NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010132-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 132
• Publication Date: December 20, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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?~.A6?p
Central
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed. Top Secret
CG NIDC 78-0295C
20 December 1978 25X1
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
CONTENTS
II
IRAN: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ISRAEL: Pressure for Settlements . . . . . . . . . . 2
NIGERIA: Afro-Arab-Israeli Ties . . . . . . . . . . 4
GREECE-TURKEY: Negotiations . . . . . . _ . . . . . 6
USSR-CHINA: Soviet Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR: Oil Production Problems . . . . . . . . . . . 8
INDIA: Gandhi Jailed Temporarily . . . . . . . . . . 9
FEATURE ARTICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
LEBANON: Phalange Shifts Tactics
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IRAN: Situation Report
Serious disturbances are continuing in Iranian pro-
vincial capitals, but Tehran remained quiet yesterday.
Pro- and anti-Shah demonstrations have occurred in
Tabriz for the last several days. The US Consul in Tabriz
believes press accounts of a large-scale mutiny of Army
troops against the Shah are exaggerated; most of the
Consul's sources, in fact, report that the troops were
fraternizing with pro-Shah demonstrators. The Turkish
Ambassador has heard, however, that some soldiers refused
to fire on anti-Shah demonstrators. II 25X1
Iran's two largest holy cities--Qom and Mashhad--have
been major centers of unrest. A battalion from the Iranian
airborne brigade was sent to Qom on Sunday to reinforce
security units. Embassy reporting indicates that in Mash-
had the military authorities have been unable to keep
demonstrations under control and the police have deserted
the streets.
//Prime Minister Azhari told a Western official on
Monday that much of the recent violence in the provincial
capitals had been stimulated by the heavy-handed action
of overzealous local military commanders who have been
encouras[ing pro-Shah demonstrators to attack the opposi-
tion.//1 J
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and worsening relations with the US.
Leaders of the Israeli radical nationalist Gush
Emunim organization, which is dedicated to settling more
Jews on the occupied West Bank, are threatening to
"create new facts" by establishing unsanctioned new
settlements there unless the government officially ap-
proves additional settlements soon. Prime Minister Begin
reportedly has not made up his mind on the settlements
issue, although he probably would prefer to defer any
action in order to avoid jeopardizing peace negotiations
back on approving new settlements.
Begin's room for maneuvering has decreased in the
face of growing pressure from key hardliners in the rul-
ing coalition who are deeply troubled by the implica-
tions of the West Bank autonomy plan and anxious to re-
affirm Israel's right to settle there. Many in the co-
alition, as well as much of the public, moreover, are
outraged over what they perceive to be unfair US pres-
sure in the peace negotiations and probably are in a
mood to support independent Gush action if Begin holds
cat Gush settlement attempt.
The Gush secretariat, at a weekend meeting, threat-
ened to try to establish new settlements near Nabulus,
the largest Arab town on the West Bank, and near Jericho.
Israeli troops forcibly evicted Gush squatters from the
Nabulus site in September and a year earlier turned back
a Gush cadre near Jericho. According to press reports,
Israeli security forces have again taken up positions
along key roads into the West Bank to head off any wild-
Begin thus far has limited himself to reiterating
that the government remains solely responsible for new
settlements. He recognizes the sensitivity of the issue
and wants to avoid needlessly antagonizing the US.
Within the context of Israeli politics and his own attach-
ment to the West Bank, Begin, since becoming Prime Minis-
ter, usually has sought to mollify the Gush and its co-
alition supporters with minimal concessions on settle-
ments issues.
Finance Minister Ehrlich, along with others in his
Liberal wing of Begin's dominant Likud bloc, and Defense
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Minister Weizman are also sensitive to the negative im-
pact on the peace process of new Jewish settlements. But
they are currently on the defensive in the face of
strong pressure for new settlements from hardliners in
Begin's Herut faction of Likud as well as the National
Religious Party, Likud's indispensable ally in the gov-
erning coalition.
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NIGERIA: Afro-Arab-Israeli Ties
raeZi cooperation with South Africa.
The possibility of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
is causing Nigerian military and civilian leaders to re-
assess their country's continued participation in the in-
formal alliance of Arab and African states that crystaZ-
Zized during and after the Middle East war in 1973. Sen-
timent is apparently growing within both the military
government and emerging political parties to reestablish
diplomatic relations with Israel. The key obstacle is Is-
The Afro-Arab relationship rests primarily on a mu-
tual trade-off of support on respective regional issues.
An Egyptian-Israeli treaty would erase the need for such
an arrangement in the eyes of the Nigerians. They have
for some time privately criticized the Arab states for
not extending as much support to the struggle for major-
ity rule in southern Africa as the Africans have for the
Arab cause in the Middle East.
resulted in Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
The Nigerians also point to the paucity of material
aid from the Arabs and maintain that most of the poorer
African states have not received adequate economic com-
pensation from the Arabs for having severed ties with
Israel five years ago. Nigeria, which does not depend on
Arab assistance, has insisted all I alon that Afro-Arab
cooperation be a two-way affair.
Nigerian Head of State Obasanjo described to visit-
ing Egyptian presidential aide Salem early this month
the conditions Israel would have to meet before Nigeria
would resume relations. His formulation suggests that
Nigeria would be prepared to consider renewed relations
with Israel if an Egyptian-Israeli treaty contained guar-
antees for Palestinians acceptable to the Egyptians and
If the military regime does not resume relations
with Israel before the scheduled changeover to civilian
rule next October, the successor government may well do
so. The US Embassy in Lagos has reported that recent con-
versations with some influential members of two of the
three major political parties that will contest elections
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next year indicate considerable sentiment for renewed re-
lations with Israel. The parties include a northern Mus-
lim-oriented group, which reportedly is taking clandes-
tine campaign funds from Libya. The US Embassy suspects
that pro-Israeli sentiment also exists in the third major
party.
Any Nigerian initiative toward Israel will be heavily
dependent on Nigeria's perception of Israel's relation-
ship with South Africa. Reported Israeli arms sales to
and alleged nuclear cooperation with South Africa would
conflict with Nigeria's key foreign policy objective,
the elimination of white minority rule in southern Af-
rica.
There are signs, however, that Nigerian concern over
Israeli - South African ties may be easing. Foreign'Min-
ister Adefope recently told a US official that his govern25X1
ment has received assurances that Israel will end its
arms sales and curtail trade with South Africa. We cannot
confirm that Israel has in fact made such a decision.
Should Nigeria take the lead in resuming relations
with Israel, several other moderate African states that
have benefited little from Arab aid would quickly follow
suit. They may restore ties even if Nigeria does not.
These countries have previously expressed varying degrees
of interest in doing so although none had been willing
to make the first move. They include Ghana, Zaire, Zambia,
Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Central African Em-
pire, and Kenya.
For some other African states, particularly the
poorer, predominantly Muslim countries, the choice would
be far more painful, and an early, wholesale African de-
sertion of the Arabs is not likely. Despite their frus-
trations with the Arabs, a dozen or so African states
are receiving from the Arabs important development aid
and credit loans, which offset the increased cost of oil
imports. These countries cannot realistically expect to
receive similar benefits from Israel. The Arabs also
pose the unstated threat of an oil boycott.
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GREECE-TURKEY: Negotiations
The International Court of Justice yesterday ruled
by a 12-2 vote that it was incompetent to adjudicate the
Aegean continental shelf dispute between Greece and
Turkey, The Court's decision will give added importance
to the two-year-old negotiations between the two nations.
The talks have recently shown some signs of movement, but
either side or both could easily backtrack. If this oc-
curs, another summit between Prime Ministers Ecevit and
KaramanZis ma be necessary to maintain the negotiating
momentum. I
The Court said Greek reservations on a 1928 inter-
national treaty dealing with the peaceful settlement of
disputes caused it to reject Greece's appeal. A desire
not to risk the Court's prestige also figured in the de-
cision; Turkey has insisted all along that the issue be
settled in bilateral talks and had declared it would not
abide by a decision to hear the case.
The decision will please the Turks and momentarily
embarrass the Greek Government, which has already been
under mounting domestic criticism for alleged blunders
in its policies toward the EC and NATO. In the longer
run the Court's endorsement of bilateral talks will pro-
vide some support for the government, which may now find
it politically more feasible to pursue serious negotia-
The latest round of negotiations took place earlier
this month, and both sides expressed satisfaction with
the improved atmosphere. Greek negotiators were pleased
that their Turkish counterparts were willing to consider
delineation of the continental shelf in addition to their
proposal for an Aegean condominium. Turkish representa-
tives likewise were encouraged by the Greeks' seeming
willingness to consider eventual demilitarization of is-
lands close to Turkey and to make some additional adjust-
t
men
s regarding control of Aegean airspace.
Greeks and Turks hope that the next round of talks,
scheduled to begin in Vienna on 9 January, will lead to
further progress. Both sides have had a history of back-
trackinq, however, and the Aegean issue is connected
with a number of other complex issues such as Cyprus and
the participants' responsibilities within NATO. Thus,
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while additional progress in Vienna is possible, it is
by no means assured. Given the complexity of the issues,
intervention at the top, in the form of an Ecevit-
Karamanlis summit, may be needed to keep the talks mov-
ing.
USSR-CHINA: Soviet Reaction
Soviet reaction thus far to US-Chinese normalization
of relations has revealed Moscow's anxieties, particu-
ZarZy with regard to the possibility of a freer Chinese
diplomatic hand in Asia. Soviet commentators are thus
far concentrating their criticism on Peking rather than
Washington and have acknowledged US statements favoring
closer US-Soviet ties. There is no indication of any
ZikeZy Soviet political moves to counter what the Soviets
view as the latest success in China's anti-Soviet pol-
icies.
One Soviet commentator noted that Peking may think
normalization means expanded freedom of action in pursuit
of its "expansionist" plans, suggesting heightened con-
cern in Moscow over possible Chinese moves against Viet-
nam. Soviet observers are also likely to link normaliza-
tion to the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of
last summer, which the Soviets have portrayed as an al-
liance orchestrated by Washington. There has been no
mention of high-level visits scheduled between the US
and China in January and February. I 25X1
The Soviets may produce more authoritative responses
in days to come, but these statements will probably con-
tinue to be carefully formulated because of the sensitive
US-Soviet discussions now under way. The USSR has hitherto
tried to avoid polemics with both the US and China when
crucia otiations on a strategic arms agreement were
near.
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The USSR recently announced reduced targets for the
oil industry, indicating that production is ZikeZy to
peak soon--perhaps even next year. Even if output grows
in 1979 and 1980, maximum production will be about 12
million barrels per day and probably will begin to de-
cline rather sharply within two or three years there-
after, resulting in a drop in oil exports. The Soviets
apparently intend to push gas production during the next
two years harder than they originaZZy planned in order
to compensate. DIA estimates that there will be no de-
cline in Soviet oil production through 1980 and for sev-
eral years thereafter. During that period, however, rp o-
duction may ZeveZ off and show ZittZe or no growth.
West Siberia provided all of the growth in Soviet
oil production in recent years and is the only major
region from which the Soviets can obtain output increases
through the early 1980s. The giant Samotlor oilfield
there has accounted for a large share of the growth in
output during the past five to six years, but it prob-
ably reached peak production this year. Other large
older fields in West Siberia have also reached their
peak, and some are beginning to decline. In the older
producing region of the Urals-Volga, production has al-
ready fallen seriously.
Development of the smaller and more costly West
Siberian fields that are supposed to compensate for the
leveling off of Samotlor's ouput is lagging. Originally,
62 new oilfields were to have been developed in West
Siberia from 1976 to 1980, but the number has now been
scaled down to only 22 or 23. A serious lack of facili-
ties--such-as roads, pipelines, and electric power lines
to these distant new fields--has hampered their exploita-
The 1979 gas production target--14.3 trillion cubic
feet--would require growth next year to be about 8.6
percent, the largest annual rise ever. The target is
probably unattainable because pipeline capacity is not
being installed fast enough and because the infrastruc-
ture in he areas of West Siberia is poorly de-
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INDIA: Gandhi Jailed Temporarily
Indian Prime Minister Desai's government faces a
period of new pressures following the temporary jaiZing
of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and as a result
of increased activity by dissidents in the ruling Janata
Party.
The Janata majority in the lower house of parlia-
ment voted yesterday to jail Gandhi for the remaining
few days of the parliamentary session and to deprive her
of the seat she won in a byelection last month. The
vote climaxed a heated debate over how severely to pun-
ish Gandhi for allegedly having obstructed a 1975 offi-
cial investigation of her son Sanjay's car manufacturing
project.
In deciding--after considerable hesitation--to sup-
port the motion to expel Gandhi, Desai bowed to pressure
from Janata hardliners, many of whom had been imprisoned
during Gandhi's emergency rule between 1975 and 1977.
Desai earlier had sided with party moderates who fear
that Gandhi's political comeback will only be facili-
tated by the expulsion. The move casts her as a martyr
and helps substantiate her claim that she is the target
of a political vendetta. I 25X1
Continued squabbling within Janata weakens its
ability to deal with the long-term threat of Gandhi.
Among numerous divisive issues is the question of former
Home Minister Charan Singh's return to the cabinet.
Desai fired Singh from the number-two slot in June and
has refused to meet Singh's conditions for rejoining
the government. Singh charges that his faction of the
loose-knit Janata Party--one of its most important
components--is beienied adequate representation in
Janata forums.
Singh currently is continuing plans for a rally in
New Delhi on Saturday, ostensibly to demand greater
benefits for the small landowners of northern India--
the backbone of Singh's popular support. If the turnout
approaches a million, Singh probably will sharpen his
attack on Desai's leadership and may eventually threaten
to withdraw his group from Janata and form a new party.
His followers are as yet divided over the feasibilit
and wisdom of such a drastic step. 25X1
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FEATURE ARTICLE
LEBANON: Phalange Shifts Tactics
//Evidence is growing that the senior Phalange
leader, Pierre JumayyiZ, and his son Amin want to turn
away from military confrontation with the Syrians and
begin looking for political solutions to Lebanon's prob-
lems. The halting moves toward political reconciliation
may yet founder, but they do seem to reflect greater
flexibility than the Phalange leaders have shown before--
as well as disillusionment with the policies of Maronite
militants, including the elder Jumayyil's other son
Bashir.//
//Since the latest cease-fire began in early Octo-
ber, these two leaders have taken several steps that
demonstrate they now believe they have more to gain by
talking with their opponents especially the Syrians,
than by fighting them.//
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//Pierre Jumayvil has made a series of accommo-
tic Lebanese factions.//
iate "in a personal capacity" between domes-
datinq statements about Syria.// 25X1
-- //He has offered to go to Damascus if the trip
could be made in "dignity and honor," and he
has proposed that Syrian President Assad med-
25X1
-- Both Pierre and Amin Jumayyil have met with
Palestinian representatives, and both have
taken ste s to begin a dialogue with Lebanese
Muslims.II 25X1
The emphasis on dialogue is a significant shift in
Phalange tactics. Throughout most of 1978 the party--
along with most other Maronites--tried to provoke the
Syrians in an effort to generate a crisis that might in-
duce Israel, the UN, or western countries to intervene
on the side of the Christians. Militia chief Bashir
Jumayyil has been one of the chief proponents of this ef-
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//There was no foreign intervention on their behalf
during the heavy fighting in October, and Pierre and
Amin Jumayyil are reexamining their tactics. They seem
particularly disillusioned with Israel, and even the
Maronite militants are less confident than they were
about Israeli intervention in the event of renewed fight-
ing with the Syrians. Since the October cease-fire, the
Maronites have also received clear signals from France
that it would not act militarily or diplomatically in
support of Maronite extremist policies.//
//The Phalangists have not by any means abandoned
L.he military option or altered their determination to
gain Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. They are continu-
ing--with Israeli assistance-to strengthen their mili-
tary forces for another round of fighting if they decide
they are not making enough progress on the political
While showing a more accommodating attitude toward
their opponents, the Phalangists apparently have not yet
advanced any substantive proposals for resolving Lebanon's
political problems. Before doing so, the Phalangists
want to have some indication that concessions on their
part will be reciprocated by the other factions.
The Palestinians have responded favorably to the
;:phalange overtures, but--like the Phalangists--have
viewed the contacts mainly as a means of improving the
general political atmosphere and have not made specific
The Syrians have reacted even more cautiously. While
Syrian officials in Beirut have talked privately with
Amin, the Syrians are suspicious of Maronite intentions.
Foreign Minister Khaddam told a journalist early this
month that his government had no intention of inviting
i'ierre Jumayyil to Damascus. President Assad may not yet
have made a final decision, however, on whether to receive
a high-level Phalange representative.
The almost total uninvolvement of the Lebanese Gov-
ernment in the Phalange-Syrian-Palestinian contacts re-
flects its general paralysis and has complicated the
process. In the absence of central direction, the sepa-
rate talks have aroused suspicions among some of the par-
Lies. The Syrians and Lebanese Muslims, for instance,
have criticized the talks between the Maronites and the
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The Maronites' ties to Israel pose the most immedi-
ate obstacle to the start of serious talks with the
Syrians and the Palestinians. Although the Syrians and
the Palestinians have been willing to engage in low-key
talks with the Maronites, they have made it clear that
real progress toward improved relations will be diffi-
cult if not impossible so lon as the Maronites remain
closely linked to Israel.II 25X1
The Syrians may not demand a severance of Maronite-
Israeli ties before agreeing to a high-level dialogue,
but they will probably insist that the Maronites give
some solid evidence of a shift away from the alliance
with the Israelis--a course the Phalangists will be re-
luctant to take as long as they face the prospect of re-
newed fighting with the Syrians. I 25X1
The Israelis, satisfied for now with the status quo
in Lebanon, probably doubt the talks will lead to any
significant change in the situation and believe there is
no immediate need for them to take a position. 0 25X1
Pierre Jumayyil will have to rein in Bashir if there
is to be any real dialogue with the Syrians. Bashir's re-
cent departure for a visit to Western Europe may prevent
him from causing trouble while other Phalangists pursue
contacts witn the Syrians. I I 25X1
National Liberal Party chief Camille Shamun, the
most prominent of the Maronite hardliners, has been much
more cautious than Pierre and Amin about supporting a
dialogue. He met in mid-November with Palestinian rep-
resentatives, but he has not sought further contacts
with the Palestinians and he has shown little interest
in reconciliation with Syria. Sh'.mun, however, apparently
has not objected strongly to the Phalangists' efforts and
his public pronouncements have been less militant since
the October cease-fire. 25X1
Shamun probably reasons he has little to lose by
letting the Phalangists take the lead and the risks in
fostering talks. He knows the Jumayyils and the Syrians
will need his support for any agreement they might reach.
On the other hand, if the Jumayyils fail, Shamun's own
oon within the Maronite camp will be strengthened.
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