NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031100020002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 2, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
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` Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
2 February 1979
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
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Briefs and Comments
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USSR: Views on European Security Talks . . . . 3
Turkey-Libya: Coope
ration Agr
eemen
ts .
Afghanistan: Tribal
Turkey: Progovernmen
Unrest .
t Editor'
. . .
s Murd
. . . . . . 6
er . . . . . 6
Romania: Leadership
Shakeup .
. . .
. . . . . . 8
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USSR: Views on European Security Talks
Soviet officials have recently expressed strong
reservations about the year-old French proposal for a
conference to negotiate proportional reductions in con-
ventional armaments by all signatories of the Helsinki
Final Act in a zone extending "from the Atlantic to the
Urals." The Soviets object to this zone and to the ex-
clusion from the agenda of nuclear weapons and naval
forces. Moscow also fears that the proposed conference
would disrupt the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 25X1
talks and prefer to expand the discussion of security
issues at the Review Conference on Security an Coopera-
tion in Europe, which meets in Madrid in 1980.
A senior French representative who held talks in
Moscow in mid-January characterized the latest Soviet
response to the French proposal as "very negative" but
less than a total rejection. The Soviets, however,
had never before been so direct or explicit in their
criticism. Moscow's harder line probably is calculated
to disabuse the French of the feasibility of their pro-
posed conference while encouraging Paris to pursue its
arms control objectives at the CSCE Review Conference
and by joining the MBFR talks.
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TURKEY-LIBYA: Cooperation Agreements
The agreements reached during Prime Minister Ecevit's
recent visit to Libya, if implemented, could slightly
ease Turkey's serious oil shortage and provide some
needed capital: to bolster its shaky economy. The Turks
remain suspicious of Libya's radical and anti-Western
outlook, however, and the overall relationship between
the two countries is not likely to improve markedly.
Ecevit's trip, which had been pending since Libyan
Prime Minister Jallud visited Ankara last February, was
made primarily for economic reasons. Its timing may
also have been calculated to improve Ecevit's domestic
25X1 political imacre.
In the new agreements, Libya promised to deliver
an additional 3 million tons of oil this year and next
and to extend unspecified amounts of emergency financial
aid to Turkey in cooperation with other Islamic countries.
In return, Libya is to receive more Turkish workers,
and the Turks will augment their training program for
Libyan military personnel. The two governments also
plan an expansion of joint scientific, agricultural, and
25X1 industrial endeavors.
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The Turks, depend on the oil and aid they receive
from Libya, while Libya needs Turkish workers and military
training. The Turks, however, remain suspicious of Lib-
yan President Qadhafi, who has hinted that Libyan aid
will be cut off unless Turkey leaves NATO; he openly ad-
vocates a homeland for the Kurdish minorities in Turkey
and neighoring countries. The Turks also know that Libya
has reneged on past promises and are not likely to count
on either the aid or the oil until it actually arrives.
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AFGHANISTAN: Tribal Unrest
iolent
opposition to the government of Afghanistan may be
spreading, possibly in reaction to the nine-month-old
leftist regime's arrest of religious leaders and its
efforts to implement land reform. The government has
25X1 been unable to quell the tribal revolt under way in
Nangarhar Province and rec_entl sent reinforcements to
mountainous Oru.zgan Province.
ssert that clashes have occurred recently
in ruzgan and also in Parvan Province north of Kabul.
There also has been unrest in and around the southern
city of Qandahar, and the city remains tense. While
tribal opposition probably presents little threat to
the government in the short term, it does represent
a potentially dangerous trend. Opposition to the regime
seems to be growing, and successful resistance could
encourage other disaffected groups to act against the
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TURKEY: Progovernment Editor's Murder
The murder in Istanbul yesterday of one of Turkey's
most prominent newsmen, Apti Ipekci, may indicate that
some rightwing extremist groups have now begun tar-
geting members of the Turkish establishment. If so,
additional assassinations of prominent Turks are likely.
No group has claimed responsibility for the murder, but
the government 'believes rightists were involved. Martial
law authorities may institute more repressive crackdowns
on extremist groups. :Ipekci was the editor of the
moderate, progovernment daily MiZZiyet, and a long-time
confidant of Prime Minister Ecevit and other leading
25X1 Turkish politicians.
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ROMANIA: Leadership Shakeup
//Emil Bobu, a powerful party secretary, was the
chief loser in the major Romanian party and government
shakeup this week. He was demoted to lesser posts in
the government and the trade union apparatus. Although
Bobu has been a close associate of President Ceausescu's
wife, his decline does not seem to reflect a change in
her position as in effect the second most powerful person
in the regime. The former party secretary for foreign re-
lations, Vasile Musat, who replaced Foreign Minister
Andrei in that capacity less than a year ago, also was
demoted. Musat's fall. suggests that Andrei remains Pres-
ident Ceausescu's foremost adviser on foreign policy
matters. The latest personnel changes are in line with
Ceausescu's policies of periodically rotating top offi-
25X1 cials.//
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