NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010144-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 144
• Publication Date: December 28, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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Top Secret
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
CG NIQC 78-0301C
28 December 1978 78
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
CONTENTS
IRAN: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TURKEY: Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
USSR: Cosmonaut Post Mission Health. . . . . . . . . 3
AFGHANISTAN: Friendship Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . 7
BRIEFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Algeria
Albania
FEATURE ARTICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
INTERNATIONAL: Jamaican Summit
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IRAN: Situation Report
The situation in Tehran and in several provincial
cities of Iran continues to deteriorate, and efforts by
GhoZam Sadigi to form a civilian government are falter-
ing.
For the first time in several weeks, demonstrators
in Tehran attacked security forces yesterday. The govern-
ment radio reports that several soldiers have been killed
by sniper fire and grenades. A US Embassy source saw a
mob severely beat a policeman, and Army and Air Force
trucks have been set ablaze in the city. I 25X1
//Sadiqi seems to be making very slow progress, if
any, in his efforts to recruit a civilian cabinet. Second-
echelon National Front official Nasser Minatchi expressed
confidence yesterday that Sadiqi would soon announce his
cabinet, but Minatchi was sure of only two selections.
Other sources say that Sadiqi has asked for more time,
even weeks.//
//Minatchi now is extremely nervous about the pros-
pect of violence that the moderate opposition would be 25X1
unable to control. National Front leader Sanjabi, in an 25X1
obvious effort not to be outdistanced by events, has
participated in some of the demonstrations.//
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TURKEY: Situation Report
//Turkey is relatively calm but tense following the
imposition of martial law in 13 strife-torn provinces
earlier this week. Reaction to the government's decision
has been mixed but eneraZZ avorable
//The military commanders in the affected provinces
have adopted low profiles, particularly in the major
cities. At least some officers, doubtless with an eye to
events in neighboring Iran, seem apprehensive about the
adverse effect that any confrontation with extremists
might have on the prestige of the military. Nonetheless,
at this stage they seem determined to carry out their
mission.//
Life is returning to normal in the provincial town
of Maras, where the death toll from the rioting last week-
end has exceeded 100, but there have been reports of un-
rest in an eastern province not under martial law, as
well as isolated incidents in major cities.
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evera sma emons ra-
ions and five bomb explosions were also repor~ed in
Izmir, which is also not under military rule.
Prime Minister Ecevit's Republican People's Party
has grudgingly acquiesced in the government's decision
to impose martial law. A substantial minority of its par-
liamentary members, mostly on the left, voted against the
decision in the party caucus, although all voted in favor
once the issue came before the Grand National Assembly on
Tuesday.
The three opposition parties also voted for martial
law, but only the Islamic-oriented National Salvation
Party--which is hoping for a role in Ecevit's govern-
ment--seems to be giving the measure full backing. The
largest opposition party, the Justice Party, and the neo-
fascist National Action Party have taunted Ecevit for re-
sorting to martial law, even though they voted their
approval.
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USSR: Cosmonaut Post Mission Health
The two Soviet cosmonauts who ended a record 140-
day space mission in November have readapted to earth
conditions quickly and, as a result, we expect the next
crew to attempt to man SaZ ut-6 or 180 days or more be-
ginning early next year. 25X1
Soviet medical specialists had anticipated an adjust-
ment period of one month at a special readaptation unit
followed by another month of adjustment outdoors. The
cosmonauts required only three to four days, however,
to complete the acute readaptation period and were well
on their way to complete readjustment within 10 days.
The short readaptation period probably is a result of
changes made to the flight program, particularly to the
exercise regimen, after an analysis of the condition of
two other cosmonauts who had been in space for 96 da s
and had difficulty adapting to earth's gravity. 125X1
The cosmonauts did display a minor loss of muscle
tone, atrophy, and a heightened reflex response to mus-
cle irritation, but they did not need any medication,
and their blood had fewer anomalies than that of the
two previous cosmonauts. II 25X1
The 140-day mission enabled medical specialists to
study the average 120-day life cycle of human red blood
cells in weightless conditions. Hemoglobin and red blood
cell counts diminished only moderately, and blood volume
remained about constant. Red blood cells produced in
space tended to be smaller than those produced on earth.
There were no irreversible changes in the cardiovascular
or nervous systems. As a result of the extended weight-
less condition, the circumference of one cosmonaut's
hip diminished by about 1.5 centimeters and the other's
by 4 centimeters, but these measurements returned to
normal within two weeks. F_ I 25X1
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AFGHANISTAN: Friendship Treaty
//Afghan Leaders apparently have gained greater con-
fidence both in dealing with the domestic opposition and
in pursuing foreign policy goals since Afghanistan signed
the peace and friendship treaty with the USSR early this 25X1
month. The Afghans have warned that, while their country
hopes to avoid calling for Soviet help, the regime, "if
pushed, might not have any other option."//
Last week, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Min-
ister Amin--the second highest ranking Afghan Government
official--told the US Ambassador that the new treaty
gives Afghanistan adequate assurances of Soviet assist-
ance to "defend the revolution" in case of "interference."
He warned that the government is aware of foreign sub-
versive efforts--presumably from Pakistan--is prepared
to take "decisive steps," and might require the "neces-
sary assistance." He denied, however, that any formal
military agreement exists between the USSR and Afghani-
stan.
There is no indication that the Soviets have in
fact offered Afghanistan blanket assurances regarding 25X1
security. The recent treaty, unlike other Soviet friend-
ship treaties with developing countries, omits any pledge
of mutual consultation if either party is threatened. II
//Amin's interpretation of the treaty also contrasts25X1
with reports that negotiations in Moscow before its sign-
ing--particularly those on political issues--were "not
satisfactory" to the Afghans.
//Amin's belief in a Soviet commitment may bolster
the regime's confidence in dealing with domestic unrest
and further strain Afghan-Pakistani relations. Tribal
rebellions broke out soon after the leftist regime seized
power in April and have since intensified. Afghanistan
may believe that the Pakistani Government is either sup-
porting the dissidents or not doing enough to prevent
Pakistani tribal and religious groups from aiding them,
although Pakistan has been very circumspect and has
sought to prevent Afghan refugees from engaging in cross-
border operations.// 25X1
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If he is convinced that the Soviets will support the
regime as necessary, Amin may eventually choose to heat
up the Pushtunistan territorial dispute with Pakistan.
No Afghan government has ever accepted the present inter-
national border with Pakistan, and the current regime has
taken a hard line on the "national rights" of the Baluch
and Pushtun peoples in Pakistan's two western provinces.
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Algeria
National Assembly President Bitat's assumption of
the duties of chief of state yesterday indicates that the
constitutional succession process is being followed, if
only to obtain additional time to work out leadership ar-
rangements. Thousands of Algerians took to the streets of
Algiers in an emotional homage to the dead President Bou-
mediene yesterday. Various world leaders also offered
tribute; Egyptian President Sadat, who had become es-
tranged from Boumediene over negotiations with Israel,
recalled Algeria's provision of $100 million for Soviet
arms during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
//Algerian students participating in the demonstra-
tions scuffled with police and broke store windows in
downtown Algiers, apparently because some shopkeepers
failed to close their businesses. Police appeared to
have little difficulty controlling the demonstration.
some 10,000 additional police
and gendarmerie had been transferred to the vicinity of
Algiers over the past month to bolster the government's
ability to control such demonstrations.// 25X1
Albania reappointed its entire cabinet at a parlia-
mentary session earlier this week. The move would seem to
indicate that the regime does not contemplate any radical
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changes in its current economic and foreign policies de-
spite the loss of Chinese economic assistance last July.
The session also confirmed Prime Minister Mahmet
Shehu, a close associate of party leader Enver Hoxha.
Shehu retains the defense portfolio, which he has held
since 1974. This suggests that the regime perceives a
continued need to maintain strong party supervision over
the military.
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//Jamaican Prime Minister Manley will be host at
a two-day meeting of world Leaders that begins today in
Jamaica to discuss Third World perspectives on global
economic problems. Six other heads of government--West
German Chancellor Schmidt, Prime Ministers Trudeau of
Canada, Nordli of Norway, and Fraser of Australia, as
well as Venezuelan President Perez and Nigerian Head of
State Obasanjo--will attend.// 25X1
//These leaders view the summit as an inexpensive
opportunity to enhance their political statures by pre-
senting ideas for the implementation of the developing
countries' goal of a New International Economic Order.
Manley has timed the meeting to bolster his declining
domestic position by demonstrating his still consider-
able international political standing. The limited time
and the informal agenda--the participants have made no
formal commitment to negotiate any issue--will, however,
limit the impact of the summit on the North-South dia-
logue.// I
//Manley's summit does not have broad interna-
tional support. US, British, and Japanese leaders will
be absent. Some developing countries, especially the
Latin Americans, have opposed Manley's initiative because
they fear that the summit's limited participation will
increase the developing countries' difficulties in co-
ordinating their positions for future negotiations with
the industrialized states. These critics apparently be-
lieve that the Jamaica meeting contravenes the develop-
ing country position--formulated at the 32nd UN General
Assembly--that the North-South dialogue should take
place within the UN framework.//
//Chancellor Schmidt will be a key participant. He
is apparently personally committed to the meeting and
has encouraged Manley in his plans, but he nevertheless
insisted on an informal conference rather than a formal
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summit. The West Germans have increasingly felt the
need for a new dimension in the North-South dialogue.
Some officials, including Schmidt, favor an expanded and
improved commodity earnings stablilization program--
like that of the European Community's Lome Convention--
as a means to move the negotiations into a more practi-
cal phase. The Lome Convention ties the EC to some 50
developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific.//
leader among the developing countries.//
//The participation of Nigeria, black Africa's
leading economic power and a member of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is particularly sig-
nificant. The Nigerians believe they must participate
in the summit in order to confirm their status as a
resources to other developing countries.//
//Venezuela's Perez, who will leave office in March,
takes a special interest in international economic policy.
Venezuela is the only OPEC member that has supported
Jamaica's contention that oil producers should transfer
70 percent of its foreign exchange earnings.//
Manley's major foreign policy goals is to secure com-
pensatory aid from OPEC countries. Jamaica also wants
to maintain remunerative prices for its bauxite and
sugar exports that, together with tourism, account for
//Manley's popularity at home is at its lowest
point since he came to power in 1972, largely because
of his failure to deal with economic problems. Jamaica
has been hard hit by the rise in oil prices, and one of
//Although Jamaicans are generally still more pros-
perous than the people of most developing countries,
they have been badly hurt by the country's sharp eco-
nomic decline. Manley's party has steadily lost popular
support since it routed the opposition by a wide margin
in elections two years ago. If present trends persist,
it may well be defeated in the parliamentary election
that must be held by 1981.//
//The summit will thus be a major event in Jamaica,
but the political benefits for Manley will be short-
lived. While Jamaicans have long appreciated Manley's
international successes, they are now far more concerned
about economic problems that they attribute to his mis-
management.//
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//The international impact of the summit will prob-
ably be limited. Manley's prediction that the two-day
meeting will have an energizing effect on the implementa-
tion of the New International Economic Order is almost
certain to fall wide of the mark.// II 25X1
//It is likely that the fears of those developing
countries opposed to Manley's initiative will prove un-
founded. The meeting probably will not seriously com-
plicate North-South negotiations in UN forums. At most,
the participants in Jamaica will exchange ideas on strat-
egies for transferring resources from richer to poorer
countries.//I j
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