NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031000160002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 25, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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State Dept. review completed Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Situation Reports
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Yugoslavia: Rivalries Continue . . . . . . . . 4
India: Janata Party Unity . . . . . . . . . . . 8
European Monetary System: Dispute . . . . . . . 9
Malta: European Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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USSR: Reaction to State of Union Message . . . 8
Argentina-Chile: Vatican Mediation
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Special Analysis
Syria-Iraq: A Temporary AZZiance . . . . . . . 11
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The military governor of Tehran announced Zast night
that all Iranian airports will be closed until Sunday.
The decision to close the airports indicates that nego-
tiations between the military and the opposition have
broken down.
The confusion yesterday over whether the airport in
Tehran would be opened probably indicates that further
negotiations were in progress during the day but reached
no result.
Friday.
Bakhtiar and the military may be trying to press
Khomeini into accepting some power-sharing arrangement
before he returns to the country. It is unlikely that
Khomeini will change his position, and his entourage
continues to insist that he will try to go to Iran on
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If the military and Bakhtiar decide to stick by
their decision and prevent Khomeini's return, we expect
the opposition to respond with more demonstrations and
strikes to force the government's downfall. Large demon-
strations had already been planned for Friday to cele-
brate Khomeini's homecoming. 25X1
Bakhtiar continues to insist that he will not turn
power over to Khomeini. The closure of the airports is
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likely to identify the Prime Minister further with the
military and the Shah and reduce what little popular ap-
peal Bakhtiar has.
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25X1 YUGOSLAVIA: Rivalries Continue
persona rivalries in the
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differ on some basic policy issues.//
Leadership remain acute and aspects of the collective
rule system introduced by President Tito last October
are in contention. The main protagonists--Stane Dolanc,
secretary of the Presidium, and Vladimir Bakarie, the
senior Croat in President Tito's inner circle--also
lective forums at that level.//
//At the party congress in June, Tito tapped Dolanc
to run the ruling Presidium, thus strengthening his suc-
cession claim by elevating him to first among equals.
Bakaric led the opposition to Dolanc's effort to estab-
lish himself as the preeminent candidate to succeed Tito
in the party. The conflict led Tito to introduce the
collective leadership scheme in the Presidium and to
argue for its adoption throughout the party. Under the
collective scheme, Tito appointed Branko Mikulic, a
Bakaric ally, to head the Presidium in a rotational o-
sition as chairman for one year.//
//Since the first of the year, Dolanc has made sev-
eral speeches that emphasize a moderate approach to in-
ternal political dissent, which directly contravene
Bakaric's position. Dolanc's failure to refer publicly
to the new collective leadership principle may well mean
he is playing to a reported wave of unhappiness in the
regional parties over Tito's order to also introduce col-
and counterbalanced against each other.
While Tito's still in charge, there is little
chance of a decisive resolution of the test of wills
between Bakaric and Dolanc. Tito's ruling style is to
keep his potential successors uncertain of their status
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MALTA: European Aid
//Libya, France, and Italy so far have failed to
formulate a joint response to Malta's demand for eco-
nomic aid after the scheduled British military withdrawal
on 31 March. Meanwhile, the USSR again has indicated a
strong desire to establish a presence in Malta.//
//Italy, in particular, fears that continued lack of
progress on a European aid package will encourage closer
bilateral relations between Malta and Libya. Maltese
Prime Minister Mintoff claims to have concluded "defense
arrangements" with Libya. There is no evidence to sup-
port his claim--despite his frequent assertions that
Libya is ready to come to his rescue. The US Embassy
in Valletta, however, believes that negotiations may be
in progress.//
//During a recent meeting with French and Italian of-
ficials, Libyan officials reiterated their government's
willingness to help Malta--through both project assist-
ance and direct budgetary grants--and requested the Eu-
ropeans to match this assistance. French law, however,
forbids giving cash aid, and Italy can grant such aid
only with parliamentary consent.//
//The-Soviets hope to expand access to port facili-
ties on the strategically located island, but Mintoff's
demands, including stringent controls on Soviet activity,
have always been too high a price to pay. Earlier this
month, a Soviet delegation visited Malta to discuss
bunkering rights for Soviet commercial ships and landing
rights for Aeroflot aircraft, as well as opening Malta
to Soviet tourism, but the talks reportedly were incon-
clusive. Soviet access to Malta would be highly un-
popular with the Maltese population and a public setback
to Mintoff's much touted neutrality policy.//
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USSR: Reaction to State of Union Message
Initial Soviet media reaction to President Carter's
State of the Union message mixes a largely straightfor-
ward and positive account of his remarks on the impor-
tance of US-Soviet cooperation and the necessity of SALT
with familiar criticism of alleged US reliance on mili-
tary force. TASS carried a relatively upbeat summary of
the President's comments about SALT--consistent with
other recent optimistic Soviet public assessments--but
criticized his statement that he would not sign an agree-
ment unless national security were thereby strengthened
and US deterrent forces remain extremely strong.
INDIA: Janata Party Unity
The appointment yesterday of former Home Minister
Charan Singh as finance minister and deputy prime
minister--a newly created post--reduces the threat of
a split in the ruling Janata Party. Singh's open cri-
ticism of Prime Minister Desai's leadership had resulted
in his ouster from the cabinet last June. Desai may
have secured Singh's agreement to return to the cabinet
by assuring him that the government will move ahead with
plans to prosecute former Prime Minister Gandhi for ex-
cesses during her emergency rule. Singh had been highly
critical of Desai's cautious a proach toward Gandhi.
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EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM: Dispute
//Implementation of the European Monetary System,
originally scheduled for 1 January, remains stalled by
a dispute over agricultural pricing policy. Although
active consultations are continuing and there are some
signs of compromise between France and West Germany,
there have been few indications of movement toward even
an interim solution. The UK has complicated the picture
by calling for a fundamental reform of EC agricultural
policy rather than the inflationary half-measures now in
prospect. Most of the potential compromises reported
in the press would postpone any basic decisions and
probably would include some increase in EC-wide farm
prices.//
Vatican spokesman announced yesterday that the
Holy See has agreed to mediate the Beagle Channel dis-
pute between Argentina and Chile that last month nearly
led to armed hostilities. No venue has been selected
and a mediator is yet to be named. Antonio Cardinal
Samore, whose shuttle diplomacy paved the way for
Vatican mediation, appears to be the most likely can-
didate.
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SYRIA-IRAQ: A Temporary Alliance
The three-month-old rapprochement between Syria
and Iraq is the product of mutual concern over the
Israeli-Egyptian peace process and the upheaval in Iran
as well as the narrow tactical considerations of each
side. Although a "unity" scheme between these two tra-
ditional rivals may come soon, it will be fragile and
superficial. Both governments are deeply suspicious
of each other and have rival pretensions for leadership
in the eastern Arab world.
Limited political, economic, and military coopera-
tion between the two is nonetheless likely as long as
their short-term objectives outweigh their permanent
national ambitions. Syrian President Assad and Iraqi
President Bakr may announce agreement in principle to
"unite" their two countries at a summit meeting in
Damascus later this month. Jordan and the Palestine
Liberation Organization may be invited to the final
session or to an immediate postsummit conclave to make
more credible Syria's military threat on Israel's east-
ern front. F7 I
There is little chance of a real integration of
the two countries. Arab groups in Syria and Iraq have
been rivals since the seventh century. Their long-
standing inability to agree on sharing waters of the
Euphrates River, for example, reflects their geopoliti-
cal difficulties.
Religious sectarianism also works against unity;
a Sunni Muslim minority rules in Baghdad and an Alawite
minority regime governs in Damascus. Many Syrians op-
pose a real rapprochement because they fear Iraqi po-
litical subversion.
Since Syria achieved independence in 1946, its fore-
most foreign policy concern has been to preserve national
independence against threats from its neighbors. Syria
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has supported the idea of Arab unity but largely as a
matter of its Baath Party's pan-Arab ideology. Iraq
and Egypt have tried to exploit this tendency in order
to dominate the Syrians. Syria joined the United Arab
Republic with Egypt in 1958, signed a never-implemented
federation agreement with Egypt and Iraq in 1963, and
joined the Confederation of Arab Republics initiated by
Egypt and Libya in 1971. N n tood the test of time.
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The Camp David accords and developments in Iran
are the most important, but not the only, current
sources of affinity between Syria and Iraq. The
Syrians are also attracted by Iraq's oil wealth and view
Iraq's armed forces as a possible reserve that could
enhance Syria's military credibility and its ability
to obtain concessions from Israel in future negotiations.
Iraq sees ties with Syria as the first step toward play-
ing a stronger role in Arab affairs and toward minimiz-
ing Soviet and domestic Communist influence in the
region. Iraq also is concerned about un s spilling
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The various joint committees created in the past
two months to pave the way for unity apparently have
made little progress in the key areas of party, mili-
tary, intelligence, and security matters. Both sides
want Israel to feel increased military pressure, and
thus are likely to hammer out some arrangement for
closer military coordination. The possibilities include:
-- The formation, at least on paper, of a
joint military command.
-- A token Iraqi military presence in Syria,
possibly on the Golan Heights.
-- Contingency planning for deployment of
an Iraqi force to Syria.
The economic results of the rapprochement to date
have been mixed. Transportation services have been
resumed, restrictions on border crossing lifted, and
new commercial and trade contracts signed. Disagree-
ment over distributing waters controlled by Syria through
the Tabaqah Dam on the Euphrates River, however, may
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continue to block the reopening of the Iraq Petroleum
Company pipeline that runs through Syria to the
Mediterranean.
Despite their congruent views toward Camp David,
the two countries have made little apparent progress in
the area of political cooperation. The two international
wings of the Baath Party could be reunited in a scheme
to stress Arab solidarity at the coming summit meeting,
but the depth of the personal antagonisms and ideologi-
cal differences between the two sides would make such a
move only cosmetic. The national leaders of Iraq and
Syria will, in any event, retain ultimate control of
all political activity in their respective countries.
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