'H Central
?,~ Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
28 November 1978
Top Secret
DIA review(s) completed. cc Nm ~ ~ 25X1
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Copy
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USSR: Harassment of Americans 1
JAPAN: LDP Primary Election 3
CHINA: Peking Party Meetings. 5
TURKEY: Wave of Domestic Violence . 9
ARGENTINA-CHILE: Weapons Suppliers. 10
BRIEFS . 12
Syria-USSR
EC
Egypt
USSR
Ecuador
Czechoslovakia
FEATURE ARTICLE. 15
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USSR:- Politburo Shifts and Changes
Soviet President Brezhnev 's political strength
has increased as the result of the significant shifts in
the leadership the Central Committee plenum made yester-
day, The pZenum's action tipped the balance zoithin the
poZicymalcing Politburo toward the Secretariat and away
from Premier Kosygin's government apparatus. Brezhnev 's
interests were also served as the plenum named a junior
provincial leader to the Secretariat to replace deceased
agricultural overseer Fedor KuZakov--a move that finesses
the issue of identifying a Zong-term successor to Brezhnev.
In the most important change, Brezhnev's close
associa e, party secretary Konstantin Chernenko, takes a
seat on the Politburo in place of First Deputy Premier
Mazurov, a long-time Breznhev critic who was relieved re-
portedly at his own request "for reasons of health."
Mazurov's departure means that Kosygin alone represents
the Council of Ministers in Politburo deliberations.
Kosygin's other first deputy, Nikolay Tikhonov, became
a candidate member of the Politburo. Tikhonov is a sup-
porter of Brezhnev, and his appointment strengthens our
view that Mazurov was a victim of a power play by Brezh-
nev.
Chernenko's promotion means that he joins Brezh-
nev, i ail Suslov, and Andrey Kirilenko as the only
party secretaries who are also Politburo members. The
youngest of this quartet at 67; Chernenko has risen
rapidly in the party hierarchy in the past two years
with Brezhnev's obvious backing.
Because Chernenko lacks an independent power
,
base, he seems an unlikely successor to Brezhnev. He is,
however, now in a position to be a key arbiter in any
future deliberations on the succession and a strong voice
representing Brezhnev's interests as the Soviet leader's
vigor declines.
Chernenko became a member of the Secretariat
in April 1976 and a candidate member of the Politburo in
October 1977. die previously worked as a party adminis-
trator--a kind of executive officer for Brezhnev and the
Politburo--but he has become increasingly involved in
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foreign affairs in recent years. Brezhnev appears to have
tried to give him broader exposure to foreign policy is-
sues in an effort to improve his credentials in the party
leadership.
In another significant personnel appointment,
the plenum appointed Stavropol premier party leader
Mikhail Gorbachev to the Secretariat to replace deceased
senior secretary Kulakov as the party's overseer of agri-
culture. By opting not to attach Politburo status to
this position, Brezhnev and his colleagues have indicated
that they will continue to temporize on the succession
issue.
The plenum also promoted Georgian party leader
Eduard Shevardnadze to Politburo candidate membership.
Shevardnadze's allegiances are not clear--in past years
he reportedly was allied with Brezhnev's rival Shelepin
and may in fact be as beholden to Suslov as to Brezhnev
for his promotion. The promotion may be a reward for
having dealt forcefully with corruption in his republic,
and for his sensitivity in handling the recent flare-ups
of Georgian nationalism.
The Supreme Soviet (the Soviet legislature) is
scheduled to convene tomorrow and may make some changes
in the government hierarchy--Mazurov is likely to be
dropped, for example, as First Deputy Premier. The Su-
preme Soviet's main business, however, is to discuss and
approve next year's economic plan and budget.
In his speech to the Central Committee plenum,
Brez nev ocused on some of the major shortcomings of
the economy--highlighting the poor performance in capital
formation over the past three years and noting that the
distribution of next year's investment would emphasize
energy, metallurgy, and transportation. Throughout his
speech, Brezhnev put the blame for most of the economy's
problems squarely on the shoulders of planning and man-
agement, althou h he roffered no new methods for dealin
with them.
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JAPAN: LDP Primary Election
Masayoshi Ohira's victory in the Liberal Demo-
cratic Party primary on Sunday makes his selection as
Japan's next prime minister virtually automatic but is
not ZikeZy to Zead to any major shifts in government
policy or to any abrupt realignments in the ruling party,
Ohira has Zong been considered Prime Minister Fukuda 's
heir, and his victory does not convey any popular repud-
iation. of Fukuda 's policies.
Ohira's primary victory--42 percent of the
vote to 36 percent for Fukuda--hinged largely on the
vigorous support he received from the faction of his
primary political ally, former Prime Minister Tanaka.
Fukuda withdrew his candidacy yesterday after the pri-
mary results became clear and thus set the stage for
Ohira's election by acclamation on Friday and his selec-
tion as prime minister within the following week or so.
Fukuda's decision to step aside will help
underwrite both party unity and a smooth transition of
power, It also insures that Fukuda's faction will be
well represented in Ohira's cabinet. Indeed, the Ohira,
Tanaka, and Fukuda factions are likely to dominate the
new government, much as they have during Fukuda's two-
year tenure,
Ohira's political record and the .likely fac-
tional balance of his cabinet suggests he will not under-
take any major departures in foreign policy. The politi-
cal, economic, and security relationships with the US
will certainly remain the cornerstone of Japanese policy.
Ohira has strongly boosted the US-Japanese Mutual Secur-
ity treaty as a vital element of Japan's defense policy,
but he has been more reluctant than other Liberal Demo-
cratic Party leaders to advocate a larger role for Ja-
pan's own Self Defense Forces.
Ohira was instrumental in normalizing Sino-
Japanese relations in 1972, is well regarded in Peking,
and will undoubtedly maintain the current momentum in
relations with China. As for the USSR, Ohira recently re-
marked that he has no major initiatives in mind. Depend-
ing on Soviet behavior, however, some expansion of Soviet-
Japanese economic relations may occur.
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//Like Fukuda, Ohira is a former bureaucrat
from the Ministry of Finance, but he has been more lib-
eral than Fukuda in his economic views. Ohira reportedly
puts a high priority on solving Japan's trade problems
with the US, although he has not mentioned any specific
plans on dealing with this issue. Japan`s bilateral
trade surplus soared to a record $10.4 billion in the
first 10 months of this year.//
//Should upward pressure on the yen resume,
Ohira is more likely than Fukuda to make an all-out ef-
fort to prevent further appreciation in order to preserve
.7apan's share in foreign markets. Ohira will certainly
honor all agreements made by the Fukuda government on
the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Ohira will probably
try to honor Fukuda's commitment to spur domestic growth.
I3e may formulate another supplemental budget for the re-
mainder of the fiscal year that ends in March.//
//While Ohira may want to do more for do-
mestic growth, he will find it difficult to push much
beyond Fukuda's efforts. Fukuda reportedly planned new
reflationary measures for the remainder of this fiscal
year and another large boost in government spending next
year. He hinted the new measures could push deficit fi-
nancing to 40 percent of next year's budget--a level
that Ohira will probably not be able to exceed.//
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CHINA: Peking Party Meetings
Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping yesterday
denied rumors that he wiZZ soon repZaee Hua Kuo-feng as
Chinas Premier. He also confirmed reports that a high-
ZeveZ party meeting is under may in Peking but d2d not
specify what kind of meeting it is.
In an interview
Teng sai he had turned down an o er o ecome remier
last year and had no intention of undertaking that post's
heavy responsibilities now. He also tried to quell spec-
ulation that he and Hua were at odds by saying "Chairman
Hua and I have always been in complete agreement on
everything."
Yesterday, in a domestic radio account of
Teng s meeting with a Japanese delegation on Sunday,
Teng appeared to modify his support for the wall poster
activity. While noting the constitutional guarantees for
poster writers, Teng said he found some of the comments
and opinions contained in them to be incorrect and "not
conducive to stability and unity."
Peking has made no announcement as yet on the
nature of the party meeting, and it is probably still in
session. Hua will reportedly deliver an "important po-
litical report" to the meeting. Party leaders may have
extended the meeting because of disagreements within the
Politburo over matters such as those raised in the recent
wall posters.
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//The Turkish Government has reportedly
decided to ban the principal rightist group involved in
the current wave of domestic violence--the Nationalist
Action Party's youth wing knoz~n as the "IdeaZ2;st Hearths. "
This action, if upheld by the courts, will trigger a
vehement--and possibly violent--reaction from the politi-
cal right.//
Under Turkish law, the courts must approve the
outlawing of any organization, and the judiciary has over-
turned several past attempts by Prime Minister Ecevit to
proscribe political groups. Rightists are known to be
responsible for a significant proportion of the 600 po-
litical killings in Turkey this year. Ecevit may there-
fore believe the courts will have no alternative but to
go along this time, particularly if he submits evidence
linking the "Idealists" to specific incidents. Leftist
groups have also been involved in some of the violence,
and the Prime Minister may find it difficult not to ban
one or more of those as well. According to a member of
his party, however, Ecevit has no plans to do so.
//Ecevit recently accused Nationalist Ac-
tion Party lea er Turkes of condoning and supporting
rightist violence. Turkes responded heatedly by accusing
Ecevit of having belonged to a Communist organization.
A ban on the "Idealists," following closely on this ex-
change, would evoke an immediate response from Turkes and
would further exacerbate the volatile Turkish political
scene.//
//Rightist extremists might also increase
their activities and could shift their attacks from left-
ist groups to government officials. If violence does in-
crease, businessmen and members of the political elite
would further press the government to impose martial law,
a move that Ecevit and the military have long sought to
avoid . //
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ARGENTINA-CHILE: Weapons Suppliers
//Argentine military leaders purchased a
large amount of arms and ammunition several weeks ago
as part of their strategy to press Chile into making
t;erritoriaZ concessions in the Beagle Channel dispute.
The Chileans have also been buying weapons, but on a
much smaller scale.//
//Argentina will obtain jet engines from
the Frenc to upgrade its training and counterinsurgency
aircraft. It has also purchased two French-built light
frigates, armed with Exocet antiship missiles, which ar-
rived in Argentina on 3 November. Nine Puma helicopters
are already being delivered, and efforts are under way
to acquire 60 Panhard armored cars, which are particu-
larly mobile in mountainous terrain.//
//Israel has sold at least 24 Mirage air-
craft to Argentina and intends to provide artillery
rockets. The Argentines are also reportedly trying to
buy large numbers of tanks in Spain and possibly other
West European countries. The Austrian Defense A'linistry
has confirmed the transfer of 17 Panzerjager-K self-
propelled antitank guns, which are basically a recon-
figuration of the French AMX-13 tank that Argentina has
had since 1968. Delivery is expected in early December.//
//Argentina has bought from Italy at least
nine light attack helicopters, which are expected to be
delivered before the end of the year. It also recently
purchased 10,000 rounds of 105-mm artillery ammunition
from Italy and is negotiating for more.//
//South Korea sent three air shipments of
arms to Argentina early this month. Over 4,000 tons of
guns, explosives, and other military hardware left Spain
for Buenos Aires in October, and the Argentine Air Force
reportedly has been negotiating in Madrid for conven-
tional bombs. //
//Chile received 10 air shipments of arma-
ments from Western Europe in early November. South Africa
has provided additional munitions, and France has agreed
to deliver two Crotale surface-to-air missile systems.
Chile recently purchased four Aviocar light transport
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aircraft from Spain, which was also the embarkation point
last month for 2,600 crates of armaments and 230 tons of
artillery ammunition.//
//There is no clear indication of how much
more either nation intends to buy, but both Chile and
Argentina appear financiall able to continue urchases
for some time..
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Syria-USSR
//President Assad's visit to Moscow--
scheduled to begin this Friday--has been postponed until
mid-December The post-
ponement, apparent y at Moscow s initiative, follows the
abrupt return to Damascus of Syrian Chief of Staff
Shihabi after only two days of a planned week's visit.//
Shihabi's talks with the Soviets
e apart ecause o yrian demands for advanced weapons
the Soviets believed Syria could not absorb. Press re-
ports from Beirut, however, indicate that Shihabi's trip
was cut short because the Syrians thought that Moscow
was reneging on pledges of military aid made to Assad
Burin his visit to Moscow in October.
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//The European Community plans to inau-
gurate its proposed European Monetary System immediately
following the meeting of EC heads of state in Brussels
on 4 and 5 December
we wou no e sur-
prise i e ma e i s move on December. EC leaders
almost certainly will compromise their remaining dif-
ferences on how the new exchange rate stabilization ar-
rangment should operate.//
//The EC target date for implementation
was l January, but putting the system into operation im-
mediately after the EC agrees on the mechanics would
avoid interim speculation against the currencies of the
participating member. All nine members of the EC except
the UK are likely to join at the outset. Britain prob-
ably will endorse the European Monetary S stem and main-
tain its option to join at a later date.
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Egypt
step in his "democratic restructuring" program by creat-
ing an official political opposition, the Socialist La-
bor Party. The group thus far has attracted little at-
tention or support; Sadat had to intervene to enable
it to mzet constitutional requirements-for qualifica-
tions as.a political party.
party as furthering his plan to build a two-party.de-
mocracy in Egypt.. He also praised Ibrahim Shukri., leader
of the new party and a former cabinet minister under 5a-
dat, as an honest nationalist, untainted by corruption
and the excesses of the past.
to be tame and loyal--and an object of derision in
Egypt. The real opposition in parliament more likely
will involve a small group of former center party mem-
bers who refused to join Sadat's new party and the 20
or so former members of the now dissolved Wafd Party.
Egyptian President Sadat has taken another
Sadat praised legalization of the "opposition"
As its origin indicates, the party is likely
A Soviet scientist at a marine hydrographics
institixte recently indicated to a visiting US scientist.
that the U5SR would- have a synthetic-aperture radar in
space in two years. Such a radar achieves improved.
resolution by using signal processing to stimulate the
effect of a very large antenna. It has the potential for
detecting targets- smaller than aircraft carriers and
thus could provide the Soviets with better ocean sur-,
veillance than-they have with their current real-:aperture
radar ocean reconnaissance satellite.
We have very little evidence to .support the
Soviet'scientist's claim, but the Soviets have been de-
velopng synthetic-aperture radars. since the late 1960s
and de to ed one for battlefield surveillance in 1974_..
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//Ecuador's Supreme Electoral Tribunal--
after a recount and review of balloting procedures in
the initial round of voting on 16 July--has confirmed
that front-runner Jaime Roldos will face center-right
candidate Sixto Duran-Ballen in the second round of the
presidential election in early April.//
//The new tribunal was named last month
following an attempt by its predecessor to provide
trumped-up evidence of massive vote fraud to justify
cancellation of the election. Although some plotting
against populist Roldos probably will continue, a ma-
jority of the ruling military now appears committed to
seeing the election process through to its conclusion.//
Recent changes in Czechoslovakia's policy on
:issuing visas are evidence of a new flexibility in govern-
ment tactics toward political dissidents. The government
has resumed giving selected dissidents tourist, rather
than emigration, visas, thus implying that they will be
allowed to return.
The leadership is probably confident that those
it gives tourist papers will not publicly attack the re-
gime when abroad; to those Prague considers "trouble-
makers," it gives emigration visas, thus ensuring that
they will not return.
Intimidation and imprisonment are still used
to suppress dissent. Professor Jaroslav Sabata, who was
detained during an abortive meeting with Polish dissidents
early last month, remains in jail. The son of Jiri Hajek--
who was Foreign Minister under former Czechoslovak leader
Dubcek--is being penalized for his father's current dis-
sident activities by being denied admittance to the uni-
versity. Finally, three persons charged with distributing
"nonconformist music" and literature were recently given
jail sentences.
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FEATURE ARTICLE
TUNISIA: Nouira's Visit to US
Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira, the eon-
stitutionaZ successor to ailing President Bourguiba, will
seek assurances of continued US economic and military aid
during his official visit to Washington tomorrow-and
Thursday. Nouira will no doubt stress the importance
Tunisia attaches to US political support as a deterrent
to Libyan or other outside interference in Tunisian af-
fairs.
The 67-year-old Prime Minister is a sound eco-
nomic manager and a proponent of Tunisia's moderate, pro-
Western foreign policies. He heads a group of conserva-
tive Bourguiba loyalists that is firmly in control of the
government. Nouira and his cabinet run day-to-day affairs;
Bourguiba--now in Western Europe for medical treatment--
provides only occassional policy guidance.
Tunisia has used its limited influence in re-
ional affairs to encourage dialogue and compromise. In
1965, Bourguiba jarred the Arab world by asserting pub-
licly that Israel is an internationally recognized real-
ity with which the Arabs should negotiate.
oday, Tunisia is sympathetic to Egyptian Pres-
ident Sadat's peace initiatives but is unwilling to anger
its radical neighbors, Algeria and Libya, by publicly
supporting the Camp David accords.
Tunisia's principal foreign policy concern is
the chronically tense state of relations-with Libya,- which
has made no secret of its desire to influence political
developments in Tunisia. Libyan President Qadhafi was
humiliated by Tunisia's refusal to implement a merger
agreement in 1974 and blames Nouira for scuttling it. A
dispute with Libya over oil rights on the continental
shelf remains unresolved.
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The discovery in September of a Libyan-supplied
~.rms cache in southern Tunisia has heightened Tunisian
concern that Libya may be increasing its covert activity
to undermine the Nouira government.
The domestic scene has been generally calm
since anuary when Nouira used the Army to suppress wide-
spread rioting that accompanied the country's first gen-
eral strike. The subsequent trials of former labor leader
I3abib Achour and other union officials mark a low point
Lor the restive national labor movement in its two-year-
old political contest with the Tunisian political estab-
lishment. The confrontation with labor was but one as-
pect of the competition to determine who will run Tunisia
iahen 75-year-old Bourguiba leaves the scene.
//Although Nouira lacks a broad-based polit-
ical following, he will have a considerable advantage
ever other contenders for power because of his control
of the government and party apparatus. The military,
whose support will become increasingly important in the
post-Bourguiba era, is likely to remain loyal to Nouira
or to any other legitimately constituted government.//
The Nouira government does not appear to face
any significant organized opposition, but it will continue
under pressure from labor and other groups. If the domes-
tic scene remains calm, Nouira is likely eventually to
seek a compromise with moderates critical of the present
one-party political system, but he will carefully control
any liberalization.
Political and economic discontent has been sup-
pressed but not eliminated. A sharp deterioration of the
economy could result in more strikes and disorders.
With little more than 6 million people and few
natural resources, Tunisia has achieved impressive eco-
nomic growth--the rate of growth averaged about 6.5 per-
cent over the past five years. The primary goal of Tu-
nisia's fifth development plan is to create more jobs.
.About half of new .investments are earmarked for develop-
ment of labor-intensive, export-oriented sectors.
Tunisia's current account deficit has grown
steadily since 1975 and is likely to reach a record level
this year. The growing balance-of-payments deficit is
being financed by increased foreign borrowings.
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In the absence of new oil discoveries on the
continental sYielf, Tunisia will remain dependent on for-
eign borrowing to finance its development,
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