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December 15, 2016
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March 31, 2004
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January 15, 1979
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8.pdf219.82 KB
25X1 pproved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0310009j78 O~c~tet Director of Central Intelligence o~tday 15 ~Ta~tuar~ .1979 -State Dept. review completed .Approved Fore Release 2004/07/08 : C1A-RDP79T00975A03100 25X1 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Special Analyses Iran: Post-Shah Era 10 Overnight Reports . . 16 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031 800070002-8 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 25X1 The Shah's appointment of a Regency CouneiZ this weekend sets the stage for his departure, which could come at any time. In the following assessment, we re- examine the position of key individuals and present sev- eral scenarios on how the situation in Iran may develop once the Shah leaves. The members of the Regency Council all represent the establishment and are thus unlikely to appeal to the opposition. Ayatollah Khomeini has already denounced the Council as illegal; National Front leader Sanjabi told US officials yesterday that he would not cooperate with the Council or any other entity that lacks Khomeini's approval. Prime Minister Bakhtiar's government will almost certainly be approved this week by the Senate, but the vote in the lower house of par-liament, the Majlis, is in Once the Shah leaves, we expect Bakhtiar will try to take credit for his departure. Some moderates in the opposition may try to give Bakhtiar breathing room out of fear of a military coup or a takeover by Khomeini, whom Bakhtiar has already invited to return. Bakhtiar faces formidable obstacles to holding onto power. He has no popular support and is regarded as a tool of the Shah b man in the o osition, in- cluding Sanjabi. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A0310 - Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 25X1 Bakhtiar's best hope is to present himself as the only alternative to a military coup and chaos. He will argue that his government is essential to the transition to a new era. We doubt that he will be able to restore any semblance of order, however, unless he moves to brin into the overnment persons acceptable to Khomeini. trigger civil war. 25X1 Islamic Republic Judging by his recent comments, Khomeini clearly believes he is close, to achieving his goal of establish- 25X1 ing an Islamic republic but is worried by the prospects of a militar coup. Khomeini p ans o re urn o ran so o gui e ~ e revo ution. He will undoubtedly be greeted by mass adulation, and any effort to arrest him might 25X1 Military Coup The only major barrier between Khomeini and power is the military. Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 25X1 25X1 If the senior officers arrest opposition leaders and are able to order key units to suppress demonstra- tions, they may succeed in the short term in restoring order in Tehran and some other cities. It is uncertain, however, whether the military can maintain order through- out the country and get the economy moving. Some members of the opposition may be cowed by a brutal crackdown, but Khomeini's hardcore followers are likely to turn to terrorism. If the military moved to make some accommodation with the opposition and broke with the Shah, it might stand a chance of achieving a longer term political solution and of securing the cooperation of the majority of the labor force. Should the leaders of a coup insist on the retention of the Shah and fail to revive the economy, they risk a countercoup by officers more will- ing to make a deal with the opposition. The left probably cannot come to power without military support. We have no evidence of leftist sym- pathies in the military. Senior military officers as well as many prominent members of the opposition, in- cluding Khomeini, over the past few weeks have expressed deep concern about recent increased activit by radical leftists. The pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party and other left- ists probably hope that once the Shah departs the Bakhtiar government or its successors will allow free political activity and grant an amnesty that would per- mit the return of veteran party cadre now in exile in Eastern Europe. The Tudeh has shown in the past that it can take advantage of opportunities to make rapid strides and is doubtless exploiting the collapse of Iranian antisubversive a encies to reconstitute its organiza- tion. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A031 - 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/08- : CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 (The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.) The Senate today approved the Bakhtiar government by a vote of 38 to 2, according to a press report. One mem- ber abstained, and 19 members were not on hand. The lower house is ex ected to vote on the government tomor- row. Jordan The US Embassy in Amman reports that Armed Forces Commander in Chief Bin Shakir yesterday complained to Ambassador Veliotes about Washington's diversion to North Yemen of F-5Es initially intended for Jordan. He said that the diversion, coupled with other military supply problems over the past 18 months, have led Amman to be- lieve that such actions were taken because of its atti- tude toward the Camp David agreements or because the US no longer desires a close military relationship with Jordan. Bin Shakir affirmed that Jordan wants that re- lationship maintained and noted that Amman last month turned down an Iraqi offer of 150 Soviet-built T-55 tanks. He told the Ambassador that King Hussein would also be discussing the diversion with him. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975A031060~70002-8 25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8 Top Secret ~ Top Secret Approved For Release 2004/07/08 :CIA-RDP79T00975A031000070002-8