NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 15, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
o~tday
15 ~Ta~tuar~ .1979
-State Dept. review completed
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Special Analyses
Iran: Post-Shah Era 10
Overnight Reports . . 16
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The Shah's appointment of a Regency CouneiZ this
weekend sets the stage for his departure, which could
come at any time. In the following assessment, we re-
examine the position of key individuals and present sev-
eral scenarios on how the situation in Iran may develop
once the Shah leaves.
The members of the Regency Council all represent
the establishment and are thus unlikely to appeal to
the opposition. Ayatollah Khomeini has already denounced
the Council as illegal; National Front leader Sanjabi
told US officials yesterday that he would not cooperate
with the Council or any other entity that lacks
Khomeini's approval.
Prime Minister Bakhtiar's government will almost
certainly be approved this week by the Senate, but the
vote in the lower house of par-liament, the Majlis, is in
Once the Shah leaves, we expect Bakhtiar will try
to take credit for his departure. Some moderates in the
opposition may try to give Bakhtiar breathing room out
of fear of a military coup or a takeover by Khomeini,
whom Bakhtiar has already invited to return.
Bakhtiar faces formidable obstacles to holding
onto power. He has no popular support and is regarded
as a tool of the Shah b man in the o osition, in-
cluding Sanjabi.
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Bakhtiar's best hope is to present himself as the
only alternative to a military coup and chaos. He will
argue that his government is essential to the transition
to a new era. We doubt that he will be able to restore
any semblance of order, however, unless he moves to
brin into the overnment persons acceptable to Khomeini.
trigger civil war.
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Islamic Republic
Judging by his recent comments, Khomeini clearly
believes he is close, to achieving his goal of establish- 25X1
ing an Islamic republic but is worried by the prospects
of a militar coup.
Khomeini p ans o re urn o ran so
o gui e ~ e revo ution. He will undoubtedly be greeted
by mass adulation, and any effort to arrest him might 25X1
Military Coup
The only major barrier between Khomeini and power
is the military.
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If the senior officers arrest opposition leaders
and are able to order key units to suppress demonstra-
tions, they may succeed in the short term in restoring
order in Tehran and some other cities. It is uncertain,
however, whether the military can maintain order through-
out the country and get the economy moving. Some members
of the opposition may be cowed by a brutal crackdown,
but Khomeini's hardcore followers are likely to turn to
terrorism.
If the military moved to make some accommodation
with the opposition and broke with the Shah, it might
stand a chance of achieving a longer term political
solution and of securing the cooperation of the majority
of the labor force. Should the leaders of a coup insist
on the retention of the Shah and fail to revive the
economy, they risk a countercoup by officers more will-
ing to make a deal with the opposition.
The left probably cannot come to power without
military support. We have no evidence of leftist sym-
pathies in the military. Senior military officers as
well as many prominent members of the opposition, in-
cluding Khomeini, over the past few weeks have expressed
deep concern about recent increased activit by radical
leftists.
The pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party and other left-
ists probably hope that once the Shah departs the
Bakhtiar government or its successors will allow free
political activity and grant an amnesty that would per-
mit the return of veteran party cadre now in exile in
Eastern Europe. The Tudeh has shown in the past that it
can take advantage of opportunities to make rapid strides
and is doubtless exploiting the collapse of Iranian
antisubversive a encies to reconstitute its organiza-
tion.
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(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the intelligence community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from
the production offices of NFAC.)
The Senate today approved the Bakhtiar government by
a vote of 38 to 2, according to a press report. One mem-
ber abstained, and 19 members were not on hand. The
lower house is ex ected to vote on the government tomor-
row.
Jordan
The US Embassy in Amman reports that Armed Forces
Commander in Chief Bin Shakir yesterday complained to
Ambassador Veliotes about Washington's diversion to North
Yemen of F-5Es initially intended for Jordan. He said
that the diversion, coupled with other military supply
problems over the past 18 months, have led Amman to be-
lieve that such actions were taken because of its atti-
tude toward the Camp David agreements or because the US
no longer desires a close military relationship with
Jordan. Bin Shakir affirmed that Jordan wants that re-
lationship maintained and noted that Amman last month
turned down an Iraqi offer of 150 Soviet-built T-55
tanks. He told the Ambassador that King Hussein would
also be discussing the diversion with him.
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 Top Secret ~
Top Secret
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