NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031000090001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
17 January 1979
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
op`gs,c
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Situation Reports
Nicaragua: Possible Mediation Rebuff . .
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South Africa: Fuel Depots in Namibia .
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Overnight Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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Iranian opposition leaders are planning massive
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z s ans or re urn-n
With the Shah having departed, the chances for the
survival of Prime Minister Bakhtiar's government will be
largely determined by Khomeini's next move; he has gen-
erally acted cautiously in the past.
Bakhtiar's government would almost certainly col-
lapse if Khomeini returns soon. If he waits until his
followers work out some understanding with Bakhtiar, it
is possible that Bakhtiar could survive long enough to
preside over an orderly transition. The immediate fate
of Iran thus appears to hinge on Khomeini's decision.
Khomeini's incentives for returning to Iran now are
high--he may well be at the peak of his power and influ-
ence and probably believes his return would sweep away
the Bakhtiar government. At the same time, he is proba-
bly concerned about the possibility of a move by the
military.
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The demonstrations on Friday will mark the end of
the traditional 40-day mourning period since Ashura, the
holiest day in Shia Islam. There is little doubt that 25X1
the religious opposition will be able again to mobilize
hundreds of thousands of marchers to celebrate the Shah's
departure.
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Some members of the opposition are becoming concerned
by the prospect of Khomeini's return, fearing that secular
leaders would be i nored if Khomeini establishes an Is-
lamic republic.
These fears reflect the opposition leaders' recog-
nition that, while they have some supporters among intel-
lectual and professional groups, Khomeini commands the
support of the masses. They hope that Khomeini can be
persuaded to sta in exile until the emotions of the
moment subside.
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President Somoza is likely to respond negatively by
Friday's deadline to the international mediators' propo-
sal for a plebiscite and transitional government. Somo-
za's military position continues to appear favorable and
may be enhanced b the presence of OAS observers.
I
Rather than outright rejection, Somoza will prob-
ably focus on the "inadequacies" of the proposal--such
as a prohibition on voter preregistration--and on the
"intransigence" of the Broad Opposition Front.
Somoza's confidence has been increasingly bolstered
by his belief that he can cope with the guerrillas and
that the Broad Opposition Front, a collection of rela-
tively moderate political groups, is dissolving. The
political atmosphere does in fact seem to be becoming
more radical with the threat of further defections from
the Broad Front and the formation of a new, more leftist
coalition, the National Patriotic Front.
By fostering this greater polarization and arguing
that his regime is the "only alternative" to a Marxist
guerrilla takeover, Somoza may hope to win US support.
The Nicaraguan Foreign Vice-Minister has already "offi-
cially" asked the US what reforms Somoza could enact
to improve relations with the US. He also advised the
US that Somoza will remain in control during the next
two years.
The military situation remains static--but in
Somoza's favor. The imminent arrival of several OAS ob-
servers at the Costa Rica - Nicaragua border will com-
plicate the guerrillas' access to sanctuaries in Costa
Rica. The guerrillas appear to be less bold than they
once were. If they continue to concentrate on urban
harassment rather than strike at the more vulnerable
National Guard outposts in rural areas, the military
balance favoring Somoza is unlikely to change.
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Walvis Bay
(South Africa)
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Angola
Fuel
Depot
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SOUTH AFRICA: Fuel Depots in Namibia
South Africa is building two fuel depots in Namibia
for military convoys in the event of an increased threat
by guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's organi-
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in the Angolan border area. The depots, next to
will accom-
l
i
,
enta
key highways near Karasburg and Mar
ents.
ontin
t
g
c
e small security and or
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(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the intelligence community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from
the production offices of NFAC.)
Iraq-US
In a front-page editorial yesterday, the Baath
Party newspaper termed the current visit of US F-15s to
Saudi Arabia a "provocation and a cover for other inter-
vention." It also warned against alleged US efforts to
exploit regional instability and claimed that Baghdad
is maintaining a neutral position on events in Iran.
The US Interests Section in Baghdad comments that the
style and tone of the editorial, combined with its dis-
cussion of substantive issues previously avoided by
Iraqi media, suggest it was written, or at least cleared,
at the highest level. F77 I
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USSR-Japan
The US Embassy in Moscow reports it has learned
from a Japanese diplomat that Soviet Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Firyubin earlier this month suggested that March
would be a good time for his official visit to Japan.
Firyubin had postponed the visit following the signing
of the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty last
August. The Embassy comments that Moscow's more posi-
tive stance on relations with the Japanese has probably
been strongly influenced by the normalization of Sino-US
relations, but adds that it does not expect any early,
dramatic progress in Soviet-Japanese ties. According to
the Japanese diplomat, Tokyo would be willing to sign a
long-term economic agreement with the USSR only if Presi-
dent Brezhnev or Premier Kos in were prepared to pay an
official visit to Japan.
The new cabinet announced yesterday includes most
of those in the previous government of President Padilla,
which had resigned en bloc Monday night. The US Embassy
comments that the episode appears to be a purely military
affair reflecting institutional strains developing since
the coup of late November that ousted the government of
Juan Pereda. Some senior military officers apparently
had been disturbed by the fact that younger officers
serving in the cabinet--three lost their posts yester-
day--were too liberal in pushing reforms aimed at re-
storing civilian rule through the elections still set
for 1 July. F7 I
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Intelligence 25
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
I uuuuu0C
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COPY
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Situation Reports
Vietnam-Kampuchea
Briefs and Comments
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USSR: Criticism of Yugoslavia on Indochina . . 2
TURKEY: Martial Law Continues. . . . ... . . . 3
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ISRAEL: View on Self-Government Plan . . . . . 4
ISRAEL: Commando Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
USSR-LIBYA: F-Class Submarine. . . . . . . . . 6
GREENLAND: Home RuZe . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Overnight Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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Kampuchean units have reportedly recaptured the port
of Kompong Som, which fell to the Vietnamese on.10 Jan-
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uary. Kampuchean resistance appears to be increasin
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The loss of Kompong Som--the first major setback
for the Vietnamese since they launched their offensive-- 25X1
almost certainly will be short-lived. The Vietnamese
have fallen back, but are likely to send reinforcements.
We believe the Kampucheans will withdraw into the nearby
mountains rather than fight a set-piece battle with
reinforced Vietnamese troops.
Kampuchean Vice Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs
Ieng Sary has told third-country diplomats in Beijing
(Peking) that Prime Minister Pol Pot and other leaders
are still in Kampuchea organizing the resistance. Ieng
Sary indicated he would return to Kampuchea or tour
friendly countries when he leaves Beijing.
.A Pol Pot-oriented radio station began transmitting
yesterday for the first time since the fall of Phnom
Penh.. The new "Voice of Democratic Kampuchea" apparently
is located in China.
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Some Kampuchean civilians are now apparently sup-
porting the Vietnamese, but in Svay Rieng City many of
them are probably refugees who had been living in Viet-
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USSR: Criticism of Yugoslavia on Indochina
Pravda yesterday accused the Yugoslav press of join-
ing Western "slanderers" who charge Vietnam with invading
Kampuchea. The sharply worded commentary introduces a
new chill into Soviet-Yugoslav relations and raises
doubts about any near-term summit between Presidents
Tito and Brezhnev.
Although the article only criticized the media in
Yugoslavia, the commentary applies as well to Romania,
which has also supported Kampuchea. Even worse in Soviet
eyes, both Yugoslavia and Romania have significantly im-
proved their relations with China over the past year.
Pravda's sharp criticism of Yugoslav journalists
and its failure to mention the Romanian press probably
reflect Moscow's aggravation at Belgrade's continued
needling. The Romanians have thus far not returned to
the subject after their initial criticism of the Viet-
namese action.
The timing of the Soviet criticism also is signif-
icant. Pravda's comments follow a Soviet veto in the UN
Security Council blocking a resolution calling for the
withdrawal of Vietnamese military forces from Kampuchea.
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Support for the resolution by China
the nonaligned
,
states, and the West underscored Moscow's isolation.
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President Brezhnev continues his visit at a resort
near Sofia. He may use his Bulgarian platform to issue
a major foreign policy announcement, perhaps includin
remarks about China and the need for bloc unity.
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On Brezhnev's arrival in Sofia, he seemed extremely
tired, his face heavily lined and his speech slow and
slurred. His doctors may well have advised him to leave
Moscow for a rest.
Brezhnev is accompanied by newly elected Politburo
member Konstantin Chernenko. In the past year Chernenko
has frequently been present during Brezhnev's talks with
East European leaders and may be assumin reater responsi-
bilities for bilateral party relations.
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Martial Zaw has reduced the violence in Turkey but
politically motivated killings continue and a crisis
atmosphere pervades much of the country. Far from
uniting behind Prime Minister Ecevit, opposition po-
litical groups are actively seeking opportunities to
topple him. Ecevit seems likely to survive for the
time being, but even if he does Turkey's problems will
remain severe.
After three weeks, martial law is still relatively
popular in Turkey. Although there has been some reduc-
tion of tensions, the urban population is uneasy and
several hundred people have-been arrested for violating
restrictions. Troops have become an irritant to some
and a reminder to all that Turkey is in a political
crisis.
Politicians have disregarded pleas for a common ef-
fort to maintain democratic stability. Justice Party
leader Demirel now attacks nearly every facet of
Ecevit's policy during daily news conferences. Many
Justice Party leaders believe they will return to power
this year, perhaps as early as March.
Ecevit's Republican People's Party has become in-
creasingly fractious; left- and rightwing rivals are
capitalizing on his reduced popularity by demanding po-
litical concessions as the price for their continued
loyalty. A skilled tactician, Ecevit has thus far
fended off these rivals. His rivals, however, have
yet to come up with an acceptable alternative.
No matter how the current political struggle ends,
Turkey is in for a long period of political and econo-
mic uncertainty. Martial law may temporarily cure some
of the symptoms of the unrest, but the basic problems--
including sectarian differences, a cumbersome educational
system, high unemployment, and soaring inflation--per-
sist and will present a serious obstacle to Turkish
stability for some time.
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ISRAEL: View on Self-Government Plan
//Most Israelis are increasingly skeptical that the
Plan for self-government in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip that was worked out at Camp David can or should
be implemented, according to an assessment by the US
Embassy in Tel Aviv. The Embassy believes there is a
general feeling in Israel that Prime Minister Begin's
interpretation of the plan will be impossible to sell to
the US or Egypt and that he is likely to come under
25X1 strong pressure to make significant--and dangerous--
concessions. The major political parties are starting
to think about alternative solutions for the West Bank.//
//Most Israelis, according to the Embassy, believe
that a Palestinian self-governing authority with meaning-
ful control over its own affairs will inevitably lead to
a Palestinian state. In a recent poll, 60 percent of
those queried agreed that "in the long run" this would
happen. Begin's assurances that Israel would not allow
a Palestinian state and would retain control over secu-
rity, water rights, and settlement affairs apparently do
25X1 not impress most Israelis.//
Hardliners in Israel's ruling coalition are at-
tempting to get the cabinet to spell out its view of the
self-governing authority before negotiations with Egypt
are resumed. Some rightwing legislators recently sub-
mitted a bill--apparently designed to prevent Begin from
making concessions--calling for Israeli trusteeship over
25X1 West Bank water and state lands.
The opposition Labor Party, which once supported
the self-governing plan, is beginning to have doubts and
is offering a compromise solution--under which populated
areas of the West Bank would be returned to Jordan and
strategic areas around the Jordan Valley would be re-
tained. other political parties are also seeking al-
ternatives but, apart from a general belief that the
framework outlined at Camp David would not work, there
25X1 is little agreement.
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ISRAEL: Commando Raid
//The US Defense Attache in Tel Aviv believes the Is-
raeli attack Monday night on a Palestinian commando base
near Tyre in southern Lebanon may have been a "routine
action spurred by intelligence" rather than a reprisal
for the terrorist incident at Maalot Saturday. An Is-
raeli commando team Monday night destroyed a house
thought to have been a terrorist haven while Israeli
patrol boats exchanged fire with Palestinian artillery
located in a nearby refugee camp. The Israelis have
acknowledged the raid, but assert that it was not in
retaliation for the Maalot incident. If this is the
case, another Israeli attack against Palestinian facili-
ties in southern Lebanon will likely take place soon.//
//A Soviet F-class diesel-powered attack submarine
was sighted in the Baltic yesterday flying a Libyan en-
sign, indicating the delivery of Libya's fourth F-class
submarine. Libya reportedly will receive a total of
six F-class submarines; one was delivered in 1976 and
25X1 two in 1977.//
Greenland's voters are expected to approve home
rule in a referendum today. Denmark will continue to
handle most foreign policy matters, including the is-
land's relations with NATO. The small US-NATO presence
has not generated local opposition as part of the drive
for self-determination, and none is likely to develop.
Danish subsidies will continue to provide a substantial
portion of the island's income; exploratory oil drilling
produced nothing and has been suspended. Greenland, un-
less given special exceptions on fisheries policies,
could decide to withdraw from the EC, following the ex-
ample of the Faeroe Islands, which have home rule under
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(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the intelligence community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from
the production offices of NFAC.)
//Dutch Foreign Minister Van Der Klaauw, responding
to a question in parliament, has publicly complained of
the "incorrect French attitude" in failing to inform its
EC partners about the Guadeloupe summit. He asserted
that his government did not consider itself bound by any
agreements reached there. The US Embassy comments that
Van Der Klaauw's statement is much sharper than his
private remarks to Ambassador Joseph on 3 January. The
US Mission at NATO reports that permanent representatives
to the alliance will meet privately today for further
talks on the Guadeloupe summit. Yesterday's session was
postponed, apparently at the request of the Italian
delegation.//
El Salvador
//Groups from the United Popular Action Front yester-
day simultaneously occupied the Mexican Embassy, the
headquarters of the OAS, and--for a brief period--the
office of the International Red Cross in San Salvador.
According to the press, the FAPU took hostages, demanded
the release of political prisoners, publication of an
antigovernment manifesto, and a general amnesty.
COMMENT: FAPU is the Leftist front for the Armed
Forces for National Resistance, the country's second
Largest terrorist group. It specializes in kidnappings
and currently holds three foreign businessmen. Occupa-
tion of foreign offices has been a highly successful
FAPU publicity tactic. The police generaZZy do not
interfere, and past occupations have ended peacefully.
The inclusion of the Mexican Embassy is designed to em-
barrass President Romero, who is scheduled to visit
Mexico Later this week.//
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