NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031100070002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 8, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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sir Vcctor ,1 g secret
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hr _ ` intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
USSR-Iran: Soviet Views on Khomeini .
Vietnam: Food Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Turkey: Another Assassination . . . . . . . . . 7
Belgium: Decision on Troops to Zaire . . . . . 7
International: Wheat Agreement Negotiations . . 8
Special Analyses
Iran: A Crucial Turning Point . . . . . . . . . 9
France: Domestic Politics and Europe . . . . . 12
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Recent Soviet public statements have indicated an
increasingly favorable, but cautious, view of Iranian 25X1
opposition Leader Khomeini. The statements presumably
reflect the USSR's view that it will eventuaZZ be deal-
ing with the government he designates.
Press comment has depicted Khomeini as an anti-
imperialist who would cut military alliances with the
West, curtail arms purchases, and eliminate the US mili-
tary presence in Iran. At the same time, the Soviets
have indicated they have some reservations with parts of 25X1
his plan for an Islamic republic and have implied that
the banned Communist Tudeh Party should be included in
the opposition political movement.
On Sunday, a Leningrad lecturer defended Khomeini
and cast his views in a positive light; this contrasted
with a lecture last week in which the religious leader
was referred to critically. In a recent conversation,
a Soviet diplomat indicated that the more "objective"
Soviet media treatment of Khomeini reflected the conclu-
sion that he represented "progressive" tendencies because
of his support among the Iranian people. He maintained,
however, that the Soviets were trying to take a "neutral"
course because they still have many doubts about him.
I I
The Soviets continue to attack alleged US inten-
tions in Iran. While their charges that the US is plan-
ning a military coup have abated somewhat, the media,
including Pravda, are reprinting charges of US involve- 25X1
ment in alleged assassination plots aimed at Khomeini
and his associates. The US was also accused of trying
to prevent Khomeini's return to Tehran last week.
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VIETNAM: Food Shortages
//The effects of an estimated 3-million-ton short-
faZZ in grain production Zast year in Vietnam are becom-
ing increasingly evident. Officials are concerned about
food shortages, and the war in Kampuchea has worsened
the problem.// F_ I
//The shortages exist throughout Vietnam, and asso-
ciated malnutrition has been reported in Ho Chi Minh
City. The government is holding food allotments in the
city to nine kilograms per person per month of manioc,
sweet potatoes, and noodles, which at best are only
carbohydrate supplements equivalent to about one-third
of the minimum total energy requirement for an adult
male. The ration is more generous in Hanoi--around 15
kilograms per person per month of starches. Consumers
must supplement their diet by purchasing food at free
markets at over 10 times the off' of rations.//
Since North Vietnam annexed the South in 1975, it
has made no progress on the goal of food self-sufficiency
by 1980. Geography and climate limit food production in
the north; a lack of economic incentives and resistance
to collectivization preclude a rice surplus in the south.
Food production problems were worsened last year by un-
usually severe flooding. In addition, insects did seri-
ous damage to high-yielding varieties of rice.
//The war in Kampuchea has caused authorities to di-
vert rice to Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, and mobili-
zation of transportation for the war effort has disrupted
normal food distribution channels. Vietnam typically im-
ports 1.5 to 2 million tons of grain annually, and will
probably have to import nearly 3 million tons this year.
We believe the USSR will continue to provide or finance
most of Vietnam's food imports at a level sufficient to
avert serious food shortages but not eno?crh to boost ra-
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TURKEY: Another Assassination
A radical leftist group has claimed responsibility
for the murder on Tuesday of a rightist politician and
former police official in Istanbul. Although the victim
was not nearly as well known as the editor killed last
week, the killing will probably be interpreted as fur-
ther evidence that rightist and leftist extremists have
begun to target members of the establishment as well as
each other. Since both murders occurred in an area
under martial law, the armed forces may now demand a
freer hand in its implementation. Prime Minister Ecevit,
already under heavy criticism from the parliamentary op-
position, will find it hard to resist giving the mili-
tary a greater role in the administration of martial
law.
BELGIUM: Decision on Troops to Zaire
//Belgian Foreign Ministry officials have told the
US Embassy in Brussels that the decision to send addi-
tional troops to Zaire next week is intended in part to
preclude domestic criticism should trouble erupt in
Zaire. The Belgian Government apparently is still sen-
sitive about charges after the Shaba invasion last year
that Belgian forces "arrived too late, after the French"
and that they inadequately protected Belgian nationals.
The two companies of com-
man os are going to zaire under an existing military
agreement and will be sent to an area close to where the
majority of Belgian and other European civilians are lo-
cated. Belgian military authorities have inquired about
the possibility of the US providing transportation for
the troops.//
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INTERNATIONALS Wheat Agreement Negotiations
//Negotiations on a new International Wheat Agree-
ment are bogged down over the price that will trigger
the release on the international market of proposed buf-
fer stocks. The EC and other importing countries argue
that the US-proposed stock release price of $215 per ton
is too high; the EC refuses to budge from its proposed
$195. Of the exporters, Canada wants a price even
higher than the US proposal; Australia and Argentina
would accept something in the range of $185 to $200.
Unless the EC and the developing countries are willing
to go along with a price near the $215 level, negotia-
tions on other aspects of the agreement will remain
stalled and the ros ects will be dim for an agreement
this year.//
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IRAN: A Crucial Turning Point
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The crisis in Iran is approaching a turning point.
The key question appears to be whether there will be an
orderly transfer of power from Prime Minister Bakhtiar's
government to one acceptable to the Islamic opposition
movement. If power is ZegaZZy transferred to a provi-
sional government headed by Ayatollah Khomeini's prime
minister - designate Mehdi Bazargan, the prospects for
restoring relative stabi Zd improve because o
Khomeini's mass support. 25X1
If Bakhtiar refuses an arrangement that would allow
Bazargan to assume power legally, Khomeini is likely to
order an illegal takeover that would prompt a showdown
with the military. In that case, the situation is likely
to deteriorate sharply. Khomeini has already threatened 25X1
to order an armed uprising and continued strikes to
paralyze the economy.
//Bazargan and other moderates in the Liberation
Movement of Iran are eager to find a political compromise.
He has move cautiously so far in his efforts to oust
Bakhtiar but,
e is un er p
down.
from Khomeini to move more quic y to establish an Is-
lamic republic. Bazargan is probably not willing to
break with Khomeini if the Ayatollah insists on a show-
Bazargan apparently hopes he can gain power simply
by having the legislature vote Bakhtiar out and him in.
This procedure could take some time and the risk is high
of some unpredictable incident upsetting the process.
The Bakhtiar regime is evidently incapable of re-
storing order because it lacks significant popular sup-
port. Even the government bureaucracy does not obey
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Bakhtiar. Although some in the middle class have rallied
to the Prime Minister, they are timid and unorganized.
Bakhtiar and some senior military officers, includ-
ing General Gharabaghi, chairman of the Supreme Com-
mander's Staff, insist they will accept changes in the
country's political structure if they are accomplished
constitutionally and gradually. Bakhtiar has offered
concessions to the opposition. The senior officers in
the military are particularly concerned that their in-
terests be protected and that the integrity of the mili-
tary as an institution be safeguarded in any transition.
If no accommodation is reached soon between Bazargan
and Bakhtiar that allows an orderly transition, the coun-
try will remain mired in confusion. Khomeini will urge
his followers to continue the demonstrations, and crip-
pling strikes will keep the economy paralyzed.
In these circumstances the danger will grow that
one side may become sufficiently impatient that it de-
cides to force a showdown. If Bazargan supporters try
to take over the control of key ministries, for example,
the military will probably resist and arrest them. Such
a move would spark hardliners in the opposition to press
for armed struggle--plunging Iran into civil war. Some
in the opposition are already collecting arm and pre-
paring for a holy war
Leftist forces--including the pro-Soviet Tudeh
Party--are already calling for an armed struggle against
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the regime. They probably would welcome continuing un-
rest and confusion because it gives them the opportunity
to organize and develop their own forces. These radical
forces could try to precipitate an incident to spark
a showdown.
No Iranian regime that emerges from the crisis of
recent months will restore the extremely close ties
with the US that prevailed under the Shah. Bakhtiar
has already promised to pull Iran out of the Central
Treaty Organization and to end Iran's role as policeman
of the Persian Gulf. An Islamic republic under Bazargan's
direction would doubtless further re-evaluate Iran's
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FRANCE: Domestic Politics and Europe
The campaign for direct elections to the European
Parliament in June is now fully under way in France
among the political elite, although it has so far left
the general public indifferent. It has already sparked
heated debate over France's role in Europe, deepened
divisions within the governing coalition and in the Zeft
opposition, and given President Giscard's rivals on both
the left and right issues they can use to further their
presidential ambitions. The Gaullists and Communists
have been evoking old demons of German domination, too
much US influence, and Zoss of French sovereignty in an
effort to draw out voters for an election all parties
view as a test of political strength in the runup to the
1981 presidential contest. Although Giscard is in a
strong position, there are signs that the campaign is
already affecting his political calculation u-
Zarly in foreign policy.
Giscard has tried to play down the domestic impor-
tance of the European contest, but the three losers in
the legislative election last March--the Gaullists, Com-
munists, and Socialists--are seeking not so much vengeance
as political survival. The Socialists and Communists
must do at least as well as they did in March--22.6 per-
cent and 20.6 percent respectively. The Socialists, how-
ever, hope to move even further ahead of the Communists
and prove that they are the "first party" of France.
Most of the Gaullists, permanently at odds with
Giscard over his desire for rapprochement with the non-
Communist left and his long-range goal of governing
France from the center, fault the President for not ap-
preciating their role in the defeat of the left. Many
Gaullists probably genuinely suspect that Giscard intends
to bring France into a Europe more "supranational" than
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For Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac, who wants to
displace Giscard as France's leading political figure,
the European issue is partially a pretext--a way of keep-
ing himself in the spotlight as the principal defender
of French national independence and grandeur. Chirac
has been trying to make the election a referendum on
Giscard's social and economic policies as well as his
European strategy.
In a recent press conference and in television ap-
pearances, Chirac has stressed the Gaullist alternative
to Giscard's European policy. He says present French
policy, by acquiescing in the expanding bureaucratic
power of the EC, does not sufficiently defend French in-
terests. He has also said that members of the Gaullist
list elected to the European Parliament will be asked to
resign at the end of one year; other members of the
Gaullist slate would then serve each remaining year of
the five-year term. This scheme would limit the impor-
tance of the EC mandate and assure that Gaullist deputies
do not become "Eurobureaucrats." Because foreign affairs
is Giscard's strong suit, Chirac is not on particularly
good ground in challenging his conduct of foreign af-
fairs, but he hopes to capitalize on nationalistic sen-
timents and garner support by stressing the government's
inadequacy in such matters as reducing unemployment.
Giscard is not anxious to hand his rival profitable
issues, especially in sensitive areas like the multi-
lateral trade negotiations, the European Monetary System,
and enlargement of the EC. On all these issues, Giscard
is taking pains to show that he puts French interests
first. Thus, Giscard has delayed the introduction of
the European Monetary System, planned for the beginning
of 1979, until he can extract a promise from other EC
members that French complaints over related financial
aspects of the common agricultural policy are resolved;
French farmers have become increasingly concerned about
the advantages the present arrangements give to West
German farmers.
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In their negotiations with the Community on the
multilateral trade negotiations, meanwhile, French rep-
resentatives have been careful to seek adequate trade-
offs for any concessions that could be viewed as con-
tributing to France's already serious unemployment prob-
lem; in a recent poll, 79 percent of the French public
thought the government was not doing enough about unem-
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Enlargement of the Community is an equally sensitive
issue: all of Gisc':ard's opponents, particularly the Com-
munist Party, argue that the prospective enlargement
poses a serious threat to farmers in France's politically
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The Communists and Socialists are still blaming each
other for losing the March election, and the European
issue is one more source of conflict between them. The
Communists have the harshest anti-European line, and
they see the contacts and links of the Socialists with
other pro-European parties as one more "proof" of the
Communist char e that the Socialist Part has veered to
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Within the Socialist Party, deeply divided over
leadership and party orientation, the European issue was
apparently one of several factors that led Pierre Mauroy,
the powerful head of the party's northern federations,
to throw his support this month to presidential hopeful
Michel Rocard, thus greatly increasing Rocard's chances
of becoming the Socialist presidential candidate in 1981.
Mauroy has refused to accept his party's slow slide--
condoned thus far by Socialist chief Francois Mitter-
rand--toward a nationalistic position more hostile to
European integration. The Mauroy-Rocard faction and the
Mitterrand faction are certain to clash at the Socialist
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congress in April.
The European election campaign will keep the politi-
cal pot boiling until June. While Giscard is in a strong
position, the unique nature of the contest and its many
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uncertainties--it will be the first time the French have
voted under proportional representation in 20 years--mean
he can take nothing for granted. Whatever Giscard's real
intentions on Europe, he will have to clothe them in am-
biguities and stress the "confederal" nature of his Euro-
pean view. He will do all he can to prevent his rivals
from exploiting the European issue to deal him and his
fledgling Union for French Democracy a defeat that could
have ramifications stretching well be and the June
balloting.
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