NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010142-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 142
• Publication Date: December 27, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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Toa Secret
27 December 1978
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
27 December 1978
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
CONTENTS
IRAN: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]_
SYRIA: Views on Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . 4
BANGLADESH: Making Concessions . . . . . . . . . , 6
BRIEFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
India
Belgium
FEATURE ARTICLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
TURKEY: Martial Law
PERSIAN GULF: Impact of Unrest
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IRAN: Situation Report
Oil production in Iran fell yesterday to its lowest
level--probably 600,000 barrels or Zess--since oil work-
ers began striking in October. The nation's major export
facility was completely shut down, and deliveries of
crude oil to domestic refineries were only one-third of
normal. In Tehran, security forces have been unable to
halt the series of disruptive demonstrations.
Few oil workers--and virtually no Iranians--reported
to their jobs following death threats from strike lead-
ers. Oil consortium officials estimated that yesterday's
deliveries of crude oil to refineries were only 240,000
barrels compared with normal daily levels of 700,000 to
800,000 barrels at this time of the year. The shortfall
in deliveries will aggravate existing shortages of kero-
sene, diesel, and heating oil. The US Embassy reports
that reserves of heating oil are adequate for only one
or two days in Tehran and about a week in other major
Consumer hoarding of petroleum products and reduced
demand caused by the current economic slowdown may, how-
ever, delay the impact of the shortages. It is not clear
whether the shutdown of the facilities on Khark Island
will prevent Iran from importing etroleum products that
it has been purchasing abroad. 25X1
//Natural gas liquids plants probably are completely
shut down again. This has raised concern that, as the
supply of natural gas dwindles, generating turbines will
have to be shut down, necessitatin further reductions
in electric power generation.// 25X1
The government is apparently trying to respond to
the deteriorating situation in the oilfields and to the
continuing disturbances in Tehran and the provinces. The
Shah's efforts to form a civilian government seem, how-
ever, to be stalled, despite his meeting with Gholam
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 Sadiqi again on Monday. Military leaders are likely to
urge the Shah to crack down hard in order to maintain
discipline, and the Shah may now be more inclined to ac-
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25X1 cept this advice.
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//The Daily prints a summary of an assessment by
Lhe US Embassy in Damascus of Syrian President Assad's
attitude toward Middle East peace negotiations.//
I
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//The Syrian President wants peace but is unwill-
ing to compromise his basic position to achieve it. Assad
recognizes that nothing he alone can offer Israel today
is enough to obtain the concessions that he feels he must
have. He is concerned that an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty
and a possible Gaza accord will further dim prospects
for a Syrian-Israeli peace.//
//Assad does not oppose the peace process because
of his minority Alawite status and his presumed need to
placate extremists at home. He does not survive by pla-
cating his opponents but rather by maintaining control
of the means of repression and by a willingness to use
these means whenever necessary. Assad--given the right
Framework and peace package--would sign an agreement
with Israel and would have the support of most Syrians;
he would ruthlessly suppress those Syrians he could not
win over.//
//Assad probably will continue to hold out for a
peace that restores Syrian sovereignty over all of the
Golan Heights and that meets minimal Palestinian demands
for establishment of a Palestinian state. He does not
like or trust the Israelis and will resist full normali-
zation of relations even under conditions of peace.//
//The Syrian President recognizes that he must in-
crease Israel's incentives for making unpalatable conces-
sions. He believes it is necessary that Syria develop a
credible military threat by upgrading its weaponry and by
seeking closer ties with its arch-rival, Iraq. He also
wants both great powers involved in negotiations, strong
US pressure on Israel, and a negotiating framework that
confronts the Israelis with the choice of a comprehensive
agreement or nothing.//
//Assad believes the form of negotiations is at
least as important as the substance. He wants to be
able to exploit Israel's strong desire for peace with
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Egypt and possibly Jordan in order to extract conces-
sions on the Syrian and the Palestinian issues. His ob-
struction of the Geneva peace conference effort last
year and his current opposition to the Camp David ac-
cords have the same foundation: he perceived both ini-
tiatives as providin a framework for separate negoti-
ations.//
//Assad is not eagerly waiting in the wings to
join the negotiating process, and he is unlikely to
enter it unless he comes to believe that Israel is anx-
ious for peace with Syria and willing to pay a price.//
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BANGLADESH: Making Concessions
President Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh has made several
significant concessions to opposition political parties
this month in an effort to persuade them to participate
in the parliamentary election early next year. On Monday
he at least partially met another opposition demand by
postponing the election from 27 January to 12 February.
it is still unclear whether the concessions will cause
a significant number of opposition parties to forego a
threatened boycott and to participate in the election.
0
time to prepare for the election.
Zia had announced the election on 30 November. In
the next three weeks, 16 of the approximately 20 opposi-
tion parties announced they would boycott the election
unless Zia met several conditions. These included with-
drawal of martial law, annulment of a highly authoritar-
ian amendment to the constitution, unconditional release
of political prisoners, Zia's retirement from the Army,
and the restoration of press freedom. Most of the parties
also maintained that they had been allowed too little
On 15 December, the government issued a proclama-
tion modifying or eliminating several of the more undem-
ocratic provisions of the constitutional amendment. The
following day, Zia released some but not all of the po-
litical prisoners. On Sunday, the government announced
that martial law provisions would not apply to political
activities, proclaimed that further steps would be taken
to remove restrictions on press freedom, andr sed to
release more political prisoners "shortly."
It: is increasingly obvious that Zia wants to have
enough opposition participation in the election to make
it appear convincingly democratic. A faction of the im-
portant rightwing Muslim League and a small pro-Moscow
party have already announced that they are reversing
their previous stands and will participate in the elec-
tion. Zia may be only partially successful at best in
his efforts to entice still more into the contest, how-
ever, because there apparently are strong groups in some
of the larger parties that foresee no possibility of vic-
tory against Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party and would
prefer boycott to defeat.
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Pressure on Prime Minister Desai has temporarily
subsided with ex-Prime Minister Gandhi's release from
jail yesterday and the indefinite postponement of a
threatened withdrawal from the ruling Janata Party by
one of its major factions. Gandhi will probably seek re-
election, although she may decide that it is more expe-
dient now to attack the government from outside parlia-
ment.
Disaffected former Home Minister Charan Singh, mean-
while, no longer poses an immediate threat to the tenuous
Janata coalition. The turnout at a pro-Singh rally in
New Delhi on Saturday was considerably less than the 1
million expected and instead of announcing his group's
withdrawal from Janata, Singh reiterated his continued 25X1
loyalty. Nonetheless, the bitter personal dispute between
Desai and Singh is unresolved, and Singh's faction plans
to hold a strategy conference in late January.
Belgium
King Baudouin of Belgium yesterday appointed youth-
ful Economics Minister Willy Claes--a moderate Flemish
Socialist--to carry on discussions with political lead-
ers about forming a new government. Serious negotia-
tions and the choice of a "formateur" to put a govern-
ment together are not likely until the new year. 25X1
The election on Sunday gave no mandate to any party,
policy, or politician to lead the country out of its ex-
isting political impasse. The formation of a new govern-
ment will be complicated by the fact that the new parlia-
ment will have the status of a constituent assembly. A
new coalition to carry out the task of revising the con-
stitution should have a two-third's majority in both
chambers, and also a majority in both linguistic groups.
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It could take several months before a new government
is formed. In the meantime, the Vanden Boeynants govern-
ment will continue in caretaker status. I 25X1
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The resort to martial law on Monday to quell Turkey's
spiraling violence was a painful political and ideologi-
cal step for Prime Minister Ecevit. It holds dangers
for his government--perhaps even for Turkish democracy--
and opportunities for rivals if it proves unsuccessful.
The imposition on martial law for the third time
since World War II, and the second time this decade, be-
came official yesterday with the parliament's assent. It
came after Ecevit tried a series of more moderate meas-
ures during his first year in office aimed at curbing
violence while preserving constitutional liberties. Twice
as many people died in civil violence this year as dur-
ing the last year of his predecessor's term.
Ecevit had strongly criticized the Governments that
imposed earlier periods of martial law because of the ex-
cesses committed, particularly against members of the
left wing of his party. Ecevit has long shown a strong
commitment to democracy and against military or other
forms of authoritarian rule. Indications are that he con-
sented to martial law--after disturbances in Maras left
100 dead--only after a majority of his cabinet, and pos-
sibly the military as well, came out strongly in its
favor.
Political violence stems in part from a cleavage
between leftist "modernizers" and Islamic traditional-
ists and nationalists, a split that has led to the emer-
gence of rival extremist groups. Extremist ranks have
been augmented by youths radicalized by an outmoded ed-
ucational system and poor job prospects. Violence is
also fueled by sectarian disputes between Sunni and Shia
Muslims and by Kurdish se aratists in the impoverished
eastern provinces.
While urban violence has often been directed by one
extremist faction against another and resembles "gang
warfare," violence in the rural east is on a larger scale
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in part because law enforcement is less efficient, econo-
mic discontent more rampant, and the people more malle-
able.
The more conservative opposition parties accuse
Ecevit of coddling the leftist extremists, and his gov-
ernment has in fact been more vigorous in quelling right-
ist-inspired violence. The pattern in the east, however,
shows extreme rightists, possibly associated with the
neofascist National Action Party, inciting conservative
Sunnis to attack the poorer Shias who tend to support
Ecevit's party or other leftist groups. I 25X1
Ecevit implies that the rioting in Maras was or-
ganized by the neofascists. His charges have fueled
talk about a rightist conspiracy to create disorders
in order to bring down the government. The charges may
portend additional measures against the neofascists.
Late last month, Ecevit had banned the youth wing of
the neofascist party.
The immediate outlook for the Ecevit government,
and in the longer term for Turkish democracy, will de-
pend on the effectiveness of martial law in curbing do-
mestic strife. Extremist leaders have been reluctant to
incite their followers to storm the barricades. Should
the Turkish military succeed in securing peace, even
if only temporarily, Ecevit will have bought time to
attend to the underlying causes of violence, including
the serious economic problems besetting the country.
Even in such circumstances, however, the need to share
power with the military in some provinces could create
strains in the overnment's two-seat majority in the
legislature. the
Should extremists persistently challenge martial
law, Ecevit's prospects may quickly deteriorate. He
will have to contend with conflicting advice to back-
track or take even more repressive measures. His gov-
ernment might not survive, and there are serious obsta-
cles to other democratic alternatives such as a grand
coalition, a government of "technocrats," or a more ac-
tive role for the president. Democracy would be endan-
gered, because in such circumstances the military might
lose its reluctance to resume direct rule as it did in
1971.
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I
PERSIAN GULF: Impact of Unrest
//The crisis in Iran is producing a fundamental
reorientation in the politics of the Persian GuZf. Most
tu"Lf Arabs have seen the Shah as the major force for
regional stability, and they want him to survive. Even
if he does, however, Iran's willingness and ability to
project its power in the region will be substantially
reduced. If the monarchy is deposed, the Arab fear is
'hat a struggle for power will ensue in Iran that could
result in the destabilization of the other GuZf states.
A leftist takeover in Tehran would be particularly up-
asetting.//
//Neither of the two large Persian Gulf states--
Saudi Arabia and Iraq--can easily take over Iran's self-
proclaimed role as regional policeman. The rulers of the
smaller states--Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman--have all in varying degrees counted
on Iran as the key to regional stability, even though
many of them have resented Iranian pretensions of regional
hegemony.//
//All the Persian Gulf states are deeply concerned
by developments this year in Iran. They have, however,
generally avoided public expressions of support for the
Shah, in part because they fear that to speak out on his
behalf might provoke trouble for themselves. They feel
vulnerable and fear potential pressures from their domes-
tic foes as well as from the USSR.//
//The fact that demonstrators and striking workers
could bring Iran to a standstill and even threaten the
monarchy is a lesson certainly not lost on the radical
left and the religious extremists on the Arab side of
the Gulf. The rulers of the Persian Gulf states could
eventually find themselves under attack from the politi-
cal extremes and unless they relax their grip on polit-
ical power abandoned by the emerging middle classes.//
//At the same time, traditionalists in Saudi Arabia
and elsewhere will warn against the kind of modernization
programs that have so unsettled Iran.//
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//Bahrain, which has a history of leftist activity,
is probably the most susceptible to trouble in the near
term. Local leftists, dispirited by strong government
countermeasures in recent years, are now said to feel re-
invigorated because of events in Iran. Bahraini leftists--
there are numerous groups--have in the past tried to ex-
ploit the resentment of local Shia Muslims over their
second-class status in the country.// F77 I 25X1
//Sultan Qabus of Oman is doubtless worried that
Iran will be unable to help him again if the Marxist re-
gime in South Yemen resumes its support for the insurgents
in Oman's Dhofar Province. Several thousand Iranian sol-
diers played a role in beating back the insurgents in the
mid-1970s.//
//The most frequently expressed fear among Gulf Arab
leaders is that their own Shia Muslims will take to the
streets in imitation of their coreligionists in Iran. 25X1
Shias comprise about half the population in Iraq and
Bahrain, sizable minorities in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
and smaller ones in the other Gulf states.//
//Iraq's Shias are usually passive, but when they
take to the streets as they did early last year they can
cause serious disruption. Iraq's avowedly secularist gov-
ernment has courted the Shias since then. In the other
Gulf countries, most Shias are expatriate laborers often
inhibited from political activity by the threat of depor-
tation. Grievances over their second-class status in many
of these countries, however, make them susceptible to ex-
ploitation by political radicals.// 25X1
//Saudi Arabia's 125,000 Shias are concentrated in
the oil-producing Eastern Province where they comprise
about 25 percent of the population. Long discriminated
against by the Wahhabi Muslims who dominate the country,
they found the oil industry one of the few sources of em-
ployment open to them.//F- I 25X1
//Despite the forebodings of many officials in the
Arab side of the Gulf, there has been no trouble there 25X1
so far that can be traced to events in Iran. Some security
services have warned local Shia leaders not to stir
things up during the Muslim month of Moharram.// E;;9
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//Concern among the Gulf Arabs about the possibility
of a spreading revolutionary virus from Iran is mixed
with some satisfaction among those who have resented
Iran's past actions in the Gulf. Oman and Dubai, a member
of the United Arab Emirates, are probably the only gen-
uine allies the Shah has in the region. The Gulf Arab
rulers, with their Bedouin heritage, have always found
'
the Shah
s imperial pretensions unsettling.//
//Iraq, which has long wanted to exclude Iranian
power from the Arab side of the Gulf, now sees advantages
to be gained from the likely retrenchment in Iran's
willingness and ability to influence events in the region.
It would not be surprising to see Iraq resume pushing
for formal security arrangements with other Arab states
in the region. The small Gulf states would be leery of
entering into a pact, however. Iraqi leaders want to
avoid a situation in which the USSR could play off Iraq
and Iran to further Soviet ambitions in the re
ion
//
g
.
//Iraq's apparent effort to play an expanded role
in affairs of the Arab world will probably deter it from
reverting to the blatant meddling and subversion it has
used in past largely unsuccessful efforts to extend its
influence in the Gulf. Even so, it will be some time be-
fore Iraq has gained the trust of its Persian Gulf neigh-
bors. The Saudi Arabians, even if they become convinced
that Iraq has turned over a new leaf, would be loath to
see Iraqi forces intervene in any small Gulf state, even
to counter a leftist threat.//
//Some in the Saudi hierarchy, especially the more
traditionalist leaders, probably are in an "I told you
so" mood. For years, the Shah has lectured Saudi leaders
that they must do more to modernize their country or risk
revolution. The Saudis responded by telling the Shah that
the pace of Iranian social change was too fast and that
he would eventually run into trouble.//
//Those Saudis who believe the Shah's problems re-
sult from his program of Westernization will use his
experience to warn of what could happen in Saudi Arabia
if current Saudi programs of industrialization are not
curbed. If this attitude prevails, it could well alienate
Saudi liberals who seek gradual social and political
change. It could over time lead to a split between the
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II-
royal family and the Western-educated commoners who in
recent years have assumed growing importance as managers
and technocrats in the Kingdom,// 25X1
//Dramatic changes in Iran--expecially if a leftist
government emerges--could lead to a period of coolness in
Saudi-US relations. The Saudis could well blame the US
for whatever happens and argue that Iran is another fallen
domino, following Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen.//
//Saudi perceptions of a US "failure" to save the
Shah would lessen significantly the Saudis' sense of US
dependability if Saudi Arabia should face a domestic
crisis. At the same time, however, the Saudis, recogniz-
ing their dependence on the US for arms, might be so
alarmed by a new government in Iran that they would try
to involve the.US in more direct ways in guaranteeing
Persian Gulf stability.// 25X1
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