Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 20, 2006
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 12, 1978
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8.pdf300.43 KB
p~C?e~i~~+A~Br Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A03090 Intelligence National Intelligence Daily (Cable) State Dept. review completed Top Secret 88 ecem er Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000~p 18-8 25X1 gpproved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 ?et National Intelligence Daily (Cable) ARGENTINA-CHILE: Channel Dispute 1 ITALY: Parliamentary Debate. . 2 FEATURE ARTICLE . . 4 ALBANIA: An Interim Report I I Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 - Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000 ret ARGENTINA-CHILE: Channel Dispute //The meeting today of the Argentine and Chilean Foreign Ministers probably will not avert or delay an early Argentine miZitar initiative in the Beagle Chan- nel dispute.// 25X1 //Argentine diplomats in Rome have been trying to persuade the Pope to act as mediator, but high-level Vatican officials indicate that at most he will plead publicly far a successful outcome of today`s meeting, and offer his " ood offices" privately to bath govern- ments.// //If the Foreign Ministers fail to reach an accord, the most likely Argentine military initiative will be to occupy-the Evout and Barnewelt island groups, which the Argentines believe to be uninhabited, and perhaps part 25X1 of sparsely inhabited Hornos Island. This action would give the Argentines the land they seek to guarantee their claim to maritime control in the South Atlantic. //If the Argentine action were accomplished without directly engaging Chilean forces, the Chileans would probably limit themselves to a diplomatic response rather than undertake a further military escalation.// Most reporting suggests that the Argentines do not 25X1 want to initiate a major conflict. They are ready to do so, however, and might attempt large-scale actions alon the 3,200-kilometer border if the conflict widens. Q Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000 'Cop Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 ITALY: Parliamentary Debate //The Italian parliament begins debate today on ?~hether Rome should participate in the European Monetary ~~ystem. At the EC summit Zast week, Prime Minister Andreotti decided to postpone a decision on entry in order to consult further with the parties supporting his ~'hristian Democratic government. The parties are sharply {.divided on the question, and Andreotti--whose government -s already threatened by interparty differences on other ;ssues--is searehin or a compromZSe to avoid further 25X1 >trains.// j/Andreotti's reservations at the summit centered mainly on its failure to authorize as large an increase in the EC regional development fund as the Italians wanted. The Prime Minister`s stand was supported by the Communist Party, which has argued strongly that Rome should stay out of the system unless the EC grants con- cessions adequate to cushion any deflationary conse- c~uences for the Italian economy.// //The decision was criticized, however, by some lead- ing members of Andreotti's Christian Democratic Party and by the small but influential Republican Party, which says it will withdraw its support for the government unless Italy joins the monetary system, which is slated to go 25X1 :into effect on 1 January.// over the final form of the government's plan.// help the government push through its controversial eco- nomic program, aimed mainly at curbing the public sector deficit and cutting labor costs; such measures would be all the more essential if Rome joined the monetary sys- tem. Conversely, the Communists, while generally support- ive of the economic program, fear that Italian entry into the monetary system under present circumstances would limit their bargaining power in coming negotiations //Advocates of Italian participation believe it would j/Treasury Minister Pandolfi told Ambassador Gardner yesterday that Andreotti is leaning toward endorsement of T_talian entry. To avoid a split with the Communists, how- ever, Andreotti has apparently been searching this week for increased EC financial support for Italy. According too Pandolfi, the Prime Minister has received some assur- ?~nce of further EC support from French President Giscard. 'rop Secret 2 pproved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A03090001 Q'b fret Italian officials were reportedly in Bonn yesterday dis- cussing with Chancellor Schmidt~s advisers the possibil- ity of increased West German investment in southern Italy.// Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A03090001 - 0 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 FEATURE ARTICLE ALBANIA: An Interim Report since the public acknowledgement of the termination >f Chinese economic assistance in JuZ~, Albania has pur- :ued a go-it-alone foreign poZicU that has eschewed ac- ~~ammodation with its principal ideological foes--China and the USSR. Neither has it shown evidence of moderat- ing its hostiZitz~ to the US. Albania has instead acceZ- nrated efforts begun Zast near to expand economic reZa- Lions with selected Eastern and Western countris. So far, +;he Albanians are not inclined--or perhaps able--to find a "sponsor" that would rovide the benefits previousZrg 25X1 t~.xtended brg China. A small country with few resources, Albania is, and long will be, heavily dependent on foreign trade and as- :~istance to sustain its industrial development. During the nearly two decades of the Sino-Albanian alliance, 'Tirana relied almost completely on China for economic, technological, and military assistance; the impact of the pullout will therefore be severe. dustrial production and an economic slowdown. The regime of party boss Enver Hoxha has nonetheless apparently not sought to devise a strategy for finding a major new source of assistance. It seems instead to have decided to continue, for the near term at least, the }policy it has followed for the last year of gradually accelerating economic relations with the outside world ether than China. This approach will probably not enable the Albanians to obtain enough industrial materials and Equipment in the near future to avoid disruptions in in- Evidence of any challenge to his authority. As long as basic consumer needs are met, economic .hardship is not likely to provoke domestic unrest. Hoxha maintains one of the most repressive regimes in the world and, although some Albanians may have doubts about the wisdom of his "go-it-alone" policy, there has been no lb Secret 4 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900~t Hoxha publicly justified his current policy in a recent speech in which he differentiated k~etween those. states under "different social regimes" that are pro- gressive and well-disposed toward Albania and. those that are not. He-expressed Albanians desire to maintain friendly relations with the former but stressed that it . would not ignore or soft-pedal political and ideological differences with those regimes. ~ 25X1 Despite Tirana's refusal to normalize relations with the USSR, Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies con- time their low-key efforts to court the Albanians. Bul- garia, which is in .the forefront of this pursuit, re- cently published several articles that presented Albania in a positive light, and there are unconfirmed reports that Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have offered to complete several projects left unfinished by the Chi- nese and to provide credits for new ones. According to a Romanian official, ,Bucharest has also made soundings to expand economic. ties. Albania has been generally unreceptive to these overtures. Although one Albanian official has speculated that Tirana might develop relations with Bulgaria if the need should arise, the USSR--which is undoubtedly behind the efforts of its East European allies to woo Albania-- can be under no illusion that Tirana will agree to a. significant improvement in relations as long as`Hoxha remains in power. The. Albanian leader has given no indication. that he has moderated .his .longstanding deep-seated suspicions of the Soviets and the East Europeans. Moscow, however., may believe that arty minor advance encourages progress toward brin in' Albania back. into the fold in Hoxha era. 5 To Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000 - To S cret Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 25X1 The Albanians ar.e also trying to expand relations with Algeria. The two countries signed a two-year trade agreement in April, and Albania may have raised the sub- ject of further trade when it dispatched a delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Trade to Algiers in September. While information is fragmentary, it appears that several West European countries, particularly Sweden and Finland, are ready to increase their commercial ties with the Albanian regime. A delegation led by the Al- banian Minister of Foreign Trade left for Stockholm and Helsinki in early November; it will reportedl sign a five-year trade agreement with Sweden. Probably none of these probes has yielded enough economic gain to maintain Albania's current level of industrial development. The Japanese have reported that the Albanians recently made some cautious inquiries about what procedures must be taken to obtain credits. This could suggest that Tirana--or at least some Al- banian officials--may contemplate lifting the constitu- tional prohibition against borrowing from abroad. Even if the Albanians take this step, however, it is doubtful that they will be able to obtain enough credits in time to prevent a serious disruption in their industrializa- tion efforts. To Secret 6 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8 Top Secret Top Secret Approved For Release 2007/03/07 :CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010118-8