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December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 21, 2007
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December 2, 1978
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25X1 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 E"f Director of Top Secret Central Intelligence National Intelligence Daily (Cable) NSA review completed State Dept. review completed DIA review(s) completed. Top Secret CG NIDC 78-0280C 1978 25X1 December Copy r Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010102-5 Top Secret CONTENTS IRAN: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 IRAN: Alert Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ROMANIA: Ceausescu's Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 EC SUMMIT: Economic Cooperation . . . . . . . . . , 10 BAHRAIN: Possible Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . 12 TAIWAN: Fighter Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 USSR: Chemical Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 SPAIN-USSR: Continued Interest . . . . . , . . . . , 19 UGANDA: US Trade Embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 USSR-Cuba FEATURE ARTICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 INTERNATIONAL: World Water Problems Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 IRAN: Situation Report Military units in Tehran Zact night used gunfire to drive off demonstrators who ignored the curfew to observe the first hours of the holy month of Moharram. Exiled Shia leader Khomeini may soon leave France for Suria.F- Hundreds of people who took to the streets to mark the beginning of Moharram marched through several areas of Tehran chanting antigovernment slogans. The military fired rifles and automatic weapons and may have used tanks or artillery to disperse the crowds. According to press accounts, there were some casualties, although the bulk of the reports suggest that most troops fired over the heads of the people. Tehran remains very tense. People have hoarded food, cooking oil, and other supplies in the expectation that the general strike will last well into the month. Food was plentiful but expensive yesterday. Antiforeign sentiment is much higher than in pre- vious years during Moharram. Several Iranian friends have warned one US diplomat that his life is in danger and that he should not identify himself to strangers as an American. A homemade bomb was thrown into the home of a US noncommissioned officer but caused no casualties. A member of Khomeini's entourage in France said on Thursday that the Shia opposition leader is considering leaving soon--possibly this weekend--for Damascus, and the Syrians have allegedly agreed to accept him. Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Top Secret //The Daily prints excerpts from an Alert Memoran- dum on the situation in Iran, which takes a Zook at the position the Shah will be in if he survives the civil violence this month--and what Iran is likely to face if he does not. The memorandum was prepared by CIA and co- ordinated in substance at the working ZeveZ //In the current very difficult political circum- stances, there is a good chance that civil unrest will be sufficiently serious to threaten the survival of the monarchy.// //The likely deterioration of the security situa- tion during Moharram will substantially raise the risk to Americans in Iran. Manifestations of xenophobia have occurred during these religious observances in the past. This year, any antiforeign activity will be especially likely to take on an anti-American cast, given US sup- port of the Shah.// //If the Shah remains in power through Moharram, he will have won a temporary political and psychological respite--one that could buy him limited time in which to pursue efforts to form a civilian coalition government. He might be able to elicit the cooperation of "neutral" civilian figures in forming a government of elder states- men, technocrats, and senior civil servants.// //Khomeini's views will not change, however, and the Ayatollah will retain his influence among the masses. In such a situation, it would be very difficult to get leaders of the National Front to participate in a coali- tion government--and only such a government would have a reasonable chance of reestablishing public trust.// //The Shah's outlasting'Moharram might also rein- force the military leadership in its view that only the Army can keep order. The military therefore may resist an early return to civilian government and the Shah may decide to extend its involvement in government beyond the period either he or the military leadership initially envisaged.// Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 Approved For Release 2007/11/21: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010102-5 ''pop Secret /Tbe powers and prerogatives of the Shah almost ~5rta.nly will erode in the post-Moharram period. He ?ri?.l be obliged to share power with the military leader- ship and with the prime minister (whether he is a mili- '.ar_y officer or a civilian). The monarch's authority .;ill be further reduced by the impact of corruption 1.ials and other exposures of past abuses.// //Even if he survives the immediate crisis, there- ore, the Shah will find it very difficult to implement ,is planned political program or to negotiate a perma- :tent settlement with his emboldened opposition.// /If the Shah were to abdicate or be forcibly re- ..,oved, it is more likely that a military regime would :.acceed him than that he would be succeeded by either he religious right or the secular left. The military .i'q'it try to establish its legitimacy by becoming the .r'-fective power behind a weak regency council or a fa- -de of civilian politicians. // ;'/The Shah's abdication at an early stage would obablv be coordinated with the military leadership and Ld result in the accession to power of senior offi- s with views similar in important respects to those she Shah. Oa the other hand, if the military were to :cunt a successul coup.-and we have no sound basis on ,hich to predict the stage at which this might happen-- chances would be greater that younger officers with s ttauitional views would come to power.// /;/A goverrment would probably attempt ini- ,ally to play on the Shah's ouster to arrange a detente ith the opposition. In the likely event that this [wed, we believe that most types of military regime-- ppecially one Led by senior officers--would be more Disposed than ~-e Shah to use force to quell unrest./// for l