NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010096-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 96
• Publication Date: November 29, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed Top Secret
G NIDC 78-0277C
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ROMANIA: Warsaw Pact Relations . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ISRAEL: Arab Trends after Baghdad . . . . . . . . . 4
USSR-IRAN-US: Relations and Policy . . . . . . . . . 5
ETHIOPIA: The Fall of Keren . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
BRAZIL: Post-Election Report . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Economic Options Narrow . . . . . . . . . . 11
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
UK
France
Turkey
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I I Romanian President Ceausescu, in pointed
e lance o the USSR, has publicly disclosed details
concerning Zast week's Warsaw Pact summit in Moscow and
thereby seriously breached Pact confidentiality. Press
reports that all Warsaw Pact countries called home their
ambassadors from Bucharest yesterday proved unfounded,
and the USSR thus far has taken no overt measures against
Romania. The Soviets, however, are doubtless concerned
that Ceausescu will reveal more during a major foreign
policy speech on Friday and that he may announce an ini-
tiative of his own.
I uIn several explicit speeches since his return
to Bucharest, Ceausescu has stressed that he must alle-
viate popular "concern" over the Romanian delegation's
role at the summit. He hinted that he had refused to
sign a declaration that would increase East European
military budgets and implied that he had defied Soviet
pressure to alter Warsaw Pact command arrangements in a
way that would give the Soviets greater control over
Romanian forces.
//Although Ceausescu did not say so, Romania
was presumably responsible for the fact that the pub-
lished summit declaration failed to address the USSR's
problems with China. Ceausescu also refused to sign a
separate declaration that condemned the Camp David ac-
cords.//
Ceausescu stated his defense of the Romanian
position in terms that make it difficult for the other
Warsaw Pact members to respond effectively. He adroitly
used language that closely parallels the themes of the
Pact's joint declaration, and he may believe that his
stand enjoys some support elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
A Romanian diplomat has reported, for example, that the
East Germans also did not favor increased defense spend-
ing.
//Ceausescu appears for the most part to
be on the defensive and is attempting to dissociate
Romania from Soviet initiatives on military issues that
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would suggest his country had retreated from the inde-
pendent policies he has managed to establish in recent
years. Ceausescu may also have more in mind. He may cal-
culate that--with the USSR preoccupied with numerous
foreign policy issues and run by an elderly leadership
whose will to bring Romania to heel is questionable--
the time is propitious to make a bid to reduce still
further Romania's military collaboration with other Pact
members.//
//Ceausescu is probably banking on the fact
that any overt Soviet response to his disclosures, short
of a flat denial of any effort to increase East European
military contributions, would be embarrassing. He is
probably also aware of differences within the Soviet
leadership over the wisdom of calling for greater East
European defense expenditures, because this would aggra-
vate economic and political problems with which Moscow
would have to contend.//
//The USSR's efforts to press Romania on
Warsaw Pact issues is in large measure a response to
.tomania's tilt toward China as a counter to the USSR.
The Soviets may feel that Ceausescu went too far in
L3eptember, when he publicly promised to strengthen his
country's military cooperation with all Communist
states, implicitly including China. This statement was
in direct defiance of the USSR and was probably one of
the main reasons for Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to
3ucharest in October. Gromyko is reported to have re-
proached the Romanians for bringing Chinese influence
into the Balkans--a reference to Chairman Hua Kuo-feng's
visit to Romania last summer.//
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//Should they wish to retaliate against the
L ni ns, the Soviets may resort to rump meetings of
the Warsaw Pact in order to emphasize Romania's vulner-
ability and isolation. The USSR used a similar tactic
against Czechoslovakia in 1968.//
//The Soviets may also apply economic pres-
sure. The USSR could, as it has in the past, restrict
its exports of iron ore and coking coal--Romania's two
most important imports from the USSR--and it could also
delay or cut off the delivery of natural gas to Romania
through the recently completed Orenburg pipeline.//
//Military pressure is less likely at this
juncture but is still possible. The Soviets could hold
military maneuvers near the Romanian border--ostensibly
for the pur
off balance
pose of training--in order to keep Ceausescu
, or they could overfly Romanian territor
from the Bl
ack Sea.//
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ISRAEL: Arab Trends after Baghdad
Ana Zysts of Israe Z's Foreign and Defense Min-
..s tries attribute the stiffening in Egypt,_.rn President
r;adat's negotiating position on the linkage question
ErimariZy to his chagrin over the results of the Baghdad
summit. Nevertheless, the Israelis do not expect that
Arab opposition will deter Sadat from concluding a peace
,i:reaty and contend that his room for maneuver has not
been seriously affected.
The Israeli analysis suggests that the Begin
government sees no reason at present to make concessions
to Sadat. The Israelis, in fact, believe that Sadat still
expects that the Saudis and other major Arab leaders will
Eventually reconcile themselves to an Egyptian settlement
with Israel.
In recent conversations with officials of the
US Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israeli officials also expressed
doubt that moderate Arab states are really prepared to
apply sanctions against Egypt in the event of a peace
treaty with Israel. The Israelis anticipate that the
Saudis will go to great lengths to head off serious at-
tempts to punish Sadat.
I In the Israelis' opinion, improvement in
;yrian-Iraqi relations and the troubles in Iran have
made the Saudis fearful of a new wave of Arab radicalism.
The Israelis expect that the Saudis will conclude that
they cannot now afford poor relations with Cairo and con-
sequently will mend their fences with Sadat.
The Israeli analysts differ on the summit's
r_mpac on Lebanon. The Foreign Ministry analysts doubt
that Syria's improved relations with Iraq will lead it
to pursue a more aggressive policy in Lebanon. The mili-
tary analysts take a worst-case view and speculate that
the Syrians might now feel they have enough latitude to
undertake a more assertive approach to the Maronite
militias.
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USSR-IRAN-US: Relations and Policy
I The USSR has again publicly indicated its anx-
iety about possible US intervention in Iran in support
of the Shah and has reemphasized that Iran's internal
affairs must be decided only by Iranians.
//Moscow domestic radio, during its
coverage of Senator Byrd's two-day visit to Iran, re-
stated the concern that General Secretary Brezhnev ex-
pressed in an interview on 18 November. The radio re-
ported that the US press recently hinted that the US
might give military aid or even send troops to suppress
disturbances in Iran. Stating that Senator Byrd had
stressed US support for Iran, the radio added that this
clearly meant support for the "present Iranian regime."//
//This phrasing suggests a low-key
move to distance the USSR from the Shah and is consistent
with other recent Soviet attempts to provide a hedge
against the Shah's possible fall.
//The October issue of the magazine
Problems of Peace and Socialism also contained an inter-
view with Iranian Tudeh (Communist) Party leader Eskan-
dari. It praised the efforts of the religious side of the
anti-Shah movement and generally supported the stance of
Ayatollah Khomeini, apparently in an effort to protect
the USSR should these forces come to power in Iran.//
The Soviets continue, however, to be cautious
when reporting Iranian developments and to avoid any
direct criticism of the Shah.
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Ethiopian forces on Monday moved into Keren--
.ze last major town held by the Eritrean rebels--after
heavy fighting. Forces of the Eritrean People's Libera-
::ion Front are withdrawing north, and government forces
have been ordered to regroup and pursue them.
I IThe fall of Keren places all major Eritrean